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ABSTRACT 
The main concern of this thesis is the development of political and economic relations 
between the PRC and the KSA. The relations that officially developed after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations are the focus of analysis of the thesis. By examining 
the historical and statistical data, the thesis assesses the factors that have cultivated and 
maintained the Sino-Saudi political and economic relations, as well as the implications of 
these bilateral links. In analysing the relations, a theoretical conception of complex 
interdependence has been used. 
 
The thesis first provides background on China’s policy towards the superpowers and the 
Middle Eastern countries between 1949 and 1989, and looks at how China and Saudi 
Arabia related to each other over this period. The thesis then argues that over the first 
decade (1990-2000) of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations, the two countries began to lay 
the basis for complex interdependence between them. It highlights a number of 
characteristics of complex interdependence which came to exist. The thesis then goes on 
to examine whether, in the second decade (2001-2010) of bilateral relations, an 
intensification of complex interdependence ensued.  
 
The complex interdependence approach links closely with constructivist theory in terms 
of how this thesis is conceived. The thesis argues that China and Saudi Arabia between 
1949 and 1977 shared an understanding that their ideological positions made official 
links between them impossible. Over the course of the following twelve years, this 
understanding gradually changed. The change laid the basis for the development of 
diplomatic relations in 1990. In the years between 1990 and 2010, the policy responses of 
China and Saudi Arabia to major regional events exhibited a commonality of perception. 
This underpinned the development of the relationship.  
 
To identify clearly the growth of Sino-Saudi relations, the thesis is divided into three time 
periods: 1949-89; 1990-2000; and 2001-10. The time period 1949-89 has three distinct 
phases: 1949-65; 1966-77; and 1978-89. The 1949-65 and 1966-97 periods are 
characterised by the absence of state-to-state relations between the PRC and the KSA. 
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However, unofficial contact between Muslims on mainland China and Saudi officials and 
leaders was established and largely maintained. State-to-state contact only existed between 
the KSA and ROC governments, which shared broadly anti-Communist sentiments. During 
the 1978-89 phase, hope for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and 
the KSA was high. Some intergovernmental contact was initiated, direct communications 
between the leaders of the two countries were enhanced, and a joint endeavour towards the 
development of diplomatic ties was pursued. The 1988 missile deal smoothly accelerated the 
process of developing these ties. 
 
In the 1990-2000 phase, four decades after the establishment of the PRC, Sino-Saudi 
diplomatic relations were established. The establishment of these diplomatic relations was 
daunting for the ROC, which wanted to preserve the diplomatic recognition that the KSA had 
granted it for the preceding 45 years. The strenuous efforts of the ROC to prevent a dramatic 
shift of diplomatic recognition to mainland China were in vain.  
 
The 1990-2000 phase was marked by significant growth in the newly established Riyadh-
Beijing diplomatic relationship. Economic interests were at the heart of the agendas of the 
leaders and officials of the two countries. They began to enhance co-operation and to sign 
agreements related to various aspects of their bilateral relations. A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Oil Co-operation was concluded in 1999. The value of Sino-Saudi 
total trade rose by 643 percent between 1990 and 2000 and the volume of Saudi oil exports to 
China increased by 6,721 percent between 1991 and 2000. After nearly ten years official 
diplomatic relations were established, President Jiang Zemin viewed the development of 
bilateral relations as impressive, while Crown Prince Abdullah seemed to suggest that there 
was now “an intimate relationship” between the two countries, saying that he considered the 
PRC to be the KSA’s closest friend. 
 
The period 2001-10 is also sub-divided into two phases: 2001-05 and 2006-10. This period 
exhibits the three characteristics of complex interdependence that Keohane and Nye (2000) 
put forward in their scholarly work: multiple channels, the minimal role of military force, and 
the absence of a hierarchy of issues. Security issues were largely excluded from Sino-Saudi 
bilateral relations, while economic interests dominated the agendas of the two countries. In 
the first phase (2001-05), high-level officials continued to play a leading role in bilateral 
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economic relations. They consistently called for the participation of the private sector in 
expanding Riyadh-Beijing economic ties. The value of Sino-Saudi total trade continued to 
climb, reaching USD16.1bn in 2005, and the PRC’s oil imports from the KSA reached 22.2 
million tonnes in the same year. Some joint investment projects that involved the 
participation of Chinese and Saudi companies in the hydrocarbons sector were successful. 
With regard to the construction industry, Chinese companies won four construction projects 
from the Saudi Arabian cement industry. 
 
The second phase (2006-10) was marked by substantial advancement in Sino-Saudi relations. 
Following the exchange visits of the state leaders in 2006, bilateral contacts expanded 
rapidly. The visits led to the formulation of more strategies, with the intention of cementing 
the relationship, increasing contact and concluding more agreements. The Chinese leaders 
called for “strategic co-operation”, “a friendly and co-operative strategic partnership”, and 
“strategic friendly relations”, specifically referring to economic co-operation. 
 
This second phase saw Sino-Saudi total trade increase to USD 33bn in 2009, and the volume 
of PRC oil imports from the KSA reached a peak of 41.8million barrels in the same year. 
With regard to the hydrocarbons joint ventures, in which investments were jointly made by 
Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec, the projects in Quanzhou and Rub’ Al-Khali were good 
examples of the strong co-operation between PRC and KSA companies. The Quanzhou plant 
launched operation in 2009, and the gas-exploration project in Rub’Al-Khali engaged in 
drilling for another three years (its operation began in 2004). The achievement of SINOPEC 
SABIC Tianjin Petrochemical Co., Ltd, as part of the Tianjin petrochemical project, is 
another example of such co-operation. In non-hydrocarbons joint ventures, mutual 
investment increased exponentially, particularly in the mining sector. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis and discusses the objectives, significance, 
and scope of the study. It will assess the case study approach, as the China-Saudi bilateral 
relationship is seen as a case of developing complex interdependence. The chapter also 
includes a review of the available literature relating to China’s involvement in the Middle 
East and the development of Sino-Saudi relations.  
 
The sub-section on the theoretical approach puts forward the concepts of complex 
interdependence and the constructivist approach. With regard to complex 
interdependence, Keohane and Nye established a link between power and 
interdependence. Thus, the analysis will also detail the role of power in interdependence. 
The central focus of the analysis is on determining the characteristics and conditions of 
complex interdependence and how complex interdependence fits into Sino-Saudi 
relations. 
 
The origin of complex interdependence can be traced to liberalism, which attempts to 
promote ‘values of order, liberty, justice and toleration’ in international relations (Dunne 
2011 p.103). These all come to form part of a relationship of complex interdependence, 
together with other more practical aspects of national interest. This sub-section will 
contain an analysis of how these aspects may be used to theoretically examine the policy 
behaviours of China and Saudi Arabia.  
 
Complex interdependence and constructivism are the only theoretical concepts and 
theories which will be discussed in this thesis. After considering many of the different 
theories and concepts of IR, the researcher concluded that complex interdependence and 
constructivism are the only approaches which constitute a useful and realistic means to 
comprehend the Saudi-Chinese relationship. Realist and structuralist theories are not of 
very great value in understanding the relationship. Realism and neo-realism emphasize 
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power in international politics, and they identify some of the conflictual tendencies in a 
state’s relations with other actors in the international system. Realists believe that the 
main concerns of political activity are ‘the goal of power, the means of power and the 
uses of power’ (Jackson and Sorenson 2007 p.94). Realists also tend to stress a single 
aspect of the world, ‘power politics’ (Steans 2010). They also see the nature of 
international relations as conflictual and believe that international conflicts end in war 
(Jackson and Sorenson 2007). In an anarchic and competitive system, realists argue that 
the state adopts self-help rather than cooperative behaviour. Self-help signifies that the 
state must not rely on other states and institutions to ensure its survival (Dunne and 
Schmidt 2011). Furthermore, the state identifies all other states as ‘potential enemies and 
threats’ to its national security.  
 
Structuralism was influenced by Marxism. This idea is shared by many scholars and 
provides the basis for some IR theories, for example, dependency theory and world 
system theory. The main focus of structuralism is on inequality and unjust systems. It 
highlights the exploitation of the poor by the rich, which remains as long as the class 
interests of the rich are pursued. Class is identified as a principal actor of IR, whereas the 
state is known as a tool for enforcing ‘the rule of dominant classes’, and a facilitator of 
‘capitalist expansion’ and ‘unjust order’ (Steans 2010 p.99). In the context of this study, 
Sino-Saudi relations do not fit well into this framework. It would appear not to be 
relevant.  
 
1.1 A Brief Description of the Topic 
This study aims at understanding, assessing and analyzing the development of political 
and economic relations between the KSA and the PRC, with particular attention to the 
bilateral economic relations that were cultivated before and after the establishment of 
official diplomatic relations in 1990. Prior to 1990, Saudi Arabia had relations with the 
Republic of China (ROC). At that time, Saudi Arabia recognized the ROC, and not the 
PRC (mainland China). In 1990, the Kingdom shifted its diplomatic recognition from the 
ROC (Taiwan) to the PRC. Since then, Beijing-Riyadh political and economic relations 
have expanded significantly. Bilateral relations have been used to promote the Saudi 
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interest in diversifying its economy and China’s interest in satisfying the increasing 
demands (especially oil) that have resulted from its economic growth. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The following are the objectives of the study: 
1. To identify and asses the factors that have exerted significant influence on the 
political and economic relations between Saudi Arabia and China 
2. To trace the development of Sino-Saudi links prior to diplomatic relations 
3. To analyse the development of bilateral relations after diplomatic relations were 
established, and particularly following the events of September 11, 2001 
4. To assess the interaction of political and economic dimensions in the relationship 
5. To briefly assess the potential implications of Sino-Saudi relations for the US 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The study is intended to offer a significant and original contribution to the body of 
knowledge in the fields of International Relations (IR) and International Political 
Economy (IPE). The findings of the study are also expected to reveal new information on 
Sino-Saudi political and economic relations, especially in the period following the Cold 
War. Although there have been a number of studies and publications examining the 
relations between China and the Middle Eastern countries, there has been a lack of 
comprehensive political and economic studies on bilateral relations between China and 
Saudi Arabia. The aim of this study is to fill this gap.  
1.4 Scope of the Study 
The limitations of this study are identified in the context of the time frame it covers. 
Although it examines the Sino-Saudi relations from 1949 to the present, it focuses 
primarily on a particular period of time, which is between 1990 and 2010. 
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1.5 Methodology 
The emphasis of case study research lies in the notion of ‘focus’ since this type of 
research requires a deep concentration on a specific issue or number of issues. It can be 
applied to the field of IR and serves some specific functions. Case study research is 
identified as:  
…a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a 
case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth 
data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, 
interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports a case 
description and case-based themes (Creswell 2007 p.73).  
 
To stress the importance of the word ‘focus’, Stake clearly states: 
[t]he real business of case study is particularization, [not] generalization. We take 
a particular case and come to know it well, not primarily as to how it is different 
from others but what it is, what it does. There is emphasis on uniqueness, and that 
implies knowledge of others that the case is different from, but the first emphasis 
is on understanding the case itself (Stake 1995 p. 8).  
 
Yin (2009) asserts the importance of case study research for certain areas of academic 
research, including IR. One reason for this is that case study research allows the 
researcher ‘to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events’ (p. 4). 
Regarding its practical purposes, case study research could be considered ‘a 
methodology, a type of design in qualitative research, or an object of study, as well as a 
product of inquiry’ (Creswell 2007 p.73).  
 
The researcher has chosen a specific type of case study research and a particular kind of 
data analysis. There are three types of case study research: the single instrumental case 
study, the collective or multiple case study and the intrinsic case study (Creswell 2007 
p.74). The intrinsic case study has been identified as the most appropriate qualitative 
approach for this particular study. In this approach the main focus is on the case itself, 
which ‘presents an unusual or unique situation’ (Creswell 2007 p.74). The case that will 
be studied in this research is a rapid development of the 21st century Sino-Saudi relations 
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which creates mutual dependency and carries some significant implications to the 
Western countries. 
 
In analyzing the data, the researcher has attempted to describe the case and its setting in 
detail. The researcher used ‘direct interpretation’, which is one of the types of data 
analysis and interpretation that the case study researcher advocates. Creswell suggests 
that ‘direct interpretation’ requires the researcher to obtain meaning from a particular and 
singular instance. In further describing the method of making a ‘direct interpretation’, he 
states that a researcher does this by ‘...pulling the data apart and putting them back 
together in a more meaningful way’ (2007 p. 163). 
 
Case study researchers use a variety of reliable data sources in gathering evidence 
regarding the evolution or development of the case (Creswell 2007). This researcher has 
used documentation, statistical data and interviews as discussed by Robert K. Yin in his 
book Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage 2009). For the narrative 
documentation, the researcher consulted news clippings and relevant articles published in 
the mass media; governmental memoranda of agreement; public announcements; and 
progress reports published by official bodies. This evidence was accessed through online 
resources and internet searches. For the statistical data record, the research benefited from 
use of the UN Statistical Database, the IMF Direction of Trade Statistic dataset, the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) Annual Report and the Trade Statistics of the Bureau 
of Foreign Trade of Taiwan. These official records provided trade statistics between the 
PRC and Saudi Arabia and the ROC and Saudi Arabia. For the interviews, the researcher 
used a focused interview, meaning that the interview was conducted in a short period of 
time (Yin 2009). Most of the interviews were carried out as ‘one-on-one interview’. 
During the fieldwork, there were some interviewees who declined to make a detailed 
comment, and some refused to provide an adequate response to the questions. An 
example was a personal interview during which the interviewee claimed that he had no 
authority to share a specific piece of data with the researcher. 
 
In 2008 and 2010, the researcher conducted several interviews in Beijing, which involved 
interviewees from both China and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese interviewees were those 
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who worked with China’s Foreign Affairs institutions (research think-tanks for 
international relations). The interviews were held with personnel at the China Institute of 
International Studies (CIIS), China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 
(CICIR) and Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS). The researcher also had a 
brief interview with a Saudi attaché at the Royal Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia in Beijing. All of the interviewees provided valuable information related to the 
study. 
1.6 Literature Review 
This sub-section attempts to present the relevant literature on China’s increasing 
involvement in the Middle Eastern region with a major focus on the relations between 
China and Saudi Arabia. Most of the following literature provides an assessment on 
China’s contacts with the governments and people in the region from 1949. The 
following three areas are highlighted by some of the literature: the unofficial contacts 
between Chinese Muslims and the Saudi leaders and officials; China’s initiatives of 
building the relationship with Saudi Arabia; and the development of the Sino-Saudi 
relation since the diplomatic relations was established. The assessment of the scholarly 
works is chronologically based according to the year of publication. Most of these works 
are analyzed further in the subsequent chapters of this study. 
 
Shichor (1979) provides historical background on Chinese relations with the Middle 
Eastern countries after World War II. He examines the importance of the Middle East in 
China’s strategy and policy considerations between 1945 and 1977. He stresses that 
Chinese interests towards the Middle East were continuous and long-term and that China 
extended its support to the local governments and people who struggled against the 
Imperial powers (Western powers and the Soviet Union). He also highlights the Bandung 
Conference during which an important meeting took place between China and countries 
in the Middle East, particularly those that continued to implement hostile policies 
towards Beijing. Among these countries was Saudi Arabia. After the conference, the 
Kingdom continued to adopt the same position towards China. Schichor also underlines 
an important initiative undertaken by the China Islamic Association. Its Chairman, 
Burhan Shahidi, who led a Hajj delegation in the mid-1950s, had an opportunity to meet 
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King Saud of Saudi Arabia. This meeting, unfortunately, failed to yield any political 
implications between Beijing and Riyadh. 
 
The background of China-Middle Eastern relations in the aftermath of the World War II 
has been further analyzed in Abidi’s work. Abidi (1982) discusses the development of 
China’s relations with Iran, Iraq and the Gulf states about which he argues no 
comprehensive study had been made. For a few pages of the book, Abidi analyzes the 
efforts that went towards the development of diplomatic relations between China and 
Saudi Arabia. He states that Saudi Arabia displayed ‘indifference…prejudice and fear of 
the atheistic socio-economic ideology’ that China had embraced (1982 p. 195). However, 
Abidi stresses that when China-Oman diplomatic relations were established in May 1978, 
there had been some reports which indicated China’s initiative to build the same relations 
with Saudi Arabia. China approached Saudi Arabia in several obvious ways: it issued a 
commentary that expressed its appreciation of the Saudi economic aid to the Arab and 
Third World countries; the Chinese ambassador to Kuwait, Ting Hao, made a statement 
in which he voiced his country’s deep hope to develop a diplomatic link with Saudi 
Arabia; and the Chinese Muslims also played an important role. In 1980, however, Saudi 
Foreign Minister, Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal denied the speculation that his country had 
created any official contacts with China. 
 
China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World Three Case Studies, 1955-75, by Behbehani, 
focuses mainly on China’s relations with Palestine, Kuwait and the Liberation 
Movements. He divides his work into three phases: 1955-66, 1967-70 and 1970-75. 
Behbehani provides a brief discussion on China’s ongoing effort to develop relations with 
Saudi Arabia. In the Buraimi dispute, China originally sided with Saudi Arabia. Two 
years later, China changed its analysis of this dispute, viewing it as a clash between two 
foreign powers: the US and Britain. China also believed that the former ‘had a free hand 
in manoeuvring Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi issue’ (1981, p.166). He also highlights 
the Chinese calculation of considering Saudi Arabia as an important country. When 
Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz visited Kuwait, Iraq and Iran in 1975, New China 
News Agency (NCNA) released press reports about these visits. Saudi Arabia, however, 
upheld its decision to derecognize China. 
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Calabrese (1991) provides a brief discussion on Sino-Saudi trade and the early 
development of diplomatic relations, and merely offers a few sentences regarding the 
Chinese response to Saudi regional policy. He stresses the way in which China granted its 
support to the Saudi peace initiatives over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Chinese officials 
complimented the Saudi effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Premier Zhao praised 
the Saudi initiative of the Fez Plan. In a speech to the UN General Assembly on October 
4, 1982, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua also complimented the Saudi plan (Fez 
plan). On the issue of Yemeni political instability, Calabrese argues that China relied on 
Saudi and American military protection in North Yemen.   
 
Unlike the publication of Calabrese that provides a brief overview of the Sino-Saudi 
relations, Harris’s publication offers a more comprehensive assessment of the historical 
development of the relations, including the establishment of diplomatic relations. Her 
work also examines the contacts between the mainland China and Saudi Arabia in the 
20th century. In the 1930s and 1940s, some Chinese Muslims from Xinjiang lived in 
Saudi Arabia. They were involved in business activities that fulfilled the needs of 
Chinese Muslim pilgrims. In 1938, approximately 7,000 Chinese Muslim pilgrims 
performed Hajj in the Kingdom. Before the establishment of the PRC, Chinese Muslims, 
who mainly consisted of Hui and Uighur, also migrated to Saudi Arabia due to 
communist persecution in China. Ma Bu-Fang, who was the former governor of Qinghai 
also fled to Saudi Arabia and later became Taipei ambassador to the Kingdom.  
 
Harris (1993) argues that China and Saudi Arabia, realizing that there was a commonality 
of interest in limiting the Soviet influence, began to cultivate a relationship. One of the 
indicators that reflected the relations between the two countries was Chinese exports to 
the Kingdom, which amounted to approximately USD 25 million by 1977. Harris’ work 
is also concerned with some of the factors that prevented the establishment of Sino-Saudi 
diplomatic relations. Among these factors were Islamic conservatism, a strong Riyadh-
Taipei relationship and the exports of Chinese military arms to Iran.  
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Harris outlines the unremitting efforts of China to develop diplomatic links with the 
Kingdom. China used various channels, which included the seeking of ‘American good 
office softening up the Saudis’ (Harris 1993 p. 223). In the1980s, a number of unofficial 
contacts took place between the religious delegations and the high-level officials of the 
two countries and Sino-Saudi economic cooperation was also facilitated. The investment 
was promoted in the middle of the decade and the selling of Chinese East Wind missiles 
(CSS-2 or DF-3A) occurred at the end of the decade. Harris also analyzes the steps that 
occurred in the establishment of  diplomatic relations and the implications of the Sino-
Saudi diplomatic link for Taiwan.  
 
Huwaidin’s publication provides a background of Chinese foreign policies towards the 
Gulf and Arab Peninsula region: Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, 
Oman, Iraq and Iran. Like Harris, Huwaidin closely examines the policy behaviour of 
China towards Saudi Arabia in a chronological manner. Since the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, China has attempted to cultivate its cultural, economic and political relations 
with the countries in the Middle Eastern region. It sent cultural delegations to these 
countries, including Saudi Arabia. Huwaidin analyzes a number of factors that made 
Chinese leaders keen to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. One of the 
factors was the reluctance of Saudi Arabia to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955. On the other 
hand, there were several factors that led to Saudi Arabia’s refusal to establish diplomatic 
relations with the PRC. Among the factors were the communist ideology, China’s close 
relations with the Soviet Union (during a specific period of time), Chinese revolutionary 
policy and Chinese policies towards Muslims in China.  
 
Huwaidin shows how China invested considerable efforts and used available 
opportunities to cultivate its relations with Saudi Arabia. In the 1960s and early 1970s, 
Saudi Arabia’s unfavourable attitude towards China was reinforced by China’s support of 
the revolutionary movement in Oman and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) and the Cultural Revolution. In the later part of the 1970s and in the 1980s, 
China increased its effort to develop relations with Saudi Arabia. It withdrew its support 
to the revolutionary movement in Oman and later established good relations with the 
Omani and North Yemeni governments; implemented coherent policies towards the 
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Kingdom; sought a good office of Kuwaiti government in developing its relations with 
Saudi Arabia; established commercial contacts between the business communities of the 
two countries; accentuated the Chinese Muslims’ role in cultivating relations with the 
Kingdom; and sold its missile to Saudi Arabia. Huwaidin also provides a detailed account 
of the development of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the growth of 
Sino-Saudi economic cooperation. 
 
Alterman and Garver (2008) analyze the security implications of the US and Chinese 
policies in the Middle East. They claim that China benefits from the US security 
protection in the region and that its policy behaviour does not aim to confront the US in 
the Middle East. They indicate that China believes that the US involvement in the Middle 
East undermines the regional security, and consequently threatens Chinese interests. They 
assess the source of potential conflict between China, the US and the Middle East and 
discuss conflict prevention. They contend that the environments that might create conflict 
between China and the US in the region ‘are not hard to imagine’ (2008 p. 8). Concerning 
the event of the 1980s, the Beijing-Riyadh relationship had come into a conflict with 
American security interests. Nonetheless, the authors argue that the common interest that 
the US, China and the countries in the region share could provide the basis for 
cooperation, which would improve security and Beijing-Washington relations. 
 
Based on political, economic and security calculations, Alterman and Garver suggest that 
China and Saudi Arabia have laid a solid foundation for bilateral relations. In the late 
1990s, the relationship began to grow due to the following economic factors: China 
required a stable supply of oil from the Kingdom, whereas Saudi Arabia diversified its 
economic development. China and Saudi Arabia shared a common perception regarding 
the Middle Eastern issue. Concerning Iraqi WMD and the 2003 American invasion of 
Iraq, for example, the Saudi leaders appreciated Chinese policy behaviour towards these 
issues. The two countries also rejected the American initiative of democratizing the 
countries in the Middle East through the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
(BMENA) in 2004. Moreover, the two countries oppose global political norms that the 
American government has insisted, ‘[b]oth the CCP and Saudi monarchy have little use 
for elections, and both feel that they must maintain tight control over the media, the 
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Internet, and civil society for the sake of political and social stability (Alterman and 
Garver 2008 p. 35). 
 
In a PhD thesis entitled ‘From Political Rupture to Strategic Partnership: Saudi-Chinese 
Relationships (1949-2006)’, Aborhmah studies the development of bilateral relations 
between China and Saudi Arabia that began with ‘a mutual political enmity’ and 
concluded with an initiative towards the establishment of ‘a complementary strategic 
partnership’. In analyzing the historical development of this relationship, Aborhamah 
divides his study into eight phases, from 1949 to 2006. Each phase has its own individual 
criteria and significance in examining this relationship. He continues to stress the factors 
that shape the relationship: systemic-security nature; normative and ideological nature; 
and economic interdependence and the complementary relationship. 
 
The absence of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations between 1949 and 1990 resulted from an 
integrated set of factors (systemic-security and identity-ideological factors). The 
development of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations in 1990 was driven by a number of 
factors, an example of which was the missile deal in the late 1980s. In the 21st century, 
Aborhmah sees that this relationship reaches the level of ‘a comprehensive strategic 
partnership’. With this development, he projects that China will be able to increase its 
position in the Middle East and ‘negatively influence’ the Western position in the region. 
 
As a whole, Aborhmah has placed more emphasis on the political and security 
components than on the economic aspect of the relationship. An assessment of the 
economic aspect, however, should be further developed. One reason is that the 
relationship between China and Saudi Arabia is largely based on the economic interests 
of the two nations. The timeframe of the Sino-Saudi relationship upon which Aborhmah 
has focused his work, 1949-2006, encourages another future study. The years following 
2006 are crucial because they mark the rapid development and greater improvement of 
Beijing-Riyadh relations. This thesis entitled ‘The Political and Economic Relations 
between the PRC and the KSA, 1949-2010’, therefore, will attempt to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of China-Saudi Arabian political economic relations with due 
weight placed on the period of the 21st century. 
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1.7 Theoretical Conception of the Study 
1.7.1 Complex Interdependence 
Robert O. Keohane, a Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University, and 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, have made an 
important contribution to the field of IR by introducing a concept, or ‘an ideal type of 
international relations’, known as a complex interdependence. Through this concept, they 
challenge three key assumptions of realism: ‘(1) states are the only significant actors, (2) 
security is the dominant goal, and (3) force is the dominant instrument’ (2011, p. xxvii). 
The two scholars present an analysis of complex interdependence through their scholarly 
publication entitled ‘Power and Interdependence’. Since the publication of the first 
edition of this work in 1977 (the fourth edition has been published recently), Keohane 
and Nye’s idea of complex interdependence has influenced a number of IR observers in 
their evaluation of the dynamics of world politics. This thesis merely uses complex 
interdependence as its theoretical conception: other theories are found to be less relevant 
and less useful to the study. 
 
Keohane and Nye argue that their concept of complex interdependence runs counter to 
realism, yet their purpose for introducing complex interdependence was to supplement 
rather than supplant the realist perception of the international system (Strange 1977). 
Brown and Ainley stress that rather than adopting a new theory of IR to explain 
international relations, Keohane and Nye offer a new description of these relations 
(2009). Holsti (1978) asserts that Keohane and Nye’s analysis of interdependence has 
revealed ‘a new type of international politics that cannot be understood and described by 
using the concepts and categories of traditional international relations analysis’ (p.520). 
The analysis, as Holsti argues, has shown that the concept of realism does not embrace 
particular problems due to the heavy emphasis it places on nation-states as the sole actors 
and ‘the relative power position of those states’ in predicting the results of international 
conflict. 
 
IR scholars offer different views of interdependence. Sir Norman Angell, Francis Delaisi 
and Ramsay Muir view international interdependence as the result of ‘the process of 
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international specialization and exchange’ (Baldwin 1980). They argue that when the 
world is increasingly interdependent, a global government is important in achieving 
‘...many values...such as peace and economic well-being’(Baldwin 1980 p.484). Kenneth 
N. Waltz has a critical view of ‘interdependence’, describing it as a word that ‘subtly 
obscures the inequalities of national capability, pleasingly points to a reciprocal 
dependence, and strongly suggests that all states are playing the same game’ (1970, p. 
220). 
 
Keohane and Nye view interdependence as ‘mutual dependence’. To illustrate ‘the 
politics of interdependence’, Keohane and Nye stress the differences between 
interdependency and interconnectedness. Interdependency has a ‘costly effect’ on the 
interaction, whereas interconnectedness does not. Keohane and Nye (1989) further 
discuss how the ‘costly effect’ can come about. First, there could be another actor who 
‘intentionally and directly creates the “costly effect”’. Examples are the Soviet Union and 
the US, who were mutually threatened by their nuclear weapons during the Cold War. 
Secondly, there might be other actors who do not ‘intentionally and directly’ pose this 
effect. To exemplify this scenario, Keohane and Nye refer to members of an alliance 
which opt for collective action in order to avoid disaster. In the world economic system, 
as they further contend, coordination is required for the prevention of any possible 
disorder (p. 9). 
 
In the context of world politics, Keohane and Nye describe interdependence as a 
‘situation characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in 
different countries’ (1989, p. 8). The reciprocal effects are the outcome of international 
transactions. The two scholars define transactions as the movement of ‘money, goods, 
people and messages’ beyond national boundaries. Certain constraints prevailing in a 
transaction may have implications for interdependence.  
 
1.7.1.1 The Role of Power in Interdependence 
Keohane and Nye define power ‘as the ability of an actor to get others to do something 
they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). Moreover, power 
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can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes’ (2000, p. 10). Power is also 
described as a ‘control over resources, or the potential to affect outcome’ when one 
considers asymmetrical interdependence as a source of power (Keohane and Nye 2000). 
 
The two scholars suggest that the role of power in interdependence can be understood if 
one differentiates between two aspects: sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity occurs 
when  ‘interactions within a framework of policies’ exist. It also includes the ‘degree of 
responsiveness’ within a framework. Keohane and Nye attempt to explain degree of 
responsiveness by addressing the following questions: ‘how quickly do changes in one 
country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?’ (2000, p. 
10)  
 
Sensitivity assumes that a framework of policies remains constant. Such consistency may 
indicate an uneasiness concerning the development of new policy within a short period of 
time and the adherence to a specific pattern of national and international rules. In 
measuring sensitivity, the amount of trans-border flow and the adverse effects of changes 
in transaction among societies or governments are taken into consideration. Keohane and 
Nye use the example of the 1970s oil price spike to illustrate the sensitivity 
interdependence of the US, Japan and the Western European economies on imported oil. 
In this context, sensitivity refers to both the negative effect of importing oil from oil-
producing countries and the amount of oil imports. 
 
Keohane and Nye examine vulnerability of interdependence, which ‘rests on the relative 
availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face’ (2000, p. 11). In 
discussing the vulnerability of interdependence, they raise a question regarding a 
situation that might develop when a policy framework changes. In other words, they 
assess the implications of introducing alternatives and new policies to a framework. 
 
Vulnerability interdependence can arise in politico-economic and sociopolitical relations. 
In terms of politico-economic relations, Keohane and Nye give the example of raw 
material imports. They claim that in order to assess vulnerability, one has to know the 
degree of efficacy altered policies would bring about in providing an adequate amount of 
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a raw material or substitute raw material, and the cost of doing so. They state that the fact 
that America imports 85 percent of its bauxite does not reflect American vulnerability in 
regard to the actions of the bauxite supplier and that, in this scenario, American 
vulnerability can only be determined once one knows the cost that would be incurred ‘in 
time as well as money’ to acquire an alternative raw material (Keohane and Nye 2000 
p.13). In regard to sociopolitical relations, Keohane and Nye refer to the case of US-
Sweden relations. After criticizing US policy towards Vietnam, Sweden faced the threat 
of possible suspension of cultural contact with America. According to these scholars, 
Sweden’s vulnerability to the suspension would be determined by its ability to adjust its 
policies in light of this new development.  
 
1.7.1.2 The Characteristics or Conditions of Complex of Interdependence 
Keohane and Nye outline three characteristics of complex interdependence: multiple 
channels, the minor role of military force and the absence of a hierarchy of issues. The 
first characteristic, multiple channels, emphasizes the ways in which societies are linked. 
According to Keohane and Nye (2000 p. 21), channels involve a wide range of actors and 
include different types of relations: ‘governmental elites,…non-governmental elites…and 
transnational organizations (such as multinational banks and corporations)’. Channels can 
involve ‘interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations’. The nature of these 
relations is both formal and informal.  
 
Transnational and transgovernmental relations or ‘multiple channels of contact among 
societies’ can affect the results of political bargaining. A domestic group, for example, 
might change its attitudes and policies after it has had some communications with other 
groups within or outside the country. The statesmen, therefore, should be aware of the 
possible implication that this condition might have on ‘politicization and agenda control’. 
Multiple contacts also occur between governmental bureaucracies that perform a similar 
job. As a consequence of the contacts, ‘transgovernmental coalitions on particular policy 
questions’ might be built. 
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Concerning the second characteristic, the minimal role of military force, the two scholars 
contend that with the existence of complex interdependence, most countries refuse to use 
the military force to fight against other countries in their region, or when objecting to a 
particular issue. Certain countries that enjoy an ‘intense relationship of mutual influence’ 
see the use of force as an ‘irrelevant or unimportant…instrument of policy’ (Keohane and 
Nye 2000 p. 24).  
 
Keohane and Nye further argue that the use of force is not a rational approach to reaching 
certain policy objectives such as economic welfare. The use of force is also seen as an 
inappropriate method of ending economic disputes among countries. If two countries 
have established a variety of relationships, the use of force against one another may sever 
one of their profitable bilateral relationships. In such a scenario, the use of force ‘…often 
has costly effects on nonsecurity goals’ (Keohane and Nye 2000 p. 25). 
 
However, Keohane and Nye argue that ‘military power can be used politically’ (Keohane 
and Nye 2000 p.24). They apply this argument in the context of the Cold War period. The 
superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) purposely used the threat of force to deter 
attacks against each other or their allies. The superpowers thereby assumed a protective 
role for the allies, which resulted in the political influence of the former over the latter. 
 
Third, is the absence of a hierarchy of issues. While various issues exist in the agenda of 
a state-to-state relationship, the arrangement of these issues is not based on ‘a clear or 
consistent hierarchy’. Domestic policy can cause some of these issues to be raised, 
making the boundary between international and domestic issues vague. Moreover, an 
absence of a hierarchy of issues suggests that ‘military security does not consistently 
dominate’ the agenda between the states (Keohane and Nye 2000 p. 21). 
 
Keohane and Nye compare the characteristics of complex interdependence with realism. 
In complex interdependence the existence of multiple channels of access is recognized, 
whereas in realism a state is advocated. Moreover, the role of force is viewed differently: 
Complex interdependence assumes that ‘force will be of low salience’ in international 
relations as opposed to realism, which considers force to be the key role of international 
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relations. In complex interdependence, an ‘issue-area’ can dominate the international 
agenda for only a specific period of time. This development reflects the absence of a 
hierarchy of issues. In realism, security issues dominate the international agenda (Brown 
and Ainley 2009). 
 
1.7.1.3 Five Aspects of Political Process under Complex Interdependence  
Keohane and Nye explain a political process which created by the conditions 
(characteristics) of complex interdependence. In the process, five aspects are emphasized: 
goals of actors, instrument of state policy, linkage strategies, agenda setting, and the role 
of international organizations.  
 
Goals of actors is the first aspect of the political process. The goals are varied due to ‘the 
absence of a clear hierarchy of issues’ (Keohane and Nye 2011 p.25). Keohane and Nye 
anticipate that the states and the transnational actors have different goals, depending on 
issue areas: ‘the goals of states will vary by issue areas (and)...transnational actors’ goals 
will differ by issue areas (2011, p.98). The two scholars, moreover, predict the effect of 
transgovernmental politics on the states’ efforts towards the goals: ‘transgovernmental 
politics will hinder state from pursuing coherent objectives’ (2011, p.98). 
 
The second aspect is instruments of state policy. The two scholars identify 
‘[m]anipulation of interdependence, international organizations, and transnational actors’ 
as the key instruments of the policy (2011, p.31). The instruments are used in achieving 
the states’ goals. 
 
The third aspect is termed linkage strategies, which can be described as the 
interrelatedness among issues. In discussing linkage strategies, Keohane and Nye (2000) 
stress that different issues differ in terms of their goals, distribution of power, political 
processes and patterns of outcomes. 
 
Under complex interdependence, military power is less important and therefore it is 
difficult for a militarily strong state to exert dominance on a variety of issues. For an 
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economically strong state, an ‘overall economic power’ is used in order to influence the 
outcome of certain issues. The state, however, will face some constraints since the 
economic objectives carry political implications and economic linkage is limited by 
domestic, transnational and transgovernmental actors who refuse to ‘trade off’ their 
interests. For a ‘poor weak state’, a linkage among issues can be established and is seen 
as ‘a means of extracting concessions or side payments from rich and powerful states 
(Keohane and Nye 2000 p. 27). The weak state uses the international organization as a 
linkage instrument. 
 
Agenda setting between or among states is the fourth aspect of the political process. The 
two scholars see the growing importance of developing and controlling agenda since 
there is ambiguity in the ‘hierarchy among multiple issues’. The global and domestic 
problems caused by ‘economic growth and increasing sensitivity interdependence’ shape 
this agenda. An example would be the behaviour of a local group in politicizing a specific 
issue. The group will raise issues that were ‘once considered domestic onto the interstate 
agenda’ (Keohane and Nye 2000 p. 28). Keohane and Nye also discuss the behaviour of 
politicization. They define politicization as ‘agitation and controversy over an issue that 
tend to raise it to the top of the agenda’. A particular behaviour could have a number of 
causes, such as the rising strength of a particular government relative to other 
governments and the ineffectiveness of an international regime (Keohane and Nye 2000 
p. 33). 
 
Other factors also affect agendas. Examples include changes in ‘the distribution of power 
resources’, such as the increase of OPEC oil prices, which changed the agenda of trade 
issues between North and South countries and changes in ‘the importance of transnational 
actors’, such as the growing importance of multinational corporations (MNCs) at the 
beginning of the 1970s, which later influenced both the agendas of the UN and various 
states (Keohane and Nye 2000 p. 33). 
 
The fifth condition is the role of international organizations, which includes some 
significant roles such as setting up international agenda, becoming ‘catalysts for 
coalition-formation’ and serving as a platform from which the political initiatives of the 
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weak states can be pursued. When  multiple issues are linked and transnational and 
transgovernmental coalitions are formed, the role of organizations involved in political 
bargaining becomes more powerful (Keohane and Nye 2000). 
 
The role of international organizations in world politics is substantial. In some cases 
international organizations encourage the establishment of political coalitions among 
countries and help convene the representatives of less developed countries. Keohane and 
Nye (2000) give an example of the development of Third World strategies of solidarity 
through international conferences, which are mostly supported by the UN. 
 
1.7.1.4 Sino-Saudi Relations and Complex Interdependence 
Keohane and Nye critically examine the role of power in interdependence, stressing the 
differences between sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence. Within the scope of 
Sino-Saudi relations, oil cooperation between the two countries exemplifies the link 
between power and interdependence. The cooperation, moreover, exhibits the feature of 
vulnerability interdependence since China has been pursuing alternative policies, as can 
be seen in the country’s continuous efforts to diversify its sources of foreign oil supplies. 
 
The three characteristics of complex interdependence —multiple channels, a minimal 
role of military force and an absence of a hierarchy of issues—increasingly appear in 
China-Saudi Arabian links. Concerning multiple channels, Sino-Saudi relations involve 
different groups of actors with different levels of interaction. Prior to the time that 
diplomatic relations were established, the people in the PRC and Saudi Arabia used 
Islamic organizations in initiating and maintaining their contacts. The Islamic 
Association in China, for example, made the arrangements for Chinese Muslim Hajj 
delegations to visit Saudi Arabia. On several occasions the delegations met with Saudi 
leaders in the Kingdom. When diplomatic relations were established in July 1990, 
contacts between the leaders and high-ranking officials of the two countries were 
effectively developed. Moreover, economic relations between the Saudi and Chinese 
business circles were fostered successfully. The Riyadh-Beijing bilateral contacts clearly 
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indicate interstate and transnational relations, which further reflect the aspect of ‘multiple 
channels’. 
 
The second characteristic of complex interdependence, a minimal role of military force, 
is also evident in the bilateral relations between China and Saudi Arabia. Based on an 
ABC News report, China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt joined an anti-Soviet 
alliance during the Soviet infiltration of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The third characteristic 
of complex interdependence, the absence of a hierarchy of issues, is embodied in Sino-
Saudi relations. The security aspect is less significant in the bilateral relations between 
the two countries, except during the purchase of CSS-2 missiles and ground missiles in 
1988. Overall, Sino-Saudi relations largely encompass political, economic and social 
aspects. 
1.7.2. Constructivism  
Constructivist theory is important to this thesis, and it will therefore be given some 
attention here. Three different types of constructivism will be identified. Among the 
concepts/aspects given emphasis in constructivist theory are power, institutions, norms, 
identity and interest, and social settings (including social context or social structure, the 
social construction of reality and global transformation).  
 
1.7.2.1 The Importance of Constructivism in International Relations (IR) 
The development of constructivism in IR took place in the 1980s, when constructivists 
criticised other IR theories, particularly neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism 
(Barnett 2008), and sought to develop new ways of understanding international relations. 
Constructivism shares many characteristics with the English School. It also seems to 
support the work of the English school because it introduces ‘a new level of conceptual 
clarity and theoretical sophistication’ into the analysis of international and world society 
(Reus-Smit 1996 p.227). There are some aspects of constructivism that conflict with 
materialist and rationalist theories. These aspects include emphasis on international 
norms, the acknowledgment of the influence of ideas and values on political action, 
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interest in how argument and discourse affect outcomes, and the composition of identity 
in agents and its effects on agency (Reus-Smit 1996). 
 
Chris Reus-Smit identifies three types of constructivism—systemic, unit-level, and 
holistic. Both systemic constructivism and unit-level constructivism have their own ways 
of interpreting and analysing world politics. Holistic constructivism, on the other hand, 
attempts to demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of world politics by reflecting 
both systemic and unit-level constructivism. 
 
Systemic constructivism concentrates specifically on the ‘interactions between unitary 
state actors’. Reus-Smit associates systemic constructivism with the work of Alexander 
Wendt, who classifies the identities of states into social and corporate. A state’s social 
identity is ‘the status, role or personality that international society ascribes to a state’, 
whereas its corporate identity are ‘the internal human, material, ideological, or cultural 
factors that make a state what it is’ (Reus-Smit 1996 p.219). Reus-Smit points out that 
Wendt has focused on the sources of corporate identities due to his adherence to 
‘systemic theorising’ and seen the way state identity is produced and reproduced through 
‘structural context, systemic process, and strategic practices’ (Reus-Smit 1996 p.220). 
 
Unit-level constructivism focuses on the links ‘between domestic social and legal norms 
and the identities and interests of states’ (Reus-Smit 1996 p.220). Reus-Smit highlights 
the work of Peter Katzenstein in the discussion of this type of constructivism. 
Katzenstein’s work, entitled Cultural norms and national security: Police and military in 
postwar Japan, emphasises the significance of ‘institutionalized regulatory and 
constitutive national social and legal norms’ in national security policies, which he 
studied in the context of Germany and Japan. Reus-Smit (1996) underlines the merits of 
unit-level constructivism, which allows ‘the explanation of variations of identity, interest 
and action across states’. Such explanation does not occur in systemic constructivism. 
(Reus-Smit 1996 p.220). 
 
Holistic constructivism attempts to overcome the division between systemic and unit-
level constructivism. Holistic constructivists place corporate and social elements into ‘a 
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unified analytical perspective,’ which considers ‘the domestic and international as two 
faces of a single social and political order’ (Reus-Smit 1996 p.221). They use this 
approach as a way ‘to accommodate the entire range of factors’ that determine the states’ 
identities and interests (Reus-Smit 1996 p.221). Holistic constructivism has its own 
advantages: it can clarify the dynamics of ‘the normative and ideational structure’ of 
today’s international system and the social identities that it has built. 
 
Holistic constructivists pay attention to ‘the mutually constitutive relationship’ of the 
established order (the social and political order) and the state. They concentrate on this 
relationship since they are concerned with the development of global change, in 
particular with the establishment and abolishment of a sovereign state. This perception 
produces two ‘analyses of international change’. The first analysis assesses ‘shifts 
between international systems’, while the second analysis concentrates on ‘recent 
changes within the modern system’ (Reus-Smit 1996 p.221). For the first analysis, one 
may refer to the work of John Ruggie, which stresses the significance of ‘changing social 
epistemes, or frameworks of knowledge’. His work is about the collapse of European 
feudalism that brought about the creation of the sovereign state. The second analysis can 
be understood through the writing of Friedrich Kratochwil, who emphasises ‘the role of 
changing ideas of international order and security’. This work deals with the end of the 
Cold War. 
 
1.7.2.2 The Key Aspects of Constructivism 
Power 
Constructivists view power as anything which can shape actors’ behaviour. This view has 
added two important points to the understanding of power that are most commonly found 
in IR theories:  ‘the ability of a state to compel another state to do what it otherwise 
would not do’ (Barnett 2008 p.165); and ‘material technologies’, such as economic 
statecraft. 
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These two points focus on ‘the forces of power’, which ‘can be ideational’ and move 
‘beyond material’. In explaining the first point, Barnett (2008) tries to illustrate the 
concept of the power of legitimacy by applying this concept to two situations. First, he 
examines a situation in which states see a necessity to reshape their policies because they 
want these policies to be seen as legitimate. Otherwise, states have to bear the cost of 
their policies. How do states view legitimacy? States believe that their actions should 
confirm and hold the values of the international community. If this is the case, states will 
be able to convince other states to support their policies. Second, Barnett (2008) 
examines a situation in which states are not concerned with their reputation or the ways 
in which they are perceived; here, states do not care whether their behaviour is in line 
with the existing international standard. This situation would mean that the tactic known 
as ‘naming and shaming’, which is often used by human rights activists, would have 
limited impact. 
 
In explaining the second point, Barnett (2008) suggests that power can bring an effect 
that is ‘beyond the ability to change the behaviour’. He also argues that power can be 
reflected in the role of ‘knowledge, the fixing of meanings, and the construction of 
identities’ in ‘allocat[ing] differential rewards and capacities’ (p.165).  
 
Institution 
An institution develops itself as an actor and may influence other actors at the same time. 
Adler refers to Ruggie’s (1998) writing in explaining the constructivists’ understanding 
of institutions. Institutions are seen ‘as reified sets of intersubjective constitutive and 
regulative rules that, in addition to helping coordinate and pattern behaviour and channel 
it in one direction rather than another’,  also ‘help establish new collective identities and 
shared interests and practises’ (Adler 2002 p.104). 
 
Adler (2002) recognises common perceptions among constructivists (Adler and Barnett 
1998; Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998) who have argued that certain factors 
may lead to the establishment of a good institution. These constructivists assert that 
‘socialization, learning and emulation may enable international institutions to establish, 
36 
 
articulate and transmit norms across nations, to define what constitutes legitimate 
behaviour, and to shape the identities of their members’ (Adler 2002 p.104). 
 
Alder also highlights the work of Finnemore (1996), who stresses the link between the 
role of international organizations and the formulation of national interest: ‘international 
organizations “teach” or help diffuse norms and thereby help constitute the national 
interest of states that adopt these norms’ (Adler 2002 p.103). Constructivists study 
international actors. These actors are identified as ‘epistemic communities…NGOs..., 
transnational advocacy networks…, and moral communities’ (Adler 2002 p.104).  
 
Norms, Identities, and Interests 
Constructivists forge a direct and close link between norms, identities and interests and 
argue that these three components are vital for identifying and understanding the social 
factors that affect the behaviour of actors at the international level.  
 
Constructivists view norms as a component of social identities that ‘give national interest 
their content and meaning’ (Adler 2002 p.103). They believe that the identities of actors 
are developed by ‘the institutionalized norms, values and ideas of the social environment 
in which they act’ (Reus-Smit 1996 p.219). Because constructivists see identity as a 
central part of ‘national and transnational interests’, identity is important for 
understanding ‘international behaviour, practices, institutions and change’. 
 
A constructivist perspective links identity with interest, arguing that ‘interests are the 
products of identity’. Hopf (1998) provides the example of an identity of ‘great power’, 
which reveals a specific type of interests. These interests are different from those 
produced by the identity of ‘European Union member’. Constructivists also attempt to 
define ‘absent interests’ or ‘missing interests’, which they see ‘as produced absences, 
omissions that are the understandable product of social practices and structure’ (Hopf 
1998 p.176). It should be stressed here that constructivists still consider these interests to 
be the outcome of structure and social practices. Some constructivists, however, believe 
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that ‘environment and interactions’ construct both actors’ interests and identities (Barnett 
2008). 
 
Some constructivists define the interests of actors as something that is determined before 
the social interaction occurs. These interests are ‘endogenous to such interaction…a 
consequence of identity acquisition…learnt through processes of communication, 
reflection of experience, and role of enactment’ (Reus-Smit 1996 p.219). 
 
1.7.2.3 Social Settings of International Relations 
Through an examination of the works of Alexander Wendt, Ted Hopf, Christian Reus-
Smit, and Michael Barnett, three important social settings of international relations—
social structure or social context, social construction of reality, and global 
transformation—can be identified.  
 
Social Structure or Social Context 
Some constructivists see structures as having ‘a causal impact’. This is because structures 
produce a specific behaviour, and later lead to particular ‘tendencies in [the] international 
system’ emerging. Sovereignty, for example, creates and invests states with ‘certain 
capacities’. These capacities will ‘make possible certain kinds of behaviours’. In world 
politics, sovereign states have certain ‘rights and privileges’ that other actors do not. With 
specific limitations, they may use violence, unlike other actors, like non-state actors, for 
whom the use of violence is considered to be terrorism (Barnett 2008 p.166). 
 
Wendt (1995) underlines the characteristics of social structure. The social structure has 
actors who exist in a particular situation and is based on ‘the nature of their [actors’] 
relationships’. The “nature” can be defined as ‘cooperative or conflictual’ (Wendt 1995). 
He also argues that social structures are ‘real and objective’. This objectivity, however, 
relies on ‘shared knowledge’. In discussing objectivity, Wendt (1995) deals with two 
aspects. On the ontological side, he sees social structures, such as the Cold War, as 
‘collective phenomena’. These phenomena ‘confront individuals as externally existing 
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social facts’ (p.75). On the epistemology side, he argues that constructivists could indeed 
possess ‘objective knowledge’ of the social structures (p.75). 
 
Social structures have three elements: ‘shared knowledge, material resources, and 
practice’ (Wendt 1995 p.73). The first element includes ‘shared understandings, 
expectations, or knowledge’. Constructivists believe in ‘the power of knowledge, ideas, 
culture and ideology, and language’: ideas are seen as ‘a form of power, that power is 
more than brute power’ (Hopf 1998 p.177). 
 
The second element is ‘material resources’. Through ‘the structure of shared knowledge’, 
these resources will be meaningful to human actions. Power and interests, moreover, will 
have effects when they are constituted by shared knowledge. Wendt (1995) explains how 
‘shared understanding’ works. He argues that if North Korea had five nuclear weapons, it 
would pose a serious threat to the US. In contrast, if Britain had five hundred nuclear 
weapons, these would be ‘less threatening’ to the latter because the two countries have 
developed good relations. In this context, the function of ‘shared understanding’ is 
understood in terms of ‘amity or enmity’ (p.73).  
 
The third element of social structures is practice. Constructivists attempt to analyse the 
ways in which ‘the natural social structures’ become the ‘effects of practice’. Examples 
of these structures are ‘the Cold War and self-help’ (Wendt 1995  p.74). 
 
Hopf (1998) argues that social practice is capable of reproducing ‘an intersubjective 
social structure’. He also claims that such practice can reproduce ‘actors through 
identity’. The existing social practices within and outside a country restrain and 
encourage the behaviour of a state in its foreign policy. Hopf (1998) offers the example 
of American military intervention in Vietnam, which reflects some of the US’s identities, 
such as ‘great power, imperialist [and] ally’. This intervention also implies a reproduction 
of ‘the intersubjective web of meaning’ that explains these components of identity. Some 
countries considered the US to be adopting an imperialist identity. When the US 
militarily intervened in Vietnam, a reproduction of ‘the meaning of being an imperialist 
state’ occurred.  
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Hopf (1998) stresses Onuf’s point of view regarding social practice: in ‘a socially 
structured community’, social practice reduces ‘uncertainty among actors’. This 
development boosts actors’ confidence that a certain action will yield a specific result or 
reaction from another actor (p.178). 
 
Social Construction of Reality 
The notion of the social construction of reality has two important aspects. One of these 
aspects is ‘the socially constructed nature of actors and their identities and interests’. 
Actors have their own cultural environments, which play an important role in creating 
and producing them (Barnett 2008). Barnett (2008), in an attempt to interpret an Arab 
state’s actions in a constructivist framework, argues that rules related to Arabism have 
constructed the ‘identity, interests, and foreign policy’ of Arab states. These identities, 
interests, and foreign policies are not shaped by the line that outlines the populations of 
Arab states that use Arabic as their language.  
 
The second aspect is the role of knowledge in shaping an individual’s construction and 
interpretation of the world. Having ‘historically-produced and culturally bound 
knowledge’, the individual will be able to construct and interpret reality. Knowledge can 
also be referred to as ‘symbols, rules and concepts, and categories’ (Barnett 2008 p.163). 
 
‘The social construction of reality’ shapes a ‘legitimate action’ (Barnett 2008 p.163). 
Barnett (2008) views actions as based on ‘the logic of consequences’ and ‘the logic of 
appropriateness’. The logic of consequences denotes the expected ‘costs and benefits’ of 
the action, which is based on an assumption that other actors will be doing the same thing 
(p.163). The logic of appropriateness emphasises factors that produce ‘rule-following’ 
actors who are worried about the legitimacy of their action. If a possible action is 
illegitimate, the potential cost of taking a particular action will be high. This argument 
can be illustrated through the case of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US bore the 
cost of the invasion when other states considered this action illegitimate. 
 
40 
 
Global Transformation 
Barnett’s (2008) discussions of global transformation have a key theme, which is 
diffusion. This theme involves the dissemination of specific ‘models, practices, norms, 
strategies, or belief...within a population’ (p.168). Barnett suggests two main issues 
surrounding diffusion: ‘institutional isomorphism’ and ‘internationalization of norms’. 
Institutional isomorphism explores how ‘organizations that share the same environment 
will, over time, resemble each other’ (p.168). Barnett (2008) offers a few examples of 
this phenomenon. In the past, there were several means of coordinating state structures, 
economic activities, and free trade agreements. Today, the nation-state concept facilitates 
the coordination of the world; states prefer ‘democratic forms of governance and market 
economies’, and the nature of ‘most international organizations’ is multilateral (p.168). 
 
Barnett (2008) further argues that the factors behind the behaviour of states apply ‘similar 
ideas and organizations’. Firstly, states need resources. By adopting ‘similar ideas and 
organizations’, for example, reforming a state’s institutions, the state may attract 
resources. Secondly, states are uncertain about their responses to existing challenges. In 
this situation, states tend to use models that are deemed to be ‘successful and legitimate’. 
Thirdly, a ‘symbolic standing’ is sought, and states use specific models because they 
want to have that standing. One example is the behaviour of many Third World countries 
that are seeking ‘very expensive weapons systems’ (Barnett 2008 p.169). They do this 
because they intend to let others know that ‘they are sophisticates and are a part of the 
‘club’. Finally, the role of ‘professional associations and expert communities’ should not 
be forgotten, as these associations and communities disseminate organisational models. 
 
The second main issue that addresses diffusion is the ‘internationalization of norms’. 
Norms are defined as ‘standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ 
(Barnett 2008, p.169). Some of the roles of the norms are to regulate states’ behaviour 
and to help states ‘define themselves and their interests’ (Barnett 2008 p.169). The 
political process influences the development of norms. This development, moreover, has 
to begin somewhere and to forge a ‘nearly always rough and rocky’ path in order to be 
accepted. The idea of humanitarian intervention was rejected in the past—for several 
decades, in fact. Later, this idea and the idea of ‘a responsibility to protect’ came to be 
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widely accepted. One of the reasons for such acceptance is the responsibility of the 
international community to protect citizens whose states are ‘unable and unwilling to 
protect’ them.  
 
In the context of the Sino-Saudi relations, the perceptions, practices, norms, identity and 
interests are imbedded in the way China and Saudi Arabia treat each other. 
 
1.8 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has six chapters. The following chapter (Chapter 2) deals with the foreign 
policies of China and Saudi Arabia. Further, it examines the apparatus of the foreign 
policy making process and the principles of foreign policy that both of these countries 
uphold. 
 
Chapter 3 is divided into three periods: 1949–1965, 1966–1977 and 1978–1989. This 
division aims to help the reader to understand the impact of the political and economic 
development in China on its foreign policy before, during and after the Cultural 
Revolution, as well as the policy behaviour of foreign countries in relation to this 
development. The discussion of each period will be structured similarly, tracing China’s 
policies in relation to the international system, the Middle East and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Chapter 4 covers the first 10 years of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations (1990–2000). It 
begins with an assessment of the new development of the post-Cold War international 
system. The foreign policy behaviours of China and Saudi Arabia are analysed at the 
world and regional (Middle East) levels. In the context of Sino-Saudi relations, the 
historical development of the diplomatic relations between the two countries and 
Taiwan’s responses to this development are critically assessed. Then the political and 
economic relations of China and Saudi Arabia are analysed. 
 
Chapter 5 includes a brief assessment of the post–September 11, 2001 period. It then 
examines the policies of China and Saudi Arabia towards the Middle East and the 
surrounding region, with a specific focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Afghanistan 
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war and the US invasion of Iraq. The assessment of the sub-topic ‘The PRC and the 
KSA’ is divided into two periods: 2001–2005 and 2006–2010. With this division, it is 
possible to assess whether the state visits of King Abdullah and President Hu Jintao in 
2006 greatly affected Sino-Saudi relations. 
 
Chapter 6 gives the conclusions of this study. It reveals and stresses a number of critical 
points related to Sino-Saudi political and economic relations, specifically from 1990 to 
2010. It examines the existing and future implications of the Sino-Saudi link in terms of 
the relations between Saudi Arabia and its longstanding partner, the United States.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Foreign Policy of the PRC and the KSA 
 
Introduction 
This part of the thesis will address the apparatus and the principles of Chinese and Saudi 
Arabian foreign policies.  Presenting a concise overview of the apparatus and principles 
will help draw attention to the unique character of foreign policy decision-making in the 
two political systems. By examining the nature of the foreign policy process of China and 
Saudi Arabia, the reader will be enabled to understand how complex interdependence and 
constructivism has developed within the framework of the Sino-Saudi relations. 
 
2.1 The Apparatus of Foreign Policy  
2.1.1 The KSA  
The King has full authority to decide Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. Although he consults 
with the senior princes before he makes a policy decision, not all members of the royal 
family are involved. The Council of Ministers’ involvement in this process is minimal, 
and the Majlis Ash Shura (consultative council) and the ulama (religious scholars) do not 
formally participate. 
 
The King. The King occupies the highest position in the policy-making process. The 
final say on all policy issues ultimately depends on the King’s decisions. In the policy-
making process, the King has both absolute and veto powers.  
 
The King is the head of the state whose legitimacy is derived from two pillars: Islam and 
the Al-Saud Dynasty (Niblock 2006). The King has, for most of the recent period, also 
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been the prime minister with the power to appoint cabinet ministers, senior officials and 
governors of the provinces (Hooglund 1983 p. 194). He is also the commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces. In addition to these roles, the King is a legislator responsible for 
issuing royal decrees and for consenting to the ministerial decrees. He is also the final 
court of appeal in granting a pardon. 
 
The Royal Family. The members of the royal family can influence the King’s decisions. 
In established practice, the King consults with the royal family (senior princes) before he 
makes important decisions. The King and the senior princes apply ‘a measure of division 
of labour or a degree of personal ownership’ in governing the country’s foreign relations 
(Nonneman 2006 p. 335). At present, for example, King Abdullah concentrates on Saudi 
relations with Syria and Crown Prince Sultan focuses on Yemen. In developing a policy-
making consensus, the King must demonstrate strong and effective leadership to 
overcome major difficulties and reconcile serious inconsistencies with the royal family’s 
interests (Quandt 1981).  
 
The Council of Ministers. This council, established in 1953 by King Abdul Aziz, 
currently (since August 2006) consists of 24 ministers. The King is the president and 
prime minister of the council, followed by the Crown Prince as deputy prime minister. 
The ministers have different backgrounds: most of them are commoners and only a few 
are members of the royal family. 
 
The Council of Ministers is responsible for the implementation of strategies and policies. 
This council can issue ministerial decrees, but it does not have the right to interfere with 
the King’s decisions. However, ‘royal technocrats’, who hold the top positions in the 
state bureaucracy, influence policy-making and implementation. They are ‘junior princes 
with skills and ambitions’ who work in important embassies and secure influential 
economic and military positions (Quandt 1981).  
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Regarding the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in the Kingdom’s foreign 
policy, some limitations have been identified. In many foreign policy areas, the MFA is 
not the main actor due to ‘the personalised nature of diplomacy and...capacity issues’ 
(Hill and Nonneman 2011 p. 9). King Abdullah, however, initiated a significant change 
in the foreign policy-making process to increase the involvement of the MFA and the 
intelligence services (Hill and Nonneman 2011). 
 
Majlis Ash Shura (Consultative Council).  In April 2005, the members of the Majlis Ash 
Shura were increased from 120 to 150. This increase in technocrats implies a positive 
development in the authority of the Majlis. The Majlis was allowed to challenge, 
summon and question ministers and was given the authority to propose legislation. 
Approval of its legislative powers was granted by a royal decree in November 2003.  
 
Although the influence and power of the Majlis in foreign policy is insignificant, the 
council still has a Foreign Affairs Committee that can offer suggestions. Although the 
Majlis’s voice is not powerful, the council plays a role in endorsing international treaties 
and agreements. The Majlis needs further reforms in order to perform a key role in 
foreign policy (Hill and Nonneman 2011 p. 9). 
 
Ulama (Religious Scholars). Religion and political power in Saudi Arabia have a close 
bond that safeguards the interests of the leaders and the ulama, who are known as the 
main source of ideological legitimacy of the Saudi political leadership and are strong 
supporters of Al Saud royal family (Hooglund 1993). The Council of Senior Ulama 
serves as a forum where consultations between the King and the religious establishment 
are conducted regularly (Hooglund 1993 p. 208). 
 
The ulama undertake the essential task of ensuring the practice of Islamic values, as well 
as traditional, social and political norms. They assert their influence on the decision- 
makers through ‘direct and privileged access to the highest locus of decision-making; a 
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monopoly over some ministries and areas of policy; and popular mobilisation’ (Korany 
and Fattah in Korany and Dessouki 2008 p. 359).  
 
Some contributing factors motivate the ulama in developing an interest in and exerting 
influence on foreign policy. First, the ulama have a responsibility to spread the teachings 
of Wahhabi Islam beyond the boundaries of the Kingdom. Second, the ulama have the 
authority to issue a fatwa (Islamic verdict) in accordance with foreign policy decisions. 
Third, the ulama have the capacity to press the government to support Muslim countries 
and groups through political and financial assistance (El Madani 2003). 
 
The influence of the ulama shaped the decisions of King Faisal in implementing an oil 
embargo in 1973. Nawaf E.Obaid, in his article, ‘The Power of Saudi Arabia’s Islamic 
Leaders’, claimed that King Faisal and a senior ulama had ‘a tacit agreement’ in October 
1973. Obaid defines this implicit agreement as, ‘if the war goes badly in Egypt, King 
Faisal would implement an oil embargo’ (1999, p. 53). When news that Egyptian armies 
were likely to lose the war on October 19, 1973, King Faisal announced the imposition of 
an oil embargo on the following day. 
 
2.1.2 The PRC 
The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 
(FALSG) are institutions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that have a leading role 
in foreign policy (Lawrence 2011) and are known as ‘de facto foreign policy-making 
institutions’ (Yufan and Ying 2009 p. 137). Several Leading Small Groups (LSGs) and 
some bodies under the CCP are highlighted in the following assessment. The role of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)—an institution of the government of the PRC in 
foreign policy—is briefly analysed. 
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Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). The PSC is known as ‘China’s most senior 
decision-making body’ (Lawrence 2011).  As  ‘the smaller group of elite Party members’ 
(Martin 2010 p. 5), the PSC currently consists of nine high-ranking officials of the CCP: 
Hu Jintao, president of the PRC and the general secretary of the CCP; Wu Bangguo, 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; Wen Jiabao, 
premier of the PRC; Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference; Li Changchun, in charge of the publicity and 
ideological work of the CCP; Xi Jinping, vice president of the PRC; Li Keqiang, 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the Liaoning Provincial People’s Congress; He 
Guoqiang, head of the Organisation Department of the CPC Central Committee; and 
Zhou Yongkang, minister of Public Security. The members of the PSC have increased, 
signifying an important change in the power distribution at the top level of the CCP: 
increasing decentralisation. 
 
The PSC is the highest level of the CCP’s leadership.  Known as the ‘think-tank of the 
party’, the PSC is responsible for the development and direction of new policies 
(Lanteigne 2009) and determines domestic and foreign policies. Its meetings, agendas 
and discussions are not announced to the public. 
 
The PSC officially approves the foreign policy (Cabestan 2009). Although the PSC 
makes decision on the basis of a consensus, President Hu Jintao clearly have an 
influential role in deciding foreign policy. When seeking a major decision, in particular, 
the president’s support is required (Jakobson and Knox 2010). In dealing with a sensitive 
foreign policy issue, the president’s role is obviously crucial. In 2006, the president had 
‘...to personally edit the wording of China’s official reaction...’ to North Korea’s nuclear 
tests (Jakobson and Knox 2010 p. 5). 
 
There are cases in which the PSC grants its final approval based on agencies’ 
recommendations. In 2006, for example, the policy choices of purchasing nuclear 
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reactors from an American company (Westinghouse) required ‘a blessing’ from President 
Hu Jintao as head of the PSC (Jakobson and Knox 2010). 
 
Leading Small Groups (LSGs) and Other Bodies of the CCP. Under the leadership of 
President Hu Jintao, the role of the LSGs has increased. Among the reasons for the 
strengthening of the LSGs’ role is that ‘the LSGs remain the most convenient and 
appropriate loci in which to prepare, coordinate, implement...foreign and security policy 
decisions’(Cabestan 2009 p. 78). Each LSG has offices involved in research activities, 
policy proposals and coordinating work. The LSGs do not make the final decision about 
China’s foreign policies.  
 
The FALSG comprises a number of PSC members and other leading CCP officials. 
Among the FALSG’s members are ‘State Councillor Dai Bingguo, International 
Department Head Wang Jiarui, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Minister of Commerce 
Chen Deming, Minister of Defence Liang Guanglie and Minister of State Security Geng 
Huichang’ (Jakobson and Knox 2010 p. 5). One of the best-known figures of the FALSG 
is Dai Bingguo. He is ‘...the most influential foreign policy official outside the PSC 
and...has day-to-day responsibility for foreign policy’(Jakobson and Knox 2010 p. 6). 
The FALSG also invites ‘departmental officials from relevant bureaucracies, academic 
specialists, and influential journalists’ to meetings (Lu 2001 p. 46). The discussions and 
agendas of the FALSG are not publicised. 
 
Premier Wen Jiabao is the chairman of the Financial and Economic Affairs LSG. Ding 
(2008) states that the functions of the LSG are to regulate the activities between two 
ministers—commerce and foreign affairs—and to resolve conflicting issues between 
these two ministers (in Cabestan 2009 p. 80). In the work of Weisman (2008), another 
task of the LSG is to oversee the activities of the committee that monitors China’s USD 
200 billion sovereign wealth funds (in Cabestan 2009 p. 80). 
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Other LSGs also deliberate on decisions affecting foreign policy. These groups are the 
National Security Work Leading Small Group (NSWLSG), the Central Small Group in 
charge of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, the Taiwan Affairs LSG (TALSG) and the 
Central Energy Leading Small Group. 
 
The Policy Research Office, the General Office and the International Department have 
links with the CCP and play an official role in China’s foreign policy. The tasks of the 
Policy Research Office are crucial, including ‘research, advice and draft policy 
documents ahead of major decisions’ (Jakobson and Knox 2010 p. 6). The General Office 
manages ‘the flow of information to decision makers and their schedule’ (Miller in 
Jakobson and Knox 2010 p. 6). The International Department regulates the relations 
between the CCP and foreign governments and political parties.  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The role of the MoFA is naturally important to 
China’s foreign policy. The ministry is responsible for providing information to 
policymakers, interpreting and, in some cases, verifying the decisions that ‘the country’s 
leadership’ has made. Another substantial role of the MoFA is to monitor ‘more routine, 
low-level decision making’ and ‘policies towards smaller states’. Regarding the 
formulation and promotion of policies towards close neighbours—the US, Russia, the EU 
and Japan—the ‘central decision-makers in the CCP’ will take responsibility (Lanteigne 
2009). 
 
The power of the MoFA, as Jakobson and Knox argue, has declined because of two 
factors. First, there is an increasing number of entities involved in foreign policy. Second, 
there has been a gradual decline in the power base of the foreign minister in the CCP 
since 1998. In explaining the situation, the two authors cite the view of a Chinese 
professor who ‘“[felt] sorry for Yang Jiechi” because on state visits or during meetings in 
China with important foreign delegations “Yang is fifth or sixth in protocol”’ (2010, p. 
8). 
 
50 
 
2.2 The Principles of Foreign Policy  
2.2.1 The KSA 
In pursuing foreign policy, the Saudi government considers four circles: the Gulf states, 
the Arab nations, Islam and the international realm. This sub-section attempts to assess 
the principles of Saudi foreign policy in the Gulf, Arab, international circles and Islamic 
circles.   
 
The first circle of the Kingdom’s foreign policy is the Gulf. Its primacy emerged at the 
time that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established by King Abdulaziz bin 
Abdulrahman al-Saud. Blood relations, historical links, the geographical location of the 
Gulf states and similar political and economic systems are the factors that underpin this 
circle. To implement policies within this circle, Foreign Ministry document refers to the 
following guidelines, emphasising security interests as well as the individual and 
collective roles of the Gulf states. 
• Each state is responsible for the security and stability of its region; has the right to 
preserve its independence and defend its security; and prevents any interference in 
the affairs of the Gulf states (in the case of aggression, all of these states would 
cooperate to counter aggressive behaviour since aggression toward one country is 
considered as aggression toward all member states).  
• The Kingdom and GCC members further deepen their cooperation in various 
fields, primarily in politics, economics, security and in social and cultural matters; 
agree to coordinate policies in response to any regional and international issues; 
would seriously respond to a dispute with specific reference to a border clash (the 
brotherhood and neighbouring principles would be applied in a dispute 
settlement); and consistently support the integration of economic policies 
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). 
 
51 
 
In the context of the Arab circle, the Saudi government stresses the significance of joint 
action and unified effort on the part of the Arab states. The establishment of the Arab 
League in 1945 was a necessary means through which the states could work together in 
promoting their interests and addressing specific issues. The Kingdom’s policy in the 
Arab circle and defined by the following principles, covering Arab nationalism, Islam, 
Arab solidarity and Arab brotherhood. 
• The Kingdom believes that a close link ought to be maintained between Arab 
nationalism and Islam, and this contention has been shaping the Kingdom’s policy 
since the time of its establishment. 
• The Kingdom recognizes the importance of Arab solidarity. 
• The Kingdom understands that realism carries negative implications to the peace 
and stability of the Arab world. 
• The principle of Arab brotherhood acts as the foundation for the generous support 
and assistance the Kingdom offers (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2005). 
 
With due consideration to the need to preserve and promote solidarity among the Arab 
states, the Kingdom plays the role of an honest and fair mediator. It attempts to resolve 
Arab disputes and will counter any possible threats against the unity of the Arab 
countries. The Palestine issue, for example, is a source of major concern in Saudi foreign 
policy. Since the beginning of the kingship of King Abdulaziz al-Saud, the Kingdom has 
seen itself as bearing a great responsibility in supporting this issue at the international 
level. The Saudi Foreign Ministry emphasised this responsibility in the following 
statement: ‘the Kingdom devoted Herself to serve the Palestinian issue toward realizing 
rightful solutions and fair settlement’ (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2005). 
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The third circle is Islam, which has become a driving force in determining the priorities 
of the Kingdom’s foreign policy. The Saudi government sees itself as utilizing its 
resources and significant potential with the aim of preserving unity in the Islamic World. 
This unity, moreover, is enhanced by the sharing of one belief. A number of 
organizations which were formed among the Muslim countries as a means of building 
and promoting Islamic solidarity benefited from Saudi initiation. The Muslim World 
League (1962) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) (1969) are two 
examples. 
 
The Kingdom specifies several objectives in pursuing its foreign policy within the 
Islamic circle. The objectives have three major components: Islam (as a religion), the 
Islamic countries and Muslim communities. In the pursuit of these objectives, moreover, 
Islam is seen as a way of uniting Islamic countries and developing a tight-knit global 
Muslim community. The objectives are given as: 
• to build a comprehensive Islamic solidarity 
• to explore new scopes of economic cooperation among Islamic states 
• to resist any form of ‘cultural overflow’ and ‘intellectual invasion’ that would 
pose a threat to the Muslim world 
• to support the activities of the OIC 
• to enhance the role of the Islamic states in the sphere of the New World Order 
• to support and provide assistance to Muslim minorities around the world 
• to promote ‘the true image of Islam’ and ‘the tolerance of Shariah law’  
• to protect Islam from any allegations or slander  
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005) 
 
Fourth is the international circle. The following are put across as the principles of Saudi 
foreign policy in the international circle, dealing with security, economy and social 
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aspects. First, Saudi Arabia willingly works with an international society through its 
commitment to the UN Charter and international agreements, and on the basis of 
international law. The Kingdom also retains strong faith in the role of the UN, 
particularly with regard to its constant efforts to maintain global peace and security. 
Second, Saudi Arabia denounces the use of force and interference in the affairs of other 
countries. Third, Saudi Arabia has taken on the role of ensuring the stability of the 
international oil market and developed international trade based on the fundamentals of 
free market economies. Fourth, the country is committed to emphasizing a moral 
dimension in the formulation of its foreign policy (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2005) 
 
Reflecting its policy of ensuring the stability of the international oil market, the Kingdom 
seeks to set a “reasonable” price per barrel of oil (between USD 70 and USD 80 at 
present) and supplies additional oil to the international market should there exist a supply 
shortage (Reuters 15.02.11). In cases of political unrest and natural disasters in which a 
sudden interruption of oil supplies might occur, the Kingdom promises to fill the gap of 
such a shortage. During the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, the Kingdom purposely increased its supply in order to replace Iranian, Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti oil. Bahgat (2003) describes the Kingdom’s response to shortages as ‘... an 
insurance policy against temporary shortages in world oil supplies’ (p. 456), while Saudi 
Oil Minister, Ali al-Naimi, depicts his country’s behaviour as one that ‘...consistently 
champion[s] the cause of price moderation’ (Federal News Service 22.04.02). 
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2.2.2 The PRC 
This sub-section begins with a historical background of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, which have been guiding Chinese foreign policy for almost six decades. 
Evidence of the Chinese government’s commitment to promoting and upholding these 
principles will be assessed and some new dimensions regarding these principles will be 
examined. The analysis of the new dimensions is based on three key speeches given by 
Premier Li Peng, President Hu Jintao and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. The word 
‘principles’, which is frequently mentioned in the following assessment, refers to the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
 
Some scholars have examined the historical context of the term ‘the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence’. Fifield (1958) argues that Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev had used 
the term. He highlights Stalin’s work in 1925, indicating the use of the term by the Soviet 
leader:  
…our world, the world of socialism, is becoming more and more closely welded, 
more united;…because of this…there arouse that temporary equilibrium of forces 
that put an end to war against us, that ushered in the period of “peaceful 
coexistence” between the Soviet state and the capitalist states, (Stalin in Russell 
H. Fifield 1958 p. 504). 
 
Regarding the ‘Five Principles’, Fifield claims that the term is ‘first found’ in the India-
China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, 
which was signed on April 29, 1954. Commenting on the use of the same term, the 
former Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, states that the Five 
Principles ‘…are not new’ (2004, p. 373) and that principles, with the exception of the 
last principle (peaceful coexistence), had already been mentioned in the UN Charter. 
 
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are the five principles of Chinese foreign 
policy, which consist of: mutual respect for each state’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each state’s international 
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affairs; equality and mutual benefits; and peaceful coexistence (note: the term ‘Peaceful 
Coexistence’ is one the principles of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’). The 
India-China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and 
India (signed on April 29, 1954), the Sino-Indian Joint Communiqué (signed on June 28, 
1954) and the Sino-Burmese Joint Statement (signed on June 29, 1954) endorsed the 
implementation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in Chinese-Indian and 
Chinese-Burmese relations. The leaders of the Asian countries who had subscribed to the 
principles attempted to persuade the delegations at the 1955 Bandung Conference to 
accept them (the principles). During the final communiqué of the conference, the 
Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation was signed. All of the 
delegations from 29 Asian and African countries adopted the principles (Vang 2008), yet 
they omitted the term ‘peaceful coexistence’ in the Declaration and replaced the term 
with ‘live together in peace’ (Fifield 1958).  
 
The Four Modernizations and the Open Door policy that the Chinese government had 
introduced would benefit from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In February 
1978, Chinese Premier, Hua Guofeng, had introduced the Four Modernizations, which 
was intended to make China a “modern and powerful socialist country”. The Four 
Modernizations consisted of the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense 
and science and technology. In December of the same year, the Third Plenary Session of 
the 11th CPC Central Committee introduced the Open Door policy, which aimed to 
facilitate the Four Modernizations. China needed the market, investment, trade, 
commercial dealings, technologies and resources of foreign countries (Vang 2008).  
 
China’s Constitution and the speeches of Chinese leaders during their visits to foreign 
countries showed that the government firmly adhered to the principles. In the Preamble of 
the Constitution, the Chinese government stated that the principles were the bases that 
guided the policy of the country. The Constitution stipulates that ‘China adheres to an 
independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles...in developing diplomatic 
relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries (BBC Summary of 
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World Broadcast 06.12.82). The speech of Premier Hua Guofeng, who visited Britain in 
November 1979, reflected the strong faith of the Chinese government in these principles. 
He stated: ‘[w]e will, as always, actively develop friendly relations with all countries on 
the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence…’ (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcast 05.11.79). In May 1980, Premier Hua Guofeng  delivered a ‘Commemoration 
Lecture’ in Tokyo and reaffirmed the use of the principles in Chinese foreign relations, 
stating, ‘We steadfastly hold to five principles of peaceful coexistence in our relations 
with other countries’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 31.05.80). The 6th General 
Secretary of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, who visited Australia in April 1985, stressed that the 
application of the principles in the relations between the countries could promote peace 
and cooperation. Hu Yaobang stated:  
…once these principles are followed, countries with different social systems can 
live in amity and cooperate for each other’s benefit. If these principles are 
violated, even countries with similar social systems may come into sharp 
confrontation or even armed conflict. (The Xinhua General Overseas News 
Service 16.04.85) 
 
In the 1990s, China’s top leaders continued to project the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence as important to the foreign policy agenda. Premier Li Peng, who visited 
Moscow in April 1990, stressed the significance of the principles in creating a new order 
for the country when he stated, ‘[r]egarding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
as the general norms governing international relations, China stands for the establishment 
of a new international political and economic order based on these principles’ (Xinhua 
General News Service 23.04.90). In a speech to Saudi delegates in November 1999, 
President Jiang Zemin highlighted the importance of the principles in fostering China’s 
foreign relations, stating, ‘We are committed to developing, on the basis of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, friendly relations and cooperation with all countries 
in the world and have made unremitting efforts in maintaining world peace and stability 
(Xinhua News Agency 02.11.99).  
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During the 96th Inter-Parliamentary Conference in September 1996, Premier Li Peng 
presented six key elements of China’s foreign policy, which are seen as a range of 
variations of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Comprehensive and diverse, 
these elements underlined Chinese relations with different groups of countries. One of the 
elements, which called for the preservation of world peace, reflected China’s increasing 
role within the international system. 
 
The first element involved maintaining independence, which was associated with China’s 
non-alliance with any major powers. China’s policies and stances were, it was said, based 
on the value of specific issues and were not influenced by the major powers (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2003). 
 
The second element was to maintain world peace. In doing so, China refused to become 
involved in arms races or military expansion. China was against hegemonism, aggression 
and expansion and strongly opposed foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of other 
countries. This was based on the principle of human rights as well as religious and ethnic 
issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2003). 
 
The third element consisted of upholding friendly relations and cooperation. Premier Li 
Peng stressed the significance of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in Chinese 
foreign policy. He also emphasised that China’s relations with foreign countries were not 
led by ideologies and social systems (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China 2003).  
 
The fourth element was comprised by good-neighbourly and friendly relations. It was 
stressed that China established friendly relations with its neighbouring states, encouraged 
economic cooperation and promoted peace and stability in the region. Negotiations and 
consultations were the mechanisms undertaken to resolve border and territorial disputes 
wherein the Chinese government called for the seeking of a common ground and rejected 
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the notion of irreconcilable differences (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China 2003). 
 
The fifth element was to enhance unity and cooperation with developing countries. This 
element would continue to serve as the core component of China’s foreign policy. China 
attempted to develop comprehensive friendly relations and cooperation with these 
countries and sought mutually complementary cooperation in different sectors. Aiming to 
safeguard the rights and interests of the developing countries, China also used 
consultation and cooperation in addressing international issues (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2003). 
 
The sixth element was an ‘opening policy’ under which China’s cooperation with 
developed and developing countries was characterised by mutual benefit and equality. 
Cooperation was vital for common development since China intended to establish ‘a new 
fair and equitable international political and economic order based on peace and stability’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2003). 
 
Some significant indicators in the 2000s have portrayed the continuing commitment of 
the Chinese government to apply the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in its 
relations with foreign countries. Among these indicators were the revised Constitution of 
the Communist Party of China, which was approved during the 16th CPC National 
Congress on November 14, 2002 and a ‘Report on the Work of the Government’, which 
was delivered by Premier Zhu Rongji on March 5, 2003. The New Year’s message of 
President Hu Jintao on December 31, 2010 served as another useful indicator. The 
President asserted, ‘I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm that China will 
continue to hold aloft the banner of peace, development, and cooperation; remain 
committed to the independent foreign policy of peace,…actively develop friendly 
exchanges and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries on the basis of Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence…’(BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political 31.12.10). 
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In a speech given by China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yang Jiechi, at Chatham House 
in December 2007, three objectives of China’s foreign policy were clearly stated. The 
objectives, which were based on a new development in the international system, 
promoted a tight link between security and economic aspects and reflected the nature of 
the post-September 11 international system. The minister also stressed some variations of 
China’s principles of foreign policy. 
 
The first objective was that of peaceful development, which highlighted China’s 
initiatives to develop itself within a peaceful international environment and included the 
strategies through which world peace could be secured and maintained. The notion of 
peaceful development was considered to be a strategy that suited China’s need to espouse 
‘socialism with distinctive Chinese features’ (Chatham 2007 p. 4). China also stressed the 
importance of cooperation, which served as a mechanism for securing peace and 
development. As the minister stressed, ‘we are committed to peaceful, open and 
harmonious development’ (Chatham 2007 p. 4). 
 
The second objective of China’s foreign policy was the win-win strategy of opening up. 
The opening up of the country encouraged China’s active engagement in trade and 
economic cooperation and spurred economic development. China underwent an 
unprecedented development of political, economic, social and cultural relations with 
other countries and was deemed as a powerful engine of Asian economic growth. The 
Chinese government claimed that the opening up policy was ‘based on mutual benefit, 
mutual complementarity and mutual assistance’. It did not deprive ‘the interest of other 
countries’ and took into consideration ‘the legitimate concern of other states’ (Chatham 
2007 p. 4). 
 
The third objective of China’s foreign policy was to build ‘a harmonious world of 
enduring peace and common prosperity’. This objective served as the basis for China’s 
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peaceful development and its origin, it was said, was reflected in the cultural tradition of 
China. A harmonious world implies China’s willingness to become ‘a responsible 
member of international community’ and to cooperate with other states so as to preserve 
peace and prosperity. 
 
As a long-term objective, the creation of a harmonious world would require ‘persistent 
and painstaking’ effort. It involved a process that required every country to advance its 
common interests, forge broad consensus and build cooperation in overcoming any 
challenges. In addition, the creation of a harmonious world entailed the process of 
complex interaction between different cultures and civilizations along with effective 
cooperation to benefit the strength that each country possessed. This interaction would 
ultimately promote common prosperity and development. 
 
Minister Yang Jeichi outlined the principles that could be considered as new dimensions 
of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. They seemed to underpin the fulfilment of 
the above-mentioned objectives. The principles were categorised into the aspects of 
politics, economics, security, culture and environment. In politics, China urged all 
countries to respect one another, seek fair consultation as a means of reconciling 
differences and acknowledge the right of each state to practice their individual social 
system and development strategy. China also called upon all states to cooperate in 
advocating democracy within the international system, which meant that each state could 
enjoy the right to equal involvement in world affairs.  
 
In the area of economics, cooperation and joint effort between countries were to be 
established based on their relative strength. With this initiative, a ‘balanced progress of 
economic globalization’ could be achieved, thereby allowing every state to eventually 
reap economic benefits. In the aspect of security, all states were urged to develop mutual 
trust, deepen cooperation, use peaceful means to end disputes and closely collaborate in 
preserving and sustaining peace and stability within the world. In the cultural aspect, each 
61 
 
country was advised to ‘learn from each other’, intensify their common ground and 
acknowledge diversity. In the environmental scope, all countries were to work together to 
protect the environment (Chatham 2004).  
 
Conclusion 
While the King has full authority over the foreign policymaking of Saudi Arabia, China’s 
Politburo Committee (PSC) has the capacity to approve the policies of the country on the 
basis of consensus. Thus, Saudi foreign policymaking is more centralised than that of 
China. The reason for this is that in Saudi Arabia, the King is the only actual decision 
maker when it comes to such policy, although he may consult with the senior princes of 
the royal family. In contrast, in China, the PSC includes nine high-ranking officials from 
the CCP, who are directly involved in making policy decisions.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Development of Sino-Saudi Relations during the Cold War, 1949-1989 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the historical setting for the development of Sino-
Saudi diplomatic relations. The analysis is divided into three different periods: 1949–
1965, 1966–1977 and 1978–1989. All three periods have a similar structure; each one 
systematically studies China’s foreign policies towards the superpowers of the Cold War, 
Middle Eastern countries and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the period between 
1949 and 1965, China advocated a ‘lean-to-one-side’ approach in its relations with the 
USSR and the US, and it expanded its presence in the Middle East by establishing 
diplomatic relations with some of the countries in the region. 
 
The period between 1966 and 1977 saw a strain in China’s relations with the USSR, 
whereas its relations with the US were set to normalize. The nature of China’s relations 
with the Middle East began to change. In the 1960s, China fostered ties with some 
regional liberation movements. In the 1970s, China developed relations with the 
governments of some Arabian peninsula and with some Middle Eastern countries such as 
Kuwait, Oman and Yemen. From 1978 to 1989, China gradually improved its relations 
with the superpowers. One of the main reasons for the improvement was the need to 
accelerate the domestic economic reform led by Deng Xiaoping. Within the same period, 
China’s relations with the Middle East were largely influenced by events and conflicts in 
the region. In the context of China’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the analysis attempts to 
identify strands of consistency between the Chinese and Saudi foreign policies over the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and the conflict in Lebanon. The 
analysis also focuses on the major factors that contributed to the establishment of 
diplomatic ties between China and Saudi Arabia. 
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With regard to the application of a theoretical conception of Sino-Saudi relations, the 
characteristics of complex interdependence did not exist before 1978. However, the 
bilateral relations between the two countries during the period 1979–1989 began to 
exhibit some of the necessary elements.  
 
Some of the key aspects of constructivist theory were reflected in the development of 
Sino-Saudi relations between 1949 and 1989. The norms of the social structures of the 
two countries exerted a significant influence on their policy behaviour (Note: a social 
structure consists of three components: shared knowledge or shared understanding, 
material resources and practice). Policy on both sides was being formulated on a very 
different basis, reflecting the different social structures.  
 
3.1 The PRC and the KSA prior to the Cultural Revolution of China, 1949–1965 
The PRC was established at the end of the 1940s. At the beginning of the Cold War era, 
the PRC built its relations with the superpowers using a “lean-to-one side” approach, 
favouring the USSR. In the 1950s, the PRC and the USSR reached an important treaty 
that was intended to be the cornerstone for building strong bilateral relations over the 
following 30 years. The PRC’s relations with the US were naturally hostile as a 
consequence. 
 
The 1955 Bandung Conference positively affected the PRC’s relations with some of the 
Middle Eastern countries. Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Iraq established diplomatic relations 
with the PRC as a result. The conference did not, however, change the policy of Saudi 
Arabia towards the PRC. Saudi Arabia maintained close relations with the ROC. 
 
Unlike later periods, the US dimension does not impinge on Saudi Arabia’s contacts (or 
relatively little contact) with China in this period (1949-1965). This is reflected in the 
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participation of both countries (Saudi Arabia and China) in the 1955 Bandung 
Conference. The perspective of the countries attending this conference was that the US 
was one of the imperial powers. The PRC and Saudi Arabia were, therefore, loosely 
linked together in a perspective which was unfavourable to the US. It is true that Saudi 
Arabia and the PRC had not established diplomatic links at this time, but this was due 
primarily to the anti-communist paranoia on the Saudi side. There is no evidence that this 
Saudi position stemmed from US pressure.  
 
3.1.1 The PRC and the World   
The Chinese civil war of 1949 secured communist victories in China. Mao Zedong 
established a communist regime on mainland China and officially proclaimed the PRC on 
October 1, 1949. The civil war saw the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) government 
headed by Chiang Kai-shek defeated, and he and other nationalists escaped to Taiwan 
(Formosa). The Soviet Union granted recognition to the PRC government on October 2, 
1949, and other communist countries followed the lead of the USSR.  
 
The PRC adopted a ‘lean-to-one-side’ approach in its relations with the Soviet Union, 
aiming to strengthen China’s position at the international level. On February 14, 1950, 
the two countries concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, 
effective for 30 years. Under this agreement the Soviet and Chinese governments 
consented not to go against each other either in the form of individual acts or alliances 
with other parties.  
 
Throughout the ‘lean-to-one-side’ period, PRC–US relations were hostile and 
increasingly resentful. The Korean War in 1950 worsened the relations (Chen 1979). The 
Chinese saw the US deployment of massive military troops (in addition to troops of 
sixteen other countries) as a form of American imperialism. The Chinese government, 
therefore, mobilized 200,000 troops into the fray and finally defeated the troops led by 
the US (Smith 1998 p. 60). 
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In the mid-1950s, China began to build good relations with the third world countries 
because of the tendency of the Soviet Union to compromise with the US. China viewed 
the Soviet–US conciliation attempt as an effort contradicting the principles of 
international communism that resisted imperialism and colonialism. China participated in 
a meeting of 29 countries from Asia and Africa in Bandung, Indonesia (known as the 
Bandung Conference), April 18–24, 1955, which laid the foundation for the Third World 
Movement in particular during the Cold War period. The movements within some of 
these countries were characterized by anti-colonialism and non-alignment (Young 1999 
p. 139). Not only did the participants of the conference discuss and agree upon the ‘... 
five principles of cooperation...’, but also they criticized ‘… racialism, colonialism, 
external intervention and bloc politics...’ (Young 1999 p. 139). 
 
3.1.2 The PRC and the Middle East, 1949-1965 
The Delhi Conference, April 6, 1955, in New Delhi, laid the foundation for the first Afro-
Asian Solidarity Conference held at Bandung. There was no such the Bandung 
conference was previously hosted among African and Asian countries. In the Bandung 
conference, China attempted to seek a common ground with the other participants that 
constituted one Communist state (North Vietnam), ‘twelve neutral countries, and fifteen 
anti-Communist states’(Chen 1979 p. 15). Although these countries upheld and adopted 
ideologies and social systems completely different from China, remarkably, the spirit of 
anti-imperialism had brought together twenty-nine leaders of Asian and African 
countries. Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, had strongly expressed his concern over the 
implications of colonialism as experienced by many countries in Africa and Asia.  
 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Prince Faysal Ibn Saud conferred at this conference: The 
discussion was prompted by the Saudi government’s refusal to grant entrance visas to the 
PRC’s Hajj delegation to Makkah in 1953 (Shichor 1989). Klein and Clark (1971) state 
that this discussion led to the first official PRC-originating Hajj, led by Da Pusheng and 
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Ma Yuhuai (Chinese Muslim leaders) in July of 1955 (in Shichor 1989 p.3). An 
interesting point to highlight here is that Da Pusheng had been chosen to accompany 
Premier Zhou Enlai to the Bandung conference. 
 
Although China and Middle Eastern countries already had limited contacts prior to 1955, 
the Bandung conference seemed to mark the real beginning of relationship between the 
two sides. The Bandung Conference also indicated a turning point for the wider 
involvement of China in international relations, complementing its strong commitment to 
its ally, the Soviet Union. At this conference, Chinese and other Asian country leaders 
cemented personal relationships as well as the basic foundation of state-to-state relations 
(Chen 1979 p.16). In 1956, China initiated diplomatic relations with three Middle Eastern 
countries: Syria, Yemen and Egypt. These countries withdrew their recognition of the 
ROC. The trade relations between China and these countries grew substantially. Shichor 
(1979) states that China and Egypt concluded a Sino–Egyptian trade agreement, allowing 
China to buy ‘… half a million kantars of cotton from Egypt ...’ and sell ‘... 60,000 tons 
of steel …’ to Egypt (in Harris1993 p.90). China also offered loans to Egypt and Yemen 
of USD 5 million and USD 16.4 million, respectively (Harris 1993 p.90). Diplomatic 
relations between China and Iraq, established in August 1958, saw bilateral relations 
quickly deteriorate in the ensuing year. The demise of this relationship occurred when the 
Iraqi government blamed China for supporting a communist-led uprising in Mosul and 
Kirkuk in July 1959. 
 
Chinese relations with Middle Eastern countries between 1961 and 1965 came to a 
standstill. As Shichor argues, the standstill reflected the PRC’s lack of commitment to 
winning the goodwill of Arab states, a changing Chinese perspective on world political 
development, and a Chinese shift in attention to newly independent African countries. 
From 1958 to 1962, China established diplomatic relations with ten African states.  
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3.1.3 The PRC and the KSA, 1949-1965 
The period (1949–65) saw no significant political and economic relations between China 
and Saudi Arabia. Goldstein argues that Saudi Arabia had contact with the PRC at the 
Bandung Conference, yet it chose to maintain its close friendship with the ROC at that 
time. This stemmed from an anti-communist sentiment that was fully embraced and 
broadly shared (2004, p.240).  
 
Minimal contact between the PRC and the KSA occurred during the Hajj mission. 
Burhan Shahidi (Bao Erhan), an important Muslim figure during initial Chinese contacts 
with Saudi Arabia, received an invitation at the second Hajj delegation in 1956 to meet 
with King Saud. Shichor claims that this event had some significance because the 
Kingdom had made no effort to recognize the PRC. Burhan Shahidi managed and 
supervised Chinese Hajj delegations through to 1964, up to the Cultural Revolution.  
 
3.1.4 The Republic of China (ROC) and the KSA, 1949-1965 
Establishment of ROC–KSA relations took place on October 26, 1939, with the opening 
of the first ROC Consulate in Jeddah (seven years after the foundation of the KSA in 
1932). The establishment of this Consulate stemmed from a religion purpose, and the first 
Chinese Vice Consul was Wang Shih-Ming (Haji Saad Abdulrahim Wang), a Muslim 
teacher and scholar who had a degree from al-Azhar University in Cairo. His role 
primarily dealt with ‘...  sundry matters ...’ and it was intended that no ‘… legal or 
official document could be relied upon’ (Ma 1988 p.37). At this stage, Saudi Arabia had 
no official institutions in the ROC due to the Kingdom’s political instability. The ruler of 
Saudi Arabia faced internal issues such as conflicts among tribes, disputes over 
boundaries, and the legislation of national laws and decrees.  
 
On November 15, 1946, the ROC and Saudi government concluded a Treaty of Amity 
signed by H. E. Sheikh Youssif Yassin and H. E. Cheng Ye-tung, respectively. Under this 
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treaty, seven articles detailed the governing of bilateral relations: maintaining and 
strengthening the relationship of the two countries, ensuring peace and amity between 
both governments and their people, and offering these governments and people broader 
relations, especially in economic aspects. A distinctive and specific provision of this 
treaty delineated the development of diplomatic relations between the ROC and the KSA. 
However, issues of domestic political instability and regional security delayed efforts at 
opening embassies. During this time, China was engulfed in a civil war (1946–49), which 
required the ROC to develop and maintain strong relations with the United States, 
whereas Saudi Arabia’s focus was a development of Zionism in the region. A direct 
consequence of the Chinese civil war on the ROC was budget constraints that eventually 
led to the closing of its Vice Consulate office in Jeddah (Ma 1988).  
 
Communist rule over the mainland of China led to the flight of Chinese Muslims from 
the northwest provinces (Sinkiang, Ch’inghai and Kansu) to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
Taiwan. An estimated 10,000 Chinese Muslims left their homes for Saudi Arabia from 
1949 to 1954, escaping from ‘… the tyrannical suppression of religion by the Communist 
regime in the mainland’(Ma 1988 p.58). In considering this acute crisis, the Saudi 
government allowed some Chinese Muslim émigrés to live in its territory; it then gave 
permission for the reopening of the ROC’s Consulate in Jeddah on February 26, 1956. 
The establishment of the embassies highlighted in the 1946 Treaty of Amity took place 
the following year. 
 
The period of the civil war had triggered social, economic and political turmoil in China 
and caused Chinese Muslims to abandon performing the Hajj. However, during the Hajj 
season in September 1949, General Ma Pu-Fang (the first ambassador of the ROC to 
Saudi Arabia) and his colleagues from Taipei eventually arrived in Makkah. A number of 
Hajj missions followed after the postponement of the first official Hajj journey of the 
ROC in 1953. The latter failure was associated with the delay of administrative 
procedures. In 1954, the ROC Hajj delegation, led by Yolbuz Khan, was signified the 
first official ROC Hajj mission. 
69 
 
 
3.2 The PRC and the KSA during the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1977 
This sub-section will examine Chinese relations with the superpowers during the period 
between 1966 and 1977, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, seen as one of the 
contributing factors that significantly affected the relations. China’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union became strained, while performing some rapprochement actions towards 
the US, which later led to diplomatic relations in 1979. This sub-section will also assess 
Chinese relations with Middle Eastern countries. Communist ideology and the Cultural 
Revolution created a distance between China and the Arab Gulf states. The nature of 
Chinese relations in the region, however, began to change. In the 1960s, China supported 
some national liberation movements in the Middle East, but in the 1970s China began to 
give support to the Omani and Yemeni governments in the region. Regarding PRC–Saudi 
Arabia relations, this sub-section will focus on policies of Riyadh and Beijing towards the 
issues of the Middle East, the superpowers and Taiwan, seeking to assess the extent to 
which there was some commonality of policy. 
 
It remained the case over this period (1966 to 1977) that US influence played no 
significant role with respect to Saudi Arabia’s relations with China. These, indeed, were 
years when Saudi relations with the US were far from settled. In 1967, for example,  a 
‘limited rift’ between the two countries occurred. In 1967 and 1973 the Kingdom put in 
place oil embargoes against Western countries. A rapprochement between the US and the 
PRC in 1971 was, moreover, a clear sign that Washington and Riyadh policies towards 
Beijing were moving along different lines with regard to China. Riyadh kept its distance 
from Beijing and did not begin to build official contacts with the PRC until almost two 
decades later. King Faisal assured the ROC in 1971 that his country would not pursue the 
US approach if Washington normalized its relations with Beijing. 
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3.2.1 The PRC and the World, 1966-1977 
The Cultural Revolution. Anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism were at the heart of 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Mao identified signs of capitalist values reflected in the 
party’s senior leaders. His fear was also driven by events in the Soviet Union, where 
Khrushchev had implemented a de-Stalinization program and accommodated his country 
with the West. This development, in Mao’s view, could lead to abandoning the 
communist state. Mao was fearful for the future of his legacy if leaders not interested in 
his revolutionary movement and later inherited government leadership posts (Lumbers 
2007). To confront this fear, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution. As Breslin argues, 
this revolution implied strong resistance against the ‘… signs of evil Western and 
capitalist decadence, and “revisionist” behaviour’ (1998, p.161). It also meant that the 
PRC had to maintain a socialist economic base, impeding any progress towards 
capitalism.  
 
The implementation of this revolution, however, took its toll in the lives of the Chinese 
people. The radical reforms lowered the standard of China's modern school system, with 
major implications for the educational system of the country. The revolution, moreover, 
ruined the unity of the party. ‘Hundreds of thousands of leaders, from President Liu 
Shaoqi to much humbler officials, lost their posts, were tortured and killed’ (Calvocoressi 
2001 p.137). The forming of the Red Guard signalled young Chinese people’s 
confrontation with senior officials.  
  
Not surprisingly, the US received criticism in the early phase of the revolution. 
Throughout this period (at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and before the 
rapprochement with the US), China repeatedly emphasized the main target of the 
revolution: a revoking of ‘... the world order dominated by the U.S. imperialists’ (Jian 
2001 p.241). China deemed the US responsible for dividing China through its support for 
the Kuomintang since 1949, and for taking China into ‘… the abyss of national 
humiliation in modern times’ (Jian 2001 p.241). The scenario inflamed a strong public 
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sentiment of anti-Americanism among the Chinese, which Mao then echoed in an effort 
to legitimize his revolutionary ideas.  
 
Sino–Soviet Split. The de-Stalinization campaign in the USSR began to create a rift in 
Sino–Soviet relations from the later part of the 1950s. The situation deteriorated after 
1965, when the two countries increased their military presence at their jointly border. 
From 1968 to 1969, the governments dispatched hundreds of thousands of troops to the 
border. With the rise of the Cultural Revolution in China, moreover, the resentment 
between the two countries had turned into hatred, and they severely criticized one another 
for being ‘… a traitor to true communism’ (Jian 2001 p.240). General Secretary of the 
Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, lambasted Maoism as ‘those people who 
would like to bind the chains of a new slavery around the young national states’ 
(Freeman 1998 p.85). 
 
The Vietnam War. Despite great turbulence in its domestic political, economic and 
social systems, China actively engaged in the Vietnam War (the Second Indo-China 
War). It had remained supportive of the Hanoi regime since the defeat of the French in 
Vietnam. Apart from aiding the development of air defences and railroads, China 
dispatched a huge number of its troops to North Vietnam. 
 
The Vietnam War raged for more than ten years. The involvement of the United States in 
this war (1965–75), began with assistance to South Vietnam and its support of Ngo Dinh 
Diem, the first president of South Vietnam. Communist guerrillas, who received full 
support from North Vietnam, attacked Diem, and the guerrillas later established a 
National Liberation Front (the Vietcong). Instability in South Vietnam increased and 
grew further so after the assassination of Diem.  
 
The motivation behind the involvement of the US in the Vietnam War, which 
commenced fully during the administration of President Johnson, involved implementing 
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a containment policy, demonstrating its imminent victory over wars of national 
liberation, and protecting its ally. On October 12, 1967, Dean Rusk declared that the 
involvement of the US in Vietnam was intended to limit the expansion of China’s power 
in Southeast Asia (Yafeng 2006 p.238). The American military presence then expanded. 
This development later motivated China to bolster its support for the communists in 
Vietnam.  
 
The war had a serious impact on US military ability and hurt the US economy through 
high inflation. US troops lacked experience in guerrilla war, and a total of 58,000 US 
service people were killed in the war. With the election of Richard Nixon as president, a 
gradual withdrawal of the 540,000 US military forces from Vietnam took place. The 
signing of the Paris Settlement in January 1973 led to a complete withdrawal of 
American troops from Vietnam in March of the same year.  
 
US–China Détente. Three main factors contributed the détente between China and the 
US, introducing an era of Sino–American friendship. The first factor, a strategic or 
geopolitical aspect, was the serious deterioration of Sino–Soviet relations. Both sides 
were antipathetic to the Soviet Union. In January 1969, President Nixon stressed a 
fundamental change in US policy objectives, stating, ‘After a period of confrontation, we 
are entering an era of negotiation’ (Yafeng 2006 p.239).  
 
The second factor involved the impact of the Cultural Revolution which was no longer so 
great since 1969 (Jian 2001). Mao conveyed an important message that the revolution had 
ended with a closure of the Cultural Revolution Small Group in the late winter of 1969. 
The setback for the US in the Vietnamese War was the third factor. China gained 
confidence that it could defend its interest against the US. 
 
In February 1972, President Nixon visited China and met with Mao. This historic event 
led up the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué between President Nixon and Premier 
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Zhou Enlai. After the visit, the leaders of the two countries carefully considered the 
rapprochement agenda. We should note that Mao was determined to re-establish US–
China relations because he wanted to secure China’s legitimacy among the major powers 
of the world (Pollack 1991).  
 
The Vietnam cease-fire in January 1973 facilitated considerable progress in US–China 
relations. The establishment of liaison offices in both capitals further established official 
relations. January 1, 1979, saw Sino–US diplomatic relations eventually established and 
marked the switch of the US diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC and 
recognize Beijing as the legitimate government of China.  
 
Another great accomplishment in the history of China’s foreign relations took place in 
the 1970s: the recognition of Beijing as the legitimate government of China in the UN.  
 
3.2.2 The PRC and the Middle East, 1966–1977  
During the Cultural Revolution, the relations of China with countries in the Middle East 
became increasingly strained. These relations ‘… had already gone from bad to worse...’ 
immediately after the revolution began (Shichor 1979). China recalled most of its 
ambassadors in Arab countries, from the end of 1966 through to the middle of 1967. The 
Syrian government asked seventeen Chinese students to leave the country. As the result 
of the latter act, Al-Manar newspaper (28.01.67) as summarized by Shichor (1979) 
reported that Chinese in Budapest had attacked the car of the Syrian ambassador there. In 
Egypt, Al-Hayat newspaper revealed that Egyptian officials derailed the Chinese plan of 
staging demonstrations at the embassies of the Soviet and East European states (in 
Shichor 1979). 
 
Communist ideology and the Cultural Revolution inevitably created a serious gap and 
discouraged the cultivation of bilateral relations between China and the Arab Gulf states. 
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The Gulf States paid little attention to and perhaps distanced themselves from China due 
to Chinese communist ideology, which Calabrese considers as ‘alien ... to most Gulf 
Arabs and Iranians …’ (1992, p. 471). Moreover, the implementation of the Cultural 
Revolution involved the persecuted of Muslim minorities in the country, which created a 
negative perception on the part of the Gulf States toward China (Calabrese 1992 p.472).  
 
In 1969, China began to restore its relations with the Arab governments and sought to 
establish moderate relationships. China’s ambassadors were sent back to Syria (June 
1969), Yemen (July 1969), Egypt (June 1970), Iraq (December 1970) and South Yemen 
(1970) (Shichor 1979 p.148). Nonetheless, an inherited mistrust shadowed Sino–Arab 
relations.  
 
In this period, China took a close interest in the liberation movements in the Middle East, 
despite its recently established bilateral relations with some of the Arab governments. 
China viewed these movements as involved in struggles against imperialism and 
aggression. It referred specifically to the people’s armed struggles in Palestine and 
Dhufar. As radical factions, these movements identified themselves as embracing ‘... the 
proper ideology ...’, and replicating ‘... China’s ideology and past revolutionary tactics’ 
(Rubin 1999 p.108).  
 
We can classify the relations of China with the Middle Eastern region into two types: 
government-to-government relations and government-to-the-national-liberation-
movement relations. The government-to-government relations included Sino–Arab, 
Sino–Egyptian, Sino–Syrian, and Sino–South Yemeni relations. The relations of the 
government to the liberation movements included the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the 
Dhufar Liberation Front. In general, in the 1960s, Chinese foreign policy warmly 
welcomed the role of national liberation movements. In the 1970s, China shifted its 
support from the national liberation movement to the governments. 
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A significant shift took place in Chinese policies towards Middle Eastern countries in the 
1970s. China began to act on the basis that the solution for Arab conflicts lay in the hands 
of the Arab governments themselves (Xiaoxing 1992). As Calabrese has emphasized, the 
shift towards such policies began in 1971, which is explained by a number of factors in 
the international and regional contexts. 
 
In the international context, these changes were linked due to the Chinese government’s 
analysis of the superpowers’ status quo. China now saw the Soviet Union as its chief 
enemy and a threat to its security. Calabrese argues that the hostile Sino–Soviet relations 
made China re-assessed the importance of changing its relations with the Gulf States. The 
US had agreed to improve its relations with Beijing and to decrease its military presence 
in Southeast Asia. Looking at this development, China opened a new era of diplomatic 
relations with the US. Beijing and Washington normalized bilateral relations, and China 
began to characterize its foreign policy as anti-Soviet. The PRC's entry into the UN was 
also critical. China began to develop stable relationships with Arab states that saw 
Beijing successfully resisting the influence of both superpowers. The Arab states 
anticipated that China could promote peace and security in their region. China was 
attempting to be ‘a natural member of the Third World’, and therefore able to become a 
‘model’ that opposed the domination of the superpowers (Harris 1993).  
 
As for the regional context, China no longer gave emphasis to the importance of the 
liberation movements in resisting the superpowers in the Middle East. In fact, China now 
based its policies on the idea that only the governments in the Middle East could lead a 
successful effort to liberate the Middle East from superpower hegemony and patronage; 
The Chinese government assessed the governments had the potential to prevent the 
hegemony of superpowers in the region in a better fashion than individual movements did 
(Shichor 1979 p.1989).  
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3.2.3 The PRC and the KSA, 1966-1977 
3.2.3.1 Commonalities and Differences between the PRC and the KSA on Middle Eastern 
Issues 
Beijing and Riyadh foreign policy objectives towards Egypt and Yemen closely 
paralleled each other, aimed at resisting Soviet power in the two countries. On Palestinian 
Liberation Movements, Chinese and Saudi policies were somewhat different: the two 
countries had different objectives in supporting the liberation movement.  China and 
Saudi Arabia employed different, but ultimately similarly cautious approaches to the 
rebel groups in Oman. With regard to the emergence of nationalism and communism in 
the Middle Eastern region, Riyadh and Beijing pursued incompatible policies. 
 
Egypt. Saudi Arabia and China became concerned with Egypt’s strategic position: they 
helped develop Egyptian military capability and supported moves away from Soviet 
influence. King Faisal was said to have persuaded Sadat not to purchase military 
equipment from the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia paid for weapons that Egypt had 
acquired from the West (Lackner 1978). China greatly welcomed Sadat’s decision to 
expel Soviet advisers and the break of the Egyptian–Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1976. 
This development was followed by a military protocol between Beijing and Cairo. A 
report in the New York Times stated that China supplied 30 engines for MIG-17 and 
MIG-21 fighter bombers to Egypt (New York Times 23.04.76). 
 
We should note that Saudi Arabia strongly sought to limit the growth of Arab nationalism 
due to the ideology’s posing threat to the monarchical system of the country. In the 
context of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian nationalism, Lackner views the Egyptian loss in the 
June 1967 war as a victory for Saudi Arabian and other royal families (1978). Lackner 
states: ‘The good days of Arab nationalism ended with the Israel attack’ (1978, p. 116). 
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Palestinian Liberation Movement. The basis of Saudi and Chinese support of the 
Palestinians, while solid, differed greatly. Their political stance towards the Israel–
Palestinian conflict, nonetheless, was somewhat similar. On the basis of support for Afro-
Asian nationalism, China gave its commitment and support to the Palestinian liberation 
movement. In 1967, China granted its recognition to the PLO as an independent 
movement in the Arab world and actively promoted and urged this movement to adopt 
the people’s war in their ongoing struggle against the imperialist powers. China also 
offered medical supplies, weapons and military training to the movement.  
 
As for Saudi Arabia, its firm support and deep commitment to the Palestinian movement 
grew mainly from religious considerations rather than nationalism. During the reign of 
King Faisal, the Kingdom committed itself to the return of occupied land from the Jews 
to the Muslims. Such concern, as Lackner stresses, ranked as the highest priority of the 
King, who earnestly strived for the return of Jerusalem, one of Islam’s holiest cities, to 
the Muslims. With this particular concern, Lackner further argues, the King paid scarce 
attention to the solidarity and liberation of Palestinian. Soulie and Champenois also 
emphasized that Islam served as the main factor, with no political and economic factors 
taken into consideration: ‘The affair of Israel and usurped Palestine is neither political 
nor economic. It is an affair putting in question the basics of Islam’ (in Ochsenwald 1981 
p.276). An incident involving the burning of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in August 
1969 provides an example highlighting the key importance of Islam in the Kingdom’s 
policy towards the Palestinian issue. King Faisal urgently called for a summit meeting 
among the Arab states. In the past, he had showed reluctance to host such a meeting 
although Egypt and Jordan had insisted on a meeting after experiencing the serious 
failure of the UN to withdraw Israeli troops from occupied lands (Galvani et. all. 1974 
p.16). 
 
Nonetheless there were elements of similarity in the policies adopted by China and Saudi 
Arabia on the Palestinian movement. The two countries insisted that this movement 
should focus on the main course of their struggle. Financially supporting al-Fatah, Saudi 
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Arabia insisted that the movement should not create any problems with the Arab states 
and that it avoid meddling in the domestic issues of and causing any conflicts with the 
Arab states (Galvani et. all. 1974 p.16). China had also stressed that this movement 
should focus their struggle on Israel (Disney 1977).  
 
The oil embargo in the aftermath of the October War of 1973 gained Chinese support for 
Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries in general. Again, the underlying message of the 
support reiterated the opposition to external powers. Harris argues that China offered its 
‘enthusiastic support for the Arab oil embargo’ in 1973 (1993, p.133),with the New 
China News Agency claiming that oil was ‘a powerful weapon of the third world people’ 
(in Harris 1993 p.133). Having this strategic weapon, the Arab people could defend their 
state sovereignty and challenge the supremacy of the imperialists and hegemonic 
countries. Led by Saudi Arabia, the embargo signified an aggressive response to 
continuing American support for Israel in the October War of 1973.  
 
Yemen. Saudi Arabia and China both, in different ways, resisted Soviet influence in 
Yemen. Saudi Arabia supported the new government of the Yemen Arab Republic 
(YAR) and identified Yemen as a conservative republican regime. The Saudi leaders 
contended that the regime could serve ‘as a counterbalance to the People’s Democratic 
Republic of South Yemen’ (Vazil’ev 1998 p. 378). Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia took a 
strong stand against the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), especially 
after the National Front gained power in South Yemen on June 22, 1969. The National 
Front had declared the implementation of ‘Soviet-style socio-political changes’ (Vazil’ev 
1998 p. 379). After conflict erupted between Saudi Arabia and the PDRY in 1969, Saudi 
Arabia emerged the winner.  
 
China’s support for the Yemeni independence struggles took place before the departure 
of British power from Aden in 1967. After 1968, the PDRY served as a competitive 
market for Chinese and Soviet military hardware. China granted recognition to the PDRY 
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and generously offered various kinds of assistance. In July 1969, China opened an 
embassy in Aden. China was also said to have provided political support to the “People’s 
Democratic Republic of Hadhramaut”, established in South Yemen and led by Faysal al-
‘Attas. This entity, which was effectively ‘a Maoist enclave’ (Harris 1998 p.115), lasted 
for only two months since it was banned and later demonstrated its loyalty to the 
government of the National Liberation Front.  
 
YAR interests with both Saudi Arabia and China were successfully promoted and 
maintained. Saudi Arabia recognized the YAR on July 23, 1970, and concluded a joint 
defence agreement in March 1971. Throughout the 1970s, the Kingdom’s influence in the 
YAR grew. Its rapprochement with the YAR buttressed Yemeni relations with the US. 
The YAR’s relations with the Soviet Union, however, gradually deteriorated (Vazil’ev 
Vazil’ev 1998). China opened its embassy in Sana’a in 1969, successfully maintaining 
China–YAR relations throughout the 1970s. China received occasional visits from the 
Yemeni Mufti, hosted by the Chinese Islamic Association.  
 
In terms of ideology, Saudi Arabia indirectly opposed China because the Kingdom 
rejected communism. China and Saudi Arabia, however, both opposed the Soviet Union 
and used different forms of assistance as a weapon to combat Russian influence. In 
March 1972, with the National Front declared the sole political party of the PDRY, the 
latter applied ‘the principles of scientific socialism’ in its activities. This development 
aroused mounting opposition from Saudi Arabia toward the PDRY leadership. The 
Marxism of the PDRY challenged the Saudi government. In the same year, a border clash 
took place between YAR and PDRY. Four years later, Saudi Arabia established 
diplomatic relations with the PDRY, having realised it could not topple the South Yemeni 
regime. Saudi Arabia subsequently granted a loan to the PDRY, anticipating that the 
latter would withdraw its active support to the People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman. 
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In the 1970s, China offered PDRY a USD 43 million loan mainly for road construction in 
South Yemen. In November 1974 and 1975, two top leaders of PDRY visited China. 
After President Ali fell from power in 1978, China criticized the PDRY for its closeness 
to the Soviet Union; the Soviets received consent from the PDRY to develop naval and 
air bases on Socotra Island (Harris 1998 p.159). The influence of the Soviet Union in 
Yemen became ever-stronger.  
 
Oman. Chinese involvement in Oman underwent significant changes over this period; it 
shifted from support of the rebel group to support for the government of Oman. In 1968, 
China gained significant influence over Omani rebels who adopted a Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. The rebels opposed the Sultan and later identified themselves as the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). China provided specific 
training for the members of PFLOAG. The rebels followed the model of Chinese 
revolutionary experience and Maoism (Harris 1998 p.117). China also reportedly offered 
financial, food, medical and military assistance to the rebel groups in Oman (Harris 1998 
p. 117). China, however, later modified its traditional approach in dealing with PFLOAG: 
it came to promote stability in the Gulf instead of revolution. In 1973, China broke off its 
contacts with PFLOAG, and in May 1978 it developed an official relationship with the 
Omani government. 
 
Saudi Arabia maintained its government-to-government relations with Oman, yet it 
offered only limited assistance to the Omani government. Following the visit of Sultan 
Qabus to Riyadh on December 14, 1971, it established diplomatic relations between 
Oman and Saudi Arabia. In 1972, Sultan Qabus called for assistance from the Kingdom 
in fighting the rebel movements in Dhofar. However, King Faisal had little interest in this 
effort because open interference in Omani affairs was seen as contradicting the 
Kingdom’s foreign policy of that time (Vazil’ev 1998 p.383).  
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3.2.3.2 The PRC, the KSA and the Superpowers 
Several factors offered opportunity for the US to solve its major disagreement with China 
at this time. These factors included US exhaustion with the Vietnam War and the waning 
of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In November 1968, Zhou Enlai proposed a 
resumption of the Warsaw meetings with the new US leader, President Richard M. 
Nixon. However, this meeting did not materialise. Cohen argues that Lin Piao and Chiang 
Ch’ing could have influenced the decision to call off the meeting because they rejected a 
moderation of Chinese foreign policy with the US (1980, p.239).  
 
In July 1969, trade and travel restrictions previously imposed against China since the 
Korean War were eventually lifted, and the patrol of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan 
Straits also ended. The removal of US nuclear weapons in Okinawa was positive news 
for China. Garner (1982) indicates that during the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central 
Committee in August and September 1969, Mao Zedong affirmed China's commitment to 
moderate its relations with the US (in Huwaidin 2002 p.64). 
 
Between 1971 and 1972, China and the US showed commitment to the establishment of 
bilateral relations. In April 1971, Beijing received American table tennis players and 
high-level American officials. The visit of these players was known as ‘ping pong 
diplomacy’, and contributed significantly to the initial development of Sino–US relations. 
In July 1971, American National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, arrived in Beijing. 
Three months later, the PRC became a member of the UN and occupied all the ROC’s 
positions in this organization. In February 1972, President Richard Nixon visited Beijing. 
The visit resulted in the Shanghai Communiqué in which both parties looked forward to 
normalizing relations. Diplomatic liaison offices at the ambassadorial level opened in 
both capitals in 1973. 
 
In the period between 1973 and 1976, the two countries underwent a leadership change, 
and this development elicited a mixed response to the rapprochement initiative. At the 
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end of 1976, moderates’ keenness to pursue Zhou Enlai’s policies became predominant in 
China. They advocated strengthening China's anti-Soviet policies and supported a 
positive relationship with the US. From 1976 to 1977, President Jimmy Carter was giving 
serious consideration to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet 
Union, and therefore, Cohen (1980) argues, the president ‘had no sense of urgency’ in 
pursuing a Sino–US détente. 
 
The two countries also emphasized that neither side would attempt to secure a hegemonic 
position in the Asian Pacific, and they agreed to resist any effort of any other country 
attempting at a hegemony. This decisive move, as mentioned by Huwaidin, purposely 
intended to impede growing Soviet hegemonic power in the region (2002, p. 64).  
 
As for US–Saudi bilateral relations, these gradually moved towards a special relationship 
– although with some difficulties. In June 1966, King Faisal visited the US seeking 
assistance over the Yemen. However, the US offered no commitment. In the following 
September, the US agreed to supply vehicles for the Saudi armed forces worth USD100 
million (Grayson 1982 p.97). In June 1967, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait suspended oil 
shipments to the West. This signified a hostile reaction to the West’s support for Israel in 
the 1967 war. Grayson (1982) described this situation as ‘a limited rift’ or a ‘minor 
discomfort’ between the US and Saudi Arabia (p.98). The US declared ‘an oil 
emergency’ due to the interruption of oil supply which carried implications for US troops 
in Vietnam. On September 2, 1967, however, the Kingdom resumed its oil shipments to 
the US.  
 
A perfect blend of security and economic interests underpinned the growing relationship 
between the US and Saudi Arabia. In 1969, the US increased the supply of military 
weapons to the Kingdom. Two factors motivated this: the need to improve the US trade 
balance with Saudi Arabia and the need to ensure an uninterrupted and reliable oil supply 
from the Middle East to protect the interest of American domestic oil suppliers. The US 
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gave a major priority to the development of the Kingdom’s internal security and 
intensified bilateral military links; training a growing number of Saudi military personnel.  
 
In 1973, the two countries met a tough challenge in the region. This soured, but 
subsequently strengthened their bilateral links. In 1973, Saudi Arabia led the imposition 
of an Arab oil embargo against the West. King Faisal declared this embargo on October 
17 soon after the US offered to supply USD 2.2 billion in weapons to Israel (Long 1985 
p.118). With this situation, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, became acutely 
aware of the importance of Saudi Arabia in various dimensions: Saudi Arabia could 
secure Arab support for the Arab-Israeli peace process, ensure an uninterrupted oil supply 
at an affordable price to the West, and address the US balance of payment through the 
constant demand for US technology and services.  
 
Long (1985) describes the US–Saudi relationship after the Arab oil embargo of 1973 as 
‘the special relationship’. The two countries recognized clearly the necessity of pursuing 
their mutual interests. Saudi Arabia required ‘the special relationship’ with the US 
specifically for its security interests. It based this calculation on its anxiety over the 
constant threats from Zionism and communism. The US had an ability to suppress 
‘Soviet-supported and inspired radical expansionism’ and to call Israel for to account 
compromising peace initiatives.  
 
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict demanded effective cooperation between Saudi and US 
leaders. Crown Prince Fahd improved US–Saudi political, economic and security 
relations, and proposed the establishment of a US–Saudi Joint Commission. In January 
1977, the new US president, Jimmy Carter, showed a willingness to deal with the 
Palestinian issue, a sentiment shared by Crown Prince Fahd. The Crown Prince sought 
overall Arab support to request on the US to asserting it influence on Israel. Crown 
Prince Fahd persuaded PLO leaders to accept United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolution 242. His effort looked likely to succeed when the chairman of the PLO, 
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Yasser Arafat, conveyed his approval for the proposal. Yet the situation suddenly 
changed when the PLO Executive Committee voiced its disagreement at the last hour, 
causing disappointment and embarrassment for Saudi Arabia (Long 1985 p.120).  
 
3.2.3.3 The PRC, ROC and KSA 
Taiwan continued to enjoy strong relations with Saudi Arabia, as seen in the large 
number of bilateral official visits throughout this period. These visits also signified the 
diversity of their cooperation, ranging from cultural, economic, trade, and technical to 
agricultural. Anti-communism signified a primary and common concern for Taiwan and 
Saudi Arabia. Saudi policy actions in defending Taiwan against the communist mainland 
will be focused in this sub-section. 
 
The ideological factor infused Saudi foreign policy towards Taiwan. The Kingdom 
advocated a policy that heavily favoured the interest of Taiwan, on the ground that it was 
fighting against communism. In January 1971, King Faisal and Shih Wan-Ying, a chief 
of the ROC Hajj mission to Jeddah, held a dialogue wherein the King delivered his 
commitment to fight against communism and to support the ROC. ‘Now we are facing 
two major enemies-Communism and Zionism. ... Your country and ours have common 
interests, and share the responsibility of protecting the peace and justice. …We believe 
that you will surely eliminate the Communists and recover the China mainland at an early 
date. …’ (Ma 1988 p.96).  
 
King Faisal extended his unwavering support to Taipei, and assuring the country that the 
Kingdom would not follow the footsteps of the US if the latter normalized its relations 
with the PRC. On May 17, 1971, King Faisal made a state visit to Taipei. During this 
visit, the King emphasised a number of important points, including full support for and a 
sharing of common objectives with the ROC in struggling against communism. The King 
assured the president that Saudi Arabia would not grant any recognition to the PRC. This 
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visit signified the Kingdom’s commitment to preserving diplomatic relations with the 
ROC (Ma 1988 p.123)  
 
In 1971, President Nixon announced Kissinger’s visit to Peking, which attempted to 
normalize relations between the US and the PRC. The PRC gained UN membership, and 
occupying a permanent seat in the UN, on October 25, 1971, while the ROC was 
removed from membership. Although this situation brought humiliation to the ROC, the 
US retained its diplomatic relations. Eventually, the ROC terminated the diplomatic 
relations, and this was followed by the establishment of trade centres and cultural centres 
-  as in other countries that had granted the PRC such recognition (Crozier and Chou 
1977 p.384). 
 
Despite the death of the two great leaders, King Faisal and President Chiang Kai-Shek, in 
1975, the bilateral links remained strong. The shared interest between the two countries 
continued. On July 10, 1977, Saudi Arabia received a state visit from the new Taiwan 
president, Yen Chia-kan. The president emphasized a shared belief in anti-communism. 
In a speech delivered during this visit, King Khalid (successor to King Faisal) also 
guaranteed a continuation of cooperation between the two countries and ensured that the 
ROC would receive an adequate oil supply. The King also conveyed his satisfaction with 
the ROC’s assistance in industrial and construction sectors in Saudi Arabia (Ma 1988 
p.129).  
 
3.3 The PRC and KSA, 1978-1989 
3.3.1 The PRC and the World, 1978-1989 
China actively promoted and pursued its policy objectives – ‘the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence’ and ‘opposition to hegemony’ – in its bilateral relations with the 
major powers in the period between 1978 and 1989. The PRC officially received 
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diplomatic recognition from the US on January 1, 1979, and yet the Taiwan issue still 
stood as a huge barrier in their bilateral relations. With regard to China’s relations with 
the Soviet Union, the Beijing-Moscow relationship began to improve after having 
experienced strain and tension for approximately 20 years. The two countries officially 
normalized bilateral relations in 1989 and politically and economically fostered mutual 
cooperation throughout the decade. The central focus of the following analysis is the 
development of China-American bilateral relations and the re-establishment of China-
Soviet relations in the 1980s. Since the economic agenda was one of the underlying 
factors in China’s relations with the major powers, the economic reforms in China will be 
emphasized. The Chinese economy underwent major developments when Deng Xiaoping 
introduced an ‘open door policy’ and his Four Modernizations program.  
 
3.3.1.1 The PRC and the US 
The Washington policies on the Taiwan issue constantly challenged the US-Beijing 
relationship. In 1979, Washington passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which 
authorised the resumption of American military aid to Taiwan as well as the development 
of US-Taiwan economic, political and cultural links. The new US president, Ronald 
Reagan, did not accept the legitimacy of the 1971 Shanghai Communiqué and was 
determined to supply Taiwan with US military arms (Tucker 1991 p.87).  
 
In the ensuing years, nonetheless, the Reagan administration gradually improved its 
relations with Beijing because it believed that Beijing had the ability to limit Soviet 
power. To initiate this significant change and improvement, Washington had to redesign 
its policies towards Taiwan in an attempt to quell a long-standing controversy with the 
PRC.  On August 17, 1982, the two countries issued a joint communiqué that outlined 
China’s clear commitment to achieving reunification with Taiwan through peaceful 
means. The US also gradually decreased its arms sales to Taiwan. However, the US 
technological transfer to Taiwan was still taking place, and this development encouraged 
the production of advanced military weapons in Taiwan (Tucker 1991 p.87). 
87 
 
 
Deng Xiaoping recognised the importance of deepening China’s relations with the US, 
which mainly stemmed out of a need to accelerate domestic economic reform. China 
intended to take full advantage of the advanced technology of the US in order to pursue 
and support its Four Modernizations program (Hunter and Sexton 1999 p.184). Since the 
establishment of the Beijing-Washington relationship, the US had been one of the major 
investors in China. At the same time, China’s trade volume to the US had been 
progressively increasing.  
 
3.3.1.2 The PRC and the Soviet Union 
In April 1979, the Fifth National People’s Congress decided not to renew the Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between China and the Soviet Union that 
was ratified on February 14, 1950 and would expire on April 11, 1980. This decision 
given as justification as a direct response to the expansionist policy and hegemonic 
behaviour of the Soviet Union (Xinhua General News Service 04.04.79). In the same 
year, China also attacked Vietnam (the Soviet’s ally), an action clearly putting China in 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
 
As a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Deng Xiaoping called upon 
all countries to criticise the Soviet expansionist policy. He strongly condemned the Soviet 
Union for destabilizing the international system, and stated, ‘the Soviet Union is the main 
source of a turbulent international situation and a threat to peace and security’ (Xinhua 
General News Service 08.01.80). 
 
In 1982, however, Deng Xiaoping began to see the need to improve China’s relations 
with Moscow and he indirectly stated this intention: ‘it is imperative to take a big move’. 
The reason China favoured this approach was due to the gradual weakening of Soviet 
power in Afghanistan since the 1979 invasion. In rebuilding its relations with Moscow, 
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China needed to overcome three principal obstacles: the huge presence of Soviet military 
troops on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders, the Soviet support of Vietnam, 
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Xinhua General News Service 20.02.98). 
 
In 1986, the First Vice Premier of the Soviet Union, Nikolai Talyzin, stressed the 
accelerated development of Sino-Soviet political relations. He stated that joint political 
consultations had frequently occurred between the two countries (Xinhua General News 
Service 21.09.86).In trade, the two countries had achieved fully satisfactory progress. 
From 1986 to 1988, the bilateral trade between the two countries accounted for 20 
percent of China’s total trade. By 1989, the Soviet Union had become one of China’s 
main trading partners (Xinhua General News Service 11.05.89). 
 
During the Sino-Soviet Summit in May 1989, Deng Xiaoping officially announced a 
normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet government reportedly pledged that 
the new Sino-Soviet relationship would see neither a repeat of their relations in the 1950s 
nor the open confrontation witnessed between the two countries in the 1960s and the 
1970s. The two countries also pledged not to interfere with the relations each had 
established with other countries (Xinhua General News Service 18.01.89) 
 
3.3.1.3 The PRC and Economic Reform 
The Chinese economy had previously been framed around a planned economic system, 
which had been markedly influenced by Soviet policies on economic development, 
particularly during the Stalin era, and by Maoist notions of the Great Leap Forward and 
the Cultural Revolution (White 1988 p. 82).When Deng Xiaoping came into power, 
China’s economy began to change. Deng, who was widely known as ‘the chief architect 
of China’s economic reform’ (Bader 1997 p. 71), started to transform the Chinese 
economy into a socialist market economy. His popular slogan was ‘market economy with 
socialist characteristics’. Deng pursued his economic reform agenda, though it was 
criticised by orthodox Party officials who were concerned that the reforms would 
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minimize the Party’s influence over the economy and introduce foreign influence into the 
country (Bader 1997 p.71). 
 
In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping announced an ‘open door policy’, seen a viable 
strategy in liberalizing Chinese domestic economy. This new policy invited new trading 
partners from the West, stimulated a massive flow of foreign investments and business 
into the country, and involved access to foreign resources, technology, and expertise 
(Bader 1997 p.71). More autonomy was given to public and private companies, allowing 
the economy to act on market forces rather than carrying out the government’s command 
(Bader 1997 p.71). 
 
Deng launched the Four Modernizations program for China’s economy, which mostly 
focused on the modernization of China’s agriculture, industry, national defence and 
science and technology. It was argued that the success of this modernization rested on 
four fundamental principles:  ‘ socialist path, people’s democratic centralism, communist 
party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought’ (Chang 1988 p.48). The 
program was originally conceived by Zhou Enlai and was later presented in a Report on 
the Work of the Government in January 1975. Zhou Enlai claimed that the idea had 
begun to grow in 1964, and had drawn support from Mao (Goodman 1994 p. 81). 
 
Modernization in the Industrial Sector. The extensive changes of the industrial 
sector were reflected in enterprises, labour, and price control. The changes were 
made necessary by a domestic economic environment characterized the following 
factors: an increasing number of small and household enterprises which 
continually posed a competitive threat to state enterprises; foreign investors 
preferring to hire unemployed people rather than those who were working with 
the state enterprises; and the Chinese government becoming aware of the heavy 
cost of price control. Thus, Deng Xiaoping decided to end the price control 
system in the following year (Cheung 1998 p.126).  
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Modernization in the Agricultural Sector. The Chinese government introduced 
a ‘responsibility system’ in the agricultural sector, which aimed to reform the 
‘collectivist agrarian structure’ that had been in effect since the Mao era (Blecher 
1988). In the new system, a contract was concluded between the government and 
a household or an organization. The individual would be entirely responsible for 
the production activities and would pay dues (taxes) to the government and collect 
the remaining income.  
 
The government implemented affirmative-action policies to assure the ultimate 
success of this reform. Nevertheless, some socialist elements still remained. The 
government enforced the ‘depoliticization’ of the rural economy by eradicating all 
class labels, dividing the political and economic institutions, and ending the 
commune system (Blecher 1988). The government also introduced some 
restrictions in the early part of 1980s, yet these were then gradually removed 
(Cheung  1998 p.126). A responsibility system within China, on the other hand, 
also retained and respected the rights of state over the land, which signified that 
socialist ideology was being espoused. This system could be depicted as the 
dominant element of Deng Xiaoping’s concept of ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’.  
 
Modernization in Science and Technology. Research and Development (R&D) 
was being conducted extensively since technology served as the backbone of 
China’s modernization of industry, agriculture, and national defence (Conroy 
1988 p.128). The Chinese government offered attractive incentives to the foreign 
firms in order to increase the influx of foreign technology into the country.  
 
Modernization in National Defence.  The People Liberation’s Army underwent 
some significant changes. Its military doctrine, previously known as the ‘people’s 
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war’, changed to the ‘people’s war under modern conditions’. The modernization 
of Chinese National Defence will next be observed from two functional aspects: 
military personnel and military technology.  
 
As a strategic move towards the professional development of the military forces, 
the modernization program was designed to enhance necessary qualifications 
among members of the PLA, and to diversify and increase the army’s roles. 
Military officers, moreover, were required to graduate from military academies, 
and maximize ‘the use of electronic and laser simulation appliances, and 
automated command system’ (Xinhua General News Service 23.06.87). 
 
In describing China's military strength, the Minister of National Defence, Zhang 
Aiping, agreed that China's military technology was comparatively low, stating, 
‘we are far behind the developed countries in terms of the quality of weapons’ 
(Xinhua General News Service 23.06.87). However, the positive achievements of 
the PLA since the implementation of the reform, he said, were remarkable. The 
Minister stated: ‘Now, China has built its own defence research and military 
production systems, and has solved problems with the weapons, both 
conventional and sophisticated, for its ground troops, navy and air force, as well 
as in strategic nuclear missiles’ (Xinhua General News Service 23.06.87). 
 
3.3.2 The PRC and the Middle East, 1978-1989 
China remained an ardent supporter of the Palestinian cause and the Arab countries in 
fighting against Israeli occupation. Its support took various forms, including financial and 
military assistance. China had built a strong link with Palestinian movement and 
therefore, denied ‘unfounded rumours’ about it having relations with Israel. However, at 
the end of the 1980s, China began to establish informal relations with Israel. The Chinese 
relationship with Arab countries directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  In the 
context of the Iran-Iraq war, the Chinese government took a neutral and anti-war 
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position. The Chinese leaders denied the sale of China’s weapons to Iran, although it was 
frequently claimed that China had been engaged in such business with both sides. 
 
3.3.2.1 The Arab-Israeli Conflict 
China and Palestine. Over this period, the Chinese government maintained its strong 
stand, or giving its full backing to the Palestinians and (until the end of the period) 
rejecting relations with Israel. China maintained constant contact with Palestinian 
officials and movements. The political delegations of the two sides frequently made 
exchange visits. In a meeting with a delegation of the Palestine National Council in 
November 1979, Chairman Hua Guofeng outlined ‘China’s three-point principle’ in 
resolving the Middle East issue and stated: ‘the Palestinian people must realize their 
national rights ... ; the people of the Arab countries must recover their lost territories; the 
Middle East question must be solved in an all-round, impartial way’ (Xinhua General 
News Service 22.11.79). Giving his support to the Palestinians, the Chairman said, ‘your 
struggle will surely be crowned with victory so long as you close your ranks and keep on 
fighting. Your cause is just, and a just cause is impregnable’(Xinhua General News 
Service 22.11.79). 
 
In August 1980, the Chinese government released a Communiqué regarding the Arab-
Israeli conflict wherein it expressed its intention to pursue China-Palestinian military 
cooperation and enjoined Israel to grant the rights of Arab states and Palestinians. The 
communiqué called for possible joint efforts in developing a ‘militant friendship’ 
between the Chinese and the Palestinians; called on Israel to evacuate the occupied Arab 
lands and to recognise the rights of the Palestinians and their state; and expressed 
condemnation over Israeli aggression and expansion (Xinhua General News Service 
27.08.80). 
 
The Chinese government and associated organizations offered political, financial and 
military support to the Palestinians. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the 
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China Youth Federation were among the societies that provided this financial support 
(Xinhua General News Service 04.10.85). In November 1987, the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) and the Palestine Communist Party established official relations (Xinhua 
General News Service 28.11.87). 
 
China and Israel.  Israel had been working to forge bilateral relations with China, and 
yet this effort was in vain: China rigorously upheld its decision not to engage in official 
relations with Israel, though Israeli authorities had sought American assistance in 
expressing Israel’s  intention to develop a Sino-Israeli diplomatic relationship in the late 
1970s. China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Song Zhiguang, dismissed an unsubstantiated 
rumour that China had entered into relations with Israel.  He claimed that this rumour was 
intended to cause profound disagreement between China and the Arab states. The 
Minister reiterated the Chinese posture towards Israel and reinforced the continuing 
reluctance of the Chinese government to establish bilateral contact with Israel. He stated, 
‘We are resolutely opposed to the Israeli practice of aggression and expansion against 
Arab States and its occupation of a portion of Arab territory. Since the 1950s, Israel has 
sought contact with us but has met with our categorical refusal’ (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts 10.05.79). 
 
In 1985, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, denied a rumour concerning political, 
economic and military relations between his country and Israel. He said that this claim 
was a ‘groundless’ report of the media (Xinhua General News Service 16.12.85). 
Furthermore, China’s President, Yang Shangkun, laid down a specific condition if Israel 
wanted to develop diplomatic relations with China: ‘China could only consider 
establishing diplomatic relations with Israel when the Jewish state changes its present 
intransigent policy’ (Xinhua General News Service 19.12.89). 
 
In July 1985, the spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry refuted a wide-spread rumour 
that alleged secret arms deals between the PRC and the Israeli government. This rumour, 
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which was circulating in Western press reports, sought to damage Chinese relations with 
the Palestinian movements and the Arab states. He reiterated the Chinese government’s 
decision not to cultivate any relations with Israel (Xinhua General News Service 
31.07.85).In 1986, the Chinese government denied the purchase of Israeli weapons 
valued at USD 3 billion (Xinhua General News Service 10.12.86). 
 
At the end of the 1980s, some developments did occur in Sino-Israeli contacts: the two 
countries established an unofficial contact for scientific and cultural exchange and an 
Israeli Academic Representation Office was opened in Beijing in 1988, which facilitated 
Sino-Israeli unofficial bilateral contact (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 13.10.88). In 
October 1988, Israel Radio reported that an Israeli delegation would visit China, 
discussing the purchasing of Chinese coal. China would also despatch its first official 
trade, industrial and banking delegation to Israel in November of the same year (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 14.10.88). 
 
China and Egypt. When the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was ratified in 1979, China 
retained its bilateral relation with Egypt, rather than follow the Arab countries which 
suspended their relations with Egypt. China’s Vice-Foreign Minister, He Ying, 
nonetheless, made it clear that China continued to support “the struggle of the Egyptian, 
Arab and Palestinian people”. China’s Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, asserted China’s 
strong support of all efforts aimed at protecting ‘...the national rights of the Arab and 
Palestinian people...’ (Xinhua General News Service 19.12.85). 
 
The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Esmat Abdul Meguid, responded by hailing the Chinese 
call for Arab unity and saying that China and Egypt agreed to restore the rights of the 
Palestinians. He further claimed that Egypt would keep a critical eye on Israel though the 
two countries had reached a peace agreement.   
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Lebanon.  
China advocated a zero-tolerance policy towards Israeli expansionism. China voted for 
the UN Security Council Resolution that condemned Israeli incursion into Lebanon in 
April 1980. In July 1981, China established diplomatic relations with Lebanon. The Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Canming, delivered a statement criticising of the 
Israeli attack on Beirut, a Palestinian camp, and the PLO offices (Xinhua General News 
Service 20.07.81). 
 
When Lebanon was invaded by Israel in 1982, China strongly condemned the US and 
Israel. The Chinese government criticised the US because the latter was seen as a 
principal patron of the Israeli invasion. Through the Beijing Review, China also criticised 
Israel, believing that Israeli authorities would use Lebanon in a decisive step to seize 
further Arab lands (in Harris 1993 p.214), and repeatedly urged Israeli military troops to 
leave Lebanon. In addition, China’s Charge d’Affaires in Lebanon, Yang Yihuai, 
extended the Chinese government’s support concerning the bitter struggle of the 
Lebanese government and people in safeguarding the sovereignty of the country. China 
solidly backed the initiatives of Arab states in resolving the conflict in Lebanon. 
 
Lebanon had its own internal and unresolved problem: the disunity and factionalism 
among the Lebanese and the conflict between the Shia community and the Palestinians. 
Against this backdrop, China kept calling for the conflicting parties in Lebanon to pursue 
a gradual integration, cease the ongoing war and reform Lebanese domestic politics. 
China appreciated the moves taken by the mediating committee of the Arab League, who 
attempting to solve the Lebanese issue. China hoped that the Lebanese could reconcile 
their differences and disputes so as to restore stability and achieve national unity (Xinhua 
General News Service 02.02.89) 
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Syria.  
China’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict remained steady: criticizing Israeli 
aggression while defending the rights of the Arab states. In 1979, China lent its support to 
a Syrian effort to secure the return of the Golan Heights and other occupied areas. In 
1982, China condemned Israel for its annexation of the Golan Heights, and favoured the 
imposition of UN sanctions against Israel. In 1985, China hailed Syria’s efforts to force 
the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, seeking a peaceful resolutions of conflict 
among the groupings in Lebanon, and restoring stability within the country (Xinhua 
General News Service 18.12.85).  In 1987, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang expressed his 
appreciation of the constant struggle of the Syrian people fighting against Israeli 
aggression and US involvement in the Middle East.  
 
3.3.2.2 Iran-Iraq War 
China and Iran. The Chinese leader took a cautious stance on the Iran-Iraq war. In 1980, 
Premier Zhao Ziyang recognized the equal importance of Iran and Iraq to China, and said 
that these two countries were ‘...friendly countries to China...’, and part of the third 
world. He expressed his hope that the two warring countries would diplomatically solve 
the conflict through negotiations (Xinhua General News Service 24.09.80). 
 
China was said to be supplying Iran with ‘...anti-aircraft missiles, artillery pieces, anti-
ship missiles, gun barrels and ammunition..’ (The New York Times 19.05.87), 
conventional weapons and technology. Although some of these weapons were 
categorised as older, less expensive, and low-tech weapons, Chinese military technology 
was capable of producing non-conventional weapons, which were referred to as nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons, and fears were raised about these. 
 
Sino-Iranian arms transactions brought criticism from the US and the Arab states. When 
the US demanded a halt to arms exports to Iran, China was said to have ignored US 
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pressure (Federal News Service 12.09.96). In 1987, when the SS-N-2 missile was (it was 
reported) sold to Iran, an Arab League delegation visited China and exhorted the limit of 
sophisticated weaponry exports to Iran.   
 
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang denied the accusation that China had been exporting its 
military weapons to Iran. The Premier said that no Chinese weapons or missiles were 
sold to Iran and claimed that China had focused on ending the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, 
no arms that would hinder the ongoing effort towards this reconciliation would be 
secured. He said that appropriate measures were being enforced to prevent any of China’s 
weapons from reaching Iran or Iraq (Xinhua General News Service 28.09.87). 
 
China and Iraq. Relations between China and Iraq, begun in 1958, were actively 
fostered over this period. China’s Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, stated that China-Iraq 
bilateral relations were part of the Chinese policy of opening up to the world and 
deepening its relations with third world nations. China sold its weapons to Iraq during the 
Iran-Iraq War. In 1981-82, China’s arms exports to Iraq were comprised of bombers and 
tanks (The New York Times 19.05.87). 
 
As noted above, China adopted an ‘independent policy’, and ‘neutral stance’ towards the 
Iran-Iraq War (Harris 1993 p. 221). In 1987, China urged a reconciliation between the 
two countries. In 1989, China’s Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, enjoined Iraq and Iran to 
break a lengthy deadlock in peace talks. To indicate China’s position of fully supporting 
the UN peace initiative, the Chinese government pressed both warring states to adopt the 
UN (ceasefire) Resolution 598. 
 
3.3.3 The PRC and the KSA, 1978-1989 
The purpose of this section is to critically examine a number of key questions. The 
analysis begins by attempting to determine whether there was any consistency in Chinese 
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and Saudi foreign policies on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and 
the conflict in Lebanon. The questions which follow are: How did the two countries 
cultivate bilateral and informal relations in the period before diplomatic relations had 
been established? Did the diplomatic relations between China and other Arab Gulf states 
positively encourage the establishment of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations? Were there 
any reliable indicators that suggested the growing importance of Sino-Saudi economic 
engagement? Did Muslim communities in China play an important role in the 
development of Riyadh-Beijing relations? Finally, how did the Sino-Saudi missile deal 
accelerate the progress of establishing diplomatic relations? 
 
The US-Saudi Arabian relations were critical, through negative reaction to the 
establishment of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations. The US resistance to selling its Lance 
(ground-to-ground missiles) to the Kingdom was responsible for Saudi Arabia’s 
acquisition of missiles from China. A detailed analysis of this development is a focus of 
one of the sub-topics covered in this chapter.  
 
3.3.3.1 Similarities and Variations between China and Saudi Arabia’s Middle East 
Foreign Policies 
China and Saudi Arabia had similar perceptions over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and provided solid backing for the Afghans people, who fought against the Soviet troops. 
Although they lent their full support, China and Saudi Arabia considered different factors 
when shaping their policy behaviour towards Afghanistan. The two countries were 
criticized by the Kabul regime due to their alleged involvement in Afghan domestic 
affairs. At the end of the 1980s, however, China and Saudi Arabia gained immense 
satisfaction when the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its troops from Afghan soil. 
 
If China took a neutral stance in the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia gave support to Iraq. To 
end the war, China and Saudi Arabia employed a common means: using a diplomatic 
channel to engage regional and international organizations to bring about peace. 
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Concerning the Lebanon crisis, China and Saudi Arabia urged the conflicting parties to 
solve the crisis and  rendered various forms of substantial assistance to the Lebanese. The 
Chinese and Saudi policies towards Lebanon, laid stress on defending the sovereignty 
and independence of Lebanon. 
 
The Soviet Union Invasion of Afghanistan. The Chinese and Saudi governments had a 
parallel perspective on the Afghan conflict. They vigorously rejected the Soviet invasion 
and heavily criticised the Soviet policy behaviour towards Afghanistan from a vantage 
point of international law. The Saudi government denounced a direct result of this 
invasion, namely the installation of a new regime. It said that the military intervention 
clearly violated ‘international law and practices’ since the Soviet Union had interfered in 
the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, denied Afghans their rights, and contravened the 
sovereignty and independent state of Afghanistan (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
31.12.79). It also considered the new regime of Afghanistan to be an illegal regime 
because the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had deployed foreign 
military troops in order to gain power in the country (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
08.04.81). Based on these justifications, the Kingdom eventually severed its diplomatic 
relation with Afghanistan in April 1981.  
 
China’s deep objection to the Soviet invasion emerged at many levels. Most criticism 
centred on the demand to restore the complete freedom of Afghanistan from foreign 
involvement. In December 1982, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with 
Foreign Countries, and the Islamic Association of China, called for an unconditional 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union since the invasion openly flouted the UN Charter and 
international law, and denied the right of Afghan refugees to return to their land (Xinhua 
General News Service 25.12.82). In July 1983, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, 
stressed that the retreat of Soviet troops would return the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Afghanistan (Xinhua General News Service 29.07.83). In November 1984, 
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the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN, Ling Qing, also urged the departure of 
the Soviet troops and the independence and non-alignment of Afghanistan (Xinhua 
General News Service 15.11.84). Chinese President, Li Xiannian, said that the Afghan 
issue would be politically resolved if the Soviet forces were withdrawn from the country. 
He also emphasised that superpower rivalry was the key factor of the Afghan issue 
(Xinhua General News Service 05.03.84). The Chinese government, moreover, urged for 
the attainment of an ‘independent, neutral and non-aligned’ state of Afghanistan, and an 
unconditional and a complete departure of the Soviet forces (Xinhua General News 
Service 23.09.87). 
 
The offering of unwavering support and solid backing to the Afghans during the period of 
the Soviet invasion reflected a common interest of Saudi and Chinese policies towards 
Afghanistan. This support, however, was built on different grounds; the Kingdom’s 
policy was fostered by ‘a spirit stemming from its Islamic position’(BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 08.04.81), whereas China was inspired by its own protracted struggle 
against hegemonic powers. Saudi Information Minister, Dr. Muhammad Abduh Yamani, 
viewed the Soviet infiltration of Afghanistan as an aggression against all Muslims. He 
stressed that the Kingdom would cooperate with other Muslim states in building up firm 
support and practical assistance to Muslims in Afghanistan. Dr. Yamani stated: ‘We and 
the free people of the world, especially the Muslims and Arabs, will not remain silent 
about the aggression in Afghanistan’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 16.02.80). The 
Saudi support for the Afghan resistance was very much appreciated by the latter. In 1987, 
Golboddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e Eslami, expressed gratitude for the Saudi 
role in leading the support of Islamic countries for the Mujahidin (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 25.04.87).  
 
China was known for its strong resistance against ‘hegemonism and expansionism’, and 
this basic principle clearly embodied the Chinese stance on the Afghan issue (Xinhua 
General News Service 21.02.85).  The struggle of the Afghans against the Soviet troops 
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deserved ‘sympathy and support’ from countries and people who explicitly demanded 
justice and peace (Xinhua General News Service 23.12.87).  
 
There were media reports of an alliance through which Beijing and Riyadh rendered 
essential aid and assistance to Afghans. An ABC News report claimed that an anti-Soviet 
alliance had been forged and joined by Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan and Egypt. The 
alliance was said to have been cooperating with the US, and to have armed the resistance 
groups in Afghanistan with military weapons: ‘Saudi Arabia provided additional aid, 
Egypt helped train the rebels, China agreed to facilitate the flow of arms to Afghanistan 
and also to supply hand-held SAM missiles and anti-tank weapons, and Pakistan agreed 
to allow the weapons to flow through its country at the rate of two plane loads per week’  
(United Press International 19.06.81).   
 
The continuing support of the Chinese and Saudi governments to the Afghans was 
objected to publicly by the Kabul regime. This support was seen as meddling in Afghan 
domestic affairs and entering a war against the regime. In February 1985, China 
Permanent Representative to the UN, Ling  Qing, rebuffed ‘a note of protest’ from the 
Afghan regime that accused China of interfering in Afghan domestic issues, waging 
‘undeclared war’ against Afghan authorities, sending Chinese trainers and advisors to 
training sites in Pakistan, and moving some of the camps to China. Ling Qing said that 
these allegations were baseless, and were being used to purposely to divert world 
intention away from the foreign intervention in Afghanistan (Xinhua General News 
Service 23.02.85). As for the case of Saudi Arabia, in March 1989, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of  Afghanistan lodged a protest against the Saudi 
government for recognizing and providing financial assistance for the interim 
government  that was known to be ‘a Wahhabi government of the people of Afghanistan’.  
Against this backdrop, the Kingdom was accused of waging an ongoing war that killed 
‘tens of thousands’ of Afghans (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 15.03.89). In the 
following month, the Kingdom explained that its support of the Afghan Mujahidin was in 
the form of humanitarian measures, food and medical assistance, and that it was 
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considered part of Islamic duty to help Afghan people seek their independence. The 
Kingdom denied its involvement in the Afghan war against the current Kabul government 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 21.04.89). 
 
The Chinese and Saudi governments hailed the decision of the Soviet Union to pull its 
troops out of Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia made a meaningful contribution to the settlement 
of the Afghanistan crisis, and become inevitably involved in the peace negotiation. 
Meanwhile, China was satisfied with the Geneva Accord and fully anticipated a 
successful political outcome in Afghanistan. China voiced its support of the accord, and 
viewed this progress as a ‘positive development’. A Foreign Ministry spokesman viewed 
the accord as a significant victory for Afghans who had bitterly fought against the Soviet 
troops. The victory was also for those countries that upheld ‘the established norms and 
values that regulated international relations’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
18.04.88). Li Peng also hoped that ‘a broad-based coalition government’ would be 
installed in Afghanistan (Xinhua General News Service 15.11.89). As for the case of 
Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom hosted a meeting between the Soviet First Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Yuliy Voronstov, and the Chairman of the Islamic Alliance of the Mujahidin of 
Afghanistan, Prof. Borhanoddin Rabani, in December 1988. In this meeting, the Soviet 
Union announced its fateful decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Yuli 
Vorontsov acknowledged the Kingdom’s role in restoring peace in Afghanistan (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 07.12.88). The Saudi government extended its clear 
appreciation regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops and anticipated that this initiative 
would improve relations between the Soviet Union and the Islamic World (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 11.04.89). 
 
Iran-Iraq War. China did not indicate an alignment in the Iran-Iraq war, whereas Saudi 
Arabia adopted a strong position in supporting Iraq. The articulation of Beijing and 
Riyadh policy objectives regarding this war, moreover, were based on different 
approaches. Whereas China set its policy objective on the basis of a global perspective, 
Saudi policy stemmed from its regional perspective. The Kingdom supported Iraq on the 
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basis of ‘Arab and Islamic ties (and)…neighbourliness’. Chubin and Tripp (1996) explain 
in their work that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states believed that this war could make 
Iran aware of the limitation of its power, and thus become a peaceful state in the region. 
They wanted to prevent Iran from  invading the states in the Gulf and the Arab World 
through its agenda of an ‘Islamic Revolution’. The Chinese government, through its 
representative to the UN, Ling Qing, contended that there should be no fundamental and 
sharp differences between Iraq and Iran since the two countries were part of the third 
world. These countries, he added, should initiate ‘peaceful negotiation’ in order to end 
the war (Xinhua General News Service 13.07.82). It should be noted that the promotion 
of third world unity was one of the decisive elements of Chinese foreign policy. In 
December 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang had put forward the concept of third world unity 
and two other underlying principles of China’s foreign policy: ‘opposition to 
hegemonism and defence of world peace; strengthening of solidarity and cooperation 
with other third world countries; and development of relations with various countries, 
including the United States and the Soviet Union, on the basis of the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence’ (Xinhua General News Service 27.12.82).  The Premier urged Iran 
and Iraq to quickly end their war.  
 
The maritime navigation of the Gulf was of concern to both China and Saudi Arabia. The 
two countries noted that the security threat in the Gulf directly affected their trade. To 
counter the threat, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states requested the presence of foreign 
military units at specific locations. By contrast, China insisted on an end to the war 
because it opposed the intervention of foreign powers in the region. The particular Sino-
Saudi concern about the maritime security of the Gulf began with the tanker war that 
started in April 1984. Iraq had attacked the Iranian terminal located in Khark, and this 
was followed by an Iranian blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. Iran attempted to block 
tankers of the Gulf states that transported oil.  
 
The attempted blockade carried negative implications for the Gulf economies, and, as a 
result, naval forces from the Western countries were sent to the area. In 1987, the Gulf 
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waters saw the presence of ‘40 American ships [carrying] 20,000  troops’ (Furtig 2002 
p.68). Ambassador Mi, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, articulated 
China’s concern related to the attacks on both ‘oil tanker and ships’ that sailed across the 
Gulf region. The ambassador stressed the need to respect China’s equal rights to use the 
high seas in the Gulf and to facilitate trade (Xinhua General News Service 02.06.84). In a 
meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, in  Beijing, Chinese 
President Li Xiannian called for the ending of war so as to stop the superpowers’ 
increasing involvement in the  region. He insisted that only the ‘countries along the Gulf 
coast’ should engage in the resolution of the Gulf problem (Xinhua General News 
Service13.06.87). 
 
The Chinese and Saudi approaches to ending the war were rather similar. The two 
countries sought diplomatic avenues and the collaborative effort of members of 
international and regional organizations to achieve peace. The Kingdom used the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as a platform from which to seek a 
mediating role to end the war. In May 1981, the Kingdom led moves which established 
the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), forging a tight link among the six Gulf states who 
were not at war.  
 
China remained firm regarding its ‘neutral position’ while encouraging the warring 
parties to initiate a reconciliation process. The Chinese government had high hopes that 
the two countries would take a ‘conciliatory stand’ to their conflict. The stand was seen 
as ‘the only correct position for all the third world countries to adopt’ (Xinhua General 
News Service 12.11.84). China’s Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, stressed China’s neutral 
position in the war and its serious commitment to establish peace in the region in order to 
deter their common enemies. Ambassador Li Luye remarked that the war would threaten 
regional ‘peace and security’ and become another ‘destabilizing actor’ for global 
development (Xinhua General News Service 08.10.86). He stated that the Chinese 
government consistently supported UN efforts to settle this dispute (Xinhua General 
News Service 04.04.85). China’s Foreign Minister also expressed his grave concern over 
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the ongoing Iran-Iraq war and insisted that both parties prevent any actions that might 
escalate the heated dispute (Xinhua General News Service 14.08.86). 
 
China voted in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution that demanded that the 
warring parties secure an immediate ceasefire and enter into peaceful negotiation.  
According to China’s ambassador, Huang Jiahua, China worked diligently as a 
permanent member of the UN towards an effective termination of the war (Xinhua 
General News Service 20.07.87). In October 1988, during a meeting with Iranian deputy 
Foreign Minister, Mohammad Hussein Lavasani, China’s Premier Li Peng voiced the 
Chinese government’s contentment when Iran and Iraq accepted UN Resolution 598 and 
the ceasefire agreement (Xinhua General News Service 24.10.88). The Chinese 
government took part in  follow-up discussions over this resolution.  
 
Conflict in Lebanon. Both Saudi Arabia and China had diplomatic relations with 
Lebanon, and their support and cooperation with this country were built on a shared 
common ground;  preserving of the sovereignty and independence of an Arab state.  As 
for Saudi Arabia, its importance and role in resolving the Lebanese crisis was politically 
crucial. As argued by Haddad (1985), it was based on three guiding principles: ‘the 
preservation of Arab unity and consensus, [the] freedom of Lebanon and all its 
communities, and the absolute right of the legitimate  Lebanese government to decide 
what is best for Lebanon’ (p. 98). Meanwhile, China reaffirmed its support for Lebanon 
on the ground of the just cause of the Palestinians and Arabs, who painstakingly fought 
for their ‘rights, independence and sovereignty’ (Xinhua General News Service 08.06.82). 
 
Reconciling the differences and quelling the factional fighting required Saudi and 
Chinese actions which were of a similar nature. The Saudi government appealed to the 
Lebanese groups to end their dispute, and insisted on their seeking to practice common 
sense and self-restraint, as well as hold ‘a constructive dialogue’ among themselves. The 
Kingdom also pledged to help Lebanon in every aspect, including facilitating unity 
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among population (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 09.04.81). On September 26, 
1983, the Kingdom succeeded in mediating and concluding a ceasefire agreement among 
the conflicting parties. This development led to the next stage of national dialogue 
(Haddad 1985). Through China’s Foreign Ministry, the Chinese government also 
appealed to the conflicting groups in Lebanon (the Lebanese Shiite ‘Amal Movement and 
the Palestinian forces) to stop fighting and reconcile their differences through peaceful 
means (Xinhua General News Service 25.05.85). A new Chinese ambassador to Lebanon, 
Wu Shunyu, also urged these factions to observe their national interest in narrowing their 
differences (Xinhua General News Service 04.10.85). 
 
Chinese and Saudi policy reactions towards Israeli invasion of Lebanon were developed 
in the following forms: the extension of strong support and firm commitment to Lebanon, 
the denunciation of Israeli expansionist policy, and the demand for Israeli withdrawal 
from Lebanon. The Chinese policy response towards the conflict was affirmative and 
consistent throughout the 1980s. In May 1981, China's Vice Premier, Li Peng, held a 
meeting with the Lebanese ambassador in Beijing, and voiced the concerns of his 
government and the Chinese people regarding the immediate situation in Lebanon, and 
expressed its sympathy for the suffering of the Lebanese and Palestinians. He further 
criticized Israel’s aggression in Lebanon (Xinhua General News Service 13.05.81). In a 
statement delivered by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1982, 
the Chinese government, in the context of the UN  resolution, denounced the Israeli 
invasion of southern Lebanon and Beirut, and demanded an unconditional and immediate 
withdrawal the aggressor (Xinhua General News Service 08.06.82). In August 1984, 
China's Ambassador to Lebanon, Yu Mengxin, reassured the Lebanese government that 
China would consistently maintain its stance demanding the retreat of Israeli military 
forces from Lebanon, and the restoration of the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Lebanon (Xinhua General News Service 24.08.84). China’s Vice-Foreign 
Minister, Qi Huaiyuan, China’s first high-ranking official to arrive in Lebanon since the 
war began seven years earlier, also condemned Israeli aggression against Lebanon and 
called for the departure of Israeli troops (Xinhua General News Service 13.10.86). In 
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January 1988, China’s Ambassador to Lebanon reasserted his government's posture of 
supporting the Lebanese government. The reiteration of the stance was an immediate 
response to the efforts of  Selim al-Hoss, who lodged an angry protest against Israel at the 
UN Security Council. Al Hoss was the acting Premier and Foreign Minister of Lebanon 
(Xinhua General News Service 06.01.88). 
 
Like China, Saudi Arabia condemned Israeli intervention and had already offered moral 
and technical assistance to Lebanon. In May 1981, for example, Saudi Arabia strongly 
criticized the Israeli aggression toward Lebanon. Simultaneously, the Saudi government 
reaffirmed its full support and firm commitment to empower legitimate Lebanese 
authorities and their Arab Deterrent Forces in preserving the independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Lebanon (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 19.05.81). 
 
There were a number of instances that showed how China and Saudi Arabia offered their 
financial, humanitarian and technical assistance to the Lebanese people. Their aid and 
assistance were substantial and reflected the generosity and goodwill of these two 
countries towards Lebanon. In June 1982, the Red Cross Society in China contributed ‘20 
tonnes of medicine and medical instruments’ to the Lebanese people (Xinhua General 
News Service 15.06.82). In February 1986, CYN 50,000 was sent to the Lebanese 
refugees in South Lebanon. This donation was made by China’s Red Cross (Xinhua 
General News Service 04.02.86). Saudi Arabia also delivered financial aid to the 
development of various projects in Southern Lebanon, including some for health centres 
and clinics. An amount of 100,000 (Lebanese) pounds was also donated to spiritual, 
charitable and social organizations in Lebanon (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
29.05.81). 
 
3.3.3.2 Towards the Establishment of Intergovernmental Contacts 
The visits and meetings between the Chinese and Saudi leaders and officials established 
unofficial relations between the two countries. These officials met at international events. 
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In the mid-1980s, however, informal Sino-Saudi relations were actively cultivated: the 
cooperation between the two countries progressively increased and contacts between the 
top-level officials were established. In 1988, the Chinese and Saudi governments 
eventually began to initiate collaborative efforts to develop diplomatic relations. After all, 
the direct contacts between the high-level officials of the two countries relatively 
involved a necessary element of complex interdependence (multiple channel) in the Sino-
Saudi unofficial ties. 
 
In the period 1978-1989, the basis for one of the characteristics of complex 
interdependence, (multiple channels), began to figure in Sino-Saudi relations: the high-
level officials of the two countries gradually made direct contacts. In the early 1980s, 
they met at international events. In the mid-1980s, Chinese and Saudi leaders had more 
direct communication. At the end of the decade, some practical initiatives to develop 
diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia began to take place. At the same 
time, the two countries secretly and actively negotiated the missile deal. 
 
The meeting of Chinese and Saudi high-level officials in the early 1980s revealed that the 
two countries were successfully cultivating unofficial relations between them. The Saudi 
intention to improve relations with China by way of a sports arena was expressed by 
Prince Fahad bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, Deputy Minister of Social Affairs of Saudi 
Arabia. On November 15, 1981, a meeting was convened between the Prince and Xu 
Yinsheng, Vice-Director of China’s National Sports Commission in Malaysia. The Prince 
expressed his hope that the football games held in Kuala Lumpur would ‘…further 
improve their relations’ (Xinhua General News Service 16.11.81). 
 
During the Cancun North-South Summit on November 17, 1981, as Tanzer (1982) 
highlights, Premier Zhao Ziyang was said to have shaken hands with Crown Prince Fahd 
(in Huwaidin 2002 p 218). This meeting was unofficial.The Kingdom subsequently 
reassured Taiwan that Saudi policy towards Beijing remained fully intact.  
109 
 
 
There was a high-level visit of Saudi official to China in December 1982. The intention 
behind the visit was to discuss regional issues and to ensure coordination over 
international organizations. Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal and seven other representatives from 
the Arab League made this visit, intending to explain the Palestinian problem and the 
result of the Fez Conference to the Chinese leaders. The Prince announced that this visit 
was worthwhile as the Chinese government would continue to extend its support to the 
Palestinian people (Xinhua General News Service 09.12.82). 
 
The two countries intensified an indirect contact that aimed to fulfil an aspiration of the 
international organization. In August 1984, another visit was made by a Saudi prince, 
which had come about through an official invitation from the Chinese National 
Committee. Prince Talal said that this visit had to do with his capacity as a Head of the 
Arab Gulf Development and a special envoy to the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF). In other words, the visit’s main focus was on the involved that reflected a 
certain degree of cooperation between UNICEF and the Chinese government (Xinhua 
General News Service 10.08.84). 
 
In terms of reflecting the relations between Saudi Arabia and China, Prince Talal’s 
statement seemed to indicate that the Sino-Saudi common concern for the children 
around the world would create an opportunity to understand the culture of the two 
countries. The Prince said: ‘there is no better cause to bring our two cultures closer than 
our mutual concern for children throughout the world’ (Xinhua General News Service 
10.08.84). The Prince also underscored the public perception of Saudi Arabia towards 
China, stating, ‘we in Saudi Arabia are considering China of the one billion as a friendly 
country’ (Xinhua General News Service 10.08.84). 
 
Signs of close contacts between Saudi and Chinese leaders could be observed from the 
middle of the 1980s, when the Saudi princes had more direct communication with the 
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Chinese leaders. The practical initiatives that the two countries undertook also seemed to 
encourage and promote the intensive efforts towards the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. 
 
In a celebration of Oman’s National Day in 1985, Saudi Crown Prince and first Deputy 
Prime Minister Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz had a discussion with Chinese Vice Premier, 
Yao Yilin.  They exchanged views on the issues pertaining to their particular concerns. 
The Chinese leader also extended China’s appreciation regarding Saudi support for the 
Palestinian cause (Xinhua General News Service 19.11.85). 
 
In 1987, several important events indicated a greater cooperation between the Saudi and 
Chinese high-ranking officials in the sport, science and trade sectors. In February, Prince 
Faisal met the visiting Chinese volleyball team and table tennis team in Riyadh. The 
Chinese teams had friendly matches with the Saudi teams (Xinhua General News Service 
04.02.87). During the sports event, the Prince said that the Kingdom’s team would make 
a return visit to China, which could lead to the establishment of  ‘bilateral sports 
relations’ between the two countries (Xinhua General News Service 03.02.87). 
 
In June of the same year, the ‘Saudi Arabia - Yesterday and Today’ exhibition was hosted 
in China, organized by Prince Salman Abdul Aziz, the Second  Deputy Prime Minister of 
Saudi Arabia. Prince Sultan bin Salman,  one of the Saudi delegates, expressed a hope 
that the Kingdom would establish scientific cooperation with China, especially in the area 
of space technology. He stated this during an interview with Xinhua News Agency 
(Xinhua General News Service 18.06.87). In November, at the invitation of Saudi Arabia, 
a Chinese entrepreneur delegation arrived in Riyadh and met with Prince Sultan bin 
Abdul Aziz. The Prince emphasized the significant progress of Sino-Saudi economic and 
trade relations and discussed the prospect of building cooperation in the industrial and 
labour sectors (Xinhua General News Service 24.11.87). 
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In April 1988, a discussion on developing diplomatic relations began to take place. 
China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Qi Huaiyuan, arrived in the Kingdom at the invitation of 
the Saudi government. He met with Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal, 
discussing  ‘bilateral relations and international issues of common concern’. He delivered 
an official letter from President Li Xiannian to King Fahd (Xinhua General News Service 
02.04.88). 
 
In October of the same year, Zhao Ziyang met with a delegation sent by the Saudi King, 
and expressed the Chinese government’s willingness to establish ‘friendly, cooperative 
relations with Saudi Arabia in all fields under the five principles of peaceful coexistence’. 
He stressed that there were no conflicting interests between China and Saudi Arabia and 
that the two countries shared common views on many of the world issues. He indentified 
some similarities in the development of their economies (Xinhua General News Service 
13.10.88).On behalf of the Saudi government, Prince Bandar, who attended the meeting, 
paid compliments to China regarding both its foreign and reform policy. He also 
expressed the willingness of the Saudi government to foster bilateral relations (Xinhua 
General News Service 13.10.88). 
 
The economic activity between the two countries appears to have accelerated the 
development of official relations. In December 1989, the first Chinese Export Exhibition 
was held in Riyadh and was visited by Saudi princes, senior government officials and 
businessmen. In this exhibition USD 32 million of deals was sealed. This significant 
achievement was expected to encourage bilateral trade and facilitate industrial exchange 
between the two countries (Xinhua General News Service 16.12.89). 
 
3.3.3.3 Changing Perceptions of China in Saudi Arabia 
By the end of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia was the only country in the Arab Gulf that had no 
diplomatic relations with China. It had been expected that the Kingdom would change its 
perception towards Beijing when the other Gulf States opened diplomatic links. Abidi 
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(1982) states that the Chinese ambassador in Kuwait, Ting Hao, expressed his 
government’s desire to establish official contact with Saudi Arabia on 2nd of May 1979 
(in Huwaidin 2002 p.217 ). Kuwait was the first GCC country to establish diplomatic 
relations with China, and that was in 1971. 
 
There was a belief that the establishment of Sino-Omani diplomatic relations in 1978 
might lead on to the development of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations. Before Sino-Omani 
diplomatic relations were established, the Sultan of Oman was said to have consulted 
Saudi Arabia (Foreign Broadcast Information Service 31.10.78). In November 1985, the 
Chinese Vice-Premier, Mr. Yao Yilin, visited Oman and, when there, had a dialogue with 
the Saudi Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister, Crown Prince Abdullah Abdul 
Aziz. Mr. Yao Yilin stressed several important points, including Beijing’s support of the 
Palestinian issue, and Arab unity, and Beijing’s appreciation of Riyadh’s initiative and 
commitment to the regional issue (The Xinhua General Overseas News Service 19.11.85). 
Still, however, Saudi-Chinese diplomatic relations were not established.  
 
The establishment of UAE-China diplomatic relations also seemed to increase the 
possibility of a Saudi move. The UAE ambassador to China, Ambassador Sultan Ali-Al-
Noami, stated: ‘I sincerely congratulate the UAE and China on their establishment of 
diplomatic relations…this action represents a good step to improve relations between the 
GCC countries and China as a great country. At the same time, it is a good step to 
establish trade ties and economic cooperation between them’ (Xinhua General News 
Service 04.11.84). The ambassador also placed emphasis on ‘the concerted foreign 
policy’ of the GCC members. He believed that other GCC members that currently had no 
diplomatic links with China would form this relation very soon (Xinhua General News 
Service 04.11.84). 
 
Saudi Arabia’s reaction to the Sino-UAE diplomatic link seemed positive and favourable. 
In November 1984, during an interview session with Xinhua, Prince Talal bin Abdul 
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Aziz described China-UAE relations ‘…as a good sign of developing Sino-Arab 
relations’. When asked whether China and Saudi Arabia would eventually establish 
diplomatic relations, the Prince replied, ‘that can be discussed later on at high levels 
Beijing and Riyadh’ (Xinhua General News Service 03.11.84).However, nothing 
followed from this. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations in 1990, China 
developed diplomatic relations with Qatar on July 9, 1988 and Bahrain in April 1989. 
Qatar and Bahrain became the fourth and the fifth members of the GCC, respectively, to 
establish diplomatic relations with China. 
 
3.3.3.4 The Changing Economic Balance: Saudi-ROC versus Saudi-PRC 
A number of trade delegations from particular provinces in China had fostered economic 
links between the PRC and Saudi Arabia. The increase in PRC-Saudi economic 
engagement led to a collective decision to open trade representative offices in Beijing and 
Riyadh in 1988. This sub-section begins its analysis with a comparison of Saudi exports 
to and imports from the ROC and the PRC, over the period. 
 
Table 3.1 and Graph 3.1 show that  between 1979 and 1989, Saudi Arabia preserved 
strong trade links with the ROC. The Kingdom was actively targeting the ROC market 
rather than the PRC market. Saudi exports to the ROC were larger than its exports to the 
PRC by SR 2.3 billion. Saudi exports to Taiwan averaged about SR 207 million annually, 
whereas the exports to Beijing averaged close to SR 5,000. Against this backdrop, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that their diplomatic relations successfully cultivated a 
significant trade relation between the ROC and Saudi Arabia.  
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Table 3.1: Saudi Exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic 
of China (ROC), 1978-89 (Million Riyals) 
 The People’s Republic of China  
(PRC) 
(Value ) 
The Republic of China 
 (ROC) 
(Value) 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
N/A 
31.50 
58.13 
45.75 
69.75 
105.00 
83.63 
195.75 
401.63 
732.38 
263.12 
298.70 
2,498 
3,287 
5,961 
6,435 
6,843 
6,068 
6,416 
4,651 
2,830 
3,643 
3,955 
4,069 
Source: SAMA and IMF Direction of Trade Statistic 
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Graph 3.1: Saudi Exports to the People Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic 
of China (ROC), 1978-89 (Million Riyals) 
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Source: SAMA and IMF Direction of Trade Statistic 
  
Saudi imports from the PRC began to exceed those from the ROC at the end of the 1980s 
(Table 3.2 and Graph 3.2). Between 1978 and 1987, Saudi imports from the ROC 
retained a strong performance and grew faster than imports from the PRC. The trend 
completely reversed from 1988, when Saudi Arabia acquired CSS-2 missiles from the 
PRC: Saudi import growth from the PRC jumped from SR 1.8 billion (1987) to SR 2.7 
billion (1988) – a growth of 50 percent, whereas the reported figure from the ROC 
decreased from SR 2.9 billion (1987) to SR 1.4 billion (1989) - a 52 percent shrinkage in 
two years.  
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Table 3.2: Saudi Imports from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Republic of China (ROC), 1978-1989 (Million Riyals) 
 The People’s Republic of China  
(PRC) 
(Value ) 
The Republic of China 
 (ROC) 
(Value) 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
138 
255 
510 
825 
685 
559 
 679 
740  
831 
1,171 
2,716 
2,270 
1,577 
1,990 
2,238 
2,677 
2,911 
3,245 
3,034 
2,405 
2,521 
2,917 
1,446 
1,501 
Source: SAMA and the IMF Direction of Trade Statistic  
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Graph 3.2: Saudi Imports from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Republic of China (ROC), 1978-1989 (Million Riyals) 
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Sino-Saudi Economic Links. Some of the provinces in the PRC had already facilitated 
economic engagement with Saudi Arabia, especially those which were largely populated 
by Chinese Muslims. Ningxia region is one example. In April and May of 1985, Haji 
Husayn Hei Boli, Chairman of the Ningxia regional government, made a trip to the 
Kingdom, which was followed by a trade delegation from Saudi Arabia to Yinchuan in 
November of the same year. The Chinese and Saudi trade delegations promoted bilateral 
cooperation in economic, technology, and project development such as in the 
‘agricultural and chemical industry’. In September 1985, a meeting related to economic 
and technical cooperation with the Islamic world and the province of Ningxia was hosted 
in China. In December 1985 and January 1986, a delegation of businessmen-bankers 
from Saudi Arabia arrived in Ningxia and stated their intention of developing a financial 
institution in the area. On April 13, 1989, the Al-Barakah-Ningxia Islamic International 
Trust and Investment Company was established and became known as the International 
Trust and Investment Company. The company aimed to encourage Muslim regions to 
pursue economic and financial cooperation.  
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Saudi and Chinese business circles played an important role in Sino-Saudi economic 
cooperation. Their involvement in this cooperation gained serious attention on the part of 
both governments. In November 1986, Abd al-Aziz al-Qurayshi, who was formerly a 
Governor of the Saudi Monetary Agency, led a delegation of Saudi businessmen to 
China, which was considered to be the first Saudi trade delegation to Beijing. In this visit, 
the delegation held a meeting with Premier Zhao. In November 1987, a delegation of 
Chinese businessmen led by Jia Shi, President of the China Council for Promotion of 
International Trade, was officially invited by Al-Qurayshi to visit Saudi Arabia. In this 
business trip, the delegation convened a meeting with Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the 
second Deputy Prime Minister of the Kingdom, and Defence and Aviation Minister. In a 
discussion with Saudi officials, this delegation expressed China’s strong interest to foster 
bilateral cooperation, including ‘trade, joint ventures, fairs, investment and labour 
export’. 
 
Harris states that this delegation also sought Saudi loans, which could be granted to 
Chinese companies, and Saudi funds allocated to developing countries.  However, 
obtaining approval for these loans was difficult since the two countries had not yet 
established diplomatic relations (Harris 1993 p.226). Saudi diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan, as Harris argues, prevented the offering of Saudi loans to China as well as the 
granting of permission for Chinese labourers to work in the Kingdom (1993, p. 224).  
 
In April 1988, Qi Huaiyuan, Deputy Foreign Minister of China, made a visit to Riyadh.  
A few months later (in November), China and Saudi Arabia agreed to set up commercial 
representative offices in Riyadh and Beijing. The decision to open these offices was a 
direct result of Prince Bandar’s visit to China in mid-October of the same year. An 
agreement was signed in Washington between the Chinese Ambassador to the US, Mr. 
Han Xu, and Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. China required its 
trade office to be located within the same area of other countries’ diplomatic mission 
offices in Riyadh. The reason behind this was that Chinese representatives could enjoy 
diplomatic privileges in the Kingdom.  
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3.3.3.5 Expanding Contacts through Muslim Channels 
Although there were no diplomatic relations between Beijing and Riyadh, Muslims in 
China were able to fulfil their religious duty, Hajj, in Saudi Arabia. A Chinese religious 
organization accomplished the vital task of arranging annual visits of Muslim pilgrims. 
The Pakistani authorities also played a substantial role in these visits. When arriving in 
Saudi Arabia, the pilgrims were welcomed by the Saudi authorities, who even arranged a 
meeting for them with the Saudi King. Despite the Saudi religious concern, Chinese 
Muslims and Islamic associations in China, particularly those in Xinjiang and Ningxia, 
succeeded in creating close contacts with Muslim organizations in Saudi Arabia. The 
contacts between these organizations and Chinese Muslim often drew in the involvement 
of Saudi princes. These contacts, moreover, indicated a using of multiple channels (one 
of the characteristics of complex interdependence) in the Sino-Saudi unofficial links that 
usually involved many actors and regular visits. 
 
The religious organization in China, a total number of Chinese Muslims who performed 
Hajj in Saudi Arabia steadily increased through the 1980s. In October 1979, sixteen 
Chinese Muslims had left for Hajj - the first of such visits since 1964.  The Hajj 
delegation was comprised of Muslim scholars and leaders, and headed by Muhammed 
Ali Zhang  Jie, a Vice-President of the Islamic Association of China, and Imam al-Haji 
Salah An Shiwei from Dongsi Mosque in Beijing (Xinhua General News Service 
20.10.79). It should be noted that this association had previously dispatched ten Hajj 
groups to Makkah between the years 1955 and 1964.  Hajj trips had been abandoned 
during the period of the Cultural Revolution (Xinhua General News Service 20.10.79). 
 
In the 1980s, China’s Hajj mission to Saudi Arabia was important and successful, though 
visa arrangements had to be made through the Pakistani authorities. There was a growing 
number of Chinese Muslim pilgrims, and a China Hajj Affairs Office was opened in the 
Saudi Pilgrimage Company (Harris  1993 p.224). Hajj Visas for Chinese Muslims were 
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processed through the Pakistani authorities because China and Saudi Arabia had not yet 
established diplomatic relations (Wren 1983). President Zia stressed that Pakistan had 
promoted close cooperation and extended full support to the Muslim pilgrims from 
China, who used the country as part of their travelling route to Saudi Arabia (Xinhua 
General News Service 11.07.88). 
 
The number of Chinese Muslims that attended Hajj gradually increased. Most of these 
pilgrims were from Xinjiang and Ningxia, the two provinces densely populated by 
Chinese Muslims. In September 1983, a group of 313 Muslim pilgrims from Xinjiang 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 30.03.84), and 23 Muslim pilgrims from Ningxia 
left for Makkah via Karachi, led by Vice-Chairman of the Ningxia Hui  Autonomous 
Region, Qudratallah Ma Teng’ai (Xinhua General News Service 08.09.83). The Kingdom 
was said to have provided sufficient funds for Chinese Muslim pilgrims, in particular 
those from Ningxia province, to visit Makkah (Defense & Foreign Affairs 1985). In 1984, 
the number of these pilgrims had increased dramatically when more than 1,200 Muslims 
performed the annual Hajj pilgrimage (Xinhua General News Service 17.09.84). It was in 
this year that Vice-President of the China Islamic Association, Ilyas Shen Xiaxi, was 
invited to attend the Saudi King’s state banquet. King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz greatly 
welcomed the delegation and expressed his wish for the enduring happiness of all 
Chinese Muslims.  
 
In March 1987, Jamil ‘Abd al-Rahman, Deputy-Director of the China  Hajj Affairs Office 
of the Saudi Pilgrimage Company, was invited to China, where a discussion regarding 
Chinese Hajj delegations was held with the China Islamic Association (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 24.03.87). In June 1988, forty-four Chinese Muslim pilgrims from 
Xinjiang went to Makkah through Pakistan (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
15.06.88), and this number reached 960 Chinese Muslim pilgrims in the following year 
(Xinhua General News Service 18.11.89). 
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The Muslim world, the Chinese Islamic Association and other institutions.  
Saudi princes and representatives of Muslim organizations established close contact with 
Muslim associations in China. Chinese Muslims constituted a channel which facilitated 
the development of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations. In June 1981, a delegation of the 
Muslim World League visited Muslims in China, and met with Yang Jingren, who held 
the highest position in the Chinese government. In a meeting with the representatives of 
the China Islamic Association, the delegation contributed USD 500,000 to this 
organization. In 1982, as one of delegates of the Arab League, Saudi Foreign Minister, 
Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal, made a visit to China. At the same time, Saudi Oil Minister, 
Sheikh Zaki Yamani, was said to have secretly visited China (Harris 1993 p.224). 
 
In May 1985, a meeting was convened between the Chairman of the Islamic World 
League, Abdul Aziz ibn Baz, and China’s Muslim delegation from Ningxia. In this 
meeting, Hei Boli, chairman of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regional People’s 
Government, discussed the growing link between the Muslims in China and Saudi 
Arabia. The delegation was visiting the Kingdom at the invitation of Abdula Omar Nasef 
(Xinhua General News Service 17.05.85). In December of the same year, another Muslim 
delegation from China arrived in Riyadh. In this visit, the Chairman of the Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region, Ismail Ahmed, attended a meeting with the Saudi Grand 
Mufti, Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Baz (Xinhua General News Service 01.12.85). During an 
exclusive interview with Xinhua, Ismail Ahmed spoke about the recent visits to ten cities 
in Saudi Arabia and expressed his warmest thanks to the Islamic World League and the 
Kingdom for their generous treatment. In this visit, the delegation met with three Saudi 
princes, Prince Abdul Rahman Abdul Aziz, the Deputy Minister of Defense and 
Aviation, Prince Mohamed bin Fahd and Prince Majid Abdul Aziz. According to Ismail 
Ahmad, the Chinese delegates and the distinguished Saudi officials acknowledged the 
importance of strengthening bilateral cooperation and exchanges in economic, religious 
and cultural agendas. All of the princes warmly commended China’s policy towards 
religious freedom and its open policy. They also expressed their anticipation of an 
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increasing number of Chinese Muslim pilgrims to the Kingdom (Xinhua General 
Overseas News Service 18.12.85). 
 
In December 1987, the Muslim World League organized a five-day International 
Convocation of Islamic Leaders in Beijing. It was attended by 300 participants (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 11.12.87).The President of the China Islamic Association, 
Hai Iliyas Shen Xiaxi, placed emphasis on a positive relationship between the Muslim 
communities in China and the Muslim World League, had been established in 1979. 
Burhan Shahidi, an Honorary President of the China Islamic Association, said that this 
event would facilitate and deepen mutual understanding between Chinese Muslims and 
other Muslims around the world. 
 
Common interests in economic and technological aspects directly tied and 
institutionalized the relations between Ningxia-based organizations and Muslim 
countries. The Ningxia Islamic International Economic and Technological Organization 
was formed in order to foster economic and technological cooperation between Ningxia 
province and Islamic countries. Another organization known as the Ningxia Muslim 
Trust and Investment Company was established with a fairly similar objective of building 
strong relations with Islamic countries. The company provided and offered labour 
services and contract work to these countries and various forms of joint ventures were 
promoted between Ningxia and Saudi Arabia. With regard to inward investment in 
Ningxia, an ‘opening-up’ policy that had been implemented successfully attracted CNY 
56.35 million foreign investment in 1986 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 01.04.87). 
 
Another significant visit was that by Maarouf al-Dawalibi, who was a Chairman of the 
World Muslim Congress and an advisor to the Saudi King in the field of foreign affairs 
and religious matters, made a visit to China and attended a meeting with China’s Muslim 
leaders, including Mohamed Ali Zhang Jie, and Ilyas Shen Xiaxi. Al-Dawalibi was 
notified of the Chinese Muslims’ involvement and contribution to the political and 
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economic sectors of China, and the role of the China Islamic Association in promoting 
Islamic teaching in the country (Xinhua General News Service 08.10.86).  
 
Saudi financial and technical assistance to Muslim communities in China were offered in 
different forms. In the 1980s, many Muslim students from China who were studying at 
University Al-Azhar earned educational scholarships from the Muslim World 
Organization. Saudi Arabia also delivered one million copies of Al Quran to Muslims in 
China and financed the construction of mosques and the development of Islamic 
education in China (Harris 1993 p.225). 
 
3.3.3.6 Security: China’s Missiles Sales to Saudi Arabia 
Factors Leading to the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal. Saudi Arabia sought to form a missile 
deal with China on three grounds: its national security interest, the sale of Chinese 
weapons to Iran, and the refusal of the US to supply missiles.  
 
Prince Khaled bin Sultan claimed that the original idea of possessing this missile was 
conceived by King Fahd and did not originate from Saudi military commanders (Al-Saud 
1995 p.138). The first factor was the need to pursue the Kingdom’s national security 
interest. Prince Khaled states that King Fahd took the decision to buy the missiles 
because Saudi Arabia urgently needed a powerful and sophisticated weapon to deter any 
possible attacks from external enemies. The Prince identified the enemies of the 
Kingdom as Iran and Israel. Prince Bandar, however, refers to the enemy as specifically 
being Iran. Prince Bandar recounts how he tried to convince the US that the acquisition of 
the missiles was not for the purpose of targeting Israel, the principal regional ally of the 
US.  
 
The second reason for obtaining missiles was stemmed from the long-running Iran-Iraq 
war. Since the beginning of this war, China had been exporting weapons to Iraq, valued 
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at approximately USD 3.6 billion in 1983 (Simpson 2006). As a close ally of Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia allowed the PRC to occupy its territory purposely to transfer these weapons to 
Iraq. Two years later, China also sold weapons to Iran. The Kingdom alarmed by this, 
and therefore decided to seek to stop the Beijing-Tehran arms dealing by buying the 
weapons that China had planned to export to Iran (and giving them to Iraq). The 
operation was called Operation Torch, coordinated between the US and Saudi Arabia. 
Simpson sees this program ‘as a subterfuge’, concealing Saudi Arabia’s desire to acquire 
China’s missiles.  
 
The third factor that strongly motivated Saudi Arabia to buy Chinese missiles was the 
resistance of the US to sell its ground-to-ground missiles (the Lance) and F15Es to Saudi 
Arabia. The US contended that these weapons could pose a serious threat to Israel’s 
security. Richard Murphy explained this situation to a House of Representative 
Committee as follows: ‘They felt naked. They did come to us. They asked us for…the 
Lance missile and we were not prepared to sell so they went elsewhere’ (The Washington 
Post 29.03.88). Saudi Arabia obtained the missile from China because the latter could 
supply this weapon ‘at speed and without constraining conditions’ (AlSaud 1995 p.145). 
There are different names for the Chinese missiles: DF-3A Dongfeng, the East Wind  or 
CSS-2. It had a 1600-mile-range capability as compared to the Lance, which had merely 
an 80-mile range (Simpson 2006 p.125). However, the accuracy of the missile was said to 
be less than perfect since it had been redesigned to deploy a conventional rather than 
warhead and not accurate enough to attack the military target (The Washington Post 
07.04.88). 
 
In March 1988, it was reported that Saudi Arabia had indeed purchased 25 units of CSS-2 
missiles and a ground support system from China at a total cost of USD 100 million. The 
reported total cost is questionable, however, since exact details of the missile deal remain 
unclear to this day (Simpson 2006). The architects of the missile deal were Prince Bandar 
and Prince Khaled. The mission was concluded by Prince Khaled after an initial deal was 
set up by Prince Bandar.  
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Initiating a Sino-Saudi Missile Deal. The Saudi authority’s decision to expand its 
missile deal with China was indirectly influenced by the selling of Chinese weapons to 
Iran in 1985. Prince Bandar, who was the Saudi ambassador to the US, explored a 
possible opportunity to obstruct Sino-Iranian arms trade. For him, an effective means 
could be that of purchasing of all the weapons that had been agreed upon between Beijing 
and Tehran. In July 1985, Prince Bandar immediately initiated a missile deal with China. 
With the consent of Secretary of State George Shultz, Prince Bandar personally 
approached China’s ambassador in Washington, which caused the profound shock of the 
latter. It is worth highlighting that Prince Bandar concurrently used this opportunity to 
negotiate the purchase of China’s DSS-2 missile for the Kingdom.  
 
A constructive dialogue was then conducted in Pakistan and the Saudi and Chinese 
representatives agreed to state a practical purpose for their meeting, namely that it had 
something to do with the petrochemical business. Since Saudi Arabia needed to develop 
its petrochemical market in China, using the idea of petrochemical business to conceal a 
secret missile deal with China seemed to be convincing (The Washington Post 29.03.88). 
Based on this idea, two meetings were subsequently held. Saudi Arabia reportedly sent a 
large number of petrochemical experts to the meetings. The next stage of the missile deal 
was the invitation of Prince Bandar to Beijing. During the meeting, the Prince was 
presumably shocked at China’s inquiry: ‘How dare you ask us to sell you arms if you still 
have a relationship with Taiwan and no relationship with us?’ (Simpson 2006 p.153). 
Prince Bandar replied to this question by stressing the importance of China in satisfying 
Saudi’s urgent need and of Saudi trust in China, which was higher than Saudi trust in the 
Soviet Union. Prince Bandar also stated that encouraging progress and developments 
would soon follow if China met the Saudi need. At the same time, he also informed the 
Chinese officials that his role did not go beyond that of forming a missile deal.  
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Prince Bandar further revealed his hidden motive for arms dealings when stating, ‘By the 
way, I would also like to buy a couple of billion dollars worth of weapons that you are 
going to send to Iran’. The Chinese weapons and the Silkworm missile, which were 
supposedly sold to Iran, would then be shipped to Iraq via Saudi land—a defensive 
strategy to deter an Iranian attack (The Washington Post 29.03.88). Prince Bandar clearly 
highlighted the enormous benefits that China might gain and significant implication that 
could happen if Beijing fulfilled Riyadh’s requests: extending assistance to Saudi Arabia 
and the Arab world, pleasing the US and the UK and receiving ‘good politics’ and hard 
currency (Simpson 2006 p. 154). Prince Bandar was then requested to meet with China’s 
Premier, Zhao Ziyang. In this meeting, the Premier placed emphasis on a ‘policy of non-
alliance and the five principles of peaceful coexistence’. As an immediate response to this 
statement, Prince Bandar ‘had taken pains to stress Saudi Arabia’s agreement’ to the 
aforementioned principles. Nonetheless, Prince Bandar deliberately stressed the non-
aggressive stance of Saudi Arabia and the deterrent purpose of missile purchasing 
(Simpson 2006 p. 154). Prince Bandar further stressed that if this deal were accepted, the 
potentiality of developing Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations would be vast (Simpson 2006 
p.154). 
 
Apparently, the issue of Taiwan put some external pressure on the missile deal. China’s 
Premier said that Sino-US normalization was realized when the US had severed its 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Prince Bandar accepted China’s principle and practice, 
but claimed that this policy was not relevant to Saudi Arabia because the Kingdom was 
not a superpower. Prince Bandar said, ‘In the final analysis I think you did the right thing 
with America, but that is not the way to deal with us’. Prince Bandar’s statement was said 
to have accelerated an official approval of the deal by Chairman Chao Ping. The Chinese 
government stressed its great respect for Saudi Arabia and that China planned to conduct 
business with Saudi Arabia provided that the Saudi government had real hopes of 
developing diplomatic relations with the PRC. It was also predicted that the Beijing-
Riyadh cooperation might significantly influence Saudi relations with Taiwan (Simpson 
2006 p. 154). Prince Bandar immediately went back to Saudi Arabia, delivering the 
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positive news to King Fahd. He also promptly notified Secretary of State Shultz that 
China had agreed to sell its weapons (which were supposed to have been sold to Iran) to 
the Kingdom. Nevertheless, the news concerning the acquisition of China’s missiles was 
ignored.  
 
Furthering the Missile Deal. A special meeting between Prince Khaled and Lieutenant 
General Cao Gangchuan, a Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation 
Army, was conducted at a Saudi air base. The reason for choosing this location was to 
shun unwelcome publicity and perhaps to support King Fahd’s idea that the purchasing of 
this missile was to be covertly and swiftly completed (Al-Saud 1995). The meeting was 
held between the 16th and 23rd of December 1986, and unveiled a draft of the missile 
project (Al-Saud 1995). Prince Khaled claimed that his duty was ‘to negotiate the deal, 
devise an appropriate deception plan, choose a team of Saudi officers and men and 
arrange for their training …, build and defend operational bases and storage facilities in 
different parts of the Kingdom, arrange for the shipment of the missile from China, [and] 
…defend the project against sabotage or any other form of attack’ (Al-Saud 1995). 
 
Prince Khaled had been to China several times. His first trip was in February 1987, when 
his mission was said to have resulted in the obtaining of Chinese light weapons that were 
supposed to be sold to Iran. The second trip was made to Hong Kong, where Prince 
Khaled met with two China envoys and dealt with some relevant documents. Prince 
Khaled then left Beijing and made subsequent appointments. Yang Shangkun, First Vice 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was the key contact leader of Prince 
Khaled in Beijing. Prince Khaled then went to the Chinese missile base and saw the DF-
3A missile, which was equipped with a nuclear warhead. In the latter stage, the missiles 
that were modified to carry the conventional warhead had arrived in Saudi Arabia and 
were being transported by truck to the Empty Quarter, the southern part of the country. 
As a means of preventing the area from being identified as a storage location for a China 
missile, the US government was told that a big ‘ammunition depot’ for security purposes 
had been built at that location (The Washington Post 29.03.88). 
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Prince Khaled believed that the agreement which was concluded in the deal was based on 
mutual benefit and would pave the way for ‘political recognition and…diplomatic 
relations’ between China and Saudi Arabia. The Prince claimed that the relations between 
the two countries following the signing of the deal would be built on the basis of ‘sound 
and realistic appreciation’ of the enormous benefits that each country had greatly enjoyed 
(Al-Saud 1995 p.142). In his writing, Prince Khaled drew a comparison of the economic 
and political benefits in an effective way: China had a large population and strong 
economic power, whereas Saudi Arabia possessed a vast oil resource and financial 
capacity; China identified itself as a leader of the third world, while Saudi Arabia held a 
strong position in the Muslim world and considered itself to have tremendous influence 
over the Arab world. Prince Khaled further stated that Saudi Arabia was in agreement 
with China’s notion of peaceful coexistence, which had been introduced in Bandung 
Conference in 1955.  
 
The Missile Deal and its Implications. The missile deal predictably was seen as 
carrying major implications for Saudi Arabia, China, the US, Israel, Iran and Iraq. 
 
Saudi Arabia and China. The missile deal dramatically accelerated the establishment of 
bilateral diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and China. Prince Saud was the one 
who laid ‘the groundwork’ for the development of diplomatic relations, and this 
groundwork would be discussed in a meeting with China’s Deputy Foreign Minister. 
Prince Saud’s diplomatic initiative was under the order of King Fahd and the Crown 
Prince. This initiative was being monitored by Prince Sultan. Prince Saud was also 
directly responsible for providing the appropriate details needed for the establishment of 
diplomatic relations and the opening of embassies in both countries. He further 
emphasised that this diplomatic initiative would be immediately undertaken by Prince 
Bandar (Al Saud 1995). 
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In April 1988, China’s Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, expressed his hope that the 
intention of developing diplomatic relations would be immediately transpire because the 
two countries had already developed direct relations (Xinhua General Overseas News 
06.04.88). China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Qi Huaiyuan, who arrived in Riyadh during 
the leak of the Sino-Saudi secret missile deal, emphasized an increase of cultural and 
commercial contacts between the two countries (The Guardian  04.04.88).Prince Bandar 
made a return visit to Beijing on October 12 and 13 of 1988, and this trip was publicly 
announced by both governments. The primary objective of this visit was to establish 
diplomatic relations.  
 
The United States. The Sino-Saudi missile deal generated real tension between the 
Kingdom and the US. The US was vexed with the transferring of the missile to the 
Kingdom, which had been facilitated for about two years without the US’s knowledge. 
Saudi Arabia maintained close political and military links and shared intelligence 
information with the US, but it successfully deceived the latter during the process of 
obtaining the Chinese missile. The success of the missile deal also indicated the ‘failure 
of US intelligence’ (The Washington Post 29.03.88). 
 
The secret missile deal was eventually discovered when an American satellite detected an 
image of this missile in the vicinity of Saudi security forces, who were gathering at the 
place where the truck that transported the missile had broken down. On March 4, 1988, 
the Washington Post reported the shocking news; Saudi Arabia had acquired China’s 
CSS-2 ballistic missile, which had the capacity to reach 1500 miles and to carry nuclear 
warheads. By the time this missile was discovered, the Kingdom had already imported 
half of these Chinese weapons.  
 
In dealing with the exposure of the secret deal, Prince Bandar and China’s ambassador 
had readily agreed to offer the same response to the US officials by making the same 
statement, ‘I understand your concern, but this is a military matter and I am only a 
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diplomat. I will ask my government and come back to you with an answer’ (Simpson 
2006 p.160). The prepared statement was delivered in a meeting between Bandar and 
Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, as well as between 
China’s Foreign Minister and Shultz.  
 
Prince Bandar immediately discussed the contentious issue with King Fahd. In this 
conversation, Prince Bandar received the King’s order: ‘Nuclear weapons—I wish! But 
tell them if they are willing to sell any nuclear weapons for our defences, then we would 
be very appreciative and we would be happy to negotiate immediately’ (Simpson 2006 
p.160). Prince Bandar submitted the letter from King Fahd to the US government. The 
King confirmed the purchasing of China’s missile and firmly denied the Kingdom’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. He further defended that this purchase was due to 
Congress’s decision to reject the selling of the American Lance missile to the Kingdom. 
The King also declared that the use of the missile was for defensive rather than offensive 
purposes (Simpson 2006 p.161). 
 
King Fahd delivered his justification as to why Saudi Arabia had acquired China’s 
missile, stating, ‘We buy arms and we do not buy ideology’. He further expressed a 
resolute determination to obtain the missile and claimed that the missile was not for a 
ruthless ambition: ‘we shall never be the aggressor but we shall not allow anyone to 
commit aggression against one inch of our territory’. The King seemed to emphasize that 
China was a viable and preferred option for the supplying of weapons to his country: ‘we 
shall not hesitate to acquire the arms we need from any country in the world on the 
condition that they be among the best available’...‘if matters become snarled with a 
certain country, we find other countries, whether they are Eastern or Western, and we buy 
arms and we do not buy ideology’. King Fahd made these statements during a meeting 
with army, police officers and national guards in Makkah in 1988 (The Associated Press 
26.07.88). 
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Saudi Arabia also blocked the US inspection of the missile. The US needed to conduct 
the inspection because it wanted to verify that the missile did not contain nuclear 
warheads and that it was still a firsthand weapon. The Saudi government informed the US 
government that the inspection was ‘a [matter of] strict confidentiality between Saudi 
Arabia and China’(The Washington Post 29.03.88). 
 
During a news conference in April 1988, China’s Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, 
publicly announced that Saudi Arabia had bought China’s conventional surface-to-
surface missiles. According to him, as a state that placed a greater responsibility on the 
arms sales, the PRC greatly honoured the Kingdom’s commitment: this commitment 
underscored the purpose of the missile acquisition, which was mainly intended to be a 
defensive measure rather than for the launching of an offensive (The Washington Post 
29.03.88). The Minister avowed that Beijing was behind the Arab states in the case of an 
Israeli attack on the purchasing of the new missile. This stance, however, would only be 
adopted under the condition that the purchase was aimed at preserving and securing 
regional peace.  
 
Israel. Israeli’s spontaneous reaction to the Saudi missile purchase was a possible  
pre-emptive attack to Saudi Arabia, which would pose a potential threat to US-Saudi 
relations as well as dismiss the possibility of Arab states agreeing to the US Middle East 
Peace Initiative. Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, stressed that Israel would not 
wait for an offensive operation. In a later instance, Prince Bandar was informed by Prince 
Sultan that Saudi air base radars in Tabuk had detected Israeli airplanes which were 
flying not far from Aqaba. Without delay, the King ordered that the entire Saudi Air 
Force, which was ‘fully loaded and fully armed’, be sent to the northern part of the 
country. Prince Sultan emphasised that the Kingdom’s military preparation was not for 
the purpose of initiating a military confrontation with Israel. Rather, such preparation was 
mainly for the exercising of military retaliation in the event of an Israeli assault upon 
Saudi Arabia. This message was then delivered to the White House. In a meeting with 
General Powell, Prince Bandar strongly reiterated the Kingdom’s intention not to deploy 
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the missile to attack any countries. Prince Bandar stated: ‘Here is a very simple message 
from Saudi Arabia. We have no intention of attacking anybody with these missiles. We 
know Israel’s capabilities. It would be suicidal for us to attack them and cause some 
damage, because then they would destroy everything we have. Why take us from the 
category of not wanting to engage to a category where we have no option but to?’ 
(Simpson 2006 p.163).  Prince Bandar could presumably learn that the Israeli reaction 
was a practicable means of testing Saudi’s real intention behind the acquisition of the 
Chinese missile. This issue was easily resolved when Israel claimed that the flying of its 
airplanes was merely a ‘night exercise’.  
 
Iran and Iraq. China’s Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, confirmed that Chinese Silkworm 
missile exports to Iran had been curtailed. He explicitly denied the repeated accusation 
that the Chinese government was somehow involved in direct arms transactions with Iran 
and Iraq. Wu Xueqian, however, said that Iran and Iraq could easily obtain China’s 
weapons since they were being sold at the international market (The Washington Post 
29.03.88). 
 
A verbal assurance that Chinese Silkworm was not sold to Iran, either through a direct 
bargaining or third party, was also given to the US officials. This assurance, to some 
extent, encouraged the US to resume the selling of its technology to China, which had 
been halted in October of the previous year. This news was delivered to Wu Xueqian 
during his trip to Washington in March 1988 (United Press International 21.03.88). 
 
Conclusion 
China and Saudi Arabia had no official political or economic relations in the period 1949-
1977. In the absence of official relations, Chinese Hajj delegations successfully 
established some regular contacts with the Saudi leaders and officials. Although senior 
government personnel of the two countries met at the Bandung Conference in 1955, 
Saudi Arabia was steadfast in maintaining its political stance of having a close 
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relationship with Taiwan. Anti-communist sentiment continued to strengthen the 
relationship between Riyadh and Taipei. 
 
In the period 1978-1989, the basis for one of the characteristics of complex 
interdependence, (multiple channels), began to figure in Sino-Saudi relations: the high-
level officials of the two countries gradually made direct contacts. In the early 1980s, 
they met at international events. In the mid-1980s, Chinese and Saudi leaders had more 
direct communication. At the end of the decade, some practical initiatives to develop 
diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia began to take place. At the same 
time, the two countries secretly and actively negotiated the missile deal. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Development of Sino-Saudi Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 1990-2000 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by examining the international system that characterized the post-
Cold War era. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal a clear picture of PRC and KSA 
policy towards the US and the USSR. The analysis also lays emphasis on the policies of 
the two countries regarding the major events and issues in the Middle East. The main 
focus of the chapter is on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and 
the KSA. The chapter later assesses the response of the ROC government to the shift of 
diplomatic relations to mainland China. After analysing this development, the chapter 
will focus on the sub-topics of the dynamics of political and economic relations between 
the PRC and the KSA. The sub-topics cover the important aspects of these relations, 
specifically, trade and investment. Relations will also be examined from the theoretical 
viewpoint of complex interdependence and constructivism. 
 
4.1 The Post Cold War  
With the dissolution of the USSR and the abandonment of communism, the character of 
international relations changed fundamentally and substantially. The way the Cold War 
ended and the way the post-Cold War period influenced the development of international 
system, profoundly shaped the relations among countries. This sub-section will briefly 
examine the collapse of the Soviet Union, the significance of the New World Order 
(NWO), the launch of the Gulf War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
 
The Disintegration of the USSR. Fundamental problems within communism led to the 
breakup of the USSR. When Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party in 1985, political and economic systems of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe 
were faced with the potential threat of disintegration (Antony et al. 2009). In Poland, the 
Solidarity Movement openly challenged communist leadership through strikes and the 
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demand for free elections. Eventually, in 1989, the communist government under the 
leadership of General Jaruzelski appointed a non-communist leader, Tadeus Mazowiecki, 
as the new prime minster of Poland. Hungary followed Poland’s decisive step by 
establishing a new government. The fate of East Germany was somewhat similar to that 
of Hungary and Poland. East Germany also collapsed at this time and merged with West 
Germany in 1990. In 1989, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia finally toppled the 
communist government. To follow suit, the Romanian communist government was 
overthrown in the Romanian Revolution in the same year. With a number of valid 
reasons, Gorbachev refused to interfere in these historic events of the Eastern European 
communist bloc. In his country, Gorbachev gradually reformed the political and 
economic systems of Russia and received critical comments from his people and foreign 
countries:  in 1987 Gorbachev introduced ‘perestroika’ (the restructure of the economy), 
and ‘glasnost’ (openness) to his country.  
 
On December 8, 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was jointly 
formed by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus with the main objective of 
dissolving the Soviet Union. Other Soviet republics later became members of the CIS. 
The independence of 15 republics in the communist bloc gradually undermined the 
USSR, which finally collapsed on December 25, 1991 when Gorbachev announced his 
resignation as the Soviet president. Subsequently, Russia replaced the Soviet Union as a 
member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
 
In the Cold War’s aftermath, Russian political and economic systems were relatively 
unstable. Russia specifically applied the deregulation of the price system, the 
privatization of several state-owned companies, and the expansion of inward investment. 
Nevertheless, the country was still suffering an acute economic problem. In 1992, for 
instance, its inflation amounted to 2,500 percent (Antony et al. 2009). In terms of the 
political system, the new Russian Federation was comparatively weak and a power 
struggle for political leadership of the country was likely to continue. 
 
At the international level, Russia joined the G-7 organization, later known as the G-8. 
The key reason Russia was accepted as a member of this organization was to support its 
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intensive efforts to westernize its political and economic systems. Within the context of 
global security, there was an immediate concern about the nuclear arsenal as well as 
Russia’s other chemical and biological weapons. There was also a grave concern that 
these weapons could be transferred to other countries and perhaps to terrorist 
organizations. To address these strategic considerations, Russia and the US negotiated 
and reached specific agreements regarding the reduction of nuclear weapons (Antony et 
al. 2009).  
 
The New World Order. At the beginning of the Gulf crisis, President Bush introduced a 
‘global vision’ that was widely known as the New World Order (NWO). The so-called 
global vision was said to follow from the ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had 
deliberately stressed the role of the US as the leader of ‘great power collaboration 
through the United Nations’ (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2007 p. 39). In light of this 
notion, Bush saw the 1990-91 Gulf War as the beginning of ‘a new world order,…with 
new ways of working with other nations…peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity 
against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all people’ (Nye 
1992 p. 83). 
 
Bush’s idea of the NWO was thoroughly discussed among scholars of International 
Relations. From these discussions, the critical elements and core components of the 
NWO have been vividly traced. The elements and components contained in the workable 
definitions and understandings that prominent scholars have developed will be 
highlighted next. 
 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a renowned scholar of International Relations, considers the NWO to 
be a piece of ‘grand rhetoric’ on the part of President Bush (1992). Nye also claims that 
Bush’s administration failed to clearly define the meaning of the NWO. In explaining the 
NWO, Nye begins with the definition of ‘the world order’. In world politics, as he claims, 
there are two ways to understand world order. First, the proponents of realism, like 
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, defined world order as a product of ‘a stable 
distribution of power among the major states’ (Nye 1992 p. 84). Second, world order 
according to liberals such as Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, was conceptualized as 
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a product of ‘broad values…international law and institution’ (Nye 1992 p. 84). 
Examples of these values, as Nye states, were democracy and human rights. Nye 
identifies that Bush’s NWO was based on that of the liberals, and yet his actions and 
thinking tended to reflect that of realists: ‘The problem for the Bush administration was 
that it thought and acted like Nixon, but borrowed the rhetoric of Wilson and Carter’ 
(Nye 1992 p. 84). 
 
A professor of the Middle East, Tim Niblock, argues that with the collapse of the USSR, 
the US began to heavily emphasize its international role and promoted the NWO by 
delivering ‘the key values of Western liberal democratic system’ to the world. Niblock 
conjectures that characteristic of the NWO is  ‘international progress towards democracy, 
free enterprise and the protection of human rights’ (2001, p. 296). Were the peace and 
stability of the international system to be threatened, collective actions created through 
the international organization and supervised by the US would be taken (Niblock 2001). 
 
A professor of History, Paul W. Schroeder, argues that the absence of a specific 
definition has resulted in multiple and varying interpretations of NWO. Schroeder, in 
defining the NWO, states that the NWO is ‘an international system, in which the United 
States and like-minded friends and allies act together, preferably under the aegis of the 
United Nations (UN), to preserve or establish peace by upholding international law and 
order against aggressors, lawbreakers, and oppressors’ (Schroeder 1995 p. 368). He 
continues to argue that the international community would resort to the use of force in 
order to curb the behaviour of a particular actor viewed as threatening. In other words, 
the international community has to deter and compel rather than persuade, mediate and 
conciliate the behaviour of such an actor (Schroeder 1995 p. 368).  
 
By analysing the above-mentioned definitions and interpretations, one may conclude that 
the international system in the post-Cold War period gradually adopted a new framework. 
Through United Nations, the US carefully manoeuvred a group of major powers in 
promoting Western political and economic values to the international community. 
Although President Bush had coined the NWO based on liberal beliefs, his policy actions 
regarding the NWO were largely justified from a realist perspective. 
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The Gulf War. The Gulf War began with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 
and ended with a ceasefire on February 27, 1991. Saddam Hussein made his own 
calculations as to why he chose to invade Kuwait. His assessment was generally based on 
internal and external factors.  
 
Concerning the internal factors, Saddam had to resolve the problems of domestic 
economy and the Iraqi armies. The eight-year Iran-Iraq war had been detrimental to 
Iraq’s economy. Iraq had to repay USD 80 billion worth of debt, most of which had been 
borrowed from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Antony et al. 2009). In addition to its massive 
and unpayable debt, Iraq had to deal with low oil income and a high military expenditure 
that amounted to USD 208 billion. Given these severe economic problems, Saddam 
considered it unwise to demobilize military forces consisting of 1.5 million individuals 
(Antony et al. 2009). If they were demobilized, Iraq would be drawn into massive 
unemployment that could later trigger social instability. The demobilization of military 
forces could also threaten and undermine Saddam’s authority since most of them were 
originally Shia sectarians. Entering a new war could therefore act as a workable solution 
in which these military forces could be effectively deployed. 
 
As for the external factors, Saddam had to realise his long-held ambition of turning Iraq 
into a regional hegemonic power, to deal with the policy behaviour of Kuwait and to 
challenge the belief that the US would not interfere in Arab affairs if the occupation of 
Kuwait was made possible. By invading Kuwait, Saddam believed that his country could 
become a hegemonic power in the region. With this power, Iraq could determine the 
prices of oil and its productions, as well as own 21 percent of OPEC’s total production 
(Antony et al. 2009). Iraq was also keen to become the leader of pan-Arabism. Another 
external factor was the policy behaviour of Kuwait, which seriously irritated Saddam. 
Kuwait rejected two Iraqi proposals that aimed to annex two islands located at the Shatt 
al-Arab River in 1988, and to demand territorial concessions when its war against Iran 
was waged in the interest of the Arab states. The situation became complicated when Iraq 
repeatedly accused Kuwait of stealing USD 2.4 billion worth of oil, which was from the 
Rumaila oilfield (Antony et al. 2009). The situation became even tenser when Kuwait 
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increased its oil production, which later brought about the squeeze of global oil prices. 
This disturbing development severely angered Saddam because it put Iraq’s economy at 
risk (Keylor 2001). 
 
Another external factor was Saddam’s assessment that the US would not become 
involved in inter-Arab disputes. He made this evaluation after a meeting with the US 
ambassador, April Glaspie, in July 1990. Saddam’s assessment was also influenced by 
his own experience that the US had already extended strong support to Iraq during the 
eight-year war with Iran (Dunne 2011).  
 
Three months after the invasion of Kuwait, allied forces from several major nations of the 
East and West began to liberate Kuwait. Led by the US, the alliance launched Operation 
Desert Storm on January 17, 1991. Many countries agreed on the use of force against 
Saddam since the invasion of Kuwait was considered to be a form of international 
aggression (Cyr 2000). A ceasefire was then declared on February 27, 1991.  
 
Operation Desert Storm enabled the US-led alliance to accomplish the principal 
objectives: the independence of Kuwait and a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait by 
means of force (Cyr 2000). While achieving these aims, Desert Storm gradually brought 
the US to the position of unrivalled power in the Middle East, and resulted in the 
succession of Pax Britannica by Pax Americana (Shlaim 1995). 
 
The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. The dissolution of the Yugoslavia Federation in the 
early 1990s was driven by a number of key factors: a deep ethnic separation, serious 
economic problems and the death of President Tito. From 1991, the republics that had 
been previously united under the Yugoslavia Federation began to seek and proclaim their 
independence. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, 1991, 
followed by Macedonia in September of the same year. A new Yugoslavian federation, 
which constituted Serbia and Montenegro under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, 
was also established.  
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A series of Balkan wars immediately erupted. Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the republics 
of the former Yugoslavia, evolved into a brutal ethnic war. Declining to be ruled by a 
Muslim-dominated government, the Bosnian Serbs declared a majority of Bosnia 
territory as the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Bosnian Croats 
proclaimed half of the remaining territory as the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. 
What was left to the Bosnian Muslims was 15 to 20 percent of the territory (Antony et al. 
2009). Their fates proved to be tragic when the ‘ethnic cleansing’ began. The Bosnian 
Serbs ruthlessly murdered thousands of Bosnian Muslims.  
 
The international community reacted to this human tragedy by imposing the UN 
economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in 1992, and dispatching a UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to Bosnia. These joint efforts, unfortunately, failed to 
eliminate the conflict. 
 
At this stage, the US was clearly reluctant to initiate intervention on the ground that the 
Bosnian conflict was in the sphere of European responsibility. The resistance also 
stemmed from the US public opinion that viewed the Bosnian conflict as being outside of 
national interests. When the national interests differed, the Western world policies 
towards the conflict were ‘short-sighted [and] haphazard’ (The Independent 20.08.92). 
This was the failure of the New World Order that supposedly defended the interests of 
the international community. 
 
In 1995, the American policy response to this conflict suddenly changed. After the 
massacre of 7,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, the US doggedly insisted that the 
Serbs enter negotiation in Dayton, Ohio (Antony et al. 2009). A peace accord was 
eventually signed between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.  
 
In 1997, another ethnic conflict erupted between the Serbs and the Albanian Kosovo 
Liberation Army in the Kosovo province of the new Yugoslav federation. NATO carried 
out its military intervention by launching 10,000 bombing missions to the targeted areas 
in Yugoslavia for ‘seventy-nine straight days’ (Keylor 2001 p. 483). When NATO 
decided that it would implement ‘a full-scale military intervention’ if the conflict 
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escalated, Milosevic subsequently withdrew his military forces from Kosovo (Antony et 
al. 2009). 
 
4.2 The PRC, the KSA and the World  
In the period between 1990 and 2000, a number of major events deeply affected the 
dynamic of China’s relations with the US and Russia. To assess how this dynamic 
developed, the incident of Tiananmen Square and the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
will be particularly emphasized. During the same period, Saudi Arabia was also affected 
by the collapse of the USSR and the event in the Arab Gulf region. This sub-section will 
examine how the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the collapse of the USSR exerted a significant 
influence on US-Saudi relations as well as Saudi-Russian relations. 
 
China experienced isolation from the international community due to the events within 
and outside the country. The events led by political motives carried disturbing 
implications for China’s image on the international stage. The event of Tiananmen 
Square on June 3, 1989 led some of the Western countries to impose diplomatic and 
economic sanctions against China. Further isolation was also seen as an implication of 
the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union. The apparent implication 
was that China had become a major Marxist-Leninist state that had, nevertheless, 
survived in the international system. With this development, some of the critics in the 
Western world saw China as a potential hegemonic threat and suggested that the 
containment policy rather than engagement policy be adopted in dealing with China. 
 
Deng Xiaoping seriously attempted to end the isolation by enhancing China’s potential 
role and status in the international system and modifying its behaviour and conduct with 
other countries. The Chinese government introduced the ‘One China, two systems’ 
principle, which was applied to Hong Kong after Britain handed over the control to 
mainland China. Other key strategies that Deng Xiaoping pursued in enhancing China’s 
image at the global level were to seek China’s admission into the World Trade 
Organization; to minimize and solve the crisis with other nations; and to end China’s 
ideological commitment to the communist insurgencies in other countries (Bader p. 74). 
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Moreover, China was also keen to strengthen its enviable position in the international 
system since it had identified itself as a ‘promoter of global peace and prosperity’. At the 
same time, China closely observed its relations with the US and Russia. China shared 
with the US the loss of a common enemy and assumed its traditional role as an 
independent and anti-hegemonic actor. It actively attempted to shape its relations with the 
Western world based on the principle of openness to the outside world (Beylerian and 
Cavinet 1997).  
 
US-China relations during the period between 1990 and 2000 were complicated and 
clearly affected by several contentious issues. The two countries carefully pursued 
policies towards each other and consistently attempted to repair and improve the bilateral 
relations. The Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989 led to the suspension of US-
China military sales and halted any direct contact between the officials of the two 
countries. The negative implication of the Tiananmen Square incident on US-China 
relations did not last long. Bush administration renewed Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
status to China because it believed that this initiative would allow the administration to 
engage with China in every aspect, including human rights.  
 
The Taiwan issue persistently strained US-China relations. During Clinton’s presidency, 
the visit of Taiwan’s leader to the US in 1995 caused China to recall its ambassador in 
the US. In the following year, however, China and the US resumed exchanges between 
their leaders. In 1997 and 1998, the top leaders of the countries, President Bill Clinton 
and President Jiang Zemin, met in Washington and Beijing. In 2000, China resumed 
permanent, normal trade (previously known as MFN) with the US. 
 
The Beijing-Moscow relationship improved through the regular visits of the leaders and 
an increasing number of memoranda and joint statements. The two countries also 
strengthened their bilateral strategic links, which resulted in a lessening of military 
competition and an overcoming of security challenges. Some events unfolded concerning 
the new development of China-Russian relations. In 1994, for instance, President Jiang 
Zemin and President Boris Yeltsin signed a declaration which banned the use of force 
and nuclear missiles against each other and mutually limited the number of military 
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troops stationed at the border. If this cooperation significantly improved, it would 
augment a shared interest between China and Russia to erect ‘a global power pole’ that 
could balance the US leverage (Lampton 2002).  
 
Saudi Arabia. Two developments shaped the nature of the US-Saudi relationship 
(Niblock 2006). The first development was the Gulf War of 1990-91, which further 
bolstered US-Saudi cooperation in political and military aspects. The US greatly 
facilitated the political and strategic development of the Arab Gulf. The US, moreover, 
benefited from the strategic location and resources of Saudi Arabia as these satisfied 
some of its needs (Niblock 2006).  
 
To protect the security interest of the Kingdom, as well as defend the Arab peninsular, a 
large number of American troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia. The promise of US 
Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney, that these troops would return home ‘after the danger 
is over’, however, was not fulfilled. They remained in the Kingdom under the banner of 
‘dual containment’ policy (Pollack 2002). Moreover, in the Gulf War aftermath, the US 
and Saudi Arabia signed several major contracts so as to increase the Saudi purchasing of 
military weapons.  
 
The second development that influenced the US-Saudi relationship was the collapse of 
the USSR. This development led the US to reduce its support of Saudi in countering 
communism. The waning of such support was reflected in the subsequent development of 
Afghanistan (Niblock 2006). In Afghanistan, the Najibullah regime crumbled in 1992 and 
Mujahidin groups ruled the regime in 1993, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. In 1996, the 
Taliban controlled Kabul, and in the years that followed, Pakistani and Saudi 
governments recognised the Taliban as a legitimate ruler, with Burhanuddin Rabbani as 
the head of state. 
 
In September 1990, Saudi Arabia and Russia re-established diplomatic relations. The two 
countries exchanged views regarding the Gulf crisis and were anxious about the 
possibility of their interests being affected by this situation. Saudi Arabia improved its 
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relations with the Soviet Union because it needed to win international support of an 
imposition of embargo and the launch of a military offensive against Iraq.  
 
Through a personal envoy in August 1990, King Fahd delivered an important message to 
President Gorbachev. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who undertook this mission, seemed to 
convince the President regarding the Kingdom’s decision to enter the war. The real 
reason behind the war, as he said, was to defend the Kingdom, and was not for the 
purpose of aggression. The Prince also hoped that the Soviet government could convince 
Saddam that his action was wrong and that Iraqi troops should be pulling out of Kuwait. 
In September of the same year, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal met his 
counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, in Moscow and the true intention of restoring full 
diplomatic relations, which had been suspended for about 52 years, was conveyed. Prince 
Saud further ensured that the two countries were ready to normalize bilateral relations 
(The Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS 18.09.90). A number of positive 
developments could be identified in post-Cold War Riyadh-Moscow relations. Among 
these were an increase of bilateral trade and mutual investments, and the strengthening of 
bilateral ties. A number of constructive proposals and arrangements were also presented, 
which included joint research on environmental aspects, joint investment in oil extraction 
and shipments, and cooperation on various anti-terrorism campaigns. 
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4.3 The PRC, the KSA and the Middle East   
China’s diplomatic involvement in Middle Eastern issues gradually increased since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. China pursued its foreign policy 
towards the Middle Eastern region by advocating peaceful resolution in all issues and 
crises that occurred between 1990 and 2000. China and Saudi Arabia both embraced the 
notion of promoting and preserving ‘regional peace and stability’. However, in some 
cases, the two countries adopted different policies, measures and options in advancing 
this notion. The objective of this section is to examine how China and Saudi Arabia 
implemented their policies and pursued their interests throughout the major events and 
issues that arose in the Middle Eastern region. It also examines where departures in 
policy existed between the two countries and the circumstances underlying them. The 
main focus of the analysis will be on events surrounding the Gulf War, the economic 
sanctions against Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflicts. 
 
4.3.1   The Gulf War and the Sanctions against Iraq 
The Gulf War and the subsequent economic sanctions placed on Iraq presented two major 
challenges to the two-week old Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations. Initially, the policies of 
the two countries towards Iraq’s military aggression were consistent. However, they 
gradually shifted direction when Operation Desert Storm started. In regard to a 
comprehensive economic sanction against Iraq, Riyadh and Beijing’s policies were 
clearly contrary. However, when Saudi Arabia outlined an important initiative to ease the 
sanctions in the late 1990s, the policies became more aligned. The ways these countries 
responded to the unfortunate events of Iraq will be thoroughly examined in the sub-
sections that follow. 
 
The Gulf War in 1990-91 
Iraq’s attack on Kuwait occurred on August 2, 1990. After the military invasion, Iraq 
retained its foothold on Kuwait for nearly seven months. Iraqi leaders believed that the 
international conspiracy which attempted to undermine its power would remain in place 
despite the fact that Iraq intended to pull out its military forces from Kuwait. On August 
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6, 1990, the UN immediately imposed a series of multilateral and comprehensive 
sanctions against Iraq. From January 17, 1991 to February 27, 1991, the allied forces 
launched Operation Desert Storm against Iraqi troops in Iraq and Kuwait. The objective 
Operation Desert Storm was to reverse Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait. Bringing 
together a coalition of 34 nations with the main contributors of the allied forces 
consisting of the US, Britain, and Saudi Arabia, the operation was tremendously 
successful. Iraq retreated from Kuwait, which Gause has termed as a ‘humiliating 
withdrawal’ (2009 p. 279). Despite its defeat in the Gulf War (between August 2, 1990 
and February 27, 1991), the Iraqi regime continued to identify itself as a victorious power 
on the ground that Saddam’s regime was still surviving in the aftermath of the war 
(Gause 2009).  
 
The Saudi and Chinese governments strongly condemned and were against Iraq’s 
military invasion of Kuwait. In the period prior to Operation Desert Storm, the official 
meetings between the leaders and top-level officials of the two countries did involve the 
issue of Saddam’s military aggression. When Saudi Arabia invited foreign military forces 
to the country, Chinese leaders avoided making controversial comments. By all accounts, 
the policy behaviour of China and Saudi Arabia was inconsistent when the US-led air 
campaign (Operation Desert Storm) was launched against Iraqi military. China continued 
to call for a peaceful solution, whereas Saudi Arabia was reluctant to accept the peace 
policy. 
 
The Saudi government resolutely opposed Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and forcefully 
reminded Iraq that Kuwait’s legitimacy must be restored. In December 1990, the Saudi 
government repeated its stance toward the Gulf crisis through Saudi Press Agency, 
articulating ‘the need for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces 
from Kuwaiti territories and the return of legitimacy there under the legitimacy of HH 
Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah and his government’ (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts 10.12.90). Prince Bandar Bin Sultan also made a statement urging the 
withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait: ‘Iraq must get out of Kuwait. The legitimate 
government of Kuwait must return’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 24.08.90). 
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Iraqi aggression was one of the main issues raised in a conversation between China’s 
President, Yang Shangkun, and Saudi ambassador to China, Tawfiq Alamdar, in August 
1990. The President precisely articulated his government’s resistance to Iraq’s military 
invasion, whereas the Saudi ambassador only revealed the immediate response of his 
government to this assault. The President stressed the position of China in this issue, 
stating, ‘we oppose Iraq’s invasion and call on it to pull troops out of Kuwait promptly, 
thus restoring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country’(Xinhua General 
News Service 07.08.90). He also stressed that China had casted a vote for the UN 
Security Council Resolution 660 and the UN resolutions regarding the sanction against 
Iraq. The Saudi ambassador was perceived as having  given his approval of the Chinese 
stance on this issue, when in fact the ambassador had merely commented that Saudi 
Arabia took ‘a calm and thoughtful attitude’ towards this event and expected that the 
issue could be immediately resolved (Xinhua General News Service 07.08.90). 
 
Several months after the Iraqi military invasion, Premier Li Peng and Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen drew their instantaneous reactions from different levels. At the state level, a 
peaceful solution of the crisis was consistently advocated. At the regional levels, the 
Minister conveyed his government’s support to some organizations, and at the global 
level, the Premier primarily focused on the role of the international community. Also 
during these months, the Premier and Minister held separate meetings with their Saudi 
counterparts. In August 1990, Minister Qian Qichen said that China supported the 
statements of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council concerning the crisis. 
He also contended that the Iraq-Kuwaiti dispute should be resolved through the means of 
consultation. On September 20, 1990, Premier Li Peng met Saudi Foreign Minister 
Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal. The Premier called on the international community to take some 
measures that could prevent the Gulf crisis from worsening. On November 12, 1990, 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz and emphasised that China 
would resume its efforts, which were aimed at seeking a peaceful resolution to the Gulf 
crisis. The effort would ensure a complete withdrawal of Iraqi armies from Kuwait. 
 
The Saudi government at that time invited and deployed foreign armed forces to and from 
the Kingdom’s soil. The foreign military deployment served two intended purposes: first, 
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to exercise self-defence and second, to secure Kuwait’s liberation from Iraqi control. In 
August 1990, Prince Bandar bin Sultan explained why Saudi Arabia had deployed 
foreign armed forces in the country, firmly stating, ‘...aggression is not our aim. Our aim 
is to defend ourselves but not to attack. At the same time we must always be ready for the 
worst scenario, for self-defence against the adventurism of the other side’ (BBC Summary 
of World Broadcast 24.08.90). This assumption was denied by President Saddam, who 
delivered an ‘open message’ to King Fahd on January 14, 1991. In his message, the 
President said that Iraq had no ‘expansionist ambitions’ to attack Saudi Arabia. He 
further stressed this in stating, ‘the intentions and lies of the liars who brought the 
American forces and their allies to the land of sanctities on the pretext that Iraq intended 
to invade Saudi Arabia have been uncovered’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
16.01.91).  
 
In October of the same year, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz 
revealed another purpose behind American military presence on Saudi soil, stating, ‘these 
forces are here on the demand of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to achieve a certain 
objective – that is the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restoring the 
legitimacy of Kuwait’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 02.10.90). The Prince 
contended that Iraq would not withdraw its forces from Kuwait ‘...unless superior forces 
[than Iraq’s] are available’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 02.10.90). He was seen to 
have argued that American military deployment in the Kingdom was a possible solution 
to the Gulf crisis. 
 
China carefully assessed the Saudi decision to request military assistance from foreign 
countries. China also attempted to reveal that it was aware of the volatile situation and 
acute crisis the Kingdom was facing. On August 8, 1990, Premier Li Peng was asked by a 
reporter to comment on the issue of the Saudi invitation of foreign military power into the 
country. The Premier clearly stated China’s stance: ‘in principle, we do not agree to big 
power military involvement. We do not want to see the already complicated situation in 
the Gulf area get more complicated. However, we respect and understand the defensive 
measure taken by Saudi Arabia, a sovereign state, out of consideration of its own 
security’ (Xinhua General News Service 08.08.90). One may argue that China tended to 
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support foreign military presence in Saudi Arabia because it needed to preserve and 
strengthen the newly established diplomatic relations with the latter. In any case, the Gulf 
War that broke a few weeks after the diplomatic link was established was a real challenge 
to Sino-Saudi relations. 
 
Chinese and Saudi policy decisions and responses regarding Operation Desert Storm 
were clearly contrary. Before the war against Iraq erupted, China was careful in making 
its decision, and continued to insist on the use of peaceful means in retreating Iraqi troops 
from Kuwait. By contrast, Saudi Arabia was firm in its decision and prepared to wage 
war. In November 1990, China completely abstained from voting on the UN Resolution 
678, which approved the use of all necessary means to withdraw Iraqi armies from 
Kuwait after the deadline of January 15, 1991 (Xinhua General News Service 10.01.91). 
In January 1991, the Saudi government agreed to cover almost half of the total cost of 
American military deployment in the Gulf and the war against Iraq. Prince Bandar bin 
Sultan, who was the Saudi ambassador to Washington, in announcing this decision stated, 
‘I think our share of this operation will be 40 to 50 percent’ (The Guardian (London) 
12.01.91). 
 
During Operation Desert Storm, China was seriously dissatisfied with the ongoing 
developments in the region and stood firm on pursuing a peaceful solution to the Gulf 
War. On January 17, 1991, the day that targeted places in Iraq and Kuwait were attacked 
by American air forces, China released a full statement that called the warring parties to 
exercise the utmost restraint and to avert an escalation of war. The Chinese government 
also expressed its deep anxiety and profound concern about this development. A few days 
later, Premier Li Peng promised that China would work with the international community 
to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Before the attack was launched, the Chinese 
government and international community had sought peaceful settlement and attempted 
to avoid the war, but their strenuous efforts were unsuccessful. At the end of February 
1991, Premier Li Peng repeatedly stressed that China supported any efforts aimed at 
reaching a peaceful solution to end the war. 
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King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz fully backed Operation Desert Storm. The King considered 
the allied attack as a viable option to ending Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and denied the 
Russian peace plan to avert the US-led military actions against Iraq.  The Saudi King, in 
delivering his personal view on Operation Desert Storm, defended the logic of the 
operation, declaring, ‘the military operation which started today constitutes the voice of 
right calling for lifting the injustice and restoring the situation to normal by implementing 
the international (UN) resolutions’ (United Press International 17.01.91). One month 
into Operation Desert Storm, King Fahd made his response to the Soviet plan for a peace 
resolution in the Persian Gulf. The King repeatedly dismissed the plan, stating, ‘we are 
hearing talk about a compromise... a compromise cannot be accepted unless the Iraqi 
troops withdraw completely and without conditions from Kuwait...the only thing we 
accept is total withdrawal’ (United Press International 19.02.91).  
 
Economic Sanctions against Iraq 
China aggressively sought a diplomatic solution for Iraq’s humanitarian crisis throughout 
the period of the economic sanctions. It consistently called on the international 
community to consider lifting the sanctions and urged Saddam’s regime to broadly adopt 
the UN resolutions. The Saudi policy towards the Iraqi sanction regime was inconsistent 
with China’s policy, specifically in the early years of implementation. The reason Saudi 
Arabia supported the imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq stemmed from a 
security threat within the Iraqi government. The Saudi leader, moreover, was doubtful of 
the call for lifting sanctions, though his government was increasingly aware of the 
humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq. The Saudi government, however, laid the blame on 
Saddam’s government for having triggered and worsened this crisis. At the end of the 
1990s, the Saudi government eventually agreed to the easing of sanctions. 
 
China was very concerned and sympathetic with regard to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. 
It persistently called for cooperation from the international body and Iraqi authority to 
reduce the negative and devastating impact of the crisis. In 1991, China supported the UN 
to deploy any measures that could relax the economic sanctions against Iraq. It also 
implored the international community to consider lifting these sanctions as quickly as 
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possible, as well as to lift the restrictions on the delivery of food and urgent necessities to 
civilians. At the same, China also urged Saddam’s regime to enhance its cooperation with 
the Security Council in implementing the UN resolution. To lift the sanctions, as China 
insisted, Iraqi authority should repair its poor relations with other Arab Gulf states. This 
improvement would hopefully create an environment conducive to the withdrawal of the 
sanctions. 
 
For the Arab Gulf states, the repairing of the relationship with Baghdad was not a viable 
option. Saudi Arabia extended its support for the implementation of economic sanctions 
against Iraq due to the security threat that Saddam’s regime had posed. More specifically, 
the first reason Saudi Arabia supported these sanctions was revealed in a commentary 
given by Saudi officials, who said that the economic sanctions against Iraq would be 
pursued if Saddam Hussein remained in power. The second reason was the support of the 
GCC members in June 1992 of the UN decision to maintain its comprehensive economic 
sanctions against Iraq. The reason for the resumption of this sanction was to force Iraq to 
abide to all international obligations with no exception to the removal of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) (Xinhua General News Service 03.06.92).  
 
Saudi Arabia continually criticized the political behaviour of Iraq’s regime, stating that 
Iraq had manipulated the UN resolutions, especially those related to a demarcation of the 
Kuwait-Iraq border and the Kuwaiti prisoners. Iraq was also seen to have avoided its full 
compliance to the resolutions. From the Saudi point of view, these behaviours caused 
severe implications to innocent Iraqis. Saudi Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations Jaafar al-Leqani in commenting on Iraq’s attitudes stated,  ‘Ironically, this 
regime has given itself a right to starve and humiliate the Iraqi people…it has falsely 
blamed the international community for the dangers and hardship being faced by the 
country’ (Moneyclips 15.10.93).  
 
The nature of China’s policy towards the economic sanction against Iraq had not altered 
much from the years since the UN economic sanction had initially been imposed. It 
continued to urge Iraq to strengthen its cooperation and increase its dialogue with the 
UN. In a meeting of China’s Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, with his counterpart from 
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Iraq, Mohamed Said al-Sahaf, in August 1994, the Chinese leader maintained China's 
belief that the differences in the implementation of the UN resolutions could be amicably 
resolved. Concerning the humanitarian crisis, China agreed to increase its assistance to 
Iraq by sending more medicine and food to Iraqi civilians (Xinhua News Agency 
24.08.94).  
 
While battling for the humanitarian rights of the powerless citizens under the sanction 
regime, China found that its policy behaviour towards this sanction was consistent with 
that of Russia and France. These three permanent members of the UN agreed on the need 
for Iraq to make efforts to comply with the UN resolution. Aside from this progress, 
China constantly urged the international community to objectively evaluate Iraq’s 
compliance with the UN resolutions and to consider a possibility of gradually lifting the 
economic sanctions. 
 
If China called for an end of the sanctions, Saudi Arabia re-emphasized its commitment 
to their continued implementation. The Saudi leader was hesitant about the idea of lifting 
the sanctions. In the October 1994 meeting, President Bill Clinton and King Fahd 
mutually agreed that if Saddam’s regime refused to fully comply with the UN resolutions, 
any motion aimed at lifting the sanction would be considered premature. The two leaders 
further agreed that any attempts to lift the sanction beyond the framework of the UN 
would encourage Saddam’s regime to continue pursuing its hostile policies. Although the 
two leaders were sympathetic toward the suffering of the Iraqi people, they nevertheless 
claimed that the humanitarian catastrophe was the responsibility of Saddam’s regime 
(Moneyclips 29.10.94). 
 
In March 1995, Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) reported that Saudi Arabia and the US re-
emphasized the reason that the UN sanctions should be retained, and yet could be lifted if 
Saddam’s regime complied with the resolutions regarding the invasion of Kuwait. The 
report also claimed that the assurance was delivered in a meeting of the US Defense 
Secretary William Perry and Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz in the Kingdom (Xinhua News 
Agency 20.03.95). In the same month, unanimous support for the continuation of UN 
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sanctions against Iraq was reiterated by all GCC members. This was presented during a 
meeting with the US officials (Xinhua News Agency 13.03.95).  
 
Despite its support of the continuation of sanctions against Iraq, the Saudi government 
also intended to improve the situation of a deteriorated humanitarian crisis. At least three 
approaches were adopted to ameliorate this situation. Firstly, the Kingdom insisted that 
Saddam Hussein comply with the UN resolutions related to the invasion of Kuwait. King 
Fahd expressed this concern, stating, ‘The Saudi Kingdom is deeply distressed by the 
suffering of the Iraqi people which is caused by the Iraqi ruler's stubbornness of not 
responding favourably to the resolutions’ (Agence France Presse 05.03.96). Secondly, 
the Kingdom welcomed an Oil-for-Food Program that could minimize the suffering of 
Iraqis under the sanction regime. As reported in Saudi Press Agency, a Saudi spokesman 
affirmed, ‘Saudi Arabia has constantly supported efforts by  the UN Security Council to 
guarantee the humanitarian needs of the brother Iraqi  people’ (Agence France Presse 
23.05.96).  
 
Thirdly, the Kingdom apparently offered humanitarian assistance to Iraqi civilians. The 
real reason behind the Kingdom’s humanitarian aid was to assist the suffering people, and 
not the leaders. This effort was not to be interpreted as a rapprochement between the 
Kingdom and Iraq. Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, claimed, 
‘Saudi assistance to the Iraqi people is within the framework of the policy of the 
Kingdom to help people in need and not of normalization, because is a political matter, 
while assistance is a humanitarian question’ (Agence France Presse 24.06.98). This was 
reiterated by Crown Prince Abdullah, who said, ‘We can support the Iraqi people in its 
crisis, but we cannot support those who are the cause of their suffering’ (Agence France 
Presse 08.12.98).  
 
Greatly concerned with the deteriorated lives of Iraqi civilians, China acted decisively to 
end the sanction. In October 1997, China was one the five nations that chose to abstain 
during the voting process for a new UN resolution against Iraq. The US, who wanted to 
see another sanction get imposed on the country, lamented this decision. In 1998, a call 
for an end to the sanctions against Iraq was made. According to Vice Premier Qian 
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Qichen, this repeal needed to be performed and the UN was to provide an objective and 
fair assessment of the inspection of Iraqi weapons. This statement was delivered during a 
visit of Iraqi Special envoy to China, led by Amir Mohamed Rashid (Xinhua News 
Agency 29.05.98).  
 
Iraq’s authority won Chinese sympathy in regards to the suffering of its people, but it was 
unable to change the Saudi political disposition towards the sanction. The Iraqi sanction 
regime would remain if its leaders continued to deceive the international community and 
create new crises. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah reminded Iraq of this when stating, ‘the 
sanctions cannot be lifted until Iraq has implemented UN resolutions and changed its 
foot-dragging and deception’ (Agence France Presse 08.12.98). The Crown Prince 
further stated that ‘provoking successive crises, by shirking responsibilities and 
blackmailing the whole world by showing scenes of suffering’ would not lift the sanction 
(Agence France Presse 08.12.98). Again, Saudi Arabia informed Iraq that the suspension 
of sanction would be made if the UN resolutions were respected. In the GCC summit in 
December 1998 in Abu Dhabi, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal also 
stressed that the ease of the sanctions was absolutely contingent upon Iraq’s behaviour, 
and ‘not on Saudi Arabia or other parties’ (Agence France Presse 08.12.98). 
 
Although Saudi Arabia denounced the attitude of Iraq’s government in dealing with the 
humanitarian crisis, it eventually modified its posture toward the sanction in 1999. The 
Saudi effort towards lifting the sanction was significant, for it indicated that Saudi Arabia 
and China’s policies toward the sanction were relatively aligned. In a meeting of foreign 
ministers of the Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia proposed a withdrawal of the sanction. It 
was suggested that the reason behind this proposal was to allow the sending of food and 
medicine, and not military equipment, to the sanction regime. This news, however, was 
not welcomed by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz. He was sceptical of this 
initiative because Saudi Arabia had been a close ally of the US and the UK since the 
outbreak of the Gulf war. Tariq Aziz stated, ‘it is not expected that Saudi Arabia comes 
with honest and positive proposals for the interest of Iraq’ (Xinhua News Agency 
10.01.99). 
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Twelve months later, the move to lift the sanction was gradually put into effect. During a 
visit of Madeleine Albright to Riyadh, the US and Saudi leaders agreed on the need to 
devise appropriate mechanisms concerning the suspension of the sanction. This 
suspension, however, would depend on Iraq’s decision on whether or not to allow the 
return of the UN weapon inspectors into the country (Xinhua General News Service 
07.12.91). 
 
In 1999, China took two important steps to loosen the sanction. Its Deputy Permanent 
Representative to the UN, Shen Guofang, insisted that a number of the UN Security 
Council members accelerate the approval of the contracts related to the Oil-for-Food 
Program. The implementation of this program, which had begun on December 10, 1996, 
had been hindered when oil sales were low. Iraq was incapable of producing more oil due 
to the sanction that suspended the contracts for oil industry equipment. Along with Russia 
and France, China also sent a draft proposal to the Security Council, requesting a 
suspension of sanctions against food for the civilians, financial transactions, and air and 
sea embargoes. The suspension was to take effect the first 100 days following the report 
concerning the system of monitoring and verifying of weapons had been submitted by the 
Secretary General of the UN. 
 
In 2000, China and Saudi Arabia remained steadfast in their attempts to alleviate the 
humanitarian crisis and strive to meet the pressing needs of Iraqi civilians. In urging the 
lift of the sanction, China emphasized the responsibility of the sanction’s originator, 
whereas Saudi Arabia stressed the role of the sanction’s target. China consistently 
implored the international community to be fair in evaluating the compliance of the Iraqi 
authority with the UN resolutions, and to respect the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Iraq. King Fahd continued to communicate his regret over the 
suffering of Iraqi civilians and urged Iraq to implement all the UN resolutions so that the 
economic sanctions could be waived. In the same year, Saudi Arabia reopened its border 
with Iraq, easing the movement of truck traffic (The Washington Post 22.11.00). This 
effort facilitated the flow of civilian goods to the Iraqis. 
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4.3.2 The Arab-Israeli Conflicts 
The Saudi and Chinese officials consistently voiced their understanding and support 
regarding the Palestinian struggle and strongly stressed their countries’ positions on the 
Middle East’s issues. The Palestinian issue, in particular, was generally viewed as the 
factor that influenced the security development of the region.  In July 1991, for example, 
a meeting between Undersecretary in Charge of Political Affairs, Abdul Rahman al-
Mansuri, and the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, 
emphasized the support of their countries concerning the struggle (Xinhua General News 
Service 10.07.91). Abdur Rahman al-Mansuri also said, ‘there will be no peace and 
stability in the region if we cannot find a solution to the Middle East problems.’ Minister 
Qian Qichen shared the same perspective by accentuating that the Palestinian issue was 
‘the key to the final solution of the Middle East problem’ (Xinhua General News Service 
10.07.91). 
 
A meeting between Premier Li Peng and King Fahd Abdul Aziz in 1991 drew attention to 
the integral components  required for the solution of Arab-Israeli conflict. The top leaders 
of the two countries clearly iterated that China and Saudi Arabia occupied privileged 
positions in offering a solution to the conflict. China’s Vice Premier, Li Lanqing, 
attempted to convey that China was part of the struggle of the Arab governments 
regarding this conflict.  
 
Premier Li Peng and King Fahd made a joint call for the solution of the Middle Eastern 
issue. The Premier pressed for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 
242 and 338 on the Palestinian issue and Israel’s withdrawal from the Arab lands, while 
King Fahd urged for the Palestinian rights of return. Apart from the joint call, the leaders 
reviewed the role and positions of China and Saudi Arabia in this issue. For the King, 
China could devote considerable attention to the Middle Eastern problem since it was one 
of the five permanent members of the UN. For the Premier, the Fahd plan, which was 
originally introduced in the Arab Summit in 1981, was ‘wise and still applicable’. The 
Premier also expressed his satisfaction with the Kingdom’s stance and its commitment to 
the Palestinian issue. He also stated that China had shared identical perceptions with the 
King’s belief that the Palestinian issue was the major problem in the region (Xinhua 
 157 
 
General News Service 10.07.91). China’s support for the Arab governments was 
reinforced by Vice Premier Li Lanqing, who, when visiting Saudi Arabia in 1993, 
delivered a message of his government’s support to the Arab moves towards ‘a just, 
peaceful and comprehensive solution’ of the Middle Eastern issues (Xinhua General 
News Service 27.03.93).  
 
In the meetings between the Chinese leaders and Saudi high-ranking officials in 1995, the 
significance of the Sino-Saudi relations in preserving the peace and stability in the region 
was highlighted. The Chinese leader continued to emphasize the strong position of Saudi 
Arabia in the region, showing that China needed the Kingdom to exert perpetually its 
regional influence on the Middle Eastern issues. President Jiang Zemin, who met Prince 
Khaled bin Abdul Aziz in March 1995, stressed that a strong Sino-Saudi relationship was 
a crucial factor for ‘keeping Asia stable and in maintaining world peace,’ (Xinhua News 
Agency 28.03.95). Seven months later, Premier Li Peng emphasised that Saudi Arabia 
was an influential state in the Gulf and that its position was important in preserving peace 
and stability in the area (Xinhua News Agency 24.10.95).  
 
In assessing the significance of Sino-Saudi relations in promoting regional peace and 
stability, the following analysis will identify how the two countries responded to the Oslo 
Accords, the Camp David Summit and the Second Palestinian Intifada. In brief, the Oslo 
Accords, which were seen as the major accomplishment of the Middle East Peace 
Process, received a genuine compliment from China and Saudi Arabia. For the Camp 
David Summit, the two countries heavily backed the PLO and Palestinians. The leaders 
of the two countries, moreover, undertook face-to-face consultations with Arafat before 
and after the summit ended in failure. During the Second Palestinian Intifada, the two 
countries were completely opposed to the Israeli military assault on the Palestinians. 
China used its position as a permanent member of the UN to quell Israeli’s sporadic 
violence. In the meantime, the Saudi government continued to relieve the hardship and 
suffering of the Palestinians through a number of urgent measures.  
 
 158 
 
Oslo Accords 
The Oslo Accords embrace two major agreements; Oslo I and Oslo II. Oslo I, known as 
the Declaration of Principles, is also referred to as the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements. It was signed between PLO Chairman Yasser 
Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 13, 1993 in the US White 
House. Oslo II is known as the Interim Agreement that was signed on September 28, 
1995. Arafat and Rabin met again in the White House and signed ‘the Interim Agreement 
on Implementation of the Declaration of Principles’. 
 
The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (Oslo I) marked significant achievement: the 
mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO; Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho, as well certain areas of the West Bank for a period  of five years; and the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which earned self-governing powers. 
Under the Interim Agreement (Oslo II), the Palestinian Council, the key component of 
Palestinian self-government, was established and replaced the Palestinian Authority.  
Moreover, as part of  this agreement, Palestinians and Israelis were legally obliged to 
undertake specific responsibilities (Watson 2000). The Interim Agreement, among other 
issues, detailed the stages of Israeli military redeployment and the process of transferring 
power.  
 
In the period between the Gulf War and the signing of Oslo I, China and Saudi Arabia 
had different policy behaviour, interests and concerns regarding the PLO. The reason for 
such differences was due to the strained relationship that Saudi Arabia and the PLO had 
been experiencing since the Gulf War. The Saudi government intentionally withheld 
financial aid to the PLO because of the latter’s contradictory posture during the war. A 
few months before Oslo I was ratified, the PLO representatives expressed their regret for 
the decision to support the Saddam regime. By contrast, the PLO enjoyed a long-standing 
relationship with China during this period. In the aftermath of Oslo I, the policy response, 
interests and concerns of China and Saudi Arabia towards the PLO were identical since 
Saudi Arabia had gradually improved and restored its relationship with the PLO. China 
and Saudi Arabia continued to support Oslo II, reflecting their identical and consistent 
policies towards the PLO. 
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PLO Executive Committee Member, Mahmud Abbas, visited Saudi Arabia in January 
1993. His visit raised a serious concern over whether the Saudi-PLO relationship would 
be mended. A Saudi source reported that this visit was at the request of Abbas, who 
clearly intended to attend a celebration of 28th anniversary of the Palestinian Revolution. 
The objective of the visit was claimed to have no other purposes (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 12.01.93), but it afforded Abbas a good opportunity to repair the 
PLO’s relationship with Saudi Arabia by expressing his sincere regret for taking the 
PLO’s stand in favour of Iraq during the Gulf crisis. He said that ‘the PLO never meant to 
support aggression or take the part of wrong side’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
14.01.93). Palestinian ambassador to Riyadh, Subhi Abu Karsh, also conveyed his regret 
concerning the Palestinian position during the Gulf crisis. These expressions of regret 
were given a rational response by Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the organiser of this 
event. The Prince wisely remarked that the Kingdom supported the Palestinian struggle, 
and sought a just solution to the issue of Palestine (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
14.01.93). In June of the same year, Prince Salman, the Chairman of the Popular 
Committees for Assisting the Palestinian Mujahidin in Saudi Arabia, ordered the Director 
General of this organization to donate a SR 10,405,801 to the PLO. A certain amount of 
financial contribution had been already made in previous months (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 10.06.93). 
 
A few weeks before Oslo I was concluded, the PLO authority and Chinese government 
visibly promoted a significant development in the relationship. The PLO and Chinese 
leaders exchanged their views, updated the progress of the peace process and attained an 
important agreement between them. On his way to Pyongyang in July 1993, Arafat 
briefed China’s Vice-Foreign Minister at the Beijing airport on the recent developments 
of the peace process. In the following month, a protocol agreement between the 
representatives of the CCP and the Fatah Movement was formed. The protocol indicated 
a strong link between the two parties that was officially established in October 1992. 
Through the protocol, the exchange visits of the leaders and members of the groups were 
expected to increase (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 06.08.93).  
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In a visit of Arafat to Beijing after Oslo I was concluded, the Chinese government 
expressed a deep appreciation concerning the lifelong struggle of the PLO and the 
Palestinians in general. Arafat’s success in the Oslo Accord received high praise and 
gratitude from top Chinese leaders. President Jiang Zemin gave a warm congratulation 
and stated, ‘We are glad to see that the Palestinian people have made important 
achievements in realizing their final’. The President highly stressed that this accord was 
the result of a long-term struggle of the Palestinian people and the sound policies pursued 
by the PLO. The President assured Arafat that China was willing to participate in the 
reconstruction of Palestine and to expand its close cooperation with the PLO (Xinhua 
General News Service 22.09.93). Primer Li Peng extended his compliments to Arafat, 
stating, ‘this is a good beginning’. For Arafat, the overwhelming support from the 
Chinese leaders merited deep gratitude. On behalf of the Palestinians, Arafat expressed 
his sheer admiration for the leaders and people of China and remarked, ‘the Palestinian 
people are proud of their true friends like the Chinese people’ (Xinhua General News 
Service 23.09.93).  
 
China was also an important country to Israel. After a visit of Arafat to China, the 
Chinese government received an official visit of an Israeli leader, who intended to benefit 
from good and cordial relations between China and Arab states. In the middle of October 
1993, Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, visited Beijing for five days. In this visit, 
Rabin discussed the significant progress of the Middle East Peace Process with China’s 
counterparts. He hoped that the Chinese would play a greater role in the peace 
negotiations and believed that China’s relation with the Middle Eastern countries could 
ensure the implementation of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. In expressing his positive 
expectations, Rabin said, ‘China has got good relations with many of the Arab-Islamic 
countries in the region, and no doubt, the support of China for the agreement between the 
PLO and Israel, which was expressed publicly, can bring about assistance to the 
implementation of the agreement’. He further deemed that China’s support of the Israel-
Palestinian agreement would be able to ‘mute the opposition’ to this accord (Xinhua 
General News Service 13.10.93).  
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The Palestinians not only won Chinese support, but also regained Saudi backing for their 
struggle against Israel. Within this struggle, Oslo I received an appropriate response from 
Saudi Arabia. It could be argued that the Kingdom was well prepared to mend its 
relationship with the PLO. In September 1993, through Minister of State and Member of 
the Saudi Council of Minister, Muhammad Ibrahim Mas’ud, King Fahd delivered the 
support of Saudi Arabia to the Declaration of Principles and the earnest endeavour of 
building the state of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcast 22.09.93). Instead of offering moral support, Saudi Arabia demanded that the 
PLO make a public apology in the ensuing month. The demand was due to the PLO’s 
stand in support of Saddam Hussein following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcast 28.10.93).  
 
The Palestinians continued to gain moral and financial support from a particular 
independent organization and individual in Saudi Arabia. A communiqué was issued by 
the Islamic World League during its session in Saudi  Arabia in December 1993, and 
chaired by the General Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi  Arabia, Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin 
Abdullah bin Baz. This communiqué, among other things, placed emphasis on Jerusalem 
as being the first and the utmost concern and consideration of every Muslim, and that 
there was not right to surrender Jerusalem to Israel. The communiqué also denounced the 
Israeli Supreme Court for declaring the Al-Aqsa mosque to be part of its territory. All 
Muslims, therefore, were enjoined to have a strong united voice in resolving the 
Palestinian issue (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 30.12.93).  
 
In addition to this communiqué, a voluntary donation to the Palestinians was made by 
Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz. The amount of the donation was SR 7,130,280 and was 
mainly directed to the PLO in October 1993 (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 
05.10.93). In the following month, Prince Salman also made a SR 5,500,761 donation to 
the PLO (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 03.12.93).  
 
China and Saudi Arabia were the committed supporters of the PLO and the Palestinians. 
When Oslo II was signed between Palestinian and Israeli leaders, the policies of the two 
countries towards this agreement remained similar and sound. The Saudi leader delivered 
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his clear view regarding the agreement. At the same time, his government pledged to 
grant financial aid to the PLO. The Chinese government was pleased with the remarkable 
achievement that the PLO had made, and stressed its full support to the Palestinians. 
 
Saudi Arabia continued to bolster its moral and financial support and devote considerable 
attention to the Palestinians. On October 2, 1995, in a meeting of the Council of Ministers 
in Jeddah, King Fahd viewed Oslo II as ‘a positive step toward a just and comprehensive 
peace’ (United Press International 03.10.95). The King also communicated his view that 
Israel needed to reach an agreement with Syria and Lebanon since the wars between 
Israel and the two Arab countries were still going on. On the following day, Arafat 
reportedly met with Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz in Al-Salam Palace in 
Jeddah. However, the meeting agendas were not released by the Saudi Press Agency.  
With regard to Saudi financial aid to the PLO, on September 29, 1995, the Saudi 
government officially announced that a donation of USD 100 million would be directed 
to the Palestinian Authority, which was under the leadership of Arafat (United Press 
International 03.10.95). In the same month, Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz directed the 
Popular Committee for Assisting Palestinian Mujahidin to make a donation of SR 3.12 
million to the PLO (Moneyclips 27.09.95). 
 
China also showed its continued support to Palestine and reasonably valued the PLO’s 
achievement. On September 20, 1995, the Secretary General of the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Nayif Hawatimah, met with Vice-Chairman of the 
National Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
Wu Xueqian, in Beijing. In the meeting, the Chinese official publicly stressed the 
Chinese government’s strong and continued support to the just cause of the Palestinians. 
Regarding Oslo II, the spokesman of Chinese Foreign Ministry remarked that his 
government welcomed the agreement (Oslo II).  
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Camp David of 2000 
During a nearly 10-month deadlock in the peace negotiation between Palestine and Israel, 
Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak met at Camp David for 14 days. The two leaders began 
the Camp David Summit on July 11, 2000 in which the US was a peace negotiator. 
 
Ehud Barak tabled the Israeli proposal. He clearly stated that Israel would abandon the 
pre-1967 war border, but demanded the annexation of a Jewish settlement in the West 
Bank. Barak continued to insist that the Palestinians accept having all of Jerusalem serve 
as the ‘eternal capital’ of Israel. Regarding the cause of Palestinian refugees, Barak 
stressed that Israel had no legal responsibility. 
 
The Camp David Summit rendered no results. There are certain reasons behind Arafat’s 
failure to reach an agreement in this summit. First, the Palestinian delegation, as Shlaim 
(2009) argued, held differing views regarding the proposal: one side was optimistic, 
contending that this summit would help put the conflict behind them, while another side 
was sceptical, seeing that some of the Palestinians’ rights had to be sacrificed. One of 
these rights was the right of return for refugees from 1948. Second, this delegation was 
under pressure to preserve Muslim rights, specifically the right over the Old City of 
Jerusalem. The pressure came from the two regional powers, namely Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
A report from an Israeli Radio claimed that the Jerusalem dispute that was raised in the 
Camp David Summit was a hardly compromised issue. The report showed that the 
Palestinians had demanded full sovereignty over Jerusalem. For this demand, Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt were allegedly reported to have asked Arafat not to bargain on this 
issue unless a full sovereignty to Palestinian had been guaranteed (BBC Monitoring 
Middle East 18.07.00).  
 
China and Saudi Arabia certainly lent their moral support to the PLO representatives at 
the Camp David Summit. The support signified close and high-level contacts, as well as 
the long-standing commitments, that the two countries had been making regarding the 
Palestinian issue. In this case, the PLO was seen to have placed undue reliance on Riyadh 
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and Beijing.  During a conversation with the PLO leaders, China’s President convinced 
the former that there would be no changes in its support to the just struggle of the 
Palestinians. President Jiang Zemin said, ‘no matter what happens, China will never 
change its stand of supporting Palestine’s just cause’. China also agreed with the decision 
of the Palestinian government to choose a peace negotiation as a mechanism to solve the 
conflict. This was underlined during a President's visit to Palestine in April 2000, a few 
months before the Camp David Summit was held (Xinhua General News Service 
15.04.00). On the Palestinian side, this visit was made at the right time, meaning that 
President Jiang’s visit was absolutely vital at this critical stage of the peace process. 
Moreover, Palestinian leaders recognised that China’s support had enabled them and the 
Palestinians as a whole to face every difficulty and challenge.  
 
Saudi Arabia continued to have regular consultations with the PLO, clearly indicating its 
substantial leverage on the Palestinian issue. Before the summit was convened, Arafat 
and Crown Prince Abdullah discussed the progress of the peace process on July 6, 2000 
via a telephone call. In this conversation, Arafat briefed the Crown Prince about an 
invitation of the US President for a summit with the Israeli Prime Minister (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 08.07.00). While the summit was underway, Saudi Arabia 
was one of the countries involved in ‘semi-daily contact’ with the Palestinian 
representative to the summit. One of the reasons for such contact was to insist on the 
completion of a peace process and to toughen the stance of the Palestinian team (BBC 
Monitoring Middle East 24.07.00). 
 
Saudi Arabia and China extended a close and deliberate observation of the progress of the 
peace process. Soon after the summit had ended, the leaders of the two countries 
conducted separate meetings with Arafat. What could be concluded from the meetings 
was that the two countries firmly backed Arafat though there were some critics that 
blamed him for the failure of the summit. In addition, an unremitting commitment that 
the two countries had been giving in the peace talk, regarding the Palestinian struggle in 
particular, clearly implied Saudi and China’s constant aspiration in the region was to see 
peace and stability. 
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Immediately after the Camp David Summit was concluded, a meeting between the Saudi 
and Palestinian leaders was organized on July 30, 2000 at Royal Office in Al-Salam 
Palace in Jeddah. Arafat met with King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah to discuss the 
result of Camp David Summit (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 01.08.00). The Saudi 
and Palestinian leaders were apparently also to discuss Jerusalem issues in the upcoming 
meeting of Arab and Muslim leaders. 
 
Chinese leaders expressed their disappointment and frustration at the failure of this peace 
talk, and took the initiative to meet the leaders of the two conflicting parties. Zhu 
Bangzao, who was the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed the 
disappointment of the China’s government, stating, ‘we deeply regret that the 
negotiations failed to reach an agreement’ (Xinhua General News Service 26.07.00). 
During a visit of Arafat to China in August 2000, President Jiang Zemin reemphasized 
the displeasure of his government concerning the recent development of the US peace 
process (Xinhua General News Service 14.08.00).  
 
A few days after Arafat’s visit to Beijing, China's Vice-Premier, Qian Qichen, had a 
meeting with Shimon Peres, Minister of Regional Cooperation of Israel. The Vice 
Premier presumably intended to seek an understanding regarding the collapse of the 
summit from the Israeli side. At the same time, he also presented his view on how this 
conflict should be peacefully resolved. Peres briefed the Vice-Premier on the outcome of 
the summit, and hoped that China would hold a greater position in the peace negotiation. 
The peace talk, as the Vice-Premier replied, would not be accomplished overnight since 
the issue concerned was complicated. Therefore, in his opinion, this difficulty could be 
gradually overcome if both parties (Israelis and Palestinians) demonstrated their sincerity 
and mutual trust, and adopted the UN resolution and the principle of a ‘land for peace’ 
(Xinhua General News Service 17.08.00).  
 
China’s President was keen to see that Israel would adopt the UN resolutions and 
promote good values in the peace process. He continuously solicited the valuable 
contribution of the international community for a solution to this conflict. President Jiang 
Zemin said, ‘We hope that the Israeli government will implement relevant UN 
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resolutions concerning the Middle East issue and agreements reached with Palestine, and 
engage in sincere and practical negotiations with the Palestinian side’. The international 
community, moreover, was to continue promoting peace and providing help for these 
conflicting nations. As a permanent member of the UN, China would work along with the 
international community in realizing ‘comprehensive, equitable and lasting peace in the 
Middle East’ (Xinhua General News Service 26.07.00).  
 
In brief, the collapse of Camp David Summit unveiled a shared frustration between China 
and Saudi Arabia towards the American-sponsored Middle East Peace Process. This 
apprehension was prolonged when the Palestinian uprising broke out a few months later. 
 
The Second Palestinian Intifada 
This event occurred after a visit of Ariel Sharon to Al-Aqsa mosque on September 28, 
2000. The Palestinian frustration and anger towards the collapse of Camp David talks 
was also said to be one of the factors that sparked this event.  
 
China and Saudi Arabia immediately responded to the extreme and continued violence of 
Israeli authorities against the Palestinians. The two countries used various means of 
voicing their grave concerns over the terrible hardship of the Palestinians. China fittingly 
used its position as a permanent member of the UN in calling for an immediate halt of the 
brutal aggression. As a responsible, regional power and a Muslim brother of Palestine, 
Saudi Arabia continually attempted to alleviate the unbearable suffering of the 
Palestinians.   
 
China explicitly rejected Israel’s unacceptable and violent behaviour towards the 
Palestinians. It responded immediately to the event. Since this event triggered severe 
implications to the Palestinian people and the ongoing process of peace negotiation, 
China vehemently insisted that the two conflicting parties end the fighting. To solve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as China seriously contended, the peace talks should be 
accelerated again. China, moreover, was upset with Israeli military forces excessively 
deploying heavy weapons in their aggression towards the Palestinians. The use of force 
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against these civilians, as China continued to criticise, should be also condemned by the 
international community. Chinese denunciation of Israeli aggression was clearly 
demonstrated in its vote for the Resolution 1322 of the UN Security Council.  
 
Saudi Arabia’s reactions to this event were also immediate and intense.  During the 
conflict, the Saudi and Palestinian leaders held urgent consultations, which reflected that 
the lives of the Palestinians were the main priority of Saudi policy, and concern over the 
suffering of the Palestinians was widely shared by the Muslims in the Kingdom. Crown 
Prince Abdullah made a telephone call to Arafat, asking about the latest development in 
the Palestinian territories. The Crown Prince was notified of the devastating effects of 
Israeli aggression, and the huge numbers of fatalities and victims. Instead of pledging the 
Kingdom’s full and firm support to the Palestinian just struggle, the Crown Prince 
conveyed his deep sadness to the suffering of the Palestinians (Xinhua General News 
Service 13.10.00). Arafat also met with King Fahd at Al-Yamamah Palace (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 11.12.00).  
 
The Saudi government granted financial support to the Palestinians, reflecting its great 
concern and heartfelt sympathy for the suffering Palestinians. On September 30, 2000, 
the PLO received USD 800,000 from the Kingdom (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
30.09.00). In November of the same year, Salim al-Za'nun, Palestine National Council 
speaker arrived in Saudi Arabia, and expressed his appreciation of the Kingdom’s 
political and material contribution to Palestine. In this visit, the Palestinian National 
Authority received another USD 30 million from the Kingdom (BBC Monitoring Middle 
East 09.11.00). Prince Naif bin Abdul Aziz, who was an Interior Minister and Chairman 
of the Saudi Committee for the Support of Al Quds Intifada, also ordered a donation of 
USD 5000 for every family of Palestinian martyrs. This donation was part of the 
Kingdom’s program of supporting those Palestinians who endured the harmful 
consequences of Israeli aggression (BBC Monitoring Middle East 14.11.00). 
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4.4 The PRC and the KSA 
The establishment of the Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations was greatly facilitated by the 
efforts of the top-level officials of the two countries. These efforts were immensely 
successful when the Saudi high-ranking officials managed to tackle the sensitive issues 
concerning the shift of the diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the mainland China. 
The historical development of the KSA-PRC diplomatic relations certainly had 
significant implications to the relationship of Saudi Arabia with Taiwan. In preventing 
any forms of negative implications, the Saudi and Taipei governments undertook 
appropriate measures to preserve a long-standing bilateral ties. With regard to the 
Riyadh-Beijing newly established diplomatic link, the Chinese and Saudi governments 
gave a high priority to the economic agendas in developing the relationship. The trade 
cooperation and mutual investment in the energy and non-energy sectors will be the 
central focus in assessing the implementation of these agendas. 
 
4.4.1 The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
This section will analyse the developmental process of diplomatic relations between the 
PRC and the KSA. The high-ranking officials of these two countries were the active 
players of the process. Their official exchange visits in July 1990 resulted in the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. The Saudi and Chinese governments eventually 
formed embassies. The ambassadors that were appointed by the heads of the state had 
been engaged in the Sino-Saudi relations for many years.  Some of the factors leading to 
the establishment of diplomatic relations included Saudi’s changing perceptions towards 
the PRC and the Sino-Saudi missile deals. These factors were critically assessed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The meetings held between the high-ranking officials of the two countries served as the 
means to developing Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations. The officials mutually recognized 
that they had a strong basis from which to establish this relationship and had a common 
understanding of the principles that would guide future relations.  July of 1990 was a 
pivotal month in the history of the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia. The 
visit of Prince Bandar bin Sultan to Beijing on July 10, 1990 marked the beginning of a 
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bright future in terms of the ties between the two countries. In this visit, Prince Bandar,  a 
Saudi ambassador to the US, had meetings with Chinese Premier, Li Peng, and several 
other Chinese high ranking officials, including Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, 
and his vice-minister. Their talks mostly centered on  issues of common concern.  
 
The visit of China’s Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, to Saudi Arabia from the 20th to the 
22nd of July 1990 was a peak event in the development of diplomatic relations. On July 
20, a closed-door meeting, which was considered the first in a round of meetings between 
Minister Qian Qichen and Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal, was 
held in Saudi Arabia. The two ministers had identified that there was a solid ground for 
expanding a friendly and cooperative bilateral relationship. They also agreed on similar 
principles underlying the bilateral relations: peaceful coexistence, non-interference, 
mutual benefit and equality (Xinhua General News Service 20.07.90). On July 21, the 
two countries announced the establishment of the diplomatic relation at the 
ambassadorial level, and a joint communiqué was signed between the foreign ministers. 
Minister Qian also had a 90-minute meeting with King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz in Jeddah in 
which he delivered a congratulatory telegraph to the King from President Yang Shangkun 
and Premier Li Peng. The President and the Premier also received a congratulatory 
telegraph from the Saudi King. 
 
The Saudi King and China’s President placed emphasis on the principles that would 
shape Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations. These principles seemed to be identical. The two 
leaders also delivered their views on the significance of this relationship to China and 
Saudi Arabia as well as to other countries in the international system. In a meeting with 
Minister Qian, King Fahd expressed his hope that this relationship would rest on the 
principles of ‘constructive mutual understanding and sound cooperation’. The King also 
believed that this friendship would bring sound implications to the ‘security, peace and 
independence in Asia and the world’ (Xinhua General News Service 23.07.90). The King 
went on to give his view on the possibility of the Sino-Saudi diplomatic link becoming ‘a 
model of friendly cooperation’ to the countries that embraced different ‘social systems, 
beliefs and cultural traditions’. In the words of the King, these differences existed in all 
countries, and thus these countries ‘should live with each other on good terms’ and 
 170 
 
implement the principles of mutual respect and non-interference. The Kingdom 
understood China’s attitude of non-interference with other countries’ domestic affairs. 
The Kingdom’s foreign policy, as the King described, exhibited the ‘policy of peace and 
neutrality’ and aimed to preserve good relations with all countries (Xinhua General News 
Service 22.07.90). 
 
President Yang Shangkun viewed the establishment of the Sino-Saudi diplomatic link as 
‘a new period in the two countries’ relations.’ With the implementation of the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence, the President said that China had begun to widen its 
relations with the Kingdom, the Gulf States, the Arab world, and all countries of the 
world (Xinhua General News Service 07.08.90). This statement indicated China’s 
readiness to increase and strengthen its presence, particularly in the Middle East. 
 
A month after the two countries had established diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia took 
the initiative by sending its ambassador to Beijing. China also sent its ambassador to 
Riyadh the following month. The two ambassadors were directly involved in creating 
bilateral trade ties between their countries. At this point in time, they had more 
responsibility, namely the task of driving diplomatic relations in the new era. There was 
also an upgrading of the position and role of the institutions that supported the 
commercial link between the two countries. On August 22, 1990, the first Saudi 
ambassador to the PRC, Tawfiq Alamdar, met China’s Premier Li Peng. Ambassador 
Alamdar was previously Saudi commercial representative to China since the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Establishment of Trade Representative’s 
Office had been signed on November 11, 1988 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China 2010). In this meeting, Premier Li Peng delivered a symbolic 
message in describing the dynamic of the Sino-Saudi relations. Premier Li Peng said to 
Ambassador Alamdar, ‘the change of your post shows the development of the Sino-Saudi 
relationship’. The ambassador replied to this message by stating that his new post aimed 
to develop this relationship: ‘My government has instructed me to make efforts to 
strengthen the existing friendly relations between Saudi Arabia and China. I am 
convinced that our relations will surely grow in accordance with the wishes and 
determination of the leaders of our two countries’. The Premier ensured that the Chinese 
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government would accommodate every effort made by the Saudi ambassador to develop 
the bilateral relationship (Xinhua General News Service 23.08.90).  
 
China’s Trade Representative Office in Riyadh was also upgraded to the ambassadorial 
level (Xinhua General News Service 28.07.90). Sun Bigan, China’s trade representative 
in Saudi Arabia, became charge d’affaires of China’s embassy in Saudi Arabia. In 
September 1990, he was appointed as China’s ambassador to the Kingdom.  
 
4.4.2 The PRC, the KSA and the ROC 
The major decision of Saudi Arabia to shift its diplomatic relations from the ROC to the 
PRC provoked an immediate and perhaps predictable response from Taiwan. The Taipei 
authority adopted a number of possible approaches to protect its long-standing diplomatic 
link with Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of the diplomatic severance, Saudi Arabia 
appropriately followed the ‘One China’ policy that had been widely introduced by the 
PRC. The Taipei-Riyadh economic relations in this period, however, remained unaltered 
and intact. 
 
4.4.2.1 ‘One China’ Policy  
This section will briefly assess the ‘One China’ policy that persistently prompted a major 
debate between the PRC’s government and the ROC’s authority. The Beijing government 
introduced ‘one country, two systems’ in its peaceful reconciliation of Taiwan issue. Yet, 
it was inconsistent with the Taipei authority’s proposal of having ‘one country, two 
governments’. Both sides continued to criticize each other’s actions in reuniting China. 
Saudi Arabia’s response to the Taiwan issue is an interesting case to examine. Since the 
Kingdom had formed relations with both the PRC and the ROC, it would be 
uncomfortable for the Saudi government to determine its posture and policy behaviour 
concerning the Taiwan issue.  
 
In the aftermath of the establishment of Beijing-Riyadh diplomatic relations, Taiwan’s 
leader confirmed that Taipei policy towards mainland China was similar to the one that 
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had been practiced earlier. Taipei’s leader seemed to have suggested that the Beijing 
government be realistic in dealing with the ‘One China’ policy. Taiwan’s Vice Premier, 
Shih Chi-Yang, stressed that the ROC’s policy towards mainland China would not 
change despite the change of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, stating, ‘mainland 
policy and diplomatic policy are two different things’ (Central News Agency-Taiwan 
21.07.90). Concerning the policy towards Beijing, Taiwan would continue assisting the 
Chinese people in mainland China. The Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council also 
stressed that the Beijing government should accept the fact that mainland China and 
Taiwan were ‘two separate political entities under separate rules’ (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 25.01.96).  
 
Taiwan totally disagreed with the ways in which the Beijing government tried to reunite 
the country. Threatening Taiwan with the use of force and suppressing Taipei 
independent behaviour at an international level were uncooperative approaches. Taiwan’s 
Premier, Lee Huan, denounced the use of force as it was not a tool by which to reunify 
China (Central News Agency-Taiwan 27.02.90). However, he believed that seeking the 
consensus of all the Chinese people and  promoting the concept majority participation 
would prompt and accelerate the reunification process. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan also totally condemned Beijing’s political 
response of precluding Taipei from joining the international community. Based on a 
report released by the Ministry, there were 72 instances in which Beijing attempted to 
isolate Taipei from international activities. The Ministry also lamented the authority of 
mainland China, stating, ‘the Chinese Communists have not eased their attempts to 
suppress us in spite of the growing exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait.’ One example was the proposal of Taiwan entry to the UN to which Beijing was 
seen to circulate a public statement opposing this proposal. This message was circulated 
throughout Beijing embassies in Saudi Arabia, Fiji and other states (Central News 
Agency-Taiwan 28.02.90).  
 
The Beijing government repeatedly called for the reunification of China and criticized 
Taipei authorities for repudiating the ‘One China’ policy. It clarified its approach in 
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adopting this policy, which mostly depended on Taiwan’s political behaviour.  More 
specifically, the element of ‘force’ contained in the strategy of reuniting China was 
significantly clarified by the Beijing government, which was determined to resist any 
efforts that bred the development of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China and one Taiwan’. 
Premier Li Peng indicated that the ROC government had adopted ‘flexible diplomacy’, 
and an approach towards an independence of Taiwan. He explained further by saying, 
‘that is a trend which deserves attention…we will not sit idly by and will not keep silent 
if Taiwan works for independence’ (Xinhua General News Service 27.01.90).  
 
The PRC further denounced the ‘two states’ theory proposed by Taiwan President, Lee 
Teng-hui, who made every effort to split China. Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the PRC, Taiwan’s authority was criticized for not recognizing the ‘One China’ 
principle and the lack of sincerity in the efforts to improve cross-Taiwan Straits relations. 
Thus, this created a problem in regards to the reunification of China. 
 
The possibility of the PRC using force against Taiwan, however, was contingent upon 
specific development such as a foreign invasion of Taiwan or a refusal on the part of 
Taiwan to partake in negotiations as a mechanism for China’s reunification. The use of 
force, as the PRC stated, would mainly be for the purpose of defending the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of China (Emerging Market Datafile XINHUA 19.10.00). 
 
At the international level, the ‘One China’ principle, to some extent, shaped and 
influenced the political behaviour of other countries towards the PRC and Taiwan issue. 
Saudi Arabia was not excluded in this context. The Saudi government hoped that the 
issue would be resolved through a non-violent approach. Vice Premier Qian Qichen 
stressed that the ‘One China’ principle was respected by the majority of foreign 
governments, and they also referred to this principle in maintaining relations with Taiwan 
(Xinhua General News Service 24.03.00). Crown Prince Abdullah, who visited mainland 
China in 1998, urged the use of peaceful resolution of this issue, stating, ‘Saudi Arabia 
hopes the Taiwan issue can be resolved peacefully. A peaceful resolution is in the 
interests of people on both sides of the Strait and enhances the region’s security and 
stability’ (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 11.09.99). 
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There are two different sources that revealed the stance of Saudi Arabia on Taiwan 
issues. However, these sources seemed to have created a lack of understanding regarding 
the stance. The BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, which referred to the Xinhua News Agency, 
emphasized the Kingdom’s support of the ‘One China’ policy, whereas a report from the 
BBC Monitoring Middle East, based on information from the Saudi Press Agency, failed 
to precisely disclose the nature of  the Kingdom’s support towards the ‘One China’ 
policy. In a visit to Beijing, the position of Saudi Arabia regarding Taiwan issue was 
indicated by Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz. The source said, ‘He (Prince Salman) 
emphasized that Saudi Arabia would stick to the “One China” policy and firmly support 
the Chinese people in their reunification cause’ (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 21.04.99). 
In a joint statement released during Prince Sultan’s visit to Beijing in 2000, the posture of 
the Kingdom towards Taiwan issue was reiterated. Saudi Arabia considered Taiwan as 
‘an indivisible part of the Chinese territories’ and the PRC was the only legitimate 
government that represented the Chinese people. This position was said to be found in the 
communiqué issued at the time when the Riyadh-Beijing diplomatic relation was 
established (BBC Monitoring Middle East 17.10.00).  
 
4.4.2.2 Taiwan’s Dilemma with Riyadh-Beijing Diplomatic Relations 
The Taipei government demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the Kingdom’s 
establishment of Riyadh-Beijing diplomatic relations in four main ways. This section will 
examine these ways as well as a number of the necessary measures adopted by the ROC 
in its relations with Saudi Arabia following the severance of their diplomatic link. 
 
The first measure involved the acquisition of further information on the Saudi delegation 
to China at the end of the 1980s. During a meeting between the ROC ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia Edward Kuan and the Saudi government officials, the ambassador sought to 
express Taiwan’s grave concern regarding Prince Bandar’s visit to mainland China, 
which could presumably bring about the establishment of the diplomatic relations 
between Riyadh and Beijing. The ROC seemed suspicious of the visit that had taken 
place in the late 1980s.  
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Ambassador Edward Kuan also planned to have a talk with Saudi top-level officials with 
the intention of gaining a better understanding of, and perhaps to scrutinize, the issues 
that were discussed between Prince Bandar and the PRC’s officials (Central News 
Agency – Taiwan 13.07.90).  Moreover, the Minister assumed that the meeting between 
Prince Bandar, Prime Minister Li Peng and Foreign Minister Chi Chen in Beijing had 
elicited the possibility of the formation of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom and 
the mainland China (Central News Agency – Taiwan 14.07.90). Prince Bandar’s visit to 
Beijing had been his fourth visit to the communist regime since 1985. He was the one 
who signed an agreement with the mainland in 1988, which brought about the 
establishment of the PRC trade office in Riyadh in 1989 (Central News Agency – Taiwan 
11.07.90). 
 
The second way was by insisting on the preservation of Saudi-ROC diplomatic relations. 
This was expressed in the reaction of Taiwan’s Premier, Hau Pei-Tsun, who urged the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to use any possible means of maintaining the recognition of 
ROC-Saudi diplomatic relations. The Premier was very concerned about the Taipei-
Riyadh relationship when he was briefed by the ROC Foreign Minister, Frederick Chien, 
regarding the possibility of Riyadh switching its diplomatic recognition to Beijing 
(Central News Agency – Taiwan 12.07.90). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC 
also observed that the PRC had been using any and all means to sabotage the ROC-Saudi 
diplomatic link. 
 
However, the Kingdom did not respond instantly to Taiwan’s critical concern over 
Riyadh-Beijing diplomatic relations. The only thing that Minister Frederick Chien knew 
of was the future visit of a ministerial official of the Kingdom to Taiwan.  
 
Minister Frederick Chien made an assumption regarding the factors that brought about 
the diplomatic link between mainland China and the Kingdom. He stated that pressure 
from the communist regime of China was the reason behind the initiative of the Kingdom 
towards the establishment of the diplomatic link. He assumed that this initiative had been 
‘a painful choice for Saudi Arabia.’ With this conjecture, the Minister urged the people of 
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Taiwan to have a clear understanding on the factor that altered the Kingdom’s policy 
towards mainland China. Moreover, he implored that no anti-Saudi sentiments be 
provoked. The Minister, however,  anticipated that the likelihood of rescuing Taipei-
Riyadh diplomatic ties was low. Taiwan’s government also pledged to work effectively 
in maintaining its posts in Saudi Arabia and pursuing bilateral contact (Central News 
Agency – Taiwan 14.07.90). The second set of contributing factors that the Taiwan 
government had postulated regarding the Kingdom’s diplomatic link with mainland 
China was the missile deals of 1987 and the sale of a communication satellite to Saudi 
Arabia in 1990. These two events were believed to have driven Riyadh and Beijing to the 
establishment of an official relationship (Central News Agency – Taiwan 12.07.90). 
 
The third way in which the Taipei government demonstrated its dissatisfaction 
concerning Riyadh-Beijing diplomatic relations was through its expression of ‘deep 
regrets’ concerning the Saudi decision to shift its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to 
the PRC. This was voiced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan to the Saudi 
envoy that arrived in Taipei in July 1990. The envoy was led by the Minister of Industry 
and Electricity, Abdul Aziz al-Zamil. They intended to deliver King Fahd’s message to 
President Lee Teng Hui. The message elucidated the Saudi decision to have diplomatic 
relations with the PRC and the transformation of ROC and Saudi embassies into ‘offices’ 
(Central News Agency – Taiwan 19.07.90) (note: the visit of the Saudi Minister to 
Taiwan was made just a few days before Saudi Arabia and the PRC formed a diplomatic 
link). 
 
As mentioned in a talk between Minister Frederick and Minister Abdul Aziz al-Zamil, 
both nations required the preservation of the Taipei-Riyadh link, yet there was still 
ambiguity as to how this link would be adjusted in the future. In retrospect, ROC-Saudi 
diplomatic relations had been established in 1946, and their close link was apparent along 
various ‘political, military, medical, agricultural, technological and cultural’ realms 
(Central News Agency – Taiwan 19.07.90).  
 
The ROC struggled to defend its status and sovereignty. This could be seen in the 
decision of the high-ranking officials of Taiwan, who had determined the way in which 
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the ROC-Saudi link should be shaped in the future and determined to maintain the ROC 
cooperative programs with Saudi Arabia. This decision was concluded at the Supra-
Ministry Conference in July 1990, which convened all leading officials of Taiwan’s 
Defence, Economics, and Finance Ministries and the National Science Council. The 
decision was said to be put forward in a meeting in Riyadh (Central News Agency – 
Taiwan 20.07.90). The decision was also conveyed in the message that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs sent to the Saudi government after the diplomatic relation had been 
switched to the PRC. 
 
As it is known that the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sent H. E. 
Abdul Aziz al-Zamil, Minister of Industry and Electricity as its special envoy to 
visit the Republic of China on July 17, 1990 and expressed the Kingdom’s desire 
to continue all mutually beneficial cooperation with the Republic of China after 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom and the Chinese 
communist regime, the government of the Republic of China will continue to 
consult with the kingdom about the adjustment of future ROC-Saudi relations for 
the sake of its national interests (Central News Agency – Taiwan 22.07.90). 
 
The fourth way in which Taiwan revealed its frustration regarding the establishment of 
Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations was through the strong objection conveyed by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan. In a message to the Saudi government, the ROC 
government accepted the fate of its diplomatic link with Saudi Arabia. It highlighted the 
authority of mainland China as a troublemaker to ROC-Saudi relations and expressed 
disappointment in the Saudi government’s policy regarding this issue. The statement of 
protest was: 
 
The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced on July 22, 1990 that 
it has established diplomatic relations with the Chinese communist regime starting 
from the same day.  In view of the Kingdom’s disregard of the traditional 
friendship between our two peoples and its yielding to the Chinese communists’ 
disruption of the long-standing close ties between our two countries, the 
government of the Republic of China has instructed its embassy in Riyadh to 
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lodge the strongest protest against the Kingdom for the decision and has also 
decided to suspend its diplomatic relations with the Kingdom on July 22, 1990 
(Central News Agency – Taiwan 22.07.90).  
 
On the same day, the former Saudi Ambassador to Taiwan, Assad Abdul Aziz al-Zuhair, 
responded to this protest. His response was fairly considerate and courteous. He tried to 
convince Taiwan’s authority that the future relation between Taipei and Riyadh was 
positive. He also seemed to calm the situation by saying that the switch of diplomatic 
relations simply involved a technical issue. He notified Taiwan’s Foreign Minister that 
the Taipei-Riyadh cooperation would continue and even become more prosperous. The 
switch of diplomatic relations, as he emphasised, was a matter of changing the name, and 
not the relations between the nations (Central News Agency – Taiwan 23.07.90). Before 
leaving for Saudi Arabia, Ambassador Al-Zuhair contended that the PRC-Saudi 
diplomatic relations would not affect a ‘close and long- time friendship’ between Taipei 
and Riyadh (Central News Agency – Taiwan 23.07.90). 
 
Taiwan had to accept the fact that the Kingdom had recognized mainland China as the 
sole representative of the whole people of China. During the period in which the 
diplomatic link between Taipei and Riyadh was suspended, the Taiwan government took 
several significant and purposeful measures to resume the 44-year-old Taipei-Riyadh 
relationship and to stress that the ROC was still a reliable and important friend to Saudi 
Arabia. One of these measures also involved an attempt to consolidate the ROC’s 
relations with other countries. 
 
The first measure was the institutionalization of the relationship that was proposed by 
Minister Frederick. According to the Minister, institutionalization meant the formation of 
an office that could sustain ROC-Saudi Arabia cooperation and preserve the ROC’s 
sovereignty. The Minister also saw this office as a means of supporting King Fahd’s 
perception regarding the importance of the ROC’s friendship. As the Minister stated, ‘we 
should establish a body that meets that spirit’ (Central News Agency – Taiwan 23.07.90). 
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Minister Frederick decided to resign despite his efforts to maintain and adjust the 
relations between his government and the Saudi authority. The Minister submitted his 
resignation as a way of admitting full responsibility for the failure to prevent Saudi 
Arabia from recognizing the PRC as the only country that represented China. He also felt 
responsible of not being able to secure Taipei-Riyadh diplomatic relations. The 
resignation, however, was not accepted by Premier Hau Pei-Tsun on the grounds that all 
possible means had been already carried out by Minister Frederick in protecting the 
Taiwan-Saudi diplomatic link and the national interests of Taiwan (Central News Agency 
– Taiwan 24.07.90).  
 
Two former ROC's ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Yeh Chia-Wu and Edward Kuan, 
played a critical role in the negotiation in Saudi Arabia in July 1990. They sought to 
know whether the cooperation that the Riyadh-Taipei governments had previously 
developed was going to change. They discussed future ROC-Saudi relations and brought 
up several other issues of concern. Among them were ‘the title and status’ of the ROC’s 
representative office in the Kingdom and the agreements that had been reached in the past 
(Central News Agency – Taiwan 24.07.90). In this meeting, Edward Kuan clearly stated 
Taiwan’s interest in sustaining substantive relations with the Saudi government. The 
content of the negotiation, however, was not publicly made (Central News Agency – 
Taiwan 30.07.90) and produced no agreements. The next round of talks had been 
arranged, but was postponed due to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Central News 
Agency – Taiwan 06.08.90).  
 
In January 1991, a memorandum between Taipei and Riyadh was signed whereby the 
nations agreed to establish specific institutions that served their common interests. The 
ROC would develop Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Riyadh, while the Kingdom 
would establish Saudi Arabian Trade Office in Taipei. After a few months, a new Saudi 
representative, Mohammed Y. Talabulsi, arrived in the ROC and served in the Saudi 
trade office. Staff in both offices enjoyed the ‘diplomatic immunity and preferential 
treatment under the principle of reciprocity’ (Central News Agency – Taiwan 14.10.91). 
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The second measure was the unchanging cooperation with and technical assistance for 
Saudi Arabia. In the new era of Taipei-Riyadh relations, Taiwan was immensely and 
continuously involved in various sectors of the Kingdom. The multi-faceted 
collaborations and mutual support implied that Taiwan and Saudi Arabia benefited from a 
long-established and deep relationship. As a result, the mutual interests of the two nations 
were consistently advanced. The Council’s International Cooperation Department 
maintained its cooperation that had begun in July 1978 through the signing of a 
Memorandum on Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Since then, discussions on 
this cooperation were being conducted annually. Some agreements appeared in this 
cooperation, for instance, ‘researches on Arabic-language computers, fish farming, 
astronomy, solar energy, snake poison, Hepatitis and Biological technology’ (Central 
News Agency – Taiwan 10.09.90). 
 
Taiwan continued offering a great deal of assistance to the Kingdom, which came the 
form of ‘technical counselling and advice,...the construction of roads, airports, harbours 
and military bases,…and the development of the Kingdom’s industrial sector.’ Taiwan’s 
technical teams had also offered services to the Kingdom’s Ministries, including the  
Ministry of Communication, Ministry of Agriculture and Water, Ministry of Health, and 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy (Central News Agency – Taiwan 29.10.92).  
 
The third measure was the consolidation of Taiwan’s foreign relations with other 
countries. This measure could have resulted from the important lesson that Taiwan had 
learned from its diplomatic setback with Saudi Arabia. During a cabinet meeting, Premier 
Hau Pei-Tsun ensured that Taiwan would continue implementing ‘pragmatic foreign 
policy’ in its relations with foreign countries (Central News Agency – Taiwan 03.08.90).  
The pursuit of ‘pragmatic foreign policy’ was based on several objectives with an overall 
aim to prolong the survival of the nation of Taiwan at an international level. This policy 
was intended to foster the ROC’s relations within the international system and effectively 
counter the PRC’s actions of repressing and isolating Taipei from world politics. This 
policy, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan contended, was the best approach to 
promoting and protecting its national interest. It could also encourage the formation of a 
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unified China that would be driven by ‘a free and democratic system’ (Central News 
Agency – Taiwan 17.08.90). 
 
In brief, Saudi Arabia was relatively diligent and skilful in coping with this diplomatic 
issue. While maintaining a formal diplomatic relation with the PRC, the Kingdom had 
delivered a clear message to Taiwan’s leaders that the shift of the diplomatic recognition 
was inevitable. Although it was difficult for Taiwan to agree with this decision, a 
continuation of economic cooperation between Taipei and Riyadh could, at least, assuage 
its discontent and frustration with the new establishment of  Peking-Riyadh diplomatic 
ties. The Taipei-Riyadh relationship existed for more than four decades (1946-1990), and 
it had been mutually important and beneficial to both sides. 
 
4.4.2.3 Preserving Economic Links: The Taipei-Riyadh Relationship from 1990 
Taiwan and Saudi Arabia effectively protected their economic ties though there was a 
fundamental shift in the diplomatic relations between them. This sub-section will assess 
the mechanism that Taiwan and Riyadh deployed in maintaining bilateral economic 
engagements and analyse the development of oil and non-oil trade between the two 
countries. 
 
The bilateral relations between Riyadh and Taipei possessed the characteristics of 
complex interdependence. The business communities and the governments of the two 
countries had close political and economic relations which signified the use multiple 
channels. They actively involved in a wide-range of economic relations (from business 
activities to investments) and strengthened their cooperation in technological sector and 
technical aspect. These relations and cooperation implied the absence of a hierarchy of 
issues which meant military security did not dominate the agendas of the two countries. 
 
Economic Activities and Cooperation Underpinning the Economic Link 
In the absence of diplomatic relations, neither Saudi Arabia nor Taiwan ignored their 
interest in facilitating a sound and reliable cooperation in the different economic sectors. 
Riyadh and Taipei increased economic activities and enhanced cooperation, which 
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conferred an enormous advantage to the two economies. To promote these activities and 
initiatives, the two governments held regular meetings and trade fairs. Cooperation in the 
non-energy sectors, such as the petrochemical and aquaculture sectors, further expanded. 
 
The top-level officials of the governments’ institutions and business communities were 
the central figures in the regular meetings between the two countries. The following table 
shows some of the meetings that Saudi-ROC officials and business people attended 
between 1992 and 2000 (note: such meetings were suspended for nearly three years). In 
the meetings, the officials and business groups reaffirmed their commitment to build 
cooperation in specific areas. Some of the meetings indicated the great initiative on the 
part of the government officials in formulating agreements between the two countries. 
 
Table 4.1: Meetings among Saudi and Taipei Government Officials and Business 
Groups 
Meeting Government officials and 
business groups 
Conclusions and Expected 
outcomes of the meeting 
The 12th Sino-Saudi 
Joint Committee and 
Technical Cooperation 
Conference, in Riyadh, 
in December 1992. 
Vice Economic Minister of 
Taiwan, Lee Shu-Chiu, and 
chaired by Ibrahim bin 
Salamah, Managing Director 
and Chief Executive Officer of 
SABIC. 
The Saudi government would 
consider Taipei’s proposal 
concerning an investment 
guarantee agreement. 
The 13th Economic 
Session of the Sino-
Saudi Arabian 
Permanent Joint 
Committee on 
Economic and 
Technical 
Cooperation, in 
Taiwan, from April 13 
Vice Economic Affairs 
Minister, S.J. Lee, and a Deputy 
Minister and Vice Chairman of 
the Saudi Arabia Basic Industry 
Cooperation, Ibrahim Ibn 
Salamah.  
 
Government officials and 
business leaders of the two 
The two countries agreed to 
improve cooperation in the 
fields of ‘transportation, 
shipping, agricultural, power 
and telecommunication 
projects’; ‘to sign an 
investment guarantee pact, 
and an agreement eliminating 
double taxation’; to minimize 
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to 14 1994. (The 
meeting was known as 
the first Vice 
Ministerial- level 
conference after the 
severance of 
diplomatic relations) 
countries. tariffs; to boost private 
exchange; and to strike 
against pirated computer 
software’ (Central News 
Agency – Taiwan 13.04.94).  
 
The 15th Economic 
Cooperation 
Conference, in Taipei, 
in April 1997 
The ROC Vice Economic 
Minister, Yin Chii-ming, and 
Vice Chairman of the Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation, 
Ibrahim Ibn Salamah 
The signing of Investment 
Protection Accord which 
provided a protection of 
Taiwan’s investment in the 
Kingdom, as well as the 
Kingdom’s investment in 
Taiwan (Central News 
Agency – Taiwan 08.04.97). 
The 16th Taipei-
Riyadh Economic and 
Technologic 
Corporation Meeting, 
in Riyadh, in October 
1998 
The ROC’s Vice Minister of 
Economic Affairs Lin Yi-Fu 
and Vice President of Saudi 
Arabia Basic Industrial 
Cooperation 
Several agreements, such as  a 
bilateral trade arbitration 
system, were reached. The 
Kingdom gained an approval 
of exporting its vegetables, 
ceramic and earthenware 
products to Taiwan’s market. 
Taiwan agreed to offer the 
Kingdom ‘aquaculture 
information and know-how, 
newly-developed rice and 
grain species’ and ‘personnel 
in water conservancy, 
veterinary medicine and 
environmental protection’ 
(Central News Agency – 
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Taiwan 12.10.90). 
The 17th annual 
meeting, in Taipei, in 
October 2000 
Saudi Vice Minister of Industry 
and Electricity, Mohamed H. al-
Mady and Taiwan’s Vice 
Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Chen Ruey-long. 
Discussion would focus on 
the custom-clearance process, 
Saudi trade centre in Taipei, 
and an access to the bidding 
process of contracts offered 
by the Saudi government. 
 
While working to retain strong economic ties, trade fairs served as the meeting points 
between business people from Riyadh and Taipei. They were also the places where 
members of various business circles promoted their commercial ties and business 
interests. Some examples of trade exhibitions were: the Third International Fair of Taipei, 
which organized from August 26 to 31, 1993 and welcomed the participation of Saudi 
manufacturers, including Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) (Central News Agency – 
Taiwan 27.07.92); and the China External Trade Development Council (CETRA), which 
welcomed 17 Taiwan manufacturers whose aim was to explore business opportunities in 
Saudi Arabia by promoting their products, including ‘industrial products, stationary, 
giftware, and cosmetics’ (Central News Agency – Taiwan 30.06.90).  
 
The Saudi government would help facilitate the distribution of the ROC’s products in the 
Arab Gulf markets. Saudi Arabia appeared to encourage Taiwan to use its land as the first 
destination for these products before their re-exportation to other countries in the Gulf. 
This initiative signified a solid economic cooperation between the two states. The ROC 
and Saudi governments also planned to cooperate in the inspection of made-in-Taiwan 
goods. The Kingdom would inspect these products before they were re-exported to the 
Persian Gulf states (Central News Agency – Taiwan 01.11.90). 
 
As economic cooperation underpinned the Taipei-Riyadh bilateral relations, investment 
in the petrochemical sector also dominated the agenda of the two governments. Through 
the state-owned firm, Saudi Arabia welcomed the ROC’s state-owned company to invest 
in the Kingdom’s petrochemical production. This acted as a tremendous opportunity for 
the ROC’s firm to allocate its investment in a country that offered an abundance of 
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petrochemical raw material. In 1995, an expansion of the Jubail Fertilizer Plant in Saudi 
Arabia was a joint venture between SABIC and Taiwan Fertilizer. It was expected to 
produce 2-EH, a petrochemical substance (Central News Agency – Taiwan 29.05.95). At 
the same time, SABIC planned to open its representative Office in Taiwan, targeted at 
expanding bilateral exchange and cooperation. In June 1995, the ROC sent an inspection 
delegation to Saudi Arabia whose objective was to assess the prospect of building a 
naphtha cracker in the Kingdom. The delegation was led by the Vice President of the 
Grand Pacific Petrochemical, Lin Wen-tsan. 
 
The Saudi government intended to acquire Taiwan’s technology and expertise in the 
fisheries and aquaculture sector.  It attempted to promote cooperation in this sector by 
sending its Minister to the ROC and invited Taiwan’s experts into the country. Deputy 
Minister of Fishery Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Saab Fayadh, arrived in Taiwan for an 
official visit in November 1993. As the first visit of a high-ranking Saudi official since 
the severance of the diplomatic link, the Minister’s visit was to seek cooperation in the 
aquaculture sector (Central News Agency – Taiwan 22.11.93). In August of the same 
year, the Kingdom invited two fishery experts from the ROC to assist the Saudi 
Agricultural Ministry in the cultivation project of fresh and sea water (Central News 
Agency – Taiwan 17.08.93).  
 
The two countries also strengthened cooperation in the technical sector. The cooperation 
was solidified through the signing of a two-year contract between Taiwan Power 
Company and the Electricity Corporation of Saudi Arabia in February 1993. Through the 
implementation of various projects, Taipower apparently engaged in the electricity 
industry of the Kingdom (Central News Agency – Taiwan 15.02.93).  
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The Taipei-Riyadh Energy and Non-energy Trade Relations 
This section will examine whether the energy and non-energy trade transactions boosted 
the ROC-Saudi bilateral trade relations in the aftermath of the establishment of the PRC-
Saudi diplomatic relations. In terms of energy trade dealings, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan 
heavily engaged in oil and gas transactions. Through non-energy trade ties, the two 
countries focused on the petrochemical and consumer products. The total trade volume 
between the two nations explains the direction of bilateral trade engagements and the 
ROC’s growing trade deficit with Saudi Arabia. 
 
A month after the suspension of Saudi-ROC diplomatic relations occurred, the Saudi 
government assured Taipei’s national oil company that it would continue exporting oil to 
the ROC. Another assurance was also made whereby a shift in diplomatic relations would 
have no bearing on the Saudi-ROC oil trade business. According to the source of the 
Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC, a state-owned oil company of Taiwan), the Oil and 
Mineral Ministry of Saudi Arabia had assured the CPC Vice President, Chen En-li, that 
the Kingdom would not reduce its oil supply to Taiwan though the diplomatic relations 
had been suspended. Saudi Arabia continued to provide 145,000 bpd of oil to Taiwan 
(Central News Agency – Taiwan 18.08.90). In fact, the Kingdom had also agreed that 
should the production of oil increase, the oil export to the ROC would be doubled, from 
10,000 bpd to 20,000bpd (Central News Agency – Taiwan 20.08.90). One factor that led 
to the continuation of oil export to the ROC was the ‘excellent credit’ that the Taipei 
government had built (Central News Agency – Taiwan 20.08.90).  
 
Since Taiwan relied heavily on Saudi oil, there was a suggestion that the two sides should 
cooperate closely in an oil refining project. There is some statistical data to support this 
dependency and the position of Saudi Arabia as Taiwan’s largest foreign energy supplier. 
In 1990, Saudi oil (145,000 bpd) was the largest importer of overseas oil in Taiwan’s 
market (Central News Agency – Taiwan 03.08.90). In 1996, the Kingdom’s oil made up 
26.7 percent of Taipei’s imported energy, followed by Kuwait and Iran, which accounted 
for 11.6 percent and 9.5 percent, respectively (Central News Agency – Taiwan 18.02.97). 
During the 12th Sino-Saudi Economic and Technical Cooperation Conference in 
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December 1992, the Saudi authority proposed that Taipei and Riyadh jointly build ‘oil 
refineries and produce catalysts for unleaded oil’. Taiwan’s Vice Economics Minister, 
Lee Shu-jeou, however, stated that this suggestion would be considered (Central News 
Agency – Taiwan 28.12.92).  
 
Saudi Arabia was prepared and willing to re-supply liquefied petroleum gas (LNG) to its 
customer – the ROC. The latter, however, had to seek more suppliers, preparing for a 
possible gas supply shortage after 1994.  The Kingdom continued to export this 
commodity after a contract involving energy export to the ROC ended in 1991(Central 
News Agency – Taiwan 20.10.92). In 1992, the President of Chinese Petroleum 
Corporation (CPC), Chen Kuo-yung, announced that Saudi Arabia would export 
approximately 150,000 metric tons of LNG to Taiwan. This volume was on a yearly basis 
and the export would begin in 1993. In 1994, the Kingdom decided to reduce the export 
of its LPG to Taiwan by 20 percent. The potential impact of this reduction led the CPC to 
diversify the suppliers of this commodity (Central News Agency – Taiwan 25.03.94). 
 
Concerning non-energy trade dealings, the ROC imports from Saudi Arabia were 
dominated by the petrochemical products. Its exports to the Kingdom constituted 
electronic products and apparel (Central News Agency – Taiwan 24.10.92). 
 
Table 4.2 and graph 4.2 show the total trade value between Taiwan and Saudi Arabia 
between 1990 and 2000. The ROC’s exports to Saudi Arabia were steady and smooth. 
There was not much acceleration in these exports: the rate of the exports was below NT$ 
1 billion, ranging from NT$350 million (2000) to NT$616 million (1991). The growth 
rate of the ROC’s imports from Saudi Arabia revealed a significant variation, with the 
highest increase recorded at NT$ 2.6 billion (2000) and the lowest decrease reaching 
NT$1.2 billion (1998).  Throughout this period, Taiwan ran a trade deficit with Saudi 
Arabia. Taiwan’s imports from Saudi Arabia were above NT$ 1 billion, while its exports 
remained below NT$ 1 billion. 
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Table 4.2: Taiwan’s Exports to and Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1990-2000 (New 
Taiwan Dollar: NT$) 
 EXPORTS IMPORTS 
1990 459,444,368 1,539,245,016 
1991 615,694,802 1,679,265,987 
1992 562,732,951 1,464,662,119 
1993 533,300,415 1,501,958,435 
1994 456,398,916 1,332,870,099 
1995 449,845,519 1,763,393,499 
1996 467,502,527 1,763,338,789 
1997 490,948,343 1,904,439,274 
1998 418,177,454 1,204,186,091 
1999 382,172,175 1,383,567,180 
2000 350,823,337 2,690,466,930 
Source: Directorate General of Customs, Ministry of Finance Republic of China 
 
Graph 4.2: Taiwan’s Exports to and Imports from Saudi Arabia and the PRC, 
1990-2000 (New Taiwan Dollar: NT$) 
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4.4.3 Sino-Saudi Political and Economic Relations 
At the centre of formal diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia in 1990 was 
economic motivation. This economic drive largely shaped the relations between the 
leaders, governmental officials and business communities of the two countries. This 
development prompts several questions as to how the governments and business 
enterprises built bilateral contacts. How did the competitive advantages of each of the 
two countries dominate their diplomatic agendas? Moreover, did these competitive 
advantages act as the fertile ground for bilateral trade and mutual investments? 
 
A number of characteristics of complex interdependence were developing in the Sino-
Saudi relations over this period. Multiple channels showed that the official visits of the 
leaders and high-level officials were increasingly frequent; the interstate and 
transgovernmental relations between the two countries were established; the collaborative 
efforts between the businessmen in China and Saudi Arabia were initiated and later 
consolidated; the visits of delegations of different provinces and municipalities in China 
were regular; and the connections between the authorities of two capitals ( Riyadh and 
Beijing) were built. 
 
There was an absence of hierarchy among issues when the military interest was ignored 
in the Sino-Saudi relations. The economic interests, nonetheless, were fully dominant and 
determined the states’ goals. The high-ranking officials of the two countries designed 
specific measures, agreements and institutions, aiming to promote and strengthen 
economic cooperation between the two countries. They began to diversify the agendas of 
the bilateral relations through the signing of mutual accords in different aspects, 
including oil production, education, broadcasting and television.  
 
4.4.3.1 Economic Interest as the Bedrock of Sino-Saudi Bilateral Relations  
In the first decade of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations, economic interest was a dominant 
and common agenda of the leaders of the two countries. Seen as the ‘groundbreakers’ of 
bilateral economic and political relations, the Chinese and Saudi leaders had been 
enthusiastically emphasizing the economic prospect of bilateral links. A year after 
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diplomatic relations were established, Premier Li Peng made a state visit to Saudi Arabia. 
Following this were the official visits of China’s Vice Premier Li Lanqing in 1993 and 
the Secretary General of China’s cabinet, Luo Gan, in 1995. Three years later (1998), 
Crown Prince Abdullah visited China, and President Jiang Zemin made a return visit the 
following year.   
 
The pursuit of an economic agenda was also a major consideration of the top-level 
officials of the countries. Throughout the period of 1990-2000, the officials made 
valuable contributions to the continuance and strengthening of bilateral economic ties. 
They proposed and implemented appropriate measures to intensify economic 
cooperation, formed a number of important agreements in diversifying economic 
relations and established particular institutions and organizations to facilitate economic 
engagements. The focus of this sub-section significantly narrows in on the ways in which 
Sino-Saudi economic interests were promoted and pursued by the leaders, high-ranking 
officials and business circles of the two countries.  
 
The exchange visits and communiqués shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate the 
substantial progress that the leaders, governmental officials and business communities 
achieved in pursuing economic interests. However, only those achievements deemed 
significant to the development of bilateral economic links will be assessed in this chapter. 
 
Table 4.3: Exchange Visits of China and Saudi Leaders and High-Ranking Officials,  
1990 - 2000 
Leaders and High-ranking Officials Time  of Visit  Place of 
Visit  
State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen  
July 1990  Saudi Arabia 
Foreign Minister Faisal (in the capacity of 
King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz’s special envoy)  
 
December 1990 China 
State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian November 1990 Saudi Arabia 
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Qichen 
Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry 
Thonayan (in the capacity of King Fahd’s 
special envoy) 
December 1990 China 
Premier Li Peng  July 1991 Saudi Arabia 
Minister of Finance and National Economy 
Aba al-Khail  
 
November 1992 China 
President of the Chinese People’s 
Association for Friendship with Foreign 
Countries Han Xu  
November 1992 Saudi Arabia 
Vice Premier Li Lanqing  June 1993 Saudi Arabia 
Minister of Commerce Sulaiman Salaim  March 1994 China 
Minister of Oil Hisham Nazer  May 1994 China 
Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei  June 1994  Saudi Arabia 
State Councillor and Secretary-General of 
the State Council Luo Gan  
August 1995 Saudi Arabia 
Chairman of Consultative Council Jubil  October1995 China 
Minister of Oil Naimi  December1995  China 
Minister of Finance and National Economy 
Assaf  
February 1996 China 
Vice Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission of the CPC Central 
Committee, State Councillor and Defence 
Minister Chi Haotian  
June 1996 Saudi Arabia 
Deputy Foreign Minister Mansori  October 1996 China 
Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
Ye Xuanping  
November 1996 Saudi Arabia 
Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei January 1997 Saudi Arabia 
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Minister of Higher Education Anqari  October 1997 China 
Minister of Oil Naimi October 1997 China 
Minister of Commerce Faqih  January1998  China 
Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister, 
Commander of the National Guards 
Abdullah  
October 1998 China 
Emir of Riyadh District Salman  April 1999 China 
Vice Foreign Minister Ji Peiding  May 1999 Saudi Arabia 
Minister of Commerce Faqih September1999 China 
President Jiang Zemin October 1999 Saudi Arabia 
Minister of Information  February 2000 China 
Minister of Agriculture and Water 
Conservancy  
April 2000 China 
Second Vice Prime Minister of National 
Defense, Aviation Sultan bin Abdul Aziz  
October 2000 China 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 
 
Table 4.4: The Sino-Saudi Communiqué and Bilateral Agreements, 1990 - 2000 
Communiqué and Bilateral Agreements 
The Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and 
Saudi Arabia (July 21, 1990)  
 
The Agreement on Economic, Trade, Investment and Technological Cooperation 
between China and Saudi Arabia (November 1992)  
 
The Exchange of Notes on Mutual Rendering of the Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
between China and Saudi Arabia (December 1993) 
 
The Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment between China 
and Saudi Arabia (February 1996) 
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The Memorandum of Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Saudi 
Arabia (October 1998) 
 
The Agreement on Educational Cooperation; The Agreement on Radio and Television 
Cooperation between China's Radio and Television Bureau and Saudi Arabia's 
Ministry of Information; The Agreement on Information Exchange and Cooperation 
between China’s Xinhua News Agency and Saudi Arabia News Agency; The 
Memorandum of Understanding on Petroleum Cooperation between China and Saudi 
Arabia (October 1999). 
 
 Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 
 
As earlier stated, the economic agenda was crucial to the development of the Sino-Saudi 
relationship. Five months after diplomatic relations between the two countries were 
established, top-level officials of the two countries and Saudi businessman initiated 
bilateral economic ties. Prince Faysal Ibn Saud visited China at the invitation of the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade  in December 1990. He discussed 
the issue of bilateral and economic links with Chinese Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun (Xinhua 
General News Service 08.12.90). Aiming at expanding economic cooperation between 
the countries, a Saudi delegation arrived in Beijing on July 2, 1991. A meeting was held 
between the Chairman and President of Saudi Arabian Altawi Group, Yusuf M. Altawi, 
and Vice Chairman on the standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress 
(NPC), Seipidin Aze (Xinhua General News Service 04.07.91).  
 
The leaders deemed it necessary to nurture and fortify the diplomatic link. As the 
‘groundbreakers’ of economic ties, the leaders had to enrich the political links as well as 
further develop a sense of mutual understanding between their countries. A year after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, Premier Li Peng visited the Kingdom.  As the first 
visit of China’s top leader to the Kingdom, Premier Li accentuated the main reason for 
his visit: ‘I came on the visit for the purpose of furthering the relations between our two 
countries,’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 12.07.91). The Premier had personal 
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views on the Saudi leaders and people, as well as on the Sino-Saudi friendship. Upon his 
arrival, Premier Li Peng expressed his positive feeling towards the Saudi leaders and 
people, stating, ‘As soon as we stepped on this territory of Saudi Arabia yesterday, we 
felt the friendly feelings of the Saudi leaders and people towards us’ (Xinhua General 
News Service 10.07.91).  
 
The Premier extolled the one-year old Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations, and expressed his 
belief that the joint effort between China and Saudi Arabia would bear fruit. He 
appreciated the way the two countries conducted the relationship and admitted that 
bilateral relations were well developed and getting stronger. In describing Sino-Saudi 
relations since the formation of diplomatic relations, Premier Li Peng stated that there 
were ‘friendly relations and cooperation’ and that ‘satisfactory progress’ had been made. 
The Premier also said: ‘I am convinced that our concerted efforts will result in the 
constant strengthening and expansion of Sino-Saudi friendly cooperation based on the 
five principles of peaceful coexistence’ (Xinhua General News Service 09.07.91). A joint 
communiqué was released after the Premier’s visit to Saudi Arabia wherein the two 
countries agreed ‘…to promote mutual understanding and enhance relations’ (Xinhua 
General News Service 12.07.91).   
 
The Saudi leader and high-levels official had their own observations regarding the 
success of Premier Li Peng’s visit to Saudi Arabia. The visit was seen to have laid new 
ground upon which a close and advanced relationship could be built. The visit also 
reflected the nature of the existing Sino-Saudi relationship. King Fahd viewed Premier Li 
Peng’s visit as ‘a new starting point’ in the advancement of the Sino-Saudi relationship. 
This development also sprang from the good relation the two governments had with 
business groups within their nations (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 12.07.91). 
Commenting on the Premier’s visit, Saudi Ambassador to China, Tawfiq K. Alamdar, 
also noted that this visit was a sign of a firm relationship between the two countries. The 
ambassador also said that Chinese and Saudi leaders were keen to see the expansion of 
their bilateral friendly relations, particularly in the petroleum industry (Xinhua General 
News Service 29.06.91). 
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Given the above-mentioned perspectives, the two governments had been seriously 
considering the economic aspect of the bilateral links. The Saudi and Chinese ministers 
proposed techniques of strengthening economic engagements and pledged to jointly work 
in promoting the products of the local industries. The meeting of the ministers reflected 
their role in providing a wide open arena for the growth of the bilateral economic link.  In 
a meeting between China’s Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Li 
Lanqing, with Saudi Minister of Finance and National Economy, Muhammad Aba al-
Khail, the two countries agreed to work together and increase the number of exhibitions 
in order to introduce and promote their national products. They also agreed to have a 
large number of personal exchanges. These efforts also aimed at intensifying bilateral 
trade, technology and labour cooperation (Xinhua General News Service 10.07.91).  
 
The economic and political links between the governments continued to strengthen. In 
1992, Chinese and Saudi high-ranking officials laid the foundation for more extensive 
agreements in the future and intensified their efforts towards a dynamic economic link. 
The diversification of cooperation was also a serious agenda for the two countries. The 
two governments reached agreements related to economy, trade, investment and 
technology. These agreements were signed between Premier Li Peng and Muhammad 
Aba al-Khail, Minister of Finance and the National Economy of Saudi Arabia, during the 
visit of a Saudi trade delegation to China in November 1992.  In commenting on the 
agreement, the Premier stated: ‘This is an important event, indicating the bilateral 
economic and trade relationship is entering a new phase’. The Premier also described the 
development of the Sino-Saudi relations, stating, ‘bilateral relations have developed 
apace, mutual understanding has deepened continuously and the common interest has 
been on the rise’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 10.11.92). A talk on the issues of 
bilateral trade and economic and financial cooperation was held between China’s 
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Li Lanqing, and Muhammad Aba al-
Khail. 
 
At the three-year mark of the diplomatic link, the Chinese government set up an 
institution in Jeddah, one of the main trading entrances to the Kingdom. This effort could 
be considered as a means of facilitating exports and imports between the two countries. 
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In April 1993, China’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sun Bigan, inaugurated the opening 
of China’s Consulate General in Jeddah. The first Consul General was Gao Shi Tong, 
who had previously served as Counsellor and the Head of Chancery in China’s embassy 
in Riyadh. A few months later, Jiang Qinghua was appointed as China’s Economic and 
Commercial Consul. Jiang Qinghua said, ‘my foremost task in the Kingdom is to make 
efforts to promote bilateral relations between China and the Kingdom’ (Moneyclips 
27.04.93).  The Consulate General would also arrange the visits of China’s Muslims in 
performing Hajj and Umrah in the Kingdom (Moneyclips 27.04.93). 
 
Saudi Arabia and China shared a deep interest in boosting and widening bilateral 
economic cooperation. The Saudi government invited China’s Vice Premier, Li Lanqing, 
to visit the country. This high-level China trade delegation made a two-day trip from the 
26th to 27th of June 1993. Vice Premier Li Lanqing was formerly China’s Foreign Trade 
Minister and was later  appointed as Vice Premier, whose main responsibility was foreign 
trade. The invitation showed that the Kingdom gave the highest priority to the economic 
agenda. The invitation also enabled another important Chinese leader with practical 
experience in trade relations to mould Sino-Saudi economic links. 
 
However, no agreements were concluded during this visit, perhaps because the discussion 
between the leaders at that point in time had been geared toward providing an orientation 
and exchange of ideas regarding future economic relations. In a talk to Riyadh Daily, 
China’s Ambassador to the Kingdom, Sun Bigan, reported, ‘No agreements have been 
signed yet…more talks will be held at a later stage to achieve substantive results of 
cooperation.’ Nevertheless, this visit had evidently shown China’s fervour to expand its 
ties with the Kingdom and the GCC states (Moneyclips 30.06.93).  
 
Each with different backgrounds of economic activities, at least three Chinese trade 
delegations arrived in Saudi Arabia in 1993, further emphasizing China’s enthusiasm 
towards the formation of commercial links with the Kingdom. In April, China’s Muslim 
trade delegation visited the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This delegation 
was headed by Haji Ibrahim Sha Zhiyuan. In August, the Kingdom received a trade 
delegation from the China Council of Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). They 
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discussed business contracts, specifically in the engineering and construction sectors, 
with Saudi business groups. In November 1993, China’s trade delegation, led by the 
Deputy Director of CCPIT, Li Xiumen, arrived in Jeddah. 
 
In 1994, the high-ranking officials and businessmen from Saudi Arabia visited Beijing, 
showing their commitment to the advancement of economic ties. The cooperation 
between the governments and business people reflected in these visits fortified the 
economic interests of the two nations. In January 1994, five Saudi businessmen travelled 
to Beijing and held a meeting with Vice-Premier Li Lanqing (Xinhua General News 
Service 15.01.94). In March of the same year, Saudi Arabia also sent another trade 
delegation to China, searching for a means to boost commercial transactions and to 
balance the trade exchange between the countries. Among those who joined this 
delegation were Saudi Minister of Commerce (Sulaiman Abdel-Aziz al-Solaim), the 
senior officials of the ministry, the representatives of Petromin and Saudi ARAMCO, the 
President and members of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and Saudi 
businessmen.  
 
The top-level governmental officials continued to initiate further trade cooperation 
between the two countries.  In a visit of a Saudi trade delegation to China in 1994, some 
agreements were concluded with the expectation of more to occur in the future. Emphasis 
was also given to building close cooperation between the governments and business 
communities. In a meeting with Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Commerce, Vice Premier Li 
Lanqing expressed his hope that Sino-Saudi bilateral trade and economic relations could 
be furthered through the joint efforts between the governments and their businessmen. 
Saudi Minister of Commerce Sulaiman Abdel-Aziz al-Solaim stressed that his 
delegations had also signified the Kingdom’s heightened interest in furthering such 
cooperation (Xinhua General News Service 21.03.94). This visit also witnessed the 
signing of a Letter of Intent (LOI) with China National Cereals, Foodstuffs, Oils Import 
and Export Corporation. The Kingdom planned to import 80,000 sheep from China. 
Abdullah Abbar & Ahmed Zainy, a Saudi company was also planning for an import of 
frozen chicken from some of China’s companies (Moneyclips 24.07.94).  
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Every alternate year, China’s government made an important visit to Saudi Arabia, which 
was led by the leaders of the country. In the visit of 1995, the role of the leaders that 
would accelerate a positive development of the Sino-Saudi bilateral relations was 
emphasized and various agreements were formed. The visit of the Secretary General of 
China’s Cabinet, Luo Gan, from August 13 to 15 of 1995 was said to be the ‘third most 
important delegation’ after the visits of Premier Li Peng (1991) and Vice Premier Li 
Lanqing (1993). In this visit, the government officials called for a consolidation of 
bilateral links. Luo Gan anticipated the current development of bilateral relations would 
result a positive outcome, stating, ‘We are sure that the friendly relations and the existing 
cooperation between the two countries will witness great development in the future 
through the efforts exerted by the officials in the two states’ (Moneyclips 24.08.95). In his 
meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, the issues related to political and economic 
relations of both countries were discussed. Agreements on ‘economic, investment and 
trade cooperation’ were also reached at the end of the visit.  
 
The five-year diplomatic relationship was described as well-developed relationship. This 
was  mainly due to the tremendous emphasis on economic and trade agendas. During an 
interview with Al-Riyadh Arabic newspaper, Luo Gan expressed his satisfaction with the 
growth of Sino-Saudi relations, emphasising the primary factor of economic interest 
within bilateral relations. He said, ‘Despite the fact that only five years have passed since 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, our bilateral ties 
have seen great development in the economic and trade areas,’ (Moneyclips 24.08.95). 
The bilateral economic ties, as he further claimed, were based on ‘the principle of 
reciprocal interest’. 
 
To enhance the prospects of economic relations, the officials of the two governments 
organised the Sino-Saudi ties through a special ‘committee’. In February 1996, the first 
meeting of the Sino-Saudi Arabian Mixed Trade and Economic Committee was held. 
Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia, Ibrahim al-Assaf, who had a one-week visit to China, 
chaired this meeting with Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
operation, Wu Yi. They also exchanged views and ideas on how to expand bilateral links 
in the economic and trade areas.  
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The meeting of the leaders also concerned the agenda of improving economic relations. 
They called for a maximization of their competitive advantages, an increase of exports 
and imports, and discussed the role of private business groups in the relationship between 
China and Saudi Arabia. Wu Yi strongly encouraged the use of effective strategies and 
joint efforts since there had been a huge gap between the volume of bilateral trade and 
economic advantages of the two nations. Al-Assaf hoped that China would increase the 
purchasing of petrochemicals from the Kingdom. Likewise, the Kingdom would also 
boost the demand for made-in-China products. Al-Assaf also had a meeting with 
President Jiang Zemin, who hoped to see both governments continue their support of the 
exchanges and cooperation between Saudi Arabia and China’s business groups. 
 
In 1997, the two governments institutionalized bilateral economic relations in order to 
support the development of economic relations. Perhaps the governments understood that 
through association, more economic opportunities could be explored. In October of 1997, 
the Saudi Arabia-China Friendship Association and China-Saudi Arabia Friendship 
Association were established with Abdul Rahman al-Jeraisy and Qi Huaiyuan, becoming 
the respective presidents. These associations were expected to promote the development 
of bilateral relations (Xinhua General News Service 17.10.97). 
 
Enjoying an economic bond, which mainly relied upon the initiative of their respective 
governments, the two countries held more than five important meetings (including visits) 
in 1998. Most of the meetings primarily dealt with economic agendas: a stressing of the 
economic opportunities that the countries should avail themselves of;  increasing the 
volume of trade links; the issue of trade imbalances; the diversification of economic 
cooperation; the need to identify economic areas  the countries should explore; and the 
role of business people in the bilateral economic ties. In January, the Vice Foreign 
Minister of China, Tian Zengpei, made a trip to Riyadh and stressed that there was huge 
potential in the Sino-Saudi economic and trade cooperation. In February, the two 
countries organized the first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission.  
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In June, the Commerce Minister of Saudi Arabia, Osama Faqih, was in Beijing and met 
with the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Shi Guangsheng. The two 
leaders pledged to improve the trade linkage and to diversify trade cooperation. Minister 
Shi revealed China’s target of reaching five billion US dollars in its trade volume with 
the Kingdom within five years and announced that Saudi Arabia was China’s largest 
trade partner in 1997. He also communicated that China attempted to reap the benefits of 
Saudi oil resources. Both ministers discussed the following ideas: that China and Saudi 
Arabia should began their cooperation in the petrochemical industry and in technology 
exchanges; that China’s companies should participate in Saudi mining projects and power 
grid construction; and China’s existing projects, labour service and investment in the 
Kingdom. Both leaders also expressed mutual support to their admission as members of 
the World Trade Organization (Xinhua News Agency 02.06.98).  
 
After taking a business trip to China, Minister Osama Faqih had a meeting with China’s 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Zheng Dayong, in the following month. Among the 
contents of the discussion were the reviewing of bilateral issues and the call for China’s 
business communities to strengthen their business links with their counterparts in Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
In September, the Kingdom welcomed China’s trade delegation, which was headed by 
the Deputy Director General of the West Asia and Africa Department of Chinese 
Ministry Trade and Economic Cooperation, Li Ben. The imbalance of trade between 
China and Saudi Arabia was the main concern of Saudi businessmen, who expressed this 
issue during a visit of this trade delegation to the eastern province of the Kingdom. 
Khaled Hassan al-Qahtani, who was a member of the Eastern Province Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Board of Directors, stressed that the Kingdom’s exports to China 
were increasing, yet it was at a moderate growth level. He suggested an increasing of 
Saudi non-oil exports to China in order to minimize the Kingdom’s trade deficit (Middle 
East Newsfile 15.11.98).   
 
Eight years after the development of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations, China was visited 
by the Saudi leader. With political and economic agendas, Crown Prince Abdullah bin 
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Abdul Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the National Guard of Saudi Arabia, 
was a special guest of the Chinese government from October 14 to 21, 1998. The Crown 
Prince’s state visit to Beijing was at the invitation of China’s Primer, Zhu Rongji.  
 
The Chinese and Saudi leaders delivered personal views on the development of the 
relationship between the two countries. Their views seemed to show that China and Saudi 
Arabia were currently enjoying a cordial and intimate friendship. In a meeting with 
Crown Prince Abdullah, President Jiang Zemin expressed his satisfaction with Sino-
Saudi relations (Xinhua News Agency 15.10.98). China’s Premier, Zhu Rongji, who had a 
meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, also expressed his satisfaction with the Riyadh-
Beijing relationship, particularly in the areas of politics, economic, and judicial culture. 
The Crown Prince said that the Kingdom considered China as its closest friend, and 
keenly observed China’s efforts towards promoting world peace (Xinhua News Agency 
14.10.98).  
 
The officials of the two states worked closely and effectively for a betterment of the 
Sino-Saudi links. They coordinated the strategies of bilateral cooperation and devised a 
framework of how the economic cooperation should be fostered. A concerted effort to 
build a governing body was also underway. In Crown Prince Abdullah’s visit to China, a 
number of important discussions were hosted between Saudi officials and Chinese 
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan,  Minister of the State Economic and Trade Commission 
Sheng Huaren, and  Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Sun 
Guangxiang (Xinhua News Agency 17.10.98).  An MoU related to economic cooperation 
was also signed between the two countries. This memorandum outlined some pragmatic 
approaches of improving economic cooperation between both nations, exclusively in the 
areas of trade, investment, mining and oil.  The memorandum would also intensify the 
Sino-Saudi technical and technological cooperation. As stated in this memorandum, the 
appointed working committees were required to submit their recommendations to the 
head of the joint committee within six months. The signing of this memorandum, as one 
source claimed, was made after receiving an order from the Royal Highness (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 27.10.98). This memorandum also led to the 
establishment of a joint business council. 
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There were a few differences that needed to be ironed between China and Saudi Arabia 
before a joint statement could be drafted during the visit of Crown Prince Abdullah to 
Beijing. The differences appeared in the issues of Jerusalem, Iraq and oil. In dealing with 
the Jerusalem issue, a negotiator for China’s Foreign Ministry suggested that the issue be 
ignored. The Kingdom, however, rejected this idea and emphasized that the issue of 
Jerusalem was at the centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ignoring this issue would be 
unusual since China had been supporting the just struggle of the Palestinians against 
Israeli assault. Eventually, China’s negotiator agreed to include Jerusalem in the joint 
statement, which was: ‘The two sides emphasized the importance of Jerusalem and the 
need from abstaining from adopting unilateral measures which would have an effect on 
the final status negotiations’. 
 
Differences between the two countries on the Iraq issue also emerged. China was said to 
be suspicious of the Kingdom’s call for the implementation of all UN Security Council 
resolutions regarding the inspection of Iraq’s weapons. A Saudi negotiator said that 
China had already consented to all of these resolutions, and it was therefore too late to 
object to them. Ultimately, China supported the Saudi stance towards the Iraq issue. 
 
With regard to the topic of Iraq, the two sides expressed their deep and serious concern 
over the stalemate of UNSCOM’s activities, and called for cooperation between the UN 
commission and Iraqi authority on the basis of UN Resolution 1194. They also urged Iraq 
to fully implement all related Security Council resolutions emphasising the necessity to 
fulfil  the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. They also stressed the importance of 
respecting the independence and sovereignty of Iraq as well as its territorial integrity 
(Middle East Newsfile 21.10.98).  
 
The final point of contention was over the issue of oil. It had been stated that ‘the Chinese 
seemed to be unclear on the topic’ of oil (Middle East Newsfile 21.10.98). Thus, a new 
statement appeared: 
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The two sides emphasized the importance of oil market stability for the world 
economy, and the Chinese side appreciated the role being played by Saudi Arabia 
to ensure world oil market stability as the Kingdom is considered a secure and 
dependable source of oil for world markets. The two sides expressed their desire 
to strengthen their commercial and investment cooperation in the oil sector. 
(Middle East Newsfile 21.10.98) 
 
The joint communiqué was finally issued when the Crown Prince left for Xian. However, 
it should be noted that the divergent opinion on the issues of Jerusalem, Iraq and oil just 
happened among those involved in the preparation of the final statement and not among 
the leaders. China’s leaders publicly supported the Saudi proposals for this communiqué 
(Middle East Newsfile 21.10.98).   
 
Crown Prince Abdullah made special visits to Muslim areas, which implied his constant 
attention to the Muslim communities in China. The Crown Prince visited the Islamic 
Association of China (IAC) and the Institute of Islamic Theology, and met with the 
Deputy President of IAC, Wan Yaobin. During this trip, the Crown Prince also visited 
Xian and Shanghai. In his visit to Xian on October 17, the Crown Prince met with the 
Governor of Shaanxi Province, Mr. Cheng Andong. A donation of USD 500,000 was 
given to the local mosque and would be used for renovation and Muslim education. The 
Crown Prince also performed the Jumaat prayer with other 600 Chinese Muslims in 
Niuqie Mosque, the largest mosque in Beijing, which was built in 996 A.D. 
 
Another initiative for the betterment of the Sino-Saudi links was the strong connection 
forged between the authorities of the two capital cities, Riyadh Province and Beijing 
Municipality. The leaders of the two capitals exchanged their ideas related to the 
structural development of the cities. They seemed to suggest that each capital enjoyed 
significant economic development. In April, 1999 Prince Salman visited Beijing and met 
with Beijing Mayor Liu Qi. The Mayor stressed that ‘friendly ties’ had already formed 
between Beijing Municipality and Riyadh Province. They had a discussion regarding 
‘urban infrastructure, real state, transportation and entertainment facilities’ (Xinhua News 
Agency 19.04.99). A meeting was also held with Jia Qinglin, a secretary of the Beijing 
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Municipal Party Committee. Jia explained that these ‘friendly ties’ had been established 
from the time diplomatic relations had been formed. He also conveyed the readiness of 
Beijing to boost its cooperation and exchanges with Riyadh (Xinhua News Agency 
20.04.90). To demonstrate this willingness, China invited a Saudi high-level official to 
the country in the next five months. 
 
The invitation of Saudi Minister of Commerce Osama bin Jaafar Faqih to China in 
September 1999 presumably signified that Saudi Arabia was a new and prime location 
for Chinese businesses. The Minister was invited to the Third International Investment 
and Trade Exhibition in Jiamusi as a keynote speaker. This invitation, as he commented, 
unveiled several important meanings. Firstly, it was a sign of the growing importance of  
Sino-Saudi relations and the genuine willingness of both nations to embark on common 
interests. Secondly, the invitation would  promote further cooperation between the two 
countries. 
 
For the purpose of encouraging China’s traders and investors to operate and expand their 
economic activities in Saudi Arabia, it was crucial to provide the vital background of 
economic development in the Kingdom.  Osama bin Jaafar Faqih addressed the audience 
with a discussion of the philosophy of  Saudi economic development and the major 
components of the Kingdom’s five-year development plan. The first principle was based 
on opening the country up for ‘investment, technology transfer, use of foreign human 
expertise, and two-way trade.’ This move was motivated by the fact that the Kingdom 
was part of the world and interdependent with other nations. The second principle had to 
do with the critical role of the private sector, and of a free market system in developing 
the economy. In support of this, the government would measure and assess the progress 
of the economy. Government interference in the economy would only take place if the 
private sector were no longer capable of being involved in economic activities. The third 
principle concerned the importance of oil to the country. Although oil was considered as 
the basis for developing the Saudi economy, this commodity was not to be expected to 
play a role for the long term (Middle East Newsfile 10.09.99).  
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The Minister also highlighted the intensive efforts of the Saudi government in developing 
a national economy. These efforts consisted of the diversification of economic resources 
and the increasing participation of the private sector. The Kingdom also recognised the 
equal importance of political stability and relevant economic policies to economic 
development (Middle East Newsfile 09.09.99). 
 
Minister Faqih expressed his particular concern over China’s investment into the 
Kingdom and stressed that a specific framework regarding how mutual investment would 
be promoted and protected was concluded between the two countries. The investment 
climate in Saudi Arabia, as he further emphasized, was conducive to foreign investors. 
The Minister said that the Kingdom introduced ‘generous incentives and facilities’ in 
attracting foreign investors (Middle East Newsfile 09.09.99). He invited members of 
various business circles from China to benefit from and enjoy the Kingdom’s competitive 
advantages and its market. The signing of 1997 Agreement on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment between the two countries provided additional incentive to these 
business communities. This agreement, which stipulated a legal framework for the 
development of a joint venture, would continually promote long-term economic 
cooperation between them. 
 
The visit of President Jiang Zemin to Saudi Arabia in the following month was also a 
strategic and traditional approach to increasing bilateral economic relations. This four-
day state visit was regarded as the first visit by the China’s leader. The President was 
accompanied by Vice Premier Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and State 
Development Planning Commission Director Zeng Peiyan. President Jiang arrived in 
Saudi Arabia on October 18 after several official visits to Britain, France, Portugal, 
Morocco and Algeria. 
 
In the visit, several high-level meetings were convened with the Saudi leaders King Fahd 
bin Abdul Aziz, Prince Salman (the Governor of Riyadh) and Jamil al-Hujailan (the 
Secretary General of the GCC). There was also an important meeting regarding 
investment opportunities held between members of Saudi business circles and those 
Chinese business delegations who accompanied the President on his visit. 
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President Jiang Zemin described the development of Sino-Saudi relations since the 
formation of diplomatic relations as being characterized by impressive growth that had 
been based on a number of factors. The President said, ‘We are happy to see that the 
China and Saudi Arabia relationship has enjoyed a good momentum of development, 
with frequent visits of high-ranking officials and an expanded field of cooperation,’. He 
also revealed the key factors that sustained and deepened this relationship. China and 
Saudi Arabia were important countries to the East and West accordingly; they both 
practiced ‘independent and peaceful foreign policy’; they shared similar perceptions on 
most of international issues; they had ‘no conflicts of fundamental interests’ or problems 
in the past though their social systems were different; and they conducted bilateral 
relations based on ‘mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, and non-interference in 
other’s internal affairs.’ He added that Chinese and Saudi governments constructively 
engaged in developing their economies and improving their people’s lives (Xinhua News 
Agency 02.11.99). 
 
The speech delivered by President Jiang during his visit to the Kingdom is quoted below. 
One of the core elements of the speech was the emphasis on the historical development of 
the relations between China and the Arab world, specifically Saudi Arabia: 
For a long time, the Chinese and Arab people have learned from each other and 
their friendly relations can be traced back to ancient times.  We have been linked 
up by the ancient “silk road”, which serves as a bond of friendship.  As early as 
over 1,000 years ago, Chinese commercial ships started to call at the port of Jidda.  
In the Ming dynasty, Zheng He, who led fleets to what was then called “West 
Sea”, seven times visited the port of Jidda, and even arrived at Macca on his way 
there. As early as 651 AD, envoys and businessmen of the Arab empire started to 
visit and do business in China. Some of these people settled down in China and 
served as officials in the Chinese imperial court. (Xinhua News Agency 02.11.99) 
 
 He also pointed out the importance of learning about and tolerating the richness of the 
civilizations. 
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It is essential for different civilizations to conduct dialogue and exchanges on an 
equal basis, learn from each other, and draw on others’ strength to make up for 
their own weaknesses. They will thus be able to bring new prosperity to human 
civilization while developing and enriching them. (Xinhua News Agency 
02.11.99) 
 
Finally, President Jiang stressed the importance of overcoming the differences among 
the nations and to avoid making the diversity of civilizations a source of conflict. 
Conflicts and disagreements are unavoidable between various nations due to their 
differences in historical development, social background, cultural tradition and 
lifestyle. These conflicts and differences can be resolved through dialogue and 
exchanges on an equal footing and in the spirit of mutual respect.  It is wrong to 
place the civilization of one’s own nation before other civilizations and ignore or 
even despise other civilizations, make much ado about the differences between 
civilizations, or attempt to stir up conflicts between various civilizations, for they 
are detrimental to progress of world civilization and to the lofty cause of world 
peace and development (Xinhua News Agency 02.11.99). 
 
The President’s visit to the Kingdom brought about  the ratification of mutual accords in 
the areas of ‘broadcasting and television, news exchanges between the Chinese and Saudi 
news agencies, education and oil production’ (Xinhua News Agency 03.11.99) (Table 
4.5). 
 
Table 4.5: Cooperation reached between the PRC and the KSA during President 
Jiang’s visit to Saudi Arabia.  
Cooperative agreements High-ranking officials 
A Memorandum of 
Understanding on Oil 
Cooperation   
Saudi Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources, Ali bin 
Ibrahim al-Naimi and Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation of the PRC, Guangsheng Shi 
 
Radio and television 
agreement    
Saudi Ministry of Information and the General Authority 
for Radio, Cinema and Television of the PRC  Minister of 
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Information HE Dr. Fu’ad al-Farisi and China’s Foreign 
Minister HE Jiaxuan Tang 
Agreement on Exchange of 
Information    
Saudi News Agency and the Chinese News Agency 
Xinhua  Minister of Information HE Dr. Fu’ad al-Farisi 
and China’s Foreign Minister HE Jiaxuan Tang 
Agreement on Education   The governments of the KSA and the PRC  Saudi 
Minister of Higher Education HE Dr. Khalid al-Anqari 
and China’s Foreign Minister HE Jiaxuan Tang 
The report of the Saudi-
Chinese working team   
Saudi Minister of Finance and National Economy, 
Ibrahim bin Abd al-Aziz and Minister of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation of the PRC, Guangsheng Shi 
Source: BBC Monitoring Middle East 11.01.99 
 
The two states issued a joint communiqué that reaffirmed the strengthening of the 
bilateral political and economic relations to the stage of strategic cooperation (Xinhua 
News Agency 03.11.99). In the communiqué, the leaders of the two countries expressed 
their satisfaction with the further development of Sino-Saudi trade relations. The leaders 
agreed to increase bilateral exports since there was a considerable potential that each 
economy could benefit. It also claimed that Chinese and Saudi economies were ‘highly 
complementary’. It was pointed out that China possessed valuable human resources, 
sufficient goods for consumption, and advanced technologies in specific areas, while 
Saudi Arabia had abundant energy resources, funds, and high consumption (Xinhua News 
Agency 02.11.99).  
 
President Jiang further assured that Sino-Saudi relations were being consolidated by the 
collaborative efforts of the governments and their business people. Achieving a common 
ground between the government and the businessmen was the basis for their cooperation. 
President Jiang invited the Kingdom’s business people to visit China, which would allow 
them to become familiar with China’s business environment and investment climate 
(Xinhua News Agency 01.11.99). 
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4.4.3.2 Empowering Sino-Saudi Trade Links 
In the aftermath of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two countries enhanced 
energy trade cooperation in order to fulfil the rising demand of oil in the Chinese market 
and to minimise the Saudi trade deficit. In 1993, China increased its purchase of oil 
imports from Saudi Arabia. In 1994, the leaders of the two countries began to give 
greater priority to energy cooperation. Despite the infrastructure and technology 
constraints of the Chinese oil refining sector, the Chinese and Saudi government rapidly 
deepened their oil cooperation. The concerted efforts of securing oil cooperation paid off. 
In 1997, for example, even more agreements concerning oil trade dealings were 
concluded between the two countries.  
 
In regard to non-energy trade cooperation, the Chinese and Saudi governments and the 
business entrepreneurs deployed trade exhibitions and trade delegations as the primary 
and effective means to developing and spurring the growth of non-energy trade dealings. 
The Chinese authorities and businessmen continued to vary their exports to the Kingdom. 
In terms of the trade balance between 1990 and 2000 (with the exception of 1996 and 
2000), China frequently experienced trade surpluses with Saudi Arabia.  
 
The primary concern for this section is the development of energy trade and non-energy 
trade cooperation between the two countries. An assessment of the worthwhile efforts 
that the Chinese and Saudi governments, national oil companies, and private firms 
directed towards a consolidation of such cooperation will now be assessed. 
 
Energy Trade Links 
Table 4.6 indicates the achievements of the two countries in terms of bilateral oil 
cooperation. These achievements came in the form of the signing of agreements, a Letter 
of Intent (LOI), various contracts and a Memorandum of Understanding. 
 210 
 
 
Table 4.6: The Achievements of Sino-Saudi Bilateral Oil Cooperation, 1990 - 2000 
Year High-ranking officials/ 
Companies 
Activities/Achievements 
1993 Saudi ARAMCO 
 
China’s National Oil 
Company 
An oil related agreement was reached during a 
visit  of China’s Vice Premier Li Lanqing to 
Saudi Arabia 
1997 PengJunDa Co. 
 
Saudi Arabian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources 
Renewed the contracts on oil sales 
1997 Petromin Lubricating Oil 
Company (Petrolube) 
 
Chinese company 
Signed a five-year agreement on the sale of 
Saudi oil and lubricants in Chinese market 
1997 Saudi ARAMCO 
 
Sinopec 
Signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) of supplying 
Saudi oil to China 
1997 Saudi ARAMCO 
 
Sinochem 
Signed an agreement on the export of 60,000 
bpd of Saudi oil to China 
1999 Saudi Minister of Oil and 
Mineral Resources, Ali bin 
Ibrahim al-Naimi  
 
Minister of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation 
of the PRC, Guangsheng Shi 
Signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Oil 
Cooperation 
2000 UNIPEC (China’s Oil 
company) 
 
Signed a long-term agreement on the 
importation of 180,000 bpd of Saudi oil in 
2001.  
2000 Ambassador Wu Sike Announced China’s plan of increasing one 
million ton of Saudi oil 
 
In 1991, the Chinese state’s oil and petrochemical company had a clear intention to build 
a branch in Saudi Arabia. Eighteen months after diplomatic relations were formed, 
China’s petroleum, fertilizer and chemical conglomerate, Sinochem, planned to develop 
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an offshoot in Saudi Arabia, which would steadily increase its oil trade dealings in the 
Middle East (Xinhua General News Service 01.12.91).  
 
In the third year of the Sino-Saudi diplomatic link, China revised its oil policies with the 
Kingdom. It intended to be close to Arab Gulf oil producers when it identified the 
importance of these oil-rich economies to its economic growth. In 1993, China 
announced that it would increase the purchasing of Saudi crude oil and oil by-products 
(Xinhua General News Service 27.06.93). It also planned to import oil directly from the 
Gulf states instead of directly purchasing this commodity from international oil 
companies (Xinhua General News Service 03.07.93). A year later, the Executive Vice 
President of China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), Li Yizhong, stated that his 
country had begun to consider the Arab Gulf states as its ‘long-term and main oil  
supplier’. In the past, China had purchased most of its crude oil from  Southeast Asian oil 
exporters (Xinhua News Agency 27.10.94); now it was considering shifting the location of 
its oil sources in other countries. 
 
The establishment of energy cooperation promised mutual benefits to both countries. 
When the balance of trade became unfavourable to Saudi Arabia and the Chinese 
domestic oil demand was escalating, Riyadh and Beijing began to boost their energy 
cooperation. The visit of China’s Vice Premier Li Lanqing to Saudi Arabia in June 1993 
successfully concluded an agreement between Saudi ARAMCO and China’s National Oil 
Company (CNOC). The agreement was intended to reduce a trade gap between the two 
countries. The gap that revealed a huge Saudi trade deficit with China had occurred in 
1992: Chinese exports to Saudi Arabia accounted for USD 450 million, whereas the 
latter’s exports to China reached USD 150 million. With this agreement, it was expected 
that three million tons of Saudi oil would be exported to China (Xinhua News Agency 
21.08.93). 
 
A massive domestic demand for oil was another factor that strongly motivated China’s 
move towards an increase in oil trade with Saudi Arabia. China needed to import foreign 
crude oil though it was known as one of the major oil-producing countries in 1994. China 
had produced and exported its oil since 1961 with Daqing oilfield, which was the biggest 
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oil producing location. It pumped oil from 18 oil fields and was actively involved in off-
shore oil exploration (Xinhua News Agency 03.09.94). 
 
With a mutual, strategic interest in the oil commodity, the leaders of the two countries 
began to prioritise oil cooperation as the highest agenda of the bilateral link and began to 
moulding state-to-state relations on the basis of oil interest. In a meeting with Saudi 
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Hisham Nazer, in May 1994, President 
Jiang Zemin accentuated that a close cooperation in the petroleum sector served as an 
obvious advantage to the two countries. King Fahd, who had delivered his intention in a 
letter that Minister Hisham Nazer handed to President Jiang Zemin, placed emphasis on 
the willingness of Saudi Arabia to boost bilateral economic links with China, with a 
particular stress on petroleum cooperation. The Minister also highlighted the readiness of 
the Saudi government to support the cooperation between the oil companies of the two 
countries (Xinhua News Agency 18.05.94).  Based on these factors,  more than merely a 
commodity to assist Chinese economic development, Saudi oil also served as a 
commodity for the evolution of the Sino-Saudi relationship. 
 
China was ready to boost its oil cooperation with Saudi Arabia. While admitting the 
importance of Saudi oil to China, Chinese Ministers conveyed their expectations that 
Saudi oil supply to the country could be increased. Deputy Foreign Minister, Tian Zeng 
Pei, acknowledged that Saudi Arabia was an important oil exporter to China. The 
commodity was crucial for the expansion of industrial projects. In February 1996, 
Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Wu Yi, delivered China’s 
hope for increasing of Saudi crude oil, petrochemicals and fertilizers exports to the 
country. Chinese imports of Saudi crude totalled more than ten million tons in 1995 due 
to ‘China's great need for petroleum products…’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 
29.02.96). The domestic demand for oil would lead to the penetration of Saudi oil into the 
Chinese market. 
 
The efforts of the leaders and government officials to enhance oil cooperation had certain 
limitations. China was unable to refine heavy crude oil from the Kingdom, and therefore 
it had to build a refinery complex that could overcome this problem. Minister Wu Yi said 
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that a refinery complex to process such crude oil was now being constructed. Once this 
project was completed, China would increase its purchase of Saudi crude oil (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcast 29.02.96).  
 
Despite the above constraint, the two countries further promoted and deepened the 
existing oil cooperation. The strong commitments that the leaders and high-ranking 
officials made concerning the cooperation had profound implication for the Sino-Saudi 
oil trade engagement. Since 1997, a series of agreements concerning oil trade dealings 
between the Saudi ministry and Chinese oil company, as well as between the oil 
companies of the two countries, was signed. A number of Chinese oil companies began to 
court oil supplies from the Kingdom. This development, one may argue, reflects a 
growing Chinese oil dependency on Saudi Arabia. In January, PengJunDa Co. and the 
Saudi Arabian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources renewed their contracts on 
oil sales. PengJunDa Co. would promote oil sales to Canton, Shandong and Sichuan 
provinces (IPS - Inter Press Service 02.01.97).  
 
Four months later, a five-year agreement was concluded between Petromin Lubricating 
Oil Company (Petrolube) and China’s company. The former would export 30,000 tons of 
oil and lubricants to China’s market, a volume that would be increased by 20 percent 
each year. The value of this agreement totalled USD 18 million (Middle East News Items 
20.05.97).  
 
In June, Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) concerning the 
exportation of Saudi oil to China. This agreement was sealed during the visit of a Sinopec 
delegation to Dhahran (Moneyclips 11.06.97). This delegation was comprised of 11 
senior officials of Sinopec. The aim of this visit, as an Information officer of China’s 
Embassy, Yang Tao, stated, was to intensify the Sino-Saudi cooperation in the oil and 
petrochemical sectors (Moneyclips 05.06.97). In a meeting with Saudi Oil Minister, the 
President of Sinopec, Sheng Huaren, mentioned that China’s government was seriously 
considering the participation of Saudi companies in the development of a refinery 
complex. This refinery project would increase the export volume of Saudi crude oil to 
China (Moneyclips 11.06.97).  
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The state officials adopted pragmatic policies in assisting national oil companies. They 
firmly secured a government-to-government relationship based on a common interest in 
the oil commodity. An important point to note about this effort was that a guarantee of 
uninterrupted oil supply to China was indirectly offered. In the following four months, 
Saudi Oil Minister, Ali al-Naimi, visited China and discussed with Vice Premier Wu 
Bangguo the possibility of increased exportation of Saudi oil to China. This move was 
followed by the signing of an agreement between Saudi ARAMCO and Sinochem in 
December 1997 in Riyadh. Saudi ARAMCO agreed to export 60,000 bpd of crude oil to 
China. The signatories of the agreement were Vice President of Saudi ARAMCO, Saleh 
B. K’aki, and Vice President of Sinochem, Han Gensheng (Middle East Newsfile 
27.12.97). 
 
Chinese oil companies actively secured oil supply contracts from Saudi Arabia. In 
October 2000, China International United Petroleum & Chemicals Co., Ltd. (UNIPEC) 
reached ‘a long-term agreement’ with the Kingdom to purchase 180,000 bpd of Saudi oil 
in 2001 ( 92,000 barrels were added to the present 88,000 barrels of Saudi oil import). 
The terms of the agreement allowed UNIPEC to purchase 80 percent of light Arabian 
crude oil and 20 percent of a medium Arabian crude oil from the Kingdom (Middle East 
Newsfile 08.11.00). 
 
China’s government finally decided to increase the purchasing volume of oil from Saudi 
Arabia. This decision reflected the degree to which China would be locking up Saudi oil 
and the extent to which Saudi Arabia would broaden its access to the Chinese oil market. 
The two countries would become increasingly interdependent were a proposal of oil 
refining joint venture to be endorsed. During an interview with the Saudi Gazette, a 
newly appointed China ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Wu Si Ke, commented, ‘We will be 
importing 2.5 million tons of oil this year, 3.5 million tons next year and 4.5 million tons 
for the next five years’ (Middle East Newsfile 01.10.00).The ambassador said an 
additional volume would be decided on a yearly basis for a period of five years. The 
ambassador also said that a proposal concerning a joint venture to develop three oil 
refineries in China was being considered. Saudi ARAMCO and Korea’s Ssangyong 
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Company were to be the partners in this venture. There were two factors that might delay 
the proposal. The first was that an existing oil refinery in China was still meeting the 
demand for petrochemicals. The second had to do with the location of this plant (Middle 
East Newsfile 01.10.00).When the two countries were ready to cooperate in constructing 
and upgrading the oil refineries, China would be able to prepare itself to become ‘a stable 
importer of Saudi crude’ (Middle East Newsfile 20.12.00). 
 
Between 1991 and 2000, oil from Saudi Arabia increasingly gained importance in 
China’s market. Table 4.7 and Graph 4.7 show the escalation of China’s demand for 
Saudi oil, from approximately 84 thousand tons in 1991 to 5.7 million tons in 2000. In 
1992, the demand was more than double, having increased by 123 percent (103 million 
tons) from the demand in1991. Between 1993 and 1997 (with the exception of 1994), 
China’s oil import from Saudi Arabia grew at a steady rate of  less than 1 million tons 
each year. In the following three years, the upward trend of China’s demand for Saudi oil 
moved at a variable rate: it jumped sharply by 1.3 million tons (262 percent) in 1998; 
grew by 689 thousand tons (38 percent) in 1999, and increased enormously by 3.2 million 
tons (129 percent) in 2000.  
 
There was also the reasonable likelihood that Saudi Arabia would become a major oil 
supplier to China. In the first decade since diplomatic relations had been established, the 
Saudi Arabian share of China’s total world oil imports gradually climbed from 1.41 
percent in 1990 to 8.16 percent in 2000. During the last three years of the decade, 
however, this share substantially rose by an average of 7.2 percent. 
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Table 4.7: China’s Imports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals and 
Crude from the World and Saudi Arabia, 1991 - 2000 (Tonnes) 
 China’s Imports of 
Petroleum Oil, 
Oils from 
Bituminous 
Minerals and 
Crude from the 
World 
 
China’s Imports of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals and Crude 
from Saudi Arabia 
 
%  
Change 
Percentage of China’s 
Imports of Petroleum 
Oil, Oils from 
Bituminous Minerals 
and Crude Coming 
from Saudi Arabia  
1991 5,972,471 84,001 - 1.41% 
1992 11,357,906 187,324 123% 1.65% 
1993 15,671,205 214,794 14.7% 1.37% 
1994 12,345,912 146,449 -31.8% 1.19% 
1995 17,089,939 338,551 131.2% 1.98% 
1996 22,616,949 230,635 -31.9% 1.02% 
1997 35,469,701 499,909 116.8% 1.41% 
1998 27,322,632 1,807,618 261.5% 6.62% 
1999 36,613,688 2,496,968 38.1% 6.82% 
2000 70,265,318 5,730,211 129.5% 8.16% 
Total 254,725,721 11,736,460 - - 
Source: United Nations Commodity Division 
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Graph 4.7: China’s Imports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals and 
Crude from Saudi Arabia, 1991-2000 (Tonnes)  
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Source: United Nations Commodity Division 
 
The following data gives details on the comparison of the volume of China’s oil imports 
from major suppliers namely Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran and Russia (Table 4.8 and 
Graph 4.8). The data also indicates that China and Saudi Arabia gradually and actively 
built their oil cooperation during a decade of diplomatic relations. The cooperation could 
be considered as a constructive and meaningful engagement. Between 1992 and 2000, 
China’s oil import from Saudi Arabia ranked third after Angola and Iran. The purchasing 
of the Saudi oil, moreover, had been growing dramatically since 1998 and seemed to be 
highly competitive with the import of oil from Angola and Iran. Such a trend suggested 
the likely possibility that China would become a dependent client of Saudi crude oil in 
the coming years. 
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Table 4.8: China’s Oil Import from Major Suppliers, 1990-2000 (Tonnes) 
 Saudi Arabia Angola Iran Russia 
1990 N/A N/A 301,240 N/A 
1991 84,001  N/A 55,000 N/A 
1992 187,324 203,834 114,990 7,501 
1993 214,794  1,224,482 67,860 13,923 
1994 146,449  372,145 69,120 57,072 
1995 338,551  998,863 931,221 36,530 
1996 230,635  1,662,379 2,311,106 318,932 
1997 499,909  3,836,640 2,756,718 475,257 
1998 1,807,618  1,104,985 3,619,989 144,578 
1999 2,496,968  2,876,005 3,949,291 572,276 
2000 5,730,211  8,636,634 7,000,465 1,476,738 
Source: United Nations Commodity Division 
 
Graph 4.8: China’s Oil Import from Major Suppliers, 1990-2000 (Tonnes) 
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Non-energy Trade Links 
The Saudi and Chinese markets were new markets for the business communities of the 
two countries in promoting their products, generating huge profits and expanding their 
business activities. Through trade exhibitions and trade delegations, Chinese businessmen 
were able to establish a trading route with the business groups in Saudi Arabia. They also 
attempted to understand the environment of the new market and the way in which Saudi 
business was  conducted. In December 1989, a delegation led by Zheng Hongye held the 
China Export Commodities Exhibition in Riyadh (at this time, the two states had no 
diplomatic relations but had already established trade representative offices). During the 
exhibition, a USD 32 million export contract was signed. The contract seemed to be 
conducive to the upcoming trade activities and created the opportunity for Chinese 
products to satisfy the needs of customers in Saudi Arabia (Xinhua General News Service 
28.07.90). In April 1991 (several months after the diplomatic relations had been 
established), a Chinese trade delegation led by Zhang Heng Qu arrived in Jeddah. With 
the objective to establish long-term trade cooperation with the Kingdom, the trade 
delegation sought firsthand knowledge of the business environment in Jeddah.  
 
At the early stage of the trade engagements, the range of exports and imports between the 
two countries had been relatively limited. China’s major exports to Saudi Arabia mainly 
constituted ‘foods, farm produce, arts and handicrafts, hardware, machinery, electrical 
appliances and textile and light industrial goods, whereas its imports from the Kingdom 
were dominated by ‘fertilizers, chemical raw materials, iron and steel’ (Xinhua General 
News Service 28.07.90). 
 
In the following year, China diversified and boosted its exports to Saudi Arabia. From 
trading in goods, China began to export its service to the Kingdom. In December 1991, 
thirty-four nurses from China arrived in Saudi Arabia. They were the first group to work 
under the contract that had been formed between the China Medical Corporation for 
International Technical Cooperation (CMTC) and Projects for Health Program Company 
Ltd. from Saudi Arabia. Under this contract, 2,000 nurses and medical staff would begin 
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their work in the Kingdom. The contract would last for ten years, and was known as ‘the 
biggest medical labour export project’ of China. These nurses received additional 
training, including the learning of Arab tradition and culture. The Saudi company also 
requested the arrival of Chinese doctors who had medical expertise in ‘acupuncture, 
narcotherapy, and physical therapy’, as well as Chinese engineers who specialized in the 
technology of medical equipment. Moreover, as was mentioned in the contract, some of 
the departments within Saudi hospitals would benefit immensely from the employees and 
equipment from China (Xinhua General News Service 19.01.92). 
 
China continued diversifying its products by exporting its domestically produced cars to 
Saudi Arabia. In 1992, for the first time, at least 209 mini-buses were exported to the 
Kingdom through the Huangpo Port in Guangzhou. These automobiles were domestically 
produced by Quangzhou Peugeot Corporation, which utilized French technology (Xinhua 
General News Service 11.05.92).  
 
China stepped up its efforts to increase the size of the Saudi market for its exports. Three 
trade exhibitions were organized in 1993, delivering a variety of made-in-China products. 
Exhibitions were held in both countries. At one of the exhibitions, China promoted the 
products that were produced by Chinese Muslim communities. This initiative showed that 
China wanted to highlight Muslim products in its trade cooperation with Saudi Arabia.  
From June 12-16, Beijing hosted the Beijing International Muslim Economic and Trade 
Fair, which invited the participation of Saudi companies. This was held in the Beijing 
International Convention Centre. It was expected that this fair could boost economic, 
trade, technical and scientific cooperation between China and Islamic states. Products 
that had the features of Muslim culture and tradition were also displayed at this 
exhibition. These products originated from Ningxia, Ganxu, and Xinjiang Qinghai 
provinces. At the same time, there was also a symposium on Economic and Trade 
Cooperation between China and Islamic Countries. In November 1993, Jeddah hosted 
China’s trade fair. At this exhibition, ‘more sophisticated technology and advanced 
industrial products’ of China were promoted. The same exhibition, though on a smaller 
scale, was also held in Dammam. 
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China’s policy of actively organising trade exhibitions and sending trade delegations had 
mixed implications. For China, the policy led to the increasing of exports, especially 
consumer goods, to Saudi Arabia. It enabled China to gain the position of  being one of 
the top ten importers of the Kingdom. Regarding the purchasing of Saudi Arabian 
products, China attempted to diversify its imports from the Kingdom, which mainly 
consisted of petrochemicals and fertilizers. For example, in 1993, China placed its first 
order from Zamil Steel’s Pre-Engineered Building (PEB) division. The order was for ‘a 
10,000 square meter pre-engineered building’, which would be used for an air 
conditioning plant in Shenzhen (Moneyclips 14.05.93). However, the volume of Chinese 
imports was less than its exports to the Kingdom. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia was 
running a trade deficit with China (Moneyclips 25.08.94).  
 
To address this imbalance, a number of strategies to reduce the trade deficit were 
carefully considered. The strategies concerned Saudi’s competitive advantage and the 
pivotal role of Saudi business communities. The first strategy was to increase the Saudi 
oil export to China. The boosting of this export was expected to balance a small volume 
of Saudi ‘finished and manufactured products’ exports to China (Moneyclips 13.06.94). 
The second strategy involved the participation of Saudi business enterprises in the 
Chinese market. Vice-Secretary General of the Eastern Province Chamber of Commerce, 
Saleh al-Humaidan, urged Saudi businessmen to reap the benefits of China’s market. 
‘Saudi businessmen must go there, explore the market, and establish a foothold.’ They 
were also urged to take advantage of ‘a healthy economic relationship’ between the two 
countries (Moneyclips 13.06.94). Humaidan also suggested that a proper marketing 
strategy would help distribute non-oil, Saudi products within China’s market. Saudi 
entrepreneurs were to use Saudi export agencies in order to distribute their products.  
 
The need to increase business presence in the Chinese market had called for the 
participation of Saudi Arabia in trade fairs and conferences throughout China. The 
exhibitions and conferences were the venues where governments and business groups 
could meet and learn about the business environment of the two countries, as well as 
fasten bilateral economic engagements. In March 1994, Minister of Commerce of Saudi 
Arabia Sulaiman Abdel-Aziz al-Solaim and Saudi entrepreneurs attended an economic 
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conference of China and Saudi Arabia in Beijing. Approximately one hundred 
businessmen and government officials of two countries attended this conference, 
intending to enhance the bilateral commercial links (Xinhua News Agency 21.03.94).  
 
China’s trade policy towards Saudi Arabia was consistent. Chinese authorities and 
business people used trade exhibitions as the most preferable and operative strategy in 
marketing goods and services and acquiring business deals. Chinese companies gathered 
various companies from different provinces to display their commercial products at the 
trade fairs. Trade exhibitions, in some regard, signalled the ever-increasing trade 
cooperation among the two nations and also widened the scope of business opportunities.  
 
From the 30th of November to 5th of December 1994, eighteen of China’s provinces and 
municipalities and more than a hundred companies from China promoted their 
technologies and displayed export commodities in the China Trade Exhibition in Riyadh. 
The organizer of the exhibition was the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade (CCPIT). During this event, China secured USD 10 million worth of contracts 
(Moneyclips 07.12.94).  
 
In March 1995, Jeddah hosted China’s Trade Fair in which USD 11 million of business 
deals were signed between Chinese and Saudi companies. The deals were characterised 
as ‘short-term sales arrangements and long-term contracts.’ Among the participating 
companies were China Jiangsu Arts & Crafts Imp. & Exp. Corporation, China Jiangsu 
Eastar Imp. Corporation, China Jiangsu Light Industrial Products Corp., China Jiangsu 
Machinery Corp., China Textile Corp., China Knitwear & Home Textile Group, China 
Silk Corp. (Moneyclips  28.03.95). Seventy trade delegations from Jiangsu Province were 
also present at this fair. More than 70 companies from China displayed their products at 
this exhibition. 
 
In December of the same year, China’s businessmen joined the Lifestyle Exhibition in 
Jeddah, and the Dhahran International Exhibition Centre in the Eastern province of the 
Kingdom. At the Dhahran Exhibition, the major participants consisted of 30 companies 
from the Fujian province. During this exhibition, the companies intended to seek 
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partnership with Saudi companies. In December 1996, the Fifth China Trade Exhibition 
was held in Jeddah in which 65 commercial and industrial companies from China 
participated. 
 
In March 1998, forty companies from Jiangsu province participated in the China 
Commodities Fair held in Jeddah. China’s delegations to this event were 12 members of 
Jiangsu Economic and Trade and led by the vice governor of Jiangsu Province, Wang 
Rongbin. Also attending this event was the Secretary General of the Jeddah Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (JCCI), Majid Abdullah Kasabi, who stressed that the JCCI 
would encourage more cooperation between the business people of the two countries. 
 
In September 1999, the Minister of Commerce of Saudi Arabia, Osama Jaafar, and 15 
other business delegations attended the China Fair for International Investment and Trade 
in Xiamen (Fujian Province). This event was an opportunity for the Kingdom to market 
its non-oil and non-chemical based products to China (Middle East Newsfile 14.08.99).  
 
In November 2000, the China-Saudi Friendship Association and the Council of the Saudi 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry organized the Sino-Saudi symposium on trade and 
economic cooperation in Beijing. Around 200 businessmen from Saudi Arabia and China 
attended the symposium (Xinhua General News Service 01.12.91).  
 
In the years between 1990 and 1993, the total trade volume between both countries was 
less than USD 1 billion, with an average value of USD 550 million annually. This trade 
volume rose remarkably by 146.3 percent (2.5 times) in 1994, and 642.8 percent (7.4 
times) in 2000. There was also a switch in the trade deficit from Saudi Arabia to China. 
Between 1990 and 1995, China ran a trade surplus with the Kingdom that accounted for 
USD 45.3 billion. From 1996 to 2000 (with the exception of 1997 to 1999), China began 
to report a trade deficit with the Kingdom because its imports had outpaced its exports to 
Saudi Arabia (Table 4.9 and Graph 4.9). 
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Table 4.9: China’s Exports to and Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1990 -2000 (US 
Dollars) 
 Exports Imports Balance of Trade 
 
Total Volume of 
Trade 
1990 337,444,000 79,652,600 257,791,400 417,096,600 
1991 387,422,000 138,246,000 249,176,000 525,668,000 
1992 444,289,000 127,415,000 316,874,000 571,704,000 
1993 578,750,000 118,642,000 460,108,000 697,392,000 
1994 674,351,000 352,782,000 321,569,000 1,027,133,000 
1995 734,365,000 553,046,000 181,319,000 1,287,411,000 
1996 748,498,000 839,706,000 -91,208,000 1,588,204,000 
1997 855,092,000 824,866,000 30,226,000 1,679,958,000 
1998 895,974,000 807,979,000 87,995,000 1,703,953,000 
1999 943,734,000 911,595,000 32,139,000 1,855,329,000 
2000 1,144,720,000 1,953,510,000 -808,790,000 3,098,230,000 
Source: United Nations Commodity Division 
 
Graph 4.9: China’s Exports to and Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1990 - 2000 (US 
Dollars) 
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4.4.3.3 Exploring Investment Opportunities  
In the hydrocarbon sector, the two countries opened negotiations for mutual investment 
in oil refining and petrochemical sectors in the early part of the 1990s. During the 
negotiation stage, the Chinese and Saudi leaders extended full support to the Sino-Saudi 
cooperation and joint investment in these sectors. Owing to the continued encouragement 
of the leaders, as well as a strong commitment on the part of the oil and petrochemical 
companies, the negotiations on joint venture projects located in Qingdao, Maoming and 
Fujian witnessed some significant progress. In the non-hydrocarbon sector, the authorities 
and the business communities of the two countries were seen as the prime movers of the 
Sino-Saudi mutual investment. The main purpose of the following analysis, therefore, is 
to evaluate the progress and achievement that the two countries made in the hydrocarbon 
and non-hydrocarbon sectors. The historical context of the joint investment will be 
emphasized in this analysis. 
 
4.4.3.3.1 Mutual Investment in the Hydrocarbon Sector: Refining and Downstream Process 
Mutual investment in the oil refining sector began to take the shape in 1992, when 
Chinese Vice Premier and the representatives of Saudi ARAMCO and Ssangyong Oil 
Refining Co. Ltd met in Beijing. Since then, negotiations on joint investments in Qingdao 
and Maoming oil refining projects and the Fujian oil refining and petrochemical project 
had been progressively coordinated. 
 
In 1996, the future prospects for a Sino-Saudi joint investment in the petrochemical 
sector increased when Chinese representatives attempted to invite the participation of 
Saudi companies in petrochemical projects in China. China’s delegation presented a 
number of proposals regarding petrochemical cooperation. Some of the attractive 
proposals included an expansion project for the state-owned Nanjhou refinery and the 
development of 500,000-ton ethylene unit (Moneyclips 05.08.96).  
 
In 1997, a vital step in petrochemical cooperation took place and was said to have 
realised the aspiration of Saudi leaders. In October 1997, Saudi ARAMCO, American 
Exxon and China’s companies reached an agreement regarding a joint petrochemical 
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project in Wuhan. The agreement covered an implementation of a feasibility study of the 
project, marketing, distribution and operation in Hubei Province. With a new distillation 
and breaking units, the Wuhan project was expected to produce petrochemical products 
and light oil. This project, as Saudi Oil Minister commented, was a positive response to 
the interest of King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah in intensifying the Sino-Saudi 
economic ties (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 21.10.97). 
 
The motivation and commitment of Chinese companies to develop cooperation in the 
petrochemical sector remained firm and strong. Sinopec sent the largest delegation to the 
Second Middle East Refining and Petrochemical Conference and Exhibition (Petrotech 
‘98) in Saudi Arabia in September 1998. Eighteen countries and approximately two 
hundred companies also attended this event. The participants of the conference reached a 
consensus wherein partnership was to  be encouraged in refining and petrochemical 
operations. This cooperation would provide low-cost operations, increase production and 
produce the superior technology (Middle East Newsfile 18.09.98).   
  
Chinese and Saudi companies maintained a relentless momentum of fostering 
cooperation in the petrochemical sector. They called for the implementation of the 
‘envisioned cooperation’ in this sector. The common willingness was expressed during 
the meeting of President and CEO of Saudi ARAMCO, Abdallah S. Jum’ah, with the 
delegations from China in June 2000. Seventeen representatives of Chinese companies 
involved in the oil, gas, petrochemical and power industries visited Saudi Arabia, led by 
Wang Tao, who was also a former oil minister of China. Also attending this meeting was 
China’s ambassador to the Kingdom, Yu Xingzhi (Middle East Newsfile 01.06.00).  
 
In the oil sector, the Saudi and Chinese governments fully supported oil cooperation, 
which included the concerted efforts that had been coordinated by the state-owned 
companies. The support suggested that the governments were the solid bedrock of oil 
cooperation. In 1997, China’s Vice-Premier, Wu Bangguo, said that the Chinese 
government was supporting Sinopec and Saudi ARAMCO in developing ‘a direct, long-
term and stable cooperation’. Minister Ali al-Naimi, who met with Vice Premier Wu 
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Bangguo, also claimed that the Saudi government confirmed its continuing commitment 
to the Sino-Saudi economic and trade cooperation (Xinhua News Agency 13.10.97). 
 
The oil policies of the two governments and the state oil companies were economically 
and politically significant. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, these policies had 
been heavily influenced by the development of the Sino-Saudi bilateral relations. In the 
visit of Crown Prince Abdullah to China in 1998, the two countries agreed to establish 
‘strategic cooperation relations’, particularly in the fields of oil and the downstream 
processing sector.  
 
The oil policy of Saudi Arabia had been to seek new markets for its oil products, with 
constant attention to Asian and European countries. As Saudi Minister of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources Ali al-Naimi emphasized, it had always been the Kingdom’s policy to 
promote the sales of its petroleum and to broaden its share in the world market. Among 
the beneficial effects of this policy on the Saudi ARAMCO-Sinopec relationship was the 
signing of a Letter of Intent (LOI). It was jointly agreed that oil from Saudi Arabia would 
be sold to the Chinese market, and the possibility of forging refining and marketing joint 
ventures would be also studied. 
 
What made Saudi ARAMCO such an outstanding player in Sino-Saudi oil cooperation 
was a policy to establish ‘joint ventures for oil refining, distribution and marketing’ in 
foreign countries. From the joint ventures in the oil refining industries of the US, South 
Korea, Philippines and Greece, Saudi ARAMCO was now exclusively concentrating on  
similar ventures in China. 
 
Since energy consideration was also the major priority of China’s foreign policy, 
President Jiang Zemin acknowledged that oil cooperation was an important and 
progressive agenda in the Sino-Saudi relationship. If the visit of Crown Prince Abdullah 
to China in 1998 underlined the strategic relation of the two countries in the oil sector, 
the return visit of President Jiang Zemin in 1999 highlighted the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on oil cooperation between the two nations. The 
President’s visits also brought about the forming of several other agreements. 
 228 
 
 
Table 4.10 presents some of the significant achievements that Saudi Arabia and China, 
and their national oil companies, had reached through bilateral oil and petrochemical 
cooperation. Further discussion of the achievement has been individually assessed in the 
sub-sections that follow. 
 
Table 4.10: Achievements in Oil and Petrochemical Cooperation, 1990 - 2000 
Year Project  Progress  
1992 Qingdao Refinery Project Discussed the mechanism of JVs in oil refining 
sector . 
 
Discussion was held among China’s Vice 
Premier Zou Jiahua, Chief Executive Officer of 
Saudi ARAMCO Ali al-Naimi and President  of 
Ssangyong Oil Refining Co. Ltd. of the 
Republic of Korea Sin Dong Kim. 
1993 Qingdao Refinery Project Discussed the possibility of developing an oil 
refinery the Qingdao City Economic and 
Technological Development Zone. 
 
Discussion was held between the 
representatives of China Petrochemical Corp. 
(Sinopec) and Saudi ARAMCO. 
1994 Qingdao Refinery Project Proposed the joint building of USD 1.5 billion 
oil refinery in Qingdao (in Shandong province, 
east of China). 
1995 Qingdao Refinery Project Negotiation on the development of oil refinery 
in Qingdao continued.  
 
The representatives of Saudi ARAMCO, 
Ssangyong Oil Refining Co. Ltd. and the 
Chinese government conducted the negotiation 
on the project. 
 
The distribution of investment share was 
approved 
1995 Maoming Refinery Project The representatives of Saudi ARAMCO and the 
Chinese government negotiated on the 
development of refinery on Maoming (South of 
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China). The negotiation was then halted due to a 
particular reason. 
 
1996 Qingdao Refinery Project The proposal of project construction awaited an 
approval from the Chinese authority. 
1997 Fujian Refinery Project Discussed an upgrading of oil refinery complex 
in Fujian. 
1998 Qingdao Refinery Project There was a reliable indication that this project 
would be delayed. 
1999 Fujian Refinery Project The feasibility study of the project was 
completed. 
2000 Fujian Refinery Project The Chinese government approved the project. 
 
Oil Refining Project in Qingdao 
Several preliminary discussions concerning a joint venture in the oil refining sector took 
place in 1992 and 1993. A strong link between Chinese and Saudi governments and their 
national oil companies unlocked the potential of mutual investment in Chinese oil 
refining projects. In October 1992, a meeting among China’s Vice Premier Zou Jiahua, 
Chief Executive Officer of Saudi ARAMCO Ali al-Naimi, and President of Ssangyong 
Oil Refining Co. Ltd. of the Republic of Korea Sin Dong Kim was held in Beijing. They 
discussed the logistics of developing a joint venture in oil the refining sector. In 1993, 
China Petrochemical Corp.(Sinopec) and Saudi ARAMCO also discussed the 
development of oil refinery in the Qingdao City Economic and Technological 
Development Zone. The possible cooperation would lead to the construction of ‘the 
largest export-oriented oil refinery base’ in China (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 
21.04.93).  
 
A year later, China, Saudi Arabia and Korea proposed the joint building of USD 1.5 
billion oil refinery in Qingdao (in Shangdong Province). The suggested shares of this 
project were as follows: Saudi ARAMCO – 45 percent, National Chemical Corp. and 
Qingdao Municipal Government – 40 percent, and Ssangyong Oil refining Co. – 15 
percent. The proposal was also made during the consultations among the high-level 
officials of the two countries. One of these consultations was conducted between China’s 
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Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Wu Yi, and Saudi Commerce 
Minister, Sulaiman al-Solaim. 
 
According to China’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Zheng Dayong, the construction of 
Qingdao refinery complex would begin in 1997 with a processing capacity of 300,000 
bpd of crude oil (Associated Press Worldstream 05.10.94). When the construction of the 
complex was completed, Saudi Arabia would supply 10 million tons of crude oil annually 
for a period of 30 years. Saudi oil import would be increased when the production of this 
refinery reached 15 million tons annually (Moneyclips 17.01.95).  
 
The proposal of the Qingdao joint venture project, as China’s officials had viewed, 
offered tremendous opportunities to the two nations. Ambassador Zheng Dayong 
contended that this project would enable China to re-export Saudi oil to the South Asian 
market. China’s Economic and Commercial Counsellor in Riyadh, Zhang Dimo, 
considered the proposal to be a bold step of widening investment opportunities between 
China and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it indicated an increasing of Saudi oil export 
to China: China began to import nearly 3.4 million tons of Saudi oil in 1995. 
 
Beginning in March 1995, the parties involved in the joint venture took appropriate 
measures to speed up the progress of the project. In that month, the distribution of 
investment shares for the project was officially approved and allocated among Saudi 
ARAMCO, Ssangyong and the Chinese government (The Associated Press 27.03.95). In 
August 1996, the proposal for the project entered its final stage. In October 1997, 
Minister Ali al-Naimi discussed with the Deputy Governor of Shandong Province the 
construction of the project, which was awaiting the approval of China’s State Council 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 21.10.97).   
 
In 1998, China’s Economic and Commercial Counsellor to Saudi Arabia, Yang Han Xin, 
stressed that the preliminary study was being conducted on the proposal of developing a 
USD 1.5 billion refinery in Qingdao, but that there could be some delay because this 
proposal would be incorporated in the 10th Five-Year Plan of China (for 2000 - 2005). 
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The Qingdao project was important to China owing to increased domestic oil 
consumption, which had surpassed 331,000 bpd (Middle East Newsfile 25.08.98). 
 
Oil Refining Project in Maoming 
Saudi ARAMCO continued to seek investment opportunity in Maoming oil refinery, the 
second largest oil refinery of China, but there was  a procedural obstacle regarding the 
volume of joint investment. In March 1995, the two countries further negotiated on the 
development of this refinery. The investment share of the project, however, had not yet 
been arranged (The Associated Press 27.03.95). Moreover, the negotiation was halted 
since Saudi ARAMCO had requested a 50 percent of share investment. The request was 
apparently contradictory towards China’s policy that merely authorized the foreign 
companies to own 49 percent of the share (Middle East Economic Digest 15.09.95).  
 
Oil Refining Project in Fujian 
Since China had been gradually increasing the petroleum import from Saudi Arabia, the 
need to upgrade the existing refineries became crucial. Oil companies from China, Saudi 
Arabia and the US discussed an improvement of a refinery complex in Fujian, which 
merely processed light crude oil. A discussion of the project was also initiated by China 
and Saudi governments, and was pushed forward after the visit of the Saudi Oil Minister 
to Beijing in October 1997.  
 
Saudi ARAMCO considered Fujian plant as its ‘fifth international refining and marketing 
venture’ in the making. In 1998, a negotiation with ExxonMobil on a development of a 
joint venture project in Fujian was underway (Middle East Newsfile 04.10.98). In 1999, 
President Jiang Zemin discussed Fujian oil refinery and petrochemical project with the 
Saudi leaders during his visit to Saudi Arabia.  
 
In 1999, the project attained a significant achievement. Vice Governor of the China 
People’s Government of Fujian Province, Cao De Gan, said that ‘feasibility studies’ on a 
joint venture of Fujian refinery plant had recently been completed. It was now (1999) 
time to seek an official approval from the Government of Fujian Province.  
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After several years of ongoing negotiations, China’s government eventually approved the 
proposal to expand the refinery and petrochemical complex in Fujian in October 2000. 
The participants of this joint venture project were Saudi ARAMCO, ExxonMobil and 
Fujian Petrochemical (Sinopec and the Fujian provincial government). Saudi ARAMCO 
and ExxonMobil individually held 25 percent of the investment shares, with the 
remaining shares owned by the Fujian Petrochemical. This project would build ‘a 
600,000 metric ton per year (mt/year) cracker, a 450,000 mt/year polyethylene unit, and a 
300,000 mt/year polypropylene plant’ (Chemicalweek Asia 11.10.00).  The Fujian 
refinery plant was also expected to be the principal supplier of petrochemical products in 
China. 
 
Among the desirable outcomes of this project were a favourable trade balance for Saudi 
Arabia and the strong  possibility of foreign companies acquiring a significant share of 
China’s energy market. The Fujian province would also benefit from the petroleum 
products that would be locally distributed from this refinery. 
 
4.4.3.3.2 Mutual Investment in the Non-hydrocarbon Sector 
As early as 1992, the provincial authorities in China played a larger role in promoting 
Chinese outward investment. The authorities were seen to propose joint ventures with 
foreign countries.  Ningxia Hui Autonomous region, which was known as a China’s 
Muslim province, had set up a plan with the Kingdom to invest in its capital, Yinhcuan 
City (Xinhua General News Service 03.07.92). Meanwhile, in a report given by the Head 
of the Hubei Commission for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Zhang Zhiwen, 
eighteen companies from Hubei had been formed in Saudi Arabia and other ten countries 
(Xinhua General News Service 04.06.92). 
 
In the same year, a Saudi-based company also poured its investment into China. Bawahab 
Est. for Trade & Contracts produced Beta refrigerators in China. Some years later, its 
Director-General, Salim Bawahab, planned to choose China as its manufacturing outlet 
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for certain electrical and electronics products. With a new brand, these products would be 
exported to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf markets.  
 
A year later, there were also a number of Saudi firms that attempted to operate their 
investment activities in China. These firms were interested in investment opportunities in 
China’s real estate development and construction sector. In June 1993, an economic 
advisor to China’s city of Yixing in Jiangsu Province said that Saudi investors showed 
their keen interest in investing in China’s real estate and other property development. 
Moreover, in a meeting in Jeddah, Saudi business groups were also keen to invest in the 
reconstruction and expanding of mosques, and develop ‘office blocks, shopping 
complexes and commercial centres in China (Moneyclips 20.06.93).  
 
A government-owned company of Saudi Arabia chose to invest in the maritime logistics 
sector of China and the investment locations were varied and strategic. The investment 
was seen to contribute a value-added element to Sino-Saudi economic ties. The 
commercial success of this company rested on the success of the Sino-Saudi relationship. 
It began in May 1992, when an agreement was concluded between the National Shipping 
Company of Saudi Arabia (NSCSA) and the Shekou Container Port of China’s Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone. This agreement aimed at developing Shekou as a port in the 
world’s shipping line. The Saudi company, however, was satisfied with the condition of 
the port and its technological level (Xinhua General News Service 15.05.92). Two years 
later, NSCSA began to invest in Tianjin, the north China port city (Xinhua News Agency 
13.09.94). In the following year, NSCSA planned to begin its service in Tianjin after the 
first operation was launched in Shanghai in 1994. This remarkable progress indicated the 
expansion of a Saudi shipping line in China, particularly in the northern part of the 
country which also included Beijing. The Deputy Director of NSCSA’s Lines and 
Information Technology, Hussein al-Maktum, saw his company’s success as a direct 
reflection of a growing bilateral Sino-Saudi relationship. NSCSA was a petrochemical 
shipper (Xinhua News Agency 09.04.95) and the first Arab shipping company to conduct 
such business in China. Twenty-nine percent of its company’s shares were independently 
owned by the Saudi government. 
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Providing services to Tianjin port was an economic opportunity for  NSCSA: the 
company had ‘a direct gateway’ to the nearby markets of Qingdao, Dalian and Beijing, 
while the services to Shanghai allowed the NSCSA to access easily the ports of Jiangzu, 
Xiamen, and Ningbo. NSCSA widely served the markets between China and the Middle 
East and North America, and by transporting its cargos in these areas.  
 
Since textiles served as one of the major components of China’s exports to Saudi Arabia, 
the formation of joint ventures in the textile manufacturing sector was seen as potentially 
profitable. In October 1995, the delegation of the Jiangsu Yueda Industry Group visited 
the Eastern Province Chamber of Commerce and Industry (EPCCI) and sought potential 
areas of joint ventures. The Jiangsu Yueda Industry Group also intended to form 
partnership with Saudi company in manufacturing textiles in the Kingdom. For the 
purpose of manufacturing, cotton would be exported to the Kingdom, and the production 
process would take place in the Saudi industrial city. 
 
The tourism sector, which had greatly stimulated the growth of China’s economy, had 
managed to pull the inward investment of Saudi firms. According to Zhang Dimo, the 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor at China’s Embassy in Riyadh, the Kingdom 
already had a joint venture in the hotel industry of China. In July 1997, the Mayor of the 
capital of Beijing, Jia Qinglin, met with Abdul Latif Jameel, President of the Ali Group 
of Saudi Arabia in Beijing. During this meeting, the Saudi visitors showed their interest 
in becoming involved in renovation projects of the old area of the capital (Xinhua News 
Agency 08.07.97). 
 
When the Saudi government increased its investment in the healthcare sector and the 
development of ports, Chinese firms were strongly motivated to broaden the scopes of 
their investments in the Kingdom. China’s Ambassador to the Kingdom, Yu Chingchi, 
revealed that there were three important projects currently being studied. The projects 
that would be mutually invested in by the government and the private sectors were ‘the 
construction of the Islamic Port in Jeddah, the production of pharmaceuticals, and the 
production of veterinary medicines at Dammam’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
09.12.98).  
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In 2000, the two nations reached a significant number of agreements on mutual 
investment in multiple projects. Twenty agreements were concluded between the 
Shamrany Group of  Saudi Arabia and China’s enterprises in April 2000. These 
agreements covered the following projects: ‘electricity, tyre plastic weaving, railway 
reconstruction, oil drilling equipment, labour desert control and high technology’. In the 
power grid project, the Saudi company would invest USD 30 million (Xinhua General 
News Service 02.08.00). There was also bilateral cooperation between China and Saudi 
Arabia in producing fibreglass pipes in Dalian, which was expected to begin in June 
2001. This joint venture was funded by Saudi authority and was known as the first 
investment of the Kingdom in Northeast China. The technology, as well as the equipment 
for this production, was purchased from Sweden and the US (Xinhua General News 
Service 19.05.00).  
 
Conclusion 
The PRC and KSA policy objectives and behaviour regarding the key issues in the 
Middle East region were generally consonant, but this was not consistent. In the Gulf 
War, for instance, the PRC and KSA governments opposed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Yet, in Operation Desert Storm, the two countries adopted and implemented different 
policies and strategies. In contrast, regarding the Arab-Israeli conflicts, Riyadh’s and 
Beijing policies have been reasonably coherent and consonant. 
 
Official diplomatic relations between the PRC and the KSA were established on 21st of 
July 1990. The PRC enthusiastically welcomed this, but naturally the ROC sharply 
criticised the development. The ROC authority had attempted to prevent this shift of the 
diplomatic recognition that the KSA had granted it in 1946. The Saudi government 
cautiously responded to Taipei’s criticism and scepticism. The change of emphasis in 
diplomatic recognition, however, did not downplay the importance of the ROC for the 
KSA and political and economic relations between the KSA and the ROC remained intact 
throughout the 1990s.  
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The PRC and the KSA cultivated bilateral political and economic relations over this 
period. The two countries were intent on building both energy and non-energy trade 
links. Their concerted efforts led to progress. The two countries witnessed increased oil 
industry co-operation, exchange visits and trade exhibitions. In terms of mutual 
investment co-operation, the PRC and the KSA became increasingly involved in both 
hydrocarbons and non-hydrocarbons sectors. Long-term investment in the hydrocarbons 
sector initiated direct negotiations regarding oil-refinery projects in Qingdao, Fujian and 
Maoming. In the non-hydrocarbons sector, mutual investment constantly generated 
development, involving different companies and sectors. 
 
The characteristics of complex interdependence gradually developed through the Sino-
Saudi bilateral link. The agenda between the two countries began to diversify, although 
economic issues dominated the inter-state strategy. The role of military power in Sino-
Saudi relations was insignificant because China and Saudi Arabia did not seek or want a 
strategic defence relationship. Relations began to involve many actors and use multiple 
channels. 
 
The Chinese and Saudi policies concerning some of the major events that occurred in the 
Middle East during the period between 1990 and 2000 reflect a growing commonality of 
values and norms, of the kind discussed in constructivist theory. The two countries 
emphasised the notion of regional peace and stability. Nonetheless, their policy behaviour 
with respect to the Gulf War and the sanctions against Iraq put them at odds on some 
issues. The two countries had a shared conviction that Israel’s occupation of Arab lands 
was unjustified. Saudi Arabia allocated significant material resources to provide 
immediate assistance to the Palestinians during the Second Palestinian Intifada. China, 
for its part, played an important position as a permanent member of the UN calling for 
Israel’s immediate halt to aggression. 
 
Within the framework of constructivist theory, it could be said that the two countries 
articulated a set of common underlying principles in Sino-Saudi relations. These 
principles were peaceful coexistence, non-interference, mutual benefit and equality. The 
articulation of these principles was made in the statements of the Saudi and Chinese 
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foreign ministers which were issued in July 1990. Another form of shared understanding 
was reflected in the expectations which the two countries had. The Sino-Saudi missile 
deal was seen on both sides as a move towards facilitating the development of diplomatic 
relations. The two countries also believed that economic motivations would facilitate the 
establishment of diplomatic links. After they developed diplomatic relations, China and 
Saudi Arabia organized exchange visits among the leaders, government officials and 
business communities, aimed to foster the political and economic relations and 
understanding between the two countries. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Development of Sino-Saudi Relations in the Post-September 11, 2001-2010 
 
Introduction 
This chapter starts by outlining the nature of the international political system of the first 
decade of the 21st century. The international political system in this period sometimes 
described as shaped by the dynamics of the “post-9/11” era. That background is 
necessary to understanding Chinese and Saudi policies regarding international and 
domestic terrorism. The background also helps set the policies of the two countries with 
regard to the wars in the Middle East and the surrounding region, and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, in context.  
 
The chapter offers an in-depth analysis of Sino-Saudi relations throughout the second 
decade after diplomatic ties were established. In providing a comprehensive analysis, the 
sub-topics concerning the Sino-Saudi relations are divided into two timeframes: 2001-05 
and 2006-10. Each timeframe concentrates on the same sub-topics, namely trade, 
investment and construction activities. The bilateral political contact between the two 
countries is also addressed in each timeframe. On the basis of these understanding, a 
theoretical conception of complex interdependence and constructivism are examined in 
this chapter by demonstrating the relevance of these concept and theory to Sino-Saudi 
relations over this period. 
 
5.1 The Post September 11, 2001 Period 
On September 11, 2001, nineteen members of the Al-Qa’ida launched terrorist attacks on 
the US by hijacking and crashing four planes. The disaster was overwhelming: thousands 
of people died, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre collapsed, and some parts of 
Pentagon was destroyed. On September 20, 2001, President Bush declared ‘the war on 
terror’, and less than three weeks later his administration responded to the terrorist attacks 
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by launching Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan. The administration 
wanted to defeat the international terrorist organization Al-Qa’ida and dislodge the 
Taliban regime, which had strong links to Al-Qa’ida. Two years later, the US embarked 
on a military campaign against Saddam’s regime. The Bush administration believed that 
if Saddam remained in power, ‘the fundamental conditions that breed terror could not be 
changed’ (Benjamin 2006 p.vii). 
 
Bush’s foreign policy in the aftermath of September 11th, however, had the effects of 
bolstering anti-American sentiments among some of people, especially in the Muslim 
world. There was a growing belief that the US administration was overreacting in its war 
on terror. Some perceived the pre-emptive war and encroaching occupation as a means 
for the US to dominate the world. Such perception, together with other factors such as the 
US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, gave further incitement to the terrorist attacks around the 
world. The terrorist bombings in London and Madrid were among attacks of this type. 
 
The US image in the international level could be improved when Barack Obama became 
US President on January 20, 2009. Like many other newly elected leaders in the world, 
President Obama was inspired by the idea of reform: he aimed ‘to correct many of the 
errors committed by the Bush administration’ (Cox 2011 p.79). Some US foreign policies 
towards the Middle Eastern countries began to change. Obama’s administration started to 
pull American troops out of Iraq, to engage with Iran and to be actively involved in the 
Middle East peace process. 
 
5.2 The PRC, the KSA and the World 
The events of September 11th had profound implications for the foreign policies of both 
China and Saudi Arabia. China’s government gave a strong commitment to the world 
counter-terrorism campaign, built cooperation with other states through counter-terrorism 
consultation, backed the countries that became the victims of terrorist organizations, 
joined with other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in resisting 
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regional terrorism, extremism and separatism, and consolidated its efforts in 
counteracting the acts of terrorist organizations of East Turkistan. The Saudi government 
also supported the global counter-terrorism campaign, but its relations with the US were 
tense during the few years after the 9/11 incident. This section will assess further Saudi 
and Chinese response to the fight against international terrorism. 
 
As noted some problems arose in the 68-year-old US–Saudi relationship after the 9/11 
terrorist attack. With fifteen Saudi nationals involved in this attack, and the alleged 
participation of Saudi citizens in financing the terrorist activities, relations between 
Riyadh and Washington became more complex and challenging. Saudi Arabia was 
strongly criticized in US circles, and some US observers even called for a revision in 
Saudi Arabian status as an ally of the US. It was a tough situation for both governments. 
Two examples of the effects of this situation were the denial of visa requests for many 
Saudis who wanted to travel to the US and a boycott of some American products and 
companies in Saudi Arabia (Bronson 2006 p.392). There were also vicious campaigns in 
the US media that defamed the Kingdom and provoked mutual hostility between the 
Saudis and Americans (Middle East Newsfile 22.10.01).  
 
Both sides, however, proclaimed a common determination to combat terrorism. It was 
conveyed in a meeting between Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal, and 
President George W. Bush. The two leaders expressed a shared perception that every 
country should eradicate the terrorist threats from the world (BBC Monitoring Middle 
East 21.09.01). In 2001, the Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan 
stressed the Saudi government’s firm and strong stance on counter-terrorism, ‘Saudi 
Arabia maintain an unwavering stand, without reservations, against the perpetrators of 
terrorism. We appreciate the support given by the United Nations and the Security 
Council to the on-going efforts to confront terrorism and to freeze all its associated 
financial resources’(PR Newswire  11.12.01). 
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A suicide bombing in Riyadh in May 2003 and a terrorist attack in the Kingdom in 
November of the same year strengthened Saudi commitment to fighting against terrorism 
(Bronson 2006 p.392). Many authors call these two events the 'wake-up call' for the 
Kingdom. Saudi Arabia began a four-year counterinsurgency campaign against Al-Qa’ida 
that lasted until 2007. The Kingdom’s political, economic and security approaches to this 
campaign involved hunting for the militants, breaking up Al-Qa'ida groups, confiscating 
weapon caches, warning radical clerics, preventing 'money laundering and terrorist 
financing', and monitoring charities (Bronson 2006 p.393). A strong link was created 
between the FBI and Saudi intelligence forces. The FBI was allowed to access 
information on terrorist suspects and was even permitted to place their teams in the 
Kingdom (Bronson 2006 p.394). This development, to some extent, improved overall 
US–Saudi relations. 
 
The Chinese government held a clear and firm stance towards terrorist threats throughout 
this period. This position, which most governments also revealed, embodied China’s 
forceful resistance to terrorist organizations. It also signified China’s readiness to join the 
US and the global community in deterring the unlawful actions of these organizations. 
When the US was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, China immediately 
criticized this deadly incident. On the day after the attack, President Jiang Zemin had a 
conversation with President Bush, discussing the incident and expressing his sympathy 
with and condolences to the American government, its people and the victims’ families 
(Xinhua General News Service 13.09.01). China’s Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, 
delivered a speech stressing the Chinese government’s commitment to fight against 
terrorism: ‘the Chinese people stand by the American people and the entire international 
community in the fight against terrorism’ (Xinhua General News Services 21.09.01). 
 
The Chinese government was clearly serious, active and committed to the counter-
terrorism campaign. To respond to the terrorist acts, China built its understanding of the 
campaign through cooperation with the UN, the major powers of the world and the 
neighbouring states. On December 11, 2001, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Li 
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Zhaoxing, said that since the incident, China had had consultations and built cooperation 
with the US in fighting against terrorism (Xinhua General News Service 11.12.01). A 
year later, China had already conducted anti-terrorism consultations with the US, Russia, 
Britain, France, Pakistan and India, and had been actively involved in the Security 
Council Anti-Terrorism Commission (Xinhua General News Service 09.12.02). 
 
China’s policy towards global counter-terrorism campaign remained consistent. It 
retained its close cooperation with the Arab states and increased its supports to the US in 
countering the terrorist violence. On behalf of the Chinese government, the spokeswoman 
of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Zhang Qiyue, denounced the terrorist attacks in Riyadh. 
The Chinese government, as she said, also extended its support to the Kingdom in 
fighting against terrorism (Xinhua General News Service 14.05.03). Moreover, during the 
second Ministerial Meeting of the China–Arab Cooperation Forum in 2006, China and 
Arab states agreed to improve anti-terror cooperation at all levels. In this meeting, China 
also supported the establishment of an ‘international anti-terror centre’, which was 
proposed by King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz (Xinhua General News Service 01.06.06). 
During President Obama’s visit to China in November 2009, the US and Chinese 
governments agreed to enhance their cooperation in fighting against terrorism. The two 
governments promised to strengthen their ‘joint efforts to combat transnational crime and 
criminal organization as well as money laundering and the financing of terrorism, 
including counterfeiting and recovery of illicit funds (Xinhua General News Service 
17.11.09). 
 
China joined with other countries in regional cooperation in counteracting the terrorist 
threat. Established in June 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) had six 
members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its 
members reached an agreement and formed an agency in combating terrorism, separatism 
and extremism. In 2002, the heads of state of the SCO members signed the Agreement on 
a Regional Anti-Terrorist Agency. Two years later, this agency was established with the 
purpose of continuing the fight against regional terrorism, separatism and extremism 
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(Xinhua General News Service 17.06.04). The members also pledged to continue abiding 
by the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The role of the SCO, however, has not 
limited to the security agenda. The SCO has multi-functions and broad objectives, for 
instance, ‘promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and 
technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental 
protection and other fields’ (The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2011).   
 
There was a concrete reason why Chinese government took a strong line in countering 
terrorist movements and their violence. The government claimed that the security of its 
people was threatened by the activities of East Turkistan’s terrorist, separatist and 
extremist forces. In the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, ‘260 terrorist incidents’ 
were reported from 1995 to 2005. In these attacks, 160 civilians died and more than 440 
people were injured (Xinhua General News Service 05.09.05). The Deputy Director of 
the Counter-Terrorism Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security of China, Zhao 
Yongchen, said that the terrorist forces of East Turkistan had strong links with 
international terrorist groups. They were trained in Central and South Asia (Xinhua 
General News Service 05.09.05). 
 
The above-mentioned situation meant that China saw anti-terrorism as a means to 
preserve its unity and retain its stability. China’s Ministry of Public Security released to 
the public a list of terrorist groups existed in the country. At the same time, the Chinese 
government closely monitored the activities of these terrorist forces. In 2003, based on 
the criteria for indentifying a terrorist organization and a terrorist, the Chinese 
government categorised some of East Turkistan groups as terrorist organizations. Among 
these organizations were the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the World 
Uygur Youth Congress (WUYC) (Xinhua General News Service 15.12.03). In 2009, 
China’s police forces and state security agencies crushed five terrorist plots against the 
civilians in Xinjiang. According to China’s anti-terrorism source, the separatists and 
terrorists of East Turkistan were the planners of these plots (Xinhua General News 
Service 03.08.09). 
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5.3 The PRC, the KSA and the Middle East 
The following analysis is concerned with the wars that occurred in the Middle East and 
the surrounding region after September 11th, namely the Afghanistan War and the US 
invasion of Iraq. The behaviour of China and Saudi Arabia with regard to these wars and 
the Arab–Israeli conflict will be examined, and points of policy difference and policy 
consonance will be noted. 
 
5.3.1 The Arab–Israeli Conflict 
China’s government showed its willingness and desire to engage in the Middle Eastern 
issue by sending its representatives to Saudi Arabia and several other countries in the 
region. The Chinese and Saudi governments also made direct contacts through the 
meetings of high-level officials who discussed and shared similar views and 
understanding concerning the regional issues. 
 
 In May 2001, China reassured Saudi Arabia regarding its commitment to the Middle 
East peace process and expressed its anxiety on current developments in Palestine. 
China’s Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, had a meeting with the Vice Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Nizar O. Madani, in Beijing. Minister Tang stressed the 
willingness of China to continue its contribution to the Middle East peace process. This 
contribution was made within the context of the efforts of the international community. 
He also shared with Minister Madani his country’s deep concern over the eight-month 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians: the Second Intifada that began at the end of 
September 2000. Minister Tang said, ‘The Chinese government is very concerned about 
this, and does not want to see the efforts and achievements over the past decade turn out 
to be fruitless’ (Xinhua General News Service 29.05.01). 
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In November of the same year, the Saudi representative at the UN General Assembly 
stressed the need for a solution to the Palestinian problem, through the implementation of 
Security Council resolutions. Shen Guofang, who was the Deputy Permanent 
Representative of China at the UN, for his part, stressed China’s support for the struggle 
of the Palestinians in securing their ‘legitimate national rights’ (Xinhua General News 
Service 30.11.01).  
 
In March 2002, the Chinese Foreign Minister gave his feedback on the Middle East peace 
proposal that had been put forward by the Saudi government, saying that China supported 
any initiatives that helped the Middle East peace process. In the following month, the 
President of the Saudi Arabia Consultative Council, Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim Bin 
Jubair, who participated in the third annual meeting of the Association of Asian 
Parliaments for Peace (AAPP) in China, stressed Saudi Arabia’s concern over the 
worsening situation in the Middle East. This was expressed in a meeting with Premier Li 
Peng. Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim also conveyed the Kingdom’s appreciation for China’s 
support and its ‘just stance’ on Middle East peace (Xinhua General News Service 
19.04.02).  
 
China dispatched a diplomatic mission to the region because it wanted to reveal its strong 
willingness and readiness to become an active player in Israeli–Palestinian conflict 
resolution. Starting from October 19 to 29, 2003, China’s diplomatic envoy to the Middle 
East, Wang Shejie, visited several countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia. The 
visits were regarded as part of China’s diplomatic effort to support and encourage the 
Middle East peace process. During these tours, Wang Shejie exchanged ideas with the 
leaders and officials of Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Israel. In Riyadh, Wang Shejie met 
with Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz. He discussed the prevailing situation in the 
region, and urged Israelis and Palestinian to observe self-restraint, so that the security of 
both sides could be restored (Xinhua General News Service 26.10.03). On a visit to the 
Kingdom in September 2004, China’s Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, again discussed the 
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current developments within the Palestinian territories with senior Saudi officials (Xinhua 
General News Service 07.09.04).  
 
Chinese and Saudi postures regarding the Lebanon-Israeli conflict in July 2006 were 
congruous: the two governments pointed up the role of the international community in 
the conflict. The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Dai Bingguo, expressed China’s 
position during a meeting with Prince Bandar bin Abdul Aziz on July 28, 2006. Dai 
stated: ‘China supports the United Nations and the international community in playing an 
active role in resolving the conflicts, and hopes all the relevant parties can hold 
negotiations on the basis of relevant UN resolutions, the land-for-peace principle and the 
Arab peace initiative, so as to realize peace and stability in the Middle East’ (Xinhua 
General News Service 28.07.06). The Kingdom shared the same concern and approach. 
Prince Bandar said, in response, ‘Saudi Arabia is also seriously concerned about the 
current situation…the international community should impel all sides to the conflict to 
realize a cease-fire immediately, and provide assistance to the Lebanese people’ (Xinhua 
General News Service 28.07.06).  
 
Saudi Arabia and China used the international organization in pursuing their policy 
towards Arab-Israel crisis, and this matched one of the conditions of complex 
interdependence. The two countries pushed for the effective implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1701, which required the retreat of Israel from South 
Lebanon and the dispatch of 15,000 U.N forces into this area (Xinhua General News 
Service 15.08.06). China expressed its willingness to work with Saudi Arabia and Arab 
countries in implementing Resolution 1701. This message was delivered in a meeting 
between China’s Mideast envoy, Sun Bigan, and the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince 
Sa’ud al-Faysal, on August 15, 2006. The Kingdom praised China’s efforts in reducing 
the pressure of this crisis and hoped China would play a large role with the UN forces in 
Lebanon, and also in the post-war reconstruction of the country.  
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The two governments both contributed to the reconstruction of Lebanon after the war. As 
a result of China’s concern over the situation in Lebanon, humanitarian aid worth USD 
5.04 million was dispatched to Lebanon (Xinhua General News Service 18.09.06). The 
Kingdom also allocated funds and humanitarian aid to Lebanon: USD 1 billion was used 
in supporting the stability of Lebanon’s currency, USD 500 million for the 
reconstruction, and USD 50 million for humanitarian assistance (Agence France Presse 
25.07.06).  
 
At the end of 2007, in a meeting between Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal and China’s ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia (Yang Honglin), Prince Sa’ud expressed appreciation for China’s ‘just 
and impartial position’ on the Middle East issue and hoped that China would play an 
‘active and constructive role’ in resolving this problem (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 
30.12.07).  
 
Like many other countries, China and Saudi Arabia denounced Israeli aggression in Gaza 
in December 2008. The two countries criticised the Israeli authority for using force in the 
aggression. Besides criticism, China continued to extend its support to the efforts of Arab 
states which sought the solution for the crisis. The use of force in this conflict, China 
contended, not only caused severe causalities among the people, but also destroyed the 
Middle East peace process which was being promoted by the international community. 
Thus, China urged Israel and the Palestinian authorities to use dialogue to resolve their 
differences. China restated its stance of supporting all efforts that brought about a 
regional peace, in particular those initiatives from Arab countries. The Saudi position was 
made clear at an emergency meeting in Cairo. Prince Sa’ud Al-Faysal stressed that the 
disunity among different groups of Palestinians created a difficulty for Arab states in 
taking effective action against Israeli aggression. He pressed for unity among these 
groups through a single ‘voice and leadership’, and stressed that a military campaign did 
not guarantee peace and security for Israel (Bahrain News Agency 31.12.08).  
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The issue of legitimacy implied a consistency of Chinese and Saudi positions on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In January 2010, a joint conference was held between the 
Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Sa’ud, and his Chinese counterpart, Minister Yang Jiechi. 
Prince Sa’ud stressed the necessity of respecting ‘the basis of international legitimacy’. 
He highlighted the willingness of China to uphold this legitimacy in finding solutions to 
international disputes, and said that the positions of Chinese and Arab countries on the 
Arab–Israeli conflict were consistent and based on the principle of international 
legitimacy. This required the return of Arab and Palestinian rights. Minister Yang 
emphasized China’s demand for the creation of ‘the state of Palestine’ and a ‘serious 
negotiation’ in conducting the peace process. China was willing to work with the 
international community in ensuring the stability of the region (States News Service 
13.01.10).  
 
The policy behaviour of China and Saudi Arabia towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
matched some aspects of the political process of complex interdependence. The goals of 
the two countries varied according to issue area, but their interests and values could often 
be pursued within the context of international organisations. The latter were instruments 
for China and Saudi Arabia to achieve their common interests. Beijing and Riyadh had 
the shared understanding that the Middle East peace process should be accelerated in 
order to resolve the conflict. They supported the interests and practices of the United 
Nations and ensured that their policies towards the conflict were legitimate.  
 
With regard to the Afghanistan War, there was initially little shared understanding. Yet, 
when the allied forces led by the US launched the war, there came to be a shared 
understanding between China and Saudi Arabia built around concern for the civilian 
population of Afghanistan.  
 
The concept of legitimacy figured strongly in Chinese and Saudi attitudes towards the US 
invasion of Iraq. The shared understanding was articulated in opposition to the US 
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decision to strike Iraq militarily. In the aftermath of this military strike, the social and 
international norms of both China and Saudi Arabia motivated them to become involved 
in the reconstruction of Iraq; they utilized their material resources, offering humanitarian 
assistance to the victims of the war. The policy behaviour of China and Saudi Arabia 
towards the war promoted the values of the international community; they called for a 
non-violent approach and for the UN to play an integral role. Through these policies the 
two countries earned substantial support from some other countries. 
 
5.3.2 Afghanistan War 
Nine days after the events of September 11th, President George W. Bush declared ‘the 
war on terror’ during a speech to a Joint Session of Congress, stating, ‘our war on terror 
begins with Al-Qa’ida’ (Federal News Service 20.09.01). On October 7, 2001, the US 
Armed Forces, British Special Force and Northern Alliance launched a military strike 
against the Taliban regime and Al-Qa’ida forces in Afghanistan (note: Afghanistan War 
was one of the various struggles that fell under the ‘War on Terror’). This war that 
claimed thousands of Afghan lives shaped the policy responses of China and Saudi 
Arabia towards Afghanistan and the allied forces, mainly the US. The Chinese 
government took a cautious step in commenting on this war, whereas the Saudi 
government held a firm position opposing this military strike. Nevertheless, the 
governments in Riyadh and Beijing drew identical responses to the effects of the war on 
Afghan civilians and to the new government of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era.  
 
China’s wary stance on the US-led war against Afghanistan could be seen in the 
statements from its leader and a government official.  On the day after the US and its 
allies invaded Afghanistan, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
commented on this war. He focused on the elements of the war that the military strike 
should observe, yet said nothing regarding China’s position on this war. He said that the 
Chinese government hoped the ‘relevant military strikes on terrorism should be targeted 
at a specific objective, so as to avoid hurting the civilians’ (Xinhua General News Service 
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08.10.01). On October 9, 2001, the spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, Sun Yuxi, 
quoted some of the conversation President Jiang Zemin had with President George Bush 
on October 8, 2001. In one of his statements, the President said, ‘China and the United 
States, both having a major influence on the world, shoulder common responsibility for 
maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world’ (Xinhua 
General News Service 09.10.01). Another statement from President Jiang Zemin was that 
China was willing to work with the United States ‘to reinforce exchanges and 
cooperation, and to make efforts to protect the world’s peace, stability and development’ 
(Xinhua General News Service 09.10.01). These two statements simply underlined the 
role of the two countries at the regional and international levels. But no statement 
indicated China’s support for the US in its war in Afghanistan. 
 
Saudi Arabia had a firm and clear position on the war against Afghanistan. Although the 
Kingdom backed the global anti-terrorism campaign, it contested the US military 
intervention against this country. Several pieces of evidence reflected the disagreement of 
Saudi officials with this war. The Saudi government urged the US to identify the actual 
target of the war, to prevent the use of its military base by the allied forces, and to seek an 
alternative option to the war. On the issue of the war target, Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal said, 
‘You must find the targets, you must know who the culprits are…’ (Agence France 
Presse 01.10.01). This statement was directed at the US government. Prince Sa’ud also 
seemed to express his dissatisfaction regarding the reasons for the war against 
Afghanistan. He said, ‘Everybody knows that Afghans have suffered years of war and the 
last thing they need is another conflict.’ He also emphasized that anti-terrorism 
campaigns required long-term effort, patience and determination (Agence France Presse 
01.10.01). The Kingdom’s adverse reaction to the American decision to invade 
Afghanistan was further demonstrated. Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar, 
confirmed that there was a request from the US to deploy its forces from the Kingdom’s 
territory in order to launch its war against the Taliban regime. Saudi leaders, however, 
denied the use of their land for this purpose (Agence France Presse  04.10.01). Saudi 
Defense Minister, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, moreover, rejected the claim that the 
Kingdom had permitted Washington to use the facilities at Prince Sultan Air Base.  
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While the war was in progress, the effect of the war on the civilians was of critical 
concern to both China and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia wanted the US and its allies to 
stop the war, because war escalation triggered a devastating effect on Afghan civilians. 
Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Naif bin Abdul Aziz, said, ‘We wish the United States had 
been able to drive the terrorists out of Afghanistan without having to take the ongoing 
action because this will involve (killing) innocent people who are not guilty. Not all the 
Afghan people are responsible for what had happened (in New York and Washington)’ 
(Agence France Presse 15.10.01). He also conveyed the Kingdom’s displeasure with this 
war. China, for its part, learned that the result of the war in Afghanistan was disastrous, 
and it did not want Afghan civilians to continually pay the price of the war. Therefore, 
China believed that the actions of the international community in countering terrorism 
must be guided by certain principles. The war should focus on its target, prevent any 
harm to innocent people, and avoid the spread of war to other states (Xinhua General 
News Service 11.10.01). 
 
In dealing with their citizens who were fighting in this war, China and Saudi Arabia 
chose to employ different means: the Saudi government decided not to take any actions, 
whereas the Chinese government was prepared to use legal measure. Prince Naif 
confirmed that there was nothing the Kingdom could do if there were Saudis who decided 
to join Osama bin Laden and the Taliban militia in fighting against the US and their 
allies. He saw these Saudis as harming themselves. In the case of Chinese citizens who 
fought against the allies, the Chinese government appeared to deal with these people in 
its own way. When the US claimed that some ‘people from Western China’ were 
captured, the Chinese government demanded the return of its citizens to China. As the 
spokeswoman for China’s Foreign Ministry, Zhang Qiyue, said, these people would be 
judged according to Chinese law. Furthermore, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
reported that China’s Uyghurs were found in Afghanistan. These people were said to 
have ‘close association with international terrorist forces’, and supposedly received 
training in Afghanistan (Agence France Presse 11.12.01).  
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In the post-Taliban era, Saudi Arabia opened a new page in its relations with 
Afghanistan. Riyadh’s responses to the new Afghan leadership were also very positive 
and pragmatic. It rebuilt the relationship with the latter and offered millions of dollars for 
the reconstruction of the country. In January 2002, in a meeting with Hamid Karzai in 
Riyadh, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz expressed his appreciation of the initiatives taken by 
the Afghan interim government in stabilizing the country. The King pledged to provide 
Afghanistan with financial and economic assistance (BBC Monitoring South Asia 
19.01.02). Seven months later, the Afghanistan embassy was reopened in the Kingdom 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcast  21.08.02). In the following year, the Afghanistan 
ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Anwar Omar, thanked Saudi Arabia for extending 
humanitarian assistance to Afghans and for contributing funds for the development of 
infrastructure in the country. Together with the US and Japan, Saudi Arabia also 
contributed USD 30 million for the development of a 1,500 km highway that would link 
three cities: Kabul, Kandahar and Heerat (Middle East Newsfile 12.01.03). King Fahd and 
Crown Prince Abdullah congratulated Hamid Karzai on the establishment of a multi-
ethnic government. In a congratulatory message, the two leaders expressed the hope that 
the new government would re-establish territorial integrity and unity, adopt the Bonn 
Conference agreement and respect the UN Security Council resolutions. The 
establishment of the new government was an outcome of the Bonn Conference in 2001. 
This conference, sponsored by the UN, prescribed a process of reconstructing the Afghan 
political system. The components of this process were ‘the adoption of a new 
constitution, a presidential election in 2004, and National Assembly elections in 2005’ 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2011). 
 
Like Saudi Arabia, China also nurtured its relationship with the new Afghan authority. It 
played a significant role in the rebuilding of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era: it 
offered support and assistance to the reconstruction of Afghan political, economic and 
social development. On February 6, 2002, China reopened its embassy in Afghanistan as 
a sign of its support for the interim government (Xinhua General News Service  
253 
 
06.02.02). China provided practical assistance to the ‘the Transitional Islamic 
Government of Afghanistan’ by forgiving ‘tens of millions of US dollars’ of Afghan debt 
in November of the same year (Xinhua General News Service 18.11.02). (No details on 
the exact amount of the debt were available.) China reaffirmed its stand of supporting the 
Afghan government, which was formed in 2004. Its State Councillor, Tang Jiaxuan, said, 
‘we support the Afghan government and people’s active efforts in realizing national 
pacification and reconstruction’ (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 26.04.05).  
 
5.3.3 The US Invasion of Iraq 
The following assessment reveals the similarities in the policies of China and Saudi 
Arabia towards the US-led military strike against Iraq. Before the strike was launched, 
both nations strongly pressed for a non-violent approach in dealing with the Iraqi crisis. 
The two countries strengthened their diplomatic efforts to oppose American aspirations 
for an attack on Iraq, and called for a central role for the UN in this crisis. They were 
regretful when the allied forces launched their military strikes against Iraq, and 
extensively engaged in the reconstruction of the country in the post-Saddam era. 
 
Hoping that the war could be prevented, China played an active role, as a permanent 
member of the UN, and demonstrated its strong commitment to resolve the Iraqi crisis 
through political and peaceful means. China persistently emphasized the need to pursue 
an outcome through the UN. In February 2003, China called for the Security Council to 
resolve the Iraqi crisis and opposed military action: it suggested that this crisis should be 
resolved within the framework of the UN through political means. China offered its 
personnel and technological resources to the UN in conducting an arms inspection in 
Iraq. This initiative, it said, was not intended to challenge the role of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC) in fulfilling their responsibilities in Iraq. 
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China’s position on the Iraqi crisis was consistent and solid. China consolidated its 
diplomatic efforts, insisting that the parties should prevent the war. It won support from 
some other permanent member of the UN. Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, and 
Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, in a joint communiqué released at the end of 
February 2003, insisted that the war could and should be prevented, and that weapons 
inspections should be continued. The two ministers also urged the members of the UN to 
respect the authority of the Security Council (Xinhua General News Service 27.02.03). 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan met the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who was in Beijing, 
in February 2003. The Minister reiterated his hope that all the parties involved in this 
crisis would ‘do everything possible to avoid the war’ (Xinhua General News Service 
24.02.03). But Colin Powell responded by saying that the US was planning to present ‘a 
new draft resolution to the UN Security Council in the next few days’ (Xinhua General 
News Service 24.02.03). Minister Tang Jiaxuan continued to urge the US to resume arms 
inspection of Iraq, and seek the truth instead of imposing a new UN resolution (Xinhua 
General News Service 24.02.03). As to Iraq, Minister Tang Jiaxuan urged Saddam’s 
regime to cooperate with the UN in an ‘active and unconditional’ way, and to fulfil the 
UN Security Council resolution in a ‘comprehensive, strict and practical way (Xinhua 
General News Service 03.03.03). 
 
Like China, Saudi Arabia was also against the US-led war on Iraq and sought a range of 
alternatives to the war. The 2003 US-led military actions against Iraq witnessed the 
Kingdom’s disinclination to join the allied forces. Of all the reasons, a feeling of 
brotherhood and the effects of the war could be the most compelling factors for the 
Kingdom’s opposition. Crown Prince Abdullah stressed the importance was placed on 
protecting Iraq since ‘Iraq is an integral part of the Arab and Islamic world’. The Crown 
Prince also delivered an assurance of Riyadh’s dedication to safeguard the unity and 
national integrity of Iraq (Agence France Presse 13.01.03). The Crown Prince said he 
believed that the US-led war would cause ‘a civil war, break up the country, promote 
terrorism and consequently destabilize the oil-rich region’ (Agence France Presse 
06.02.03). 
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Against the above background, Saudi Arabia called on Iraq to bolster its commitment to 
the UN, sought the right of Arab countries to prevent the war, and proposed an alternative 
solution that the UN should observe in this crisis. The cabinet of the Kingdom insisted 
that Iraq should fully cooperate with the UN arms inspectors. It also suggested that Arab 
countries should have a chance to solve this crisis via peaceful means. Ample time for 
dialogue and diplomacy should be also given to these countries. The Kingdom, moreover, 
outlined a new strategy in which the UN Security Council should give amnesty to the 
members of Saddam’s regime. Granting this amnesty would help gain Iraq’s cooperation 
with the plans of the Security Council. This was known as the last option by Saudi Arabia 
in its effort to prevent war. 
 
The Saudi leadership clearly stressed that Saudi Arabia would not join the US-led 
invasion against Iraq. On March 19, 2001, Crown Prince Abdullah, who read a statement 
of King Fahd on state television saying, ‘the Kingdom will not participate in any way in 
the war’. The Crown Prince further stated, ‘we strongly reject any blow to Iraq’s unity, 
independence and security, and oppose the country’s military occupation’. Another 
statement from the Crown Prince, which also stressed the Kingdom’s strongest 
opposition to this war, was, ‘Saudi military forces will not enter Iraqi territory’ (The New 
York Times 19.03.03).  
 
When the war broke out, Saudi Arabia denounced the US military strike against Iraq and 
called for referring the conflict to the UN. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Sa’ud al-
Faysal, delivered Saudi Arabia’s ‘great concern and deep regret’ over the US-led military 
intervention. Although Washington and Riyadh were known as close allies, the Kingdom 
strongly criticized the US for the outbreak of the war. Prince Sa’ud said that the Kingdom 
hoped for an immediate halt to the attacks on Iraq, and urged the use of peaceful means 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcast 20.03.03). A few days later, Saudi Arabia sent peace 
proposals to the US and Iraq, calling on the warring parties to stop the war. Prince Sa’ud 
said, ‘we made the proposal and we are waiting for a possible response’. The prince, 
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however, refused to elaborate on the content of the proposals (The New York Times 
26.03.03). The prince also urged the US and Iraq to subject the conflict to the UN, and 
asked for a second chance for diplomacy (The New York Times 26.03.03). 
 
China had a similar approach to Saudi Arabia in contending with the issue of war. It 
sought to stop the war, doing so through the statements by China’s Foreign Ministry and 
gave direct communications with the US at a high level. Through its Foreign Ministry, 
China declared its preferences in precise terms: ‘we strongly urge the countries concerned 
to immediately halt their military actions…the strike has violated the Charter of the 
United Nations and basic principles of international law’ (Xinhua General News Service 
21.03.03). In a phone conversation with Colin Powell, China’s State Councillor, Tang 
Jiaxuan, said that ‘the Chinese government has strongly urged an end to military actions 
against Iraq so as to avoid hurting innocent people’ (Xinhua General News Service 
20.03.03). He pressed ‘for a return to the right path of seeking a political solution to the 
Iraq issue’ (Xinhua General News Service 20.03.03). 
 
Demonstrating their concern for the innocents affected by the war, China and Saudi 
Arabia extended their humanitarian assistance to the victims. The two countries shared 
the same concern regarding the war casualties in Iraq. The China Red Cross Society 
(CRCS) donated USD 50,000 to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, and another USD 50,000 to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (Xinhua General News Service 29.03.03). Up to the end of March 2003, it was 
reported that Saudi Arabia was ready with ‘a comprehensive humanitarian assistance’ to 
Iraqis. This aid included ‘foodstuffs, medicine and shelter’ (Mena Business Reports 
30.03.03). Saudi Arabia also provided medical services to the war victims by operating 
its field hospital in Iraq (BBC Summary of World Broadcast 28.10.03). 
 
In the post-war period, China and Saudi Arabia developed an identical view on the future 
of Iraq. High-level officials in both countries stressed the importance of the UN in the 
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rebuilding of the war-torn country. The Chinese and Saudi Foreign Ministers, Li 
Zhaoxing and Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal, held a phone conversation on Iraqi issues on May 
11, 2003. Prince Sa’ud advocated for the leading role of the UN in restoring the security 
and stability in Iraq. Through these means, he believed, Iraq would be able to reinstate its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. For Minister Li Zhaoxing, the handling of the issues 
of post-war Iraq should be based on ‘the spirit of the UN Charter’ (Xinhua General News 
Service 12.05.03).  
 
5.4 The PRC and the KSA 
In the first decade of the 21st century, China and Saudi Arabia underwent an 
unprecedented development in their relationship. To analyse this development with 
clarity, this key area will be divided into two time frames: 2001 to 2005 and 2006 to 
2010. For each period, the dynamic nature of the political and economic relations 
between the two countries will be examined. Emphasis will be given to hydrocarbon and 
non-hydrocarbon trade, mutual investment and construction activities, which served as 
the main components of the Sino–Saudi economic relationship. The idea of examining 
two distinct time-periods is to better discuss whether the visits between King Abdullah 
and President Hu Jintao in 2006 had a substantial impact on the landscape of these 
bilateral relations.  
 
With regard to the adoptability of the constructivists’ view of Sino-Saudi relations, it is of 
note that the Association of the Asian Parliament for Peace (AAPP) had already 
developed shared interests and practices among its members and later proposed the 
development of parliamentary links between China and some Arab countries. In 2003, the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Saudi Consultative Council (SCC) initiated 
official contact which was crucial to the enrichment of the bilateral relations between the 
two countries. These efforts reflect the constructivists’ perspective that the shared 
interests and practices of the institutions have effects on the behaviour of countries. 
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Such practices are inevitably influenced by the national interests of the countries 
involved. This was evident in the case of Saudi business institutions. SAGIA pursued the 
interests of the Kingdom by attracting foreign investments, and SABIC advanced the 
Kingdom’s national interest of regulating and strengthening the Sino-Saudi non-oil trade. 
This trend emerged during both periods: 2001–2005 and 2006–2010. 
 
5.4.1 Sino–Saudi Relations from 2001–2005 
This section attempts to provide an in-depth analysis of the development of Sino–Saudi 
political and economic relations in the first five years of the 21st century, and provides a 
comprehensive assessment of the trade, investment and construction activities between 
the two countries. It begins with an assessment of the link between the two National 
Parliaments. Then it analyzes how high-ranking officials from both countries 
continuously shaped their bilateral trade. The total volume of trade between China and 
Saudi Arabia was on the rise, resulting mainly from the growth of Saudi oil exports to 
China. The volume of mutual investment was low. However, efforts were made to 
overcome the latter problem. The analysis of the mutual investment concentrates on joint 
ventures in the energy and non-energy sectors, and the assessment of the construction 
activities focuses on the growing participation of the Chinese companies in the 
construction sector of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Complex interdependence that Keohane and Nye have introduced well explains the Sino-
Saudi bilateral relations of this period. The links between the two National Parliaments 
indicate another variation of the multiple channels. The multiple channels were also 
emphasised by the high-levels officials who wanted to see the diverse nature of 
transnational relations; they called for an increasing involvement of the business circles 
in the Sino-Saudi economic relations and established new institutions that facilitated the 
economic activities. The role of military force was deeply underplayed in the bilateral 
relations because the Chinese and Saudi governments concentrated on the efforts of 
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improving the level of mutual investment, both in hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon 
sectors. 
 
5.4.1.1 The National Parliaments and Sino–Saudi Relations  
The data on the previous period (1990–2000) did not reveal any contact between the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Saudi Consultative Council (SCC). The 
development of links between these two national bodies can be traced through the visits 
and discussions between the members of the two parliaments between 2003 and 2005. 
 
In 2002, at an official meeting attended by all members of the Association of the Asian 
Parliament for Peace (AAPP), there was a proposal for a particular framework in order to 
organise parliamentary links between China and the Arab states. The meeting in April 
2002, brought together representatives from both the NPC and the SCC, and was held in 
Beijing and Chongqing. Premier Li Peng, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
NPC, encouraged ‘cooperation and exchanges between China and the four Arab countries 
represented (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq) within the framework of the AAPP’ 
(Xinhua General News Service 19.04.02). Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim bin Jubair, 
President of the Saudi Arabian Consultative Council, was the Kingdom’s representative 
at this meeting. The Saudi representative stated that Saudi relations with China were 
progressing smoothly (Xinhua General News Service 19.04.02).  
 
Formal contact between the SCC and the NPC began in 2003. A delegation of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Saudi Arabia in July of that year. This visit was 
at the invitation of the SCC (Xinhua General News Service 26.07.03). In the following 
month, the Chairman of the SCC, Saleh bin Abdullah bin Humeid, had a discussion with 
the Head of the Administration of Foreign Relations at the Central Committee of the 
CCP, Ma Wenu, in Riyadh. Ma Wenu emphasised the role of the SCC in the 
development of Sino–Saudi relations, while Saleh bin Abdullah bin Humeid assessed the 
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scope for cooperation between the two parliaments. No explanation was given on the 
specific areas for this cooperation (Saudi Press Agency 06.08.03). 
 
There was, then, considerable stress placed, after 2003, on ‘intensifying the cooperation 
between the SCC and the NPC’. The conception was that the SCC–NPC link was one of 
the core components that enriched state-to-state relations. During a meeting with a 
delegation of the NPC (Foreign Affairs Committee) in Riyadh in November 2005, King 
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz voiced his hope that the two parliaments would strengthen their 
‘friendly and cooperative relations’ (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 21.11.05). The 
delegation, led by Jiang Enzhu, also had discussions with Saleh bin Abdullah bin 
Humeid, who was Chairman of the SCC. In this meeting, Saleh stressed that the SCC 
considered that the increasing contact and exchange between the two parliaments would 
encourage the development of Sino–Saudi relations and would aid cooperation in various 
sectors (Xinhua General News Service 21.11.05). 
 
5.4.1.2 Re-emphasizing the Private Sector in the Bilateral Trade Engagement 
The advancement of Sino–Saudi trade relations, at this time, required strong engagement 
between the business communities of the two countries. In the period of 2001–2005, 
high-level officials continued to encourage Saudi and Chinese businessmen to foster 
bilateral trade engagements. New institutions were set up, aiming to facilitate the 
activities between these two business groups. These efforts were not new, as the two 
governments had been calling for the participation of these groups since the 1990s, but 
the initiative was given new emphasis. In 2001, Wu Yi, a member of the Political Bureau 
of the CPC Central Committee, confirmed that the two countries had recently identified 
ways of encouraging their businessmen to have regular visits and expand their 
investments. In 2002, Wu Yi had a dialogue with Chinese and Saudi business groups. In 
this meeting, she stressed that she was trying to increase exports of made-in-China 
mechanical and electronic products to the Kingdom, and to boost the volume of Saudi 
non-oil products exported to China. She also called for a minimization of Saudi trade 
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barriers and a liberalization of trade policies (Middle East Newsfile 04.04.02). 
Meanwhile, Ibrahim al-Assaf, who also had a meeting with Wu Yi, pointed to a number 
of measures to upgrade this economic cooperation. He stressed the need for Saudi 
businessmen to market their products, such as electronic and petrochemical products in 
China, and for China to support the Kingdom’s accession to the WTO (Xinhua General 
News Service 01.04.02).  
 
In line with the above efforts, the government established new institutions in 2003. These 
institutions were deemed crucial and practical as they helped businessmen to facilitate 
and expand their activities beyond their borders. With these institutions in place, the two 
governments would easily gain feedback from the business groups involved, particularly 
relating to the implementation of trade policies. On January 17, 2003 the China–Saudi 
Arabia Friendship Association and the Council of the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (CSCCI) established a non-governmental joint commercial committee. The 
members consisted of Saudi and Chinese businessmen. Among the activities that this 
committee would address were business forums and exhibitions. The committee was also 
asked to give its insights to the government regarding accommodating the Sino–Saudi 
trade dealings (Xinhua General News Service 17.01.03). In the same year, a Saudi 
Consulate-General was set up in Hong Kong. What made the Saudi government choose 
this location was that, as the Saudi Consul-General said, ‘Hong Kong is the gateway to 
China.’  
 
5.4.1.3 The Surge of Sino–Saudi Oil and non-Oil Trade  
Growing exports and imports of oil and non-oil products continued to fuel the growth of 
bilateral trade relations. The total volume of trade in the 1990s had stayed well below 
USD 1 billion, whereas the total volume of trade in the 2000s soared above USD 2 
billion. In the period from 2001 to 2005, the ‘Textiles and their Raw Materials’ category 
dominated the Chinese exports to Saudi Arabia and the ‘Minerals’ category led Chinese 
imports from the Kingdom.  
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The data in Table 5.1 and Graph 5.1 show that Sino–Saudi exports and imports (oil and 
non-oil trade) between 2001 and 2005 grew at a fast rate. The total trade of exports and 
imports between these two countries expanded by 295.6 percent from USD 4.07 billion in 
2001 to USD 16.1 billion in 2005. Also, in this period, China’s exports to Saudi Arabia 
increased by 192 percent, whereas its imports increased by 351.9 percent. This direction 
of trade, however, highlighted China’s trade imbalance with Saudi Arabia. China 
experienced a constant trade deficit because its imports from Saudi Arabia outpaced its 
exports. This negative balance of trade reached a total of USD 19.38 billion, having risen 
by 519 percent over this five-year period. The largest trade deficit was recorded in 2005 
at nearly USD 8.5 billion. The main cause of this trend was, clearly, the escalating 
Chinese demand for oil. 
 
Table 5.1: China’s Exports to and Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005 (US 
Dollars)  
 Exports Imports Balance of Trade Total Volume of 
Trade 
2001 1,356,430,000 2,723,140,000 -1,366,710,000 4,079,570,000 
2002 1,672,740,000 3,436,490,000 -1,763,750,000 5,109,230,000 
2003 2,147,160,000 5,194,680,000 -3,047,520,000 7,341,840,000 
2004 2,775,590,000 7,524,070,000 -4,748,480,000 10,299,660,000 
2005 3,824,840,000 12,286,400,000 -8,461,560,000 16,111,240,000 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division 
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Graph 5.1: China’s Exports to and Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005 (US 
Dollars) 
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The largest category of China’s exports to Saudi Arabia, as mentioned above, was 
‘Textiles and their Raw Materials’ (the raw materials of textiles are wool, cotton, silk and 
synthetic fibres). Between 2001 and 2005, the exports of this category increased by 136 
percent (Table 5.2 and Graph 5.2). The sector made up 34 percent of China’s total 
exports to the Kingdom. The ‘Machinery, Equipment, Audio and Video Products and 
Parts’ category and the ‘Cheap Metals and Products’ category ranked, respectively, 
second and third in the Chinese exports to the Kingdom. After that came the ‘Plastics, 
Rubber and Their Products’ category. The second, third and fourth major exports 
accounted for less than 18 percent of the total exported goods (Chart 5.2).  
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Table 5.2: China’s Major Exports to Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005 (1,000 US Dollars) 
 Total Exports Textiles and 
Their Raw 
Materials 
Machinery, 
Equipment, 
Audio and 
Video Products 
and Parts 
Cheap 
Metals and 
Products 
Plastics, 
Rubber and 
Their Products 
2001 1,354,111 494,227 179,953 102,032 95,070 
2002 1,671,729 578,647 225,129 123,735 104,520 
2003 2,147,155 821,858 315,136 137,776 127,672 
2004 2,775,589 909,021 540,578 217,274 159,651 
2005 3,824,673 1,169,984 735,772 385,790 253,862 
Total 11,773,257 3,973,737 1,996,568 966,607 740,775 
Source: Xinhua Economic News Service 
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Graph 5.2: China’s Major Exports to Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005 (1,000 US Dollars) 
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Chart 5.2: China’s Major Exports to Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005   
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China’s major imports from Saudi Arabia over the period were categorised in three 
sectors, ‘Minerals’, ‘Chemicals and Related Products’, and ‘Plastics, Rubber and Their 
Products’ (Table 5.3). The ‘Minerals’ sector, dominated by crude oil, was the biggest part 
of this import category. After 2001, the sector expanded at a fast pace and increased by 
389 percent over the period to 2005. The performance of the remaining two sectors was 
also very significant. The ‘Chemical and Related Products’ sector, mostly composed of 
petrochemicals and fertilizers contributed 15 percent, while ‘Plastics, Rubber and Their 
Products’ accounted for 10 percent of the total imports to China.  
 
Table 5.3: China’s Major Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005 (1,000 USD) 
 Total Imports Minerals Chemicals and Related 
Products 
Plastics, Rubber 
and Their 
Products 
2001 2,721,079 1,919,124 385,394 408,223 
2002 3,435,065 2,473,042 525,437 411,489 
2003 5,194,678 3,827,110 758,919 486,532 
2004 7,524,075 5,489,868 1,308,759 656,535 
2005 12,245,716 9,386,869 1,781,788 1,061,957 
Total 31,120,613 23,096,013 4,760,297 3,024,736 
Source: Xinhua Economic News Service 
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Graph 5.3: China’s Major Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005 (1,000 USD) 
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Chart 5.3: China’s Major Imports Relative to Total Imports from Saudi Arabia, 
2001–2005  
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Oil trade 
The Sino-Saudi oil trade dealings, as noted, increased substantially in the first five years 
of the 2000s. This upward trend was driven by a number of developments that occurred 
in the oil trade link between the two countries. The national oil companies and 
government officials of these countries both played in shaping the dynamic of this link. 
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The state oil companies were, for their part, were seeking opportunities to expand the oil 
business between the two countries. By concluding agreements, Saudi oil firms would be 
able to have greater market access to China’s oil market. For the Chinese oil companies, 
such agreements would help them satisfy the domestic demand for oil. In April 2001, 
Saudi ARAMCO and Chinese International Petroleum and Chemicals Co. reached an 
agreement for an extension of Saudi oil purchases, and also agreed on an increase in 
quantities traded. The extension period for this purchasing ability and the volume of the 
exports, however, were not publicly stated. The Chinese company that made the purchase 
then distributed this commodity to other oil companies in China (Middle East Newsfile 
18.04.01).   
 
There had always been regular meetings between the Chinese and Saudi officials about 
the future of oil cooperation between the two countries, but these now intensified. In the 
meetings, these officials continued to express their commitment to the bilateral oil links 
and re-iterated their hopes of advancing oil cooperation. The visits of Minister Ali al- 
Naimi to Beijing in 2004 and 2005 highlighted the strong commitment between the two 
countries to developing future cooperation in the energy sector. The 2004 meetings with 
China’s Minister of Commerce, Bo Xilai, and China’s Vice Premier, Zeng Peiyan, were 
concerned with the advancement of oil cooperation between the two nations. The same 
agenda was also discussed during the April 2005 meetings. Minister Al-Naimi visited 
Beijing immediately after attending OPEC’s Ministerial Conference in Vienna. His visits 
to China in this period were more frequent than in the previous decade. 
 
Table 5.4 and Chart 5.4 present the volume of Chinese imports of ‘Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous Minerals and Crude’ from the rest of the world and from Saudi Arabia. 
Between 2001and 2005, China imported a total of 470 million tons of these commodities. 
From this total import figure, 74.6 million tons came from Saudi Arabia. This signified 
that almost 15.7 percent of China’s total oil imports were supplied by Saudi Arabia. The 
volume of China’s oil imports from Saudi Arabia (2001–2005) was seven times higher 
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than in the whole of the previous decade. Only 11.8 million tons of Saudi oil was 
exported to China from 1991–2000. 
 
China’s petroleum and crude oil imports from the Kingdom rose by 154 percent over 
these years, from 8.7 million tons in 2001, to 22.1 million in 2005. The rate of increase 
varied, from the lowest at 14.7 percent in 2004 to the highest at 52.6 percent in 2001. 
This upward trend shows the growing importance of Sino–Saudi relations in the energy 
sector, as well as a gradual increase in the dependency of China on Saudi oil. 
 
Table 5.4: China’s Imports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals and 
Crude from the World and Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005 (Tonnes) 
 China’s Imports of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals and Crude 
from the World 
 
China’s Imports of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals and Crude 
from Saudi Arabia 
 
%  
Change 
Percentage of China’s 
Imports of Petroleum 
Oil, Oils from 
Bituminous Minerals 
and Crude Coming 
from Saudi Arabia  
2001 60,255,351.35 8,778,376.19 52.6% 14.56% 
2002 69,406,409.07 11,390,760.96 29.9% 16.41% 
2003 91,020,114.99 15,080,108.03 32.7% 16.56% 
2004 122,809,603.32 17,243,549.69 14.7% 14.04% 
2005 126,817,381.54 22,178,924.54 28.5% 17.48% 
Total 470,308,860.20 74,671,719.41 - 15.87% 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division 
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Chart 5.4: China’s Imports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals and 
Crude from the World and Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005  
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Source: United Nations Statistics Division 
 
Table 5.5 and Chart 5.5 highlight the important position of Saudi Arabia relative to other 
major oil exporters to China. Between 2001 and 2005, the volume of China’s total oil 
imports from Saudi Arabia was 33.5 percent (74.3 million tonnes), from Iran it was 27.5 
percent (61.1 million tonnes), from Angola 23.9 percent (53.1 million tonnes) and from 
Russia 15 percent (33.3 million tonnes).  
 
Saudi Arabian ranking as a major exporter of oil to China changed significantly from 
1999 to 2002. From third place in 1999 and 2000, Saudi Arabia climbed to China’s 
second-largest oil supplier in 2001 and later became China’s largest source of imported 
oil by 2002. Also, in comparison to Iran, Angola and Russia, the volume of Saudi oil 
exported to China was remarkable. This volume represented 30 to 35 percent of China’s 
total oil imports (Chart 5.5). 
272 
 
 
In terms of percentage, there was also a drastic increase in Russian oil imported into 
China. China’s oil imports from Russia rose by 647 percent, whereas the same imports 
from Angola, Saudi Arabia and Iran grew by 370 percent, 154 percent and 31.1 percent, 
respectively. However, China’s reliance on Russian oil was less significant than its 
reliance on Saudi oil, because the volume of oil imported from Russia remained much 
smaller. 
 
Table 5.5: China’s Oil Imports from Major Suppliers, 2001–2005 (million tonnes) 
 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division 
 
 Saudi Arabia Iran Angola Russia 
2001 8.7 10.8 3.7 1.7 
2002 11.3 10.6 5.7 3.0 
2003 15.0 12.3 10.1 5.2 
2004 17.2 13.2 16.2 10.7 
2005 22.1 14.2 17.4 12.7 
Total 74.3 61.1 53.1 33.3 
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Chart 5.5: China’s Oil Imports from Major Suppliers, 2001–2005    
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It is also worth looking at the oil relationship from the perception of its significance in 
overall Saudi oil exports. Saudi petroleum and crude oil exports to China saw a huge 
increase from 13 million tons in 2003 to 22.4 million tons in 2005 – an increase of 72.3 
percent. The total Saudi petroleum and crude oil exported to the world was 324 million 
tons in 2003, of which 4 percent was sold to China. Two years later, this percentage was 
increased by 1.96 percent (Table 5.6). It should be noted that this data was produced by 
Saudi Arabia for the UN Commodity Trade Statistic Database. Some of this data, 
however, was not provided in this database. 
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Table 5.6: Saudi Exports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals and 
Crude to the World and China, 2001–2005 (Tonnes) 
 Saudi Exports of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils from 
Bituminous Minerals 
and Crude to the World 
 
Saudi Exports of Petroleum 
Oil, Oils from Bituminous 
Minerals and Crude to 
China 
 
Percentage of Saudi 
Exports of Petroleum Oil, 
Oils from Bituminous 
Minerals and Crude to 
China Relative to the 
World 
2001 N/A N/A N/A 
2002 305,086,933.67 N/A N/A 
2003 324,891,044.96 13,086,325.84 4.02 % 
2004 365,559,912.32 N/A N/A 
2005 375,505,762.91 22,483,789.59 5.98 % 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division 
 
The data from 2001, 2002 and some from 2003 were not released by Saudi authorities. 
Therefore, this analysis begins its focus on the data from 2004 and 2005. In these two 
years (2004–2005), the US was the most important oil market for Saudi Arabia, as 
compared to the Japanese and Chinese markets. An average of 21 percent of Saudi oil 
exports were sold to the US, whereas, the average percentage for the same exports to 
Japan and China was 14.4 and 4.8, respectively. Comparatively, therefore, China was not 
a major destination for Saudi oil (Table 5.7 and Chart 5.7). 
 
In 2005, a new trend appeared in the percentage of Saudi oil exported to these three 
markets. Exports to the US dropped slightly by 6.7 percent. In contrast, exports to China 
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and Japan grew significantly, at 71.8 percent and 39 percent, respectively. Although this 
trend highlighted an expanding market share for Saudi oil in China and Japan, the largest 
oil market for Saudi Arabia was still the US. 
 
Table 5.7: Saudi Exports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals and 
Crude to the United States, Japan and China, 2001–2005 (Million Tonnes) 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division 
 
 Saudi Exports of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals and Crude to 
the World 
Saudi Exports of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals and Crude to 
the United States  
Saudi Exports of 
Petroleum Oil, 
Oils from 
Bituminous 
Minerals and 
Crude to Japan 
Saudi Exports of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals and Crude 
to China  
2001 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2002 305.1 N/A N/A N/A 
2003 324.9 74.1 52.5 N/A 
2004 365.6 77.5 45.1 13.1 
2005 375.6 72.3 62.7 22.5 
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Chart 5.7: Saudi Exports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals and 
Crude to the United States, Japan and China, 2004–2005  
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Non-Oil Trade (Saudi Exports) 
This subtopic will primarily focus on the petrochemical trade between China and Saudi 
Arabia. For this trade, SABIC was the main player in promoting its products to Chinese 
customers. SABIC was aggressively involved in the promotion and expansion of its 
278 
 
petrochemical business in China. It pursued its business strategies of building its future in 
China’s market.   
 
SABIC continued to use exhibitions as a marketing strategy in promoting its products to 
its clients. It acquired more customers by strengthening its presence in exhibitions. In 
2005, for instance, Vice Chairman of SABIC, Mohamed H. al-Mady, stated that SABIC 
had increased its presence at ChinaPlas, which involved a series of International 
Exhibitions on the Plastic and Rubber Industries (ChinaPlas2005) held in China. The 
reason why SABIC enlarged its participation in ChinaPlas, as Al-Mady said, was that 
nearly 50 percent of SABIC’s world production was channelled to the greater Asian 
region (Middle East Company News Wire 25.06.05). 
 
SABIC was very efficient in dealing with its customers. It made itself aware of the needs 
of its clients so that it knew how to preserve its economic interest in China’s 
petrochemical market. SABIC improved its service in China by cutting through a 
communication barrier with its Chinese customers. In 2005, SABIC launched a Chinese-
version website, aiming to provide an excellent service to Chinese customers and 
business partners. Two years before, SABIC also published ‘a quarterly Chinese 
newsletter’. The  General Manager for SABIC Asia Pacific, Al-Benyan, pointed out the 
reasoning behind the company’s strategy for improving its services to Chinese customers: 
‘China is one of SABIC's most important countries in terms of sales. Strengthening 
SABIC's presence in China is crucial given the importance of the Chinese market for 
SABIC. We are constantly looking for ways to better serve our Chinese customers and 
business partners, and establish stronger ties’ (Middle East Company News Wire 
23.06.05). 
 
Table 5.8 and Graphs 5.8 (a) and (b) depict Chinese imports of ‘Polymers of Propylene 
and Other Olefins in Primary Forms’, and ‘Polymers of Ethylene and Other Olefins in the 
Primary Forms’ from the world and Saudi Arabia. China purchased more polymers of 
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ethylene than polymers of propylene from the Kingdom. Saudi polymers of propylene 
accounted for a small share of China’s overall imports for polymers of propylene – only 
3.7 percent. Saudi polymers of ethylene, on the other hand, made up 13.34 percent of 
China’s total imports of polymers of ethylene. This highlights the possibility of Saudi 
Arabia becoming the major supplier of polymers of ethylene to China. 
 
The end products reveal the difference in significance or function of these two polymers. 
Polymers of propylene or polypropylene (PP) make up ‘basic plastic’. It is formed by 
combining the molecules of propylene. Examples of the products produced from PP are 
‘synthetic fibers, automotive parts, luggage, safety helmets and home  construction’ 
(Conocophillips 2010). Polymers of ethylene or polyethylene (PE) are used to produce 
plastic that uses ethylene as its component. This PE is used in the production of ‘trash 
bags, milk jugs, shampoo bottles, water coolers, and cable coating’ (Conocophillips 
2010). 
 
Table 5.8: China’s Petrochemical Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2001–2005 (tonnes) 
 Polymers of 
Propylene and 
Other Olefins in 
Primary Forms 
from the World 
Polymers of 
Propylene and 
Other Olefins in 
Primary Forms 
from Saudi 
Arabia 
Polymers of 
Ethylene in 
Primary Forms 
from the World 
Polymers of Ethylene 
in Primary Forms 
from Saudi Arabia  
2001 2,222,378.59 47,834.03 5,711,611.71 580,771.57 
2002 2,613,309.39 116,899.30 5,266,512.10 572,001.30 
2003 2,981,529.33 125,212.78 5,050,114.79 617,181.73 
2004 3,213,571.62 92,077.74 4,914,458.57 685,342.75 
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2005 3,413,344.79 159,069.15 4,382,832.96 925,553.28 
Total 14,444,133.72 541,093.00 25,325,530.13 3,380,850.63 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division 
 
Graph 5.8 (a): China’s Imports of Polymers of Propylene from the World and Saudi 
Arabia, 2001–2005 (Millions Tonnes) 
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Graph 5.8 (b): China’s Imports of Polymers of Ethylene from the World and Saudi 
Arabia, 2001–2005 (Millions Tonnes) 
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Other than petrochemical products, the non-oil trade exports and imports between the two 
nations consist of consumer products, such as textile products, shoes, leather products, 
foods and toys (Xinhua General News Service 24.04.03).   
 
5.4.1.4 Inducing Bilateral Investment through Different Channels 
Comparing the 2001-2005 with the initial decade after diplomatic links had been 
established, not much improvement occurred in the development of mutual investments. 
Although both periods observed an increase in the number of trade visits between the 
governmental officials and business circles, mutual investment remained low. This 
subtopic, therefore, will assess how the governments and the business communities 
attempted to improve and encourage the investment between the two countries. This 
assessment begins with a brief understanding of the situation regarding inward 
investment in Saudi Arabia. 
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Inward investment in Saudi Arabia, as with many other countries in the region, was 
relatively low at this time: Banking sources in Saudi Arabia revealed that the volume of 
inward investment to the Middle Eastern countries was ‘quite small’ relative to other 
countries like China. ‘Until now, the Arab World could not attract a global investments 
volume, which fits the capabilities of the emerging economies of the region’ (IPR 
Strategic Business Information Database 26.09.01). The IPR Strategic Business 
Information Database cited this information from the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper 
dated September 18, 2001. 
 
It was acknowledged in the statements delivered by Saudi and Chinese officials that the 
volume of mutual and joint investments between the two countries was indeed low. The 
officials were not satisfied with the current volume of these investments, and therefore 
they urged the business communities to increase their investment activities. The President 
of the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry (RCCI), Abdul Rahman al-Jeraisy, 
called on Chinese business groups to invest more and to transfer technological knowledge 
to Saudi Arabia. He pointed that the total value of China’s investment in the Kingdom 
was only around 0.06 percent of China’s world-wide investment (Middle East Newsfile 
SAUDI GAZETTE 26.09.02). In April 2002, the Saudi Minister of Finance and National 
Economy, Ibrahim al-Assaf, stressed the inadequacy of the current volume of joint 
investments between the private sectors from both countries. According to him, this 
volume was small and stood at around SR 180 million. SR 150 million from this value 
was from ‘joint industrial investments’. China’s State Councillor, Wu Yi, who attended a 
meeting between Chinese and Saudi business circles in Riyadh, urged each side to seek 
investment opportunities in the other. She said ways of broadening opportunities for joint 
ventures were needed (Middle East Newsfile SAUDI GAZETTE 05.04.02).  
 
Faced with the low level of inward investment, the Saudi government and its institutions 
were intent on attracting the flow of China’s investment into the country. They provided 
facilities so that the Chinese investors would find it easier to understand the investment 
background of the Kingdom. The Commercial Section of the Saudi Embassy in Beijing 
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distributed the Kingdom’s Foreign Investment Act, a Statute for the Saudi Arabian 
General Investment Authority (SAGIA) and its Executive Rules to governmental 
departments and councils in China. It was expected that this information would be 
included in the websites of Chinese government bodies. SAGIA had also distributed the 
above-mentioned materials to China’s Embassy in Riyadh, the Saudi Embassy in Beijing 
and China’s business circles (Middle East Newsfile 21.11.01). This initiative was 
intended to give the Chinese investors a better understanding of the Law and the 
procedures of investing in the Kingdom. The investors also needed to know the enormous 
advantages of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia.  
 
From China’s side, the visits of trade delegations to Saudi Arabia were intended to help 
the two countries to improve the level of joint investment. As had been practiced in the 
previous ten years, trade delegations from China’s province made business trips to Saudi 
Arabia, seeking investment opportunities as well as investors. In February 2001, a 23-
member Chinese trade delegation arrived in Jeddah for a meeting at the Jeddah Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (JCCI). This delegation was the first delegation from Hebei 
province. As claimed by the head of the delegation, Guo Shichang, one of the main 
objectives of this trip was to seek joint ventures in the manufacturing field. The Deputy 
Director and Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Department of China’s Hebei Province, Gao Wen Zhi, confirmed this objective: ‘We 
look for joint venture production units in areas like construction, light industry, pure 
water, leather bags, agricultural machinery, auto accessories, and medical and chemical 
products. We’re able to offer the necessary labour, expertise and training, which can go a 
long way in the ongoing Saudization plan’ (Arab News 26.02.01).  
 
In the ensuing year, a 15-member of Chinese business delegations arrived in Jeddah. 
With the aim of seeking opportunities for investment and joint ventures, and to spur 
bilateral trade between both nations, this delegation held a meeting with the Kingdom’s 
business groups in the JCCI. Led by Cao Xumin, the President of the China Chamber of 
Commerce for Foodstuffs, Native Produce and Animal By-products (CFNA), this visit 
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could be seen as a part of the CFNA’s effort in promoting its nearly 40,000 members 
(Middle East Newsfile 25.09.02).  
 
Saudi Arabia was clearly keen to see the strong involvement of Chinese companies in the 
investment activities of the country. In 2003 and 2004, the Saudi authorities offered a 
wide range of attractive investment choices to Chinese firms, intended to bolster the flow 
of China’s capital into the country. SAGIA granted China’s investors six licenses, which 
covered ‘petrochemical, pharmaceutical, tire manufacturing and construction material 
projects in Riyadh, Jeddah and Yanbu’ (Xinhua General News Service 24.04.03). In 
2004, the Chairman of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(CSCCI), Abdul Rahman al-Jeraisy, invited China’s companies to invest in Saudi Arabia. 
This was in the context of the upcoming investment opportunity constituted by the 
Kingdom’s allocation of USD 600 billion to the following areas: education, 
communication, road and railway construction, public health and irrigation. This 
allocation would be expended over fifteen years (Xinhua General News Service 
14.12.04).  
 
Another strategy of SAGIA in seeking to bolster mutual investment between the two 
countries was to help Saudi and Chinese private firms to establish a ‘joint investment 
company’. Such a company, it was intended, would have a strong financial capability, 
face less bureaucratic hurdles and offer high-return investment opportunities. The idea of 
having such a joint investment company was put forward by the CSCCI in 2003. The 
Huanghuaihuai Group Corporation was appointed to coordinate the project from the 
Chinese side. Chairman of the Board of Huanghuaihuai Group Corporation, Guo Kexun, 
stated that each country would allocate USD 50 million for the development of the joint 
investment company. The investment that the joint company would focus on was in the 
infrastructure and energy sectors in the two countries (Xinhua General News Service 
14.12.04). 
 
285 
 
Sending trade delegations to China remained a crucial activity as a means of assuring 
Chinese investors that they were very welcome to take up investment opportunities in the 
country. In 2005, the Kingdom sent a further business delegation to China. This 
delegation was led by Abdullah al-Mubti, the Chairman of the Abha Chamber of 
Commerce of Industry. It took part in the Arab–China Business Conference in Beijing in 
April 2005. The delegation was intended to increase ‘mutual confidence’, and to invite 
China’s investors to invest in the Kingdom. In recognition of the shared economic 
interests of China and Saudi businesses, al-Mubti called for more mutual investment 
between the two sides (Saudi Press Agency 17.04.05).  
 
5.4.1.5 Mutual Investments in the Hydrocarbon Sector: Extraction, Refining, 
Marketing and Downstream Process 
The analysis of Sino–Saudi mutual investment over this period will mainly concentrate 
on the hydrocarbon sector. The oil and petrochemical giants of Saudi Arabia and China 
continued their agenda of strengthening their bilateral cooperation. Saudi ARAMCO, the 
Fujian Petrochemical Company Ltd. and ExxonMobil continued a series of negotiations 
on the joint venture of the Quanzhou integrated refining and petrochemical project in 
Fujian province. This project had been under negotiation since 1997.  Another project 
that had been intended to bring Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec into a joint venture was the 
Qingdao oil refining project. Negotiation on this project had begun in 1993 and no 
significant development was observed in the period from 2001 to 2005. Other major 
developments that occurred in the petrochemical sector were the negotiations on joint 
venture petrochemical projects in Liaoning province and Yanbu Industrial City, Saudi 
Arabia. SABIC and Sinopec successfully drew up a joint venture agreement for Yanbu 
petrochemical project. The future of the joint venture agreements for the petrochemical 
projects in Liaoning province, however, was still undecided. In the gas sector, Saudi 
ARAMCO entered into an agreement with Sinopec in 2004. The two companies would 
explore the gas deposit in the 40,000 squares km of North Rub’ Al-Khali. 
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Quanzhou Integrated Refining and Petrochemical Project (Fujian Province) 
Table 5.9: Quanzhou Integrated Refining and Petrochemical Project (Fujian 
Province) 
Year Achievements 
2001 • Negotiation on oil refinery and petrochemical project worth USD 
3.5 billion in Quanzhou was continued (begun in 1997). 
• An agreement on joint feasibility studies (JFS) was concluded. 
2002 • The State Council of China approved the JFS. 
2003 • The Fujian Petrochemical Company Ltd. (FPCL) considered the 
production of paraxylene. 
2004 • Two agreements related to the front-end loading (FEL) were signed, 
and a submission of a JFS to China’s government was made. 
2005 • An agreement for this project was concluded, and the construction 
began. 
 
The above table shows how ARAMCO Overseas Co. B. V (a Saudi ARAMCO 
subsidiary), ExxonMobil China Petroleum and Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (ExxonMobil), 
and the Fujian Petrochemical Company Ltd. (FPCL) built their cooperation in the 
Quanzhou project throughout 2001 to 2005. The FPCL was a company owned by China 
Petroleum and Chemical Corp. (Sinopec) and Fujian government. 
 
The progress of this project was very dynamic. The participating companies were skilful 
and the Chinese government was fully supportive. In each year they made considerable 
progress with more plans and agreements concluded. The project was approved by the 
Chinese government in 2000 (Chemical Business NewsBase: Chemicalweek Asia 
06.11.00) and was the first Saudi ARAMCO joint venture project in China (Saudi Press 
Agency 05.01.05) 
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In the following year, the project moved into another stage. On November 14, 2001, 
Saudi ARAMCO, the FPCL and ExxonMobil reached an agreement related to a study on 
the development of integrated crude oil refining and an ethylene production facility. With 
the signing of this agreement, a joint feasibility study (JFS) of the project began. Upon 
the completion of this study, the signatories had to seek approval of the JFS from the 
State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) of the PRC.  
 
Remarking on this progress, the Senior Vice President of Saudi ARAMCO International 
Operations, who attended the signing ceremony, stressed the significance of this project 
to China: ‘The integrated petroleum refining and petrochemical project has strong and 
sound fundamentals and will contribute to the exceptional economic development in 
Fujian in particular and China in general. We look forward to the Chinese government’s 
acceptance and approval of the JFS’ (Middle East Newsfile 26.11.01). 
  
When China’s authorities approved the JFS, the FPCL, ExxonMobil and Saudi 
ARAMCO came out with a new plan which could offer another value-added element to 
the project. They intended to expand their cooperation and commitment into another 
project. In October of 2002, the approval for the JFS for an integrated refining and 
petrochemical project in Fujian province was given by the State Council of China 
(Xinhua General News Service 18.10.02). Now, the said companies planned for a joint 
venture in fuels’ marketing, which would lead to the development of 600 service stations 
in Fujian province (Xinhua General News Service 18.10.02). 
 
The companies were ambitious and innovative. From a new plan, they began to consider 
the development of the production of Paraxylene (PX) in the integrated refinery and 
chemical complex. This idea was proposed by the FPCL. If this proposal was agreed, all 
the companies would seek a further approval for a JFS from China’s government, since 
the original JFS did not include the production of PX (Chemical News & Intelligence 
24.12.03). 
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The FPCL, ExxonMobil and Saudi ARAMCO pushed the progress of the project by 
signing two agreements on August 26, 2004. In the first agreement, the companies agreed 
to jointly finance a front-end loading (FEL) design. Under the FEL, these companies had 
to carry out a series of activities, for example ‘completing initial engineering and design, 
selecting contractors, finalizing cost estimates and the development of the pre-ordering of 
long-lead time equipment’ (Business Wire 26.08.04). The second agreement dealt with a 
submission of the JFS to China’s government. The study highlighted the joint venture in 
marketing the oil products from this integrated plant (China Energy Report Weekly 
27.08.04). 
 
In July 2005, Saudi ARAMCO, ExxonMobil and the FPCL signed an accord on a USD 
3.5 billion venture (The New York Times 09.07.05) and began the construction. In this 
integrated project, the existing refining facilities which were located at Quangang (in 
Quanzhou city) and were owned by the FPCL would be expanded. The new refinery 
would be able to process sour crude mostly from Saudi Arabia. An additional complex 
would be built during this expansion, and it consisted mainly of ‘800,000 tonnes per year 
ethylene steam cracker, polyethylene and polypropylene units, and a 700,000 tonnes per 
year of paraxylene unit’ (Oil & Gas Journal 06.09.04). The development of 
petrochemical facilities seems to have been a positive response to the increasingly 
expanding demand for, and inadequate supply of ethylene in the Chinese market. 
Although the production of ethylene in China exceeded 4 million tons per year, this 
amount was only capable of meeting two-thirds of the Chinese ethylene market demand 
(Xinhua Economic News Service 12.12.01).  
 
The heads of the companies who attended the ‘foundation stone-laying ceremony’ of this 
project in July 2005 gave encouraging comments on this achievement. They had, they 
said, a strong belief that this project would be very successful and that it would bring 
huge benefits to Fujian’s economy and all participating companies. For Saudi ARAMCO 
and ExxonMobil, this achievement motivated them to widen their engagement in China’s 
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energy sector. The President and Chief Executive Officer of Saudi ARAMCO, Abdallah 
S. Jum’ah, expressed the readiness of Saudi ARAMCO to enhance its cooperation with 
China in the energy sector (Xinhua General News Service 12.07.05). The President of 
Sinopec, Wang Tianpu, identified the remarkable advantage that these three companies 
could reap from this project: ‘The advanced technology, reasonable product portfolio and 
robust market demand within Fujian Province will ensure a competitive success for our 
three-party joint venture’ (China Daily 09.07.05). The Senior Vice President of 
ExxonMobil, E.G. Galante, said he was also convinced that his company would retain its 
interest in pursuing business activities in China: ‘ExxonMobil sees the Fujian project as 
“a significant milestone” to continue its business involvement with China in the long 
term’ (China Daily 09.07.05). 
 
Qingdao Refinery Project (Shandong Province) 
The negotiations on the Qingdao refinery project between Sinopec and Saudi ARAMCO, 
mentioned above, began in 1993. At that time, the two companies discussed the 
possibility of a jointly developed refinery in Qingdao. After ten years, a series of 
negotiations had taken place. When asked about the position of Saudi ARAMCO in this 
project, Sinopec officials expressed confident expectations of future cooperation with the 
former. In 2004, the Vice General Manager of Sinopec Group, Wang Jiming, commented 
on Saudi ARAMCO’s response towards the Qingdao project: ‘They are very interested in 
the project ... the negotiations are proceeding smoothly’ (Asia Pulse 19.11.04). The 
expectation for cooperation was raised in 2005 by a senior official of Sinopec Corp., Yan 
Huirong. He said that Saudi ARAMCO would give its cooperation in building the 
refinery in Qingdao city (Shandong province). 
 
The project received some investment from local companies, namely Sinopec Corp., 
Shandong International Trust Investment Company and Qingdao International Trust 
Investment Company. With an estimated investment of USD 1.17 billion, this project was 
expected to produce 10 million tons per year of refined products (China Energy Report 
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Weekly 28.01.05). Qingdao refinery plant was intended to refine Saudi Arab Light and 
Arab Medium grades (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 29.11.04) 
 
Gas Exploration in Rub’ Al-Khali 
A new momentum was observed after 2001 in Saudi Arabia’s natural gas sector. The 
Kingdom, for the first time, welcomed overseas companies to explore and invest in the 
natural gas resource for the benefit of its economy. This initiative was crucial to Saudi 
Arabia, in the sense that it promised huge economic benefits and an acceleration of 
economic reform. It had to be able to cope with the highest per capita gas consumption in 
the world. The data released by Saudi ARAMCO highlighted the level of this 
consumption, in which Saudi Arabia had ‘the highest per capita gas utilisation rate in the 
world at 246 cubic feet a day per person’ (MEED Quarterly Report – Saudi Arabia 
18.03.03). The need for foreign investment in the Saudi gas sector was stressed by Oil 
Minister Ali al-Naimi. He said that the country needed such investment because it wanted 
‘to increase gas production and meet development requirements, to diversify income 
sources by making gas and associated products available to various industries, to create 
more employment opportunities ... and to support the efforts of Saudi contractors and 
suppliers’ (Al-Bawaba 09.03.04). 
 
To satisfy these needs, Saudi Arabia gradually opened its upstream activities of non-
associated gas exploration to foreign consortiums, covering different areas of Rub’ Al-
Khali. In March 2004, Saudi ARAMCO signed upstream gas agreements with three 
foreign firms. One of these firms was Sinopec, the second-largest oil company in China. 
The agreement for the JV was signed by the Saudi Oil Minister (Al-Naimi), the President 
of Sinopec (Wang Jiming), and the Chairman of Saudi ARAMCO. Saudi ARAMCO had 
20 percent of the stake and the rest was held by Sinopec (note: China’s company was the 
largest stakeholder in the joint venture). Sinopec was given a contract to explore and 
develop ‘natural gas and gas condensate deposits’ in Contract Area B of the North Rub’ 
Al-Khali (40,000 squares km), located in the south of the Kingdom. For a period of ten 
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years, the first phase was expected to cost USD 300 million. Among the activities that 
were involved in this phase were the well drillings and seismic surveys (Xinhua General 
News Service 07.03.04). 
 
Petrochemical Projects in Liaoning Province  
Chinese and Saudi companies also pursued their quest for new investment opportunities 
and cooperation in downstream petrochemical production in north-eastern China. In 
2005, JVs in two petrochemical projects in Liaoning province were still being negotiated 
(Chemical News & Intelligence 26.09.05).  
 
The first project was the construction of a PVC–VCM complex in the Shuangdao Bay 
Chemical Industry Park, located in Liaoning province. This project, for which approval 
was sought from the State Development Planning Commission in 2001, was expected to 
produce 490,000 tons of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM), and 500,000 tons of polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC) (China Business 16.03.02).  In 2003, SABIC was still studying the 
proposed investment for this project. A year later, the project was reviewed by the 
China’s National Development and Reform Commission. In 2005, Dalian Shide was still 
discussing with SABIC the possibility of concluding a JV for the project (Chemical Week 
24.08.05). In this project, SABIC could become one of the shareholders and would 
supply ethylidene dichloride to this plant. Another project in Liaoning which SABIC was 
also considering investing in was a ‘300,000 tonne/year Panjin Ethylene Industry Corp’s 
(PEIC) cracker expansion project’ (Chemical News & Intelligence 26.09.05).  
 
Petrochemical Project in Yanbu Industrial City 
Another achievement of Saudi and Chinese companies was a petrochemical project in 
Yanbu Industrial City in Saudi Arabia. On September 14, 2005, a JV was reached 
between SABIC, Sinopec and Aker Kvaerner (a Norwegian company). Aker Kvaener and 
Sinopec would be involved in ‘the engineering, procurement and construction’ of two 
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plants: a linear low-density polyethylene (LLDPE) plant that would use SABIC’s 
polyethylene technology, and a polypropylene (PP) plant that would benefit from Dow 
Chemical’s Unipol technology. These plants were the core sections of the ethylene and 
propylene manufacturing complex located in Yanbu Industrial City in Saudi Arabia. 
Other elements that were agreed in this JV were ‘the supply and construction of shared 
offsite product handling facilities’ (Al-Bawaba 15.09.05). The company that designed 
this project was Yanbu National Petrochemical Co. (YanSab), a new subsidiary of 
SABIC. 
 
This project was expected to begin its operations in April 2008. As had been proposed, 
these plants would produce ‘1.3 million tpa of Ethylene; 400,000 tpa of Propylene; 
500,000 tpa of High Density Polyethylene (HDPE); 700,000 tpa of Mono Ethylene 
Glycol (MEG); and 250,000 tpa of Benzene, Xylene and Toluene compound’(Al-Bawaba 
15.09.05). 
 
This project offered two main advantages to SABIC. First, SABIC’s capability to meet 
the need of the regional petrochemical industries would be enhanced. There was currently 
a strong and rapid demand for petrochemical products in Asia, in particular in the South 
East Asian market. Ensuring this critical development, SABIC’s Vice President for 
Polyolefins, Abdulrahman al-Ubaid, stressed that: ‘Recognizing the rising demand for 
petrochemical products in Asia, SABIC is expanding its operations in the Middle East to 
meet this demand' (Middle East Company News Wire 27.04.05). Second, SABIC’s 
aspiration to lift its global competitiveness and world ranking would be achieved. SABIC 
was expected to lead the world production of ethylene glycol as soon as this project was 
completed. At the time, SABIC was ranked as the second-largest producer of this product 
(Middle East Company News Wire 24.07.05).  
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5.4.1.6 China’s Involvement in the Construction Activities in Saudi Arabia 
Construction activity is another form of economic engagement between the companies of 
the two countries. In the 1990s, construction activities that involved both parties were 
minimal. These activities, however, became more seriously considered in the 2000s. The 
involvement of Chinese companies in Saudi construction activities grew. The assessment 
which follows will focus on the involvement of Chinese companies in the construction 
sector of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Railway Construction Contracts in Saudi Arabia    
Railway construction in Saudi Arabia involved, in part, the development of 
approximately 945 kilometres of railway line linking Riyadh and Jeddah. Upon 
completion, this project would be linked to the existing railway line between Riyadh and 
Dammam. The construction of a 115-kilometre railway line between Dammam and Jubail 
was a further part of this project (Arab News 08.02.02). All of these lines would be used 
for transferring goods from the Jeddah Islamic Port to the eastern part of the country.   
 
The railway project required cooperation with foreign companies due to the limited 
capability of local firms. Seeking business alliances with overseas firms was seen as an 
effective approach to pull together the expertise and technology related to the project. 
According to the General Manager of LAM Co., Saleh Mutabbakani, ‘Major construction 
companies in the Kingdom lack the necessary expertise in building railway projects, and 
this called for inviting foreign firms to do the work’ (Arab News 08.02.02). In 2002, 
LAM Co. (a Saudi firm) and the China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation 
(CCECC) signed an MoU for partnership in the bidding contract for the development of a 
railway line in Saudi Arabia. The CCECC was a state-owned company and was known 
for its expertise in building railway lines in China. It was the core partner of the LAM 
Co. For bidding purposes, LAM Co. had already concluded agreements with three other 
companies, from Germany, Austria and Canada. The cost of the project was estimated at 
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USD 2.7 billion and would link the eastern and western parts of the country (Arab News 
08.02.02). 
 
Construction of Processing Facilities in Saudi Arabian Cement Industry  
The cement industry was an important component of the Saudi manufacturing sector. Its 
development was rapid and strong in the first few years of the 2000s. In 2003, for 
instance, the cement industry earned SR 2.5 billion in profits, a surge of 12 percent from 
2002. This industry also underwent a huge demand in cement due to the development of 
new infrastructures in the country (Saudi Press Agency 26.03.05).  The figures of 2003 
showed that the domestic demand for cement amounted to 22.2 million tonnes, an 
increase of 9.3 percent from 20.3 million tonnes in 2002 (Patrick and James 2004). This 
situation, to some extent, welcomed the engagement of foreign construction firms in the 
Saudi cement industry. 
 
The participation of Chinese companies in the construction activities of the Saudi cement 
industry was considerable. In 2004 and 2005, the Chinese companies won four 
construction contracts. They acquired big projects that were worth hundreds of millions 
of  dollars in different locations in the country. With these contracts, the capability of 
Chinese companies to use their skills, expertise and technology in Saudi cement projects 
became apparent. 
 
In 2004, China’s Sinoma International Engineering Co. Ltd. won a 24-month 
construction contract worth USD 240 million. Sinoma would build a new clinker plant in 
al-Moujarada (north of Abha) with a production capacity of 5,500 tonnes per day (Middle 
East Economic Digest 29.10.04). There were also other elements to this contract: ‘a 56-
MW, diesel-fuelled captive power plant, a reverse osmosis (RO) desalination unit and 
sewage treatment and related facilities’ (Middle East Economic Digest 29.10.04). In 
Saudi Arabia, this was the first Greenfield cement project that was given to a Chinese 
company. 
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In March 2005, China’s Sinoma International Engineering Co. Ltd. won another USD 
296 million (SR 1.035 billion) contract to construct a cement plant in Muzamiyah for a 
period of 26 months. This contract was signed between the Chairman of the Riyadh 
Cement Company (RCC), Prince Faisal bin Abdul Majeed, and Sinoma Chief Executive 
Officer, Wang Wei. In the plan, this plant would be able to produce ‘5,000 tons of clinker 
cement per day’ (Saudi Press Agency 26.03.05).  
 
In July 2005, the China Material International Corporation signed a contract for a third 
cement production line in Saudi Arabia. This production line was expected to produce 
5,000 tons per day. The worth of the contract was USD 165 million and construction 
would be completed in 23 months. The location of this project was in Marat. The Chinese 
company would have more than ‘900 management, technical and construction staff’ in 
this project, all from China. 70 percent of the equipment used in the production line was 
made in China (InfoProd 27.07.05).  
 
In December 2005, a USD 580 million contract was signed between Sinoma International 
Engineering Co. Ltd. and Saudi Cement Co. (SCC). In this deal, two cement production 
lines would be built in Hufuf, one of the cities in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia 
(Business Daily Update 20.12.05).  
 
5.4.2 Sino-Saudi Relations in 2006 to 2010 
From 2006 to 2010, the political and economic relationships between China and Saudi 
Arabia were successfully and highly developed. The establishment of these relationships 
began to take off following the exchange of visits between the leaders of the two 
countries in 2006. In an effort to intensify bilateral economic ties, concepts such as 
‘natural strategic trading partner’ and ‘friendly and cooperative strategic partnership’ 
emerged. The remarkable growth of the total trade volume between the two nations 
reflected the effectiveness of these concepts. The introduction of the multiple concepts 
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showed that China had seriously attempted to broaden and refine its shared understanding 
with Saudi Arabia. A profound shared understanding was expected to effectively and 
meaningfully maximize the use of resources between the two countries.  
 
In the matter of investment, the success of the Sino-Saudi joint ventures in the 
hydrocarbon sector are two in China (Quangzhou and Tianjin) and one in Saudi Arabia 
(gas exploration in Rub’ Al-Khali). There are two joint investments which have not yet 
been finally agreed. Mutual investments in non-hydrocarbon sector, such as the mining 
sector, have expanded drastically. The same trend has also occurred with Chinese 
construction activities in Saudi Arabia.  
 
In analysing a theoretical conception of complex interdependence, the three 
characteristics – multiple channels, a minimal role of military force, and an absence of 
hierarchy among issues – were clearly identified in the Sino-Saudi relations over the 
2006-2010 period. The interactions between the Chinese and Saudi governments were 
closer and more complex after the exchange visits of the two leaders in 2006. A donation 
of USD 50 million in cashes to the Sichuan province in 2008 was one of the examples. 
Transnational organizations such as Saudi ARAMCO, SABIC, Sinopec and Sinoma 
International Engineering Co., Ltd., markedly increased their role as the most important 
actors in the Sino-Saudi economic ties.  The role of military force in the bilateral relations 
was irrelevant. The two countries did not form a military alliance, and Saudi Arabia did 
not rely on China for the purchasing of its military equipment. China also had no 
intention of becoming a rival power that could challenge the US power in the Middle 
Eastern region. The devaluation of military force in the Sino-Saudi relation indicated an 
absence of hierarchy among issues. The military concern was impractical, whereas the 
economic concern was prominent in the interstate agenda of the two countries. The 
achievement of mutual investment in refining and petrochemical projects as well as 
Chinese construction activities in Saudi Arabia showed a high preponderance of 
economic interests on the agenda. 
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5.4.2.1 Proliferating Sino-Saudi Relations through Personal Contact between 
Leaders 
The leaders and officials of the two countries continued to have regular visits and 
meetings to promote bilateral relations. King Abdullah’s visit to China in 2006 gave a 
new spirit to this relationship and led to the formation of more agreements, as well as 
further contact and meetings. With the visions and missions of these leaders and officials 
in consolidating the relations of the two nations, this period marked an advanced level in 
regards to the Beijing-Riyadh bilateral link. 
 
The three-day state visit of King Abdullah to China, starting on January 23, 2006, was a 
sign of a new phase in the Riyadh-Beijing relationship. This phase was characterized by 
the warm personal relationship between the leaders of the two countries, and in the 
special position that China had attained in Saudi foreign policy. China was the first 
foreign country the King visited after taking the throne in 2005. Moreover, he was  the 
first Saudi King ever to visit the country. 
 
A line of comprehensive strategies aimed to forge a close and resilient relationship 
between the two countries was proposed. What made these strategies so significant was 
that they embraced aspects of politics, economics, society and culture, and provided a 
clear direction for the future development of the Sino-Saudi relationship. Of all these 
strategies, the most crucial one was China’s earnest interest in the matter of energy. 
During King Abdullah’s visit to China, President Hu Jintao put forward four strategies to 
enhance bilateral relations (Xinhua General News Service 23.01.06). The first strategy 
was the advancement of mutual trust and bilateral political ties. China and Saudi Arabia 
were to continue their high-level contacts, promote close consultation, encourage mutual 
support in order to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity, and work together in 
facilitating international and regional issues. The second strategy was the expansion of 
energy cooperation for mutual benefit, and the third strategy entailed the strengthening of 
trade and economic cooperation overall. Bilateral cooperation would be reinforced in 
different sectors, including those of ‘telecommunications, finance and investment’. The 
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fourth strategy was to enhance cultural exchange and friendship. China would boost 
exchanges of ‘education, science, technology and press’ with the Kingdom and 
encourage dialogue on different civilizations (Xinhua General News Service 23.01.06). In 
a meeting with King Abdullah, President Hu extolled the dynamic of the Sino-Saudi 
relationship, which, he said was based on the win-win principle and a pragmatic 
approach. 
 
The King’s visit resulted in the conclusion of five agreements, which fell within the areas 
of cooperation envisaged by the four strategies mentioned earlier. The agreement related 
to energy; technical, trade and economic collaboration; vocational training; tax evasion 
and dual taxation; and a loan by the Saudi Development Bank to Aksu city in Xinjiang 
Province, where the Muslim population was the majority (Wall Street Journal 24.01.06). 
The aim of this loan was to develop and improve the facilities in Aksu. 
 
During the King’s visit, several meetings between high-ranking officials were arranged. 
Much of the discussions between these officials reflected their concerns with the 
development of Sino-Saudi ties and the need to realize the leaders’ stances. There was 
also a discussion between Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz and Ismail Amat, 
Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The main 
item on the agenda of the meeting was the bilateral relation between both nations. There 
was no specific defence agenda identified at this meeting. China’s Foreign Minister, Li 
Zhaoxing, held a meeting with Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal. The two ministers agreed to 
implement the joint efforts and the ‘directive and identical stands’ of their leaders. 
Minister Li conveyed the desire of China’s government to establish Sino-Saudi ties to 
exemplify good South-South relations (Saudi Press Agency 23.01.06).  
 
The high-ranking officials of the two countries had promising views on the cooperation 
and position of China and Saudi Arabia at the international level. For China’s ambassador 
to the Kingdom, H.E. Mr. Wu Chunhua, cooperation at an international level 
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consolidated the bilateral links. His statement was complemented by the view of the 
newly appointed Saudi Ambassador to China, H.E. Mr. Saleh al-Hegelan, who 
ascertained that a close link between Beijing and Riyadh would bolster the political clout 
of both countries in the international arena. Ambassador Saleh al-Hegelan, stated, ‘the 
closer contacts and cooperation between the two countries will surely exert a great 
influence on international society’ (Xinhua General News Service 20.01.06). Ambassador 
Wu Chunhua, noted that the lack of fundamental conflict, the sharing of common will, 
and the practice of reciprocal cooperation deepened the Beijing-Riyadh relationship. 
Cooperation also appeared in the context of regional and international issues. Mutual 
support on anti-terrorism, moreover, had furthered the bilateral links. 
 
Several meetings among high-ranking officials further signified a consistent effort of the 
two countries to bolster, deepen and expand their friendship. Because of these meetings, 
the officials appeared to be enthusiastic and committed to the effort to intensify the 
bilateral link. They seemed to realise that the current development of Sino-Saudi relations 
had to strengthen and advance. A few weeks before the state visit of President Hu Jintao 
to Saudi Arabia in 2006, the Secretary-General of the Saudi National Security Council, 
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, met China’s Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, in Beijing. The 
meeting was partly for making  arrangements regarding the President’s visit, and partly 
for an articulation of their political allegiance towards a close bilateral relation. The 
Chinese Foreign Minister called for an increase in exchanges and political mutual trust 
with the Kingdom in order to foster and deepen the friendship (Xinhua General News 
Service 29.03.06). On this visit, Prince Bandar also held a discussion with China’s 
Premier, Wen Jiabao. Although the objectives of Prince Bandar’s meeting with Chinese 
leaders were not evident, they could have served as part of an effort to heighten relations 
between the two nations. 
 
President Hu Jintao arrived in Saudi Arabia on April 22 at the invitation of King 
Abdullah exactly three months after the King’s visit to China. The President’s three-day 
state visit occurred after his visit to the US. President Hu Jintao conveyed China’s 
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readiness to build strategic cooperation with the Kingdom (Xinhua General News Service 
24.04.06). There were two reasons, he said, for China’s enthusiasm for advancing 
strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia. The first stemmed from the Kingdom’s vital role 
as a state within the Middle East: Saudi Arabia had made a significant contribution to the 
peace and stability of the region, called for the unity of the Arab world, and encouraged 
integration within the Gulf area (Xinhua General News Service 24.04.06). The second 
concerned the commonalities between the two nations. Both were developing countries 
and major powers in their regions; both had been concentrating on national economic 
growth and fostering peace in the world; and both shared similar positions on most world 
issues. 
 
International Relations scholars and observers have been arguing about the term 
‘strategic cooperation’, a concept to which China’s leaders have frequently alluded. 
Within the context of the Sino-Saudi relations, the term does not denote security relations 
but common political and economic agendas. China requires Saudi Arabia’s political 
leverage in preserving the stability of the region because such stability is necessary in 
order for China to pursue its economic interests.  
 
Sino-Saudi relations received the full and constant attention of the Saudi King. 
Describing China as the Kingdom’s special friend, the King strove to preserve the 
friendship formed between the two countries. The King, moreover, was very pleased with 
the smooth development of the bilateral link. On January 22, 2008, King Abdullah met 
General Cao Gangchuan, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the PRC 
and Defence, in Riyadh. King Abdullah described the friendship as mutually beneficial,  
‘win-win’, and good for the Chinese and Saudi people (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 
24.01.08).  In a meeting with China’s envoy to the Middle East, Sun Bigan, in April 2008 
in Riyadh, King Abdullah described China as ‘the most precious friend’ of the Kingdom 
(Xinhua General News Service 01.04.08). Sun Bigan expressed his appreciation of King 
Abdullah’s attachment to the Sino-Saudi relationship. Both leaders also expressed their 
hope for an advancement of bilateral contact.  
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The reaction to the May 12, 2008 earthquake disaster in Sichuan province provided some 
evidence of the deepening friendship between the two countries. Apart from the 
generosity of Saudi Arabia, an immediate action of offering the material support implied 
the Kingdom’s deep concern for the Chinese people. The Kingdom made a donation of 
USD 50 million in cash, and USD 10 million in relief equipment, which China would 
allocate to the rebuilding of schools and hospitals. In May 2008, ‘4,000 tents and 
blankets, instant food, milk powder for children and rescue tools’ were also received as 
part of the Saudi donation to the victims of the earthquake. The Saudi donation was 
divided between ‘the Southwest Sichuan Province and Chongqing Municipality, and the 
Northwest Gansu and Shaanxi Provinces’. Among other countries that made donations 
was the United Kingdom, which provided USD 4 million for earthquake relief, including 
5,000 tents for the victims (Xinhua General News Service 27.05.08).  
 
A few weeks later, China’s president and his officials thanked the Saudi King and his 
people. China  truly appreciated the assistance offered by the Kingdom. In June 2008, 
through a telephone call to King Abdullah, President Hu conveyed his ‘sincere 
appreciation’ to the King, the Saudi government, and people for assistance given to the 
people in the earthquake area of Sichuan. President Hu delivered this appreciation on 
behalf of China’s government and its people. In the same month, China’s Vice President 
Xi Jinping met with King Abdullah and Crown Prince Sultan in Jeddah and expressed his 
gratitude to the King for the Saudi donation to the victims of earthquake (Xinhua General 
News Service 23.06.08).  
 
The Saudi and Chinese leaders persistently delivered positive statements concerning the 
bilateral relationship. These assertions were crucial; not only did they act as gestures of 
significant and strong goodwill between the two countries, they also implied that these 
countries were enjoying the fruits of such a relationship. China’s Vice President, Xi 
Jinping, emphasized China’s stand in placing ‘great importance’ on the Sino-Saudi 
relationship. There had been, as he described, ‘a smooth development’ in this relationship 
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since the visits between President Hu and King Abdullah in 2006. King Abdullah 
continued to stress that the relationship between the two nations was based on a solid 
foundation. The Kingdom valued the ‘friendly policy’ and traditional friendship of China. 
The King also accentuated the Kingdom’s stand on respecting and having more dialogue 
in dealing with different civilizations (Xinhua Economic News Service 22.06.08). Crown 
Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud also met with China’s Vice President on this 
occasion and stressed that the people in Saudi Arabia had ‘deep friendly feelings’ for the 
people of China (Xinhua General News Service 02.01.08). 
 
In the 1980s, Prince Bandar had been one of the ‘match-makers’ between his country and 
China. Now in the 2000s, he seems to have become a ‘booster’ of close links between 
Beijing and Riyadh. The meetings of the Prince and Chinese officials signified the efforts 
to sustain the closeness and intimacy between the two countries. During the Olympic 
Games in 2008, China’s Vice President and Prince Bandar bin Sultan took the 
opportunity to convey their views on Sino-Saudi relations. There was also a meeting 
between Prince Bandar and Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee.  
 
Saudi Ambassador to China Yahya bin Abdul Kareem was reflecting on how the world 
event and natural disaster had impacted Sino-Saudi relations. The ambassador said that 
the Kingdom shared China’s ‘weal and woe’, which meant the sharing of China’s success 
in the Beijing Olympic Games as well as the suffering brought about by the earthquake 
disaster. During an interview with Xinhua, the ambassador stressed that through the 
Olympic Games, people in the Kingdom had learned of the ‘indomitable spirit’ and 
constant struggle of China’s people. When the ambassador conveyed the concern of 
people in Saudi Arabia for China, the psychological attachment became a significant 
element in the relationship. 
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The leaders and officials of both countries believed that the next generation would 
continue and expand the development of a close Sino-Saudi relationship. While working 
to cultivate the seed of such a relationship for the future generation, the Chinese leader 
seemed to contend that the link between China and Saudi Arabia should be inherited. 
Three years after his first visit to Saudi Arabia, President Hu made another trip to the 
Kingdom, in February 2009 (Xinhua General News Service 10.02.09).  Saudi ARAMCO 
invited 12 children from China to be part of this visit. The presence of  these children, 
who would spend time communicating with Saudi children, was a symbolic gesture for 
the Sino-Saudi relationship. Ambassador Yahya bin Abdul Kareem commented, 
‘Children are the future of any people in the world and the basis and future of the Sino-
Saudi friendly relationship also rest with these children. We hope they will advance and 
deepen the current friendly cooperative ties in healthy development’ (Xinhua General 
News Service 10.02.09). 
 
In a meeting with King Abdullah, the President viewed Sino-Saudi relations as having 
rapidly developed and attained ‘an all-time high’ since the exchange visits of both leaders 
in 2006. The President called for the development of ‘strategic friendly’ relations 
between the two countries. (Note: In his 2006 visit to Saudi Arabia, President Hu Jintao 
had called for ‘a strategic cooperation’ between the countries). Six elements for the 
formation of strategic friendly relations were presented:  
 
(1) Setting up ‘a high-level consultation mechanism’ and maintaining 
high-level visits  
(2) Benefiting from each country’s own resources and markets, and 
bolstering energy partnership and bilateral investment  
(3) Improving the cooperation level and expanding economic and trade 
cooperation  
(4) Increasing exchanges in ‘education, sports, tourism, and personal 
contact’  
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(5) Intensifying coordination in responding to the core issues of the region, 
and ensuring peace and stability  
(6) Fostering China-GCC cooperation (States News Service 11.02.09)  
 
While promoting its close relations with Saudi Arabia, China modified the term ‘strategic 
cooperation’ to ‘strategic friendly relations’. There were two reasons for this.  First, 
China tended to avoid any miscalculation of its interest in the Middle East. China was 
neither an outside power that sought military alliance nor was it a rival power that could 
challenge US predominance in the region. On the other hand, China was a foreign power 
that sought business partners in expanding its economic leverage and extending mutual 
economic benefits to Middle Eastern countries. Second, China had become aware of the 
implications of using the term ‘strategic cooperation’, which would create uneasiness 
with the US, the only Western superpower left in the region that had a long-established 
‘strategic partnership’ with Saudi Arabia. This attitude was evident when referring to 
China’s ‘unusual step of assuring’ the US that no alliance had been formed with the 
Kingdom. Thus, no alliance that would threaten Washington’s interests had been formed 
(Cheow 2006). 
 
Since the exchange visits of the leaders in 2006, positive changes and marked 
improvement in the bilateral relations of the two countries had been identified and 
acknowledged, and the leaders were content with this improvement. In January 2010, 
China’s Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, who met King Abdullah in Riyadh, characterized 
the relations as a ‘comprehensive, fast and in-depth development’.  The factors that lay 
behind this development were a deepening ‘mutual trust’, an improved cooperation 
regarding various aspects, ‘a close coordination’ in dealing with the international and 
regional issues, and the role of President Hu Jintao and King Abdullah in driving the 
relationship toward ‘a strategic and friendly’ level. King Abdullah himself described the 
bilateral relations as improving especially in the aspects of ‘political mutual trust, 
economic and trade collaborations and cultural exchanges.’  
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5.4.2.2 Accentuating ‘A Friendly and Cooperative Strategic Partnership’ in 
Economic Ties 
The focus of this section will begin with an analysis of the importance of the concepts of 
‘natural strategic trading partner’ and ‘friendly and cooperative strategic partnership’ in 
relation to the bilateral economic links. It attempts to assess how the Saudi and Chinese 
officials elicited these concepts and the economic development that subsequently ensued. 
The analysis will then cover the development of trade relations between the two 
countries. The tremendous amount of the bilateral trade required the countries to set a 
higher target of total trade volume between them.  By comparing with the period from 
2001 to 2005, the total trade volume also experienced an upward march. The Saudi and 
Chinese high-level officials continued to call for an extensive and active participation of 
the business communities in the bilateral trade activities. To facilitate the trade 
engagements, the governments established an institution and a non-governmental joint 
commercial committee. 
 
China and Saudi Arabia needed to establish ‘a friendly and cooperative strategic 
partnership’ for the bilateral economic link because the two countries had been 
economically serving each other as ‘natural strategic trading partners’.  Chief Executive 
Officer of SABIC, Mohamed al-Mady, stressed why China and Saudi Arabia were 
considered ‘natural strategic trading partners’. China had been experiencing tremendous 
economic growth, while Saudi Arabia possessed a tremendous hydrocarbon reserve. 
Consequently, as a natural strategic trading partner, China benefited from the export of 
manufactured goods, while the Kingdom sought to benefit from the exportation of energy 
products (Middle East Company News Wire 07.05.08). Al-Mady identified three factors 
that bolstered the Sino-Saudi economic engagement as ‘a natural strategic trading 
partner’. First, was underpinning of this economic tie by cooperative political ties. 
Second, the geographic location of the partners permitted an economic pathway for two-
way trade (Middle East Company News Wire 07.05.08). Third, the world economic drive 
had shifted to the East.  Al-Mady claimed that this new trend in the global economy was 
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based on statistical data of economic growth and trade balance.  He provided evidence of 
this when stating, ‘China alone has been experiencing GDP growth of 10-12% for a 
number of years and experienced a positive trade balance of $265bn in 2007’ (Middle 
East Company News Wire 07.05.08).  
 
In recognizing the importance of ‘a natural trading partnership’, the two countries began 
to transform the economic and trade cooperation into ‘a friendly and cooperative strategic 
partnership’. To build this partnership, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping proposed two 
mechanisms during a Seminar on China-Saudi Economy and Trade in Jeddah in June 
2008. The first step was to draft a good plan for this partnership, and the second involved 
defining the role of Chinese and Saudi business circles, which served as ‘a bridge of 
friendship’ between the two nations. In this role, these business groups had to ensure that 
the bilateral economic and trade ties continued to expand. In promoting such expansion, 
Vice President Xi Jinping suggested three mechanisms: ‘adhering to friendly cooperation 
based on mutual respect and sincerity; striving for win-win cooperation characterized by 
mutual benefit; and reciprocity and common development and going for innovation and 
blazing new trails in further cooperation’ (Xinhua General News Service 22.06.08).  
However, there was some lack of clarity concerning to what extent the idea of ‘friendly 
and cooperative strategic partnership’ had been implemented. 
 
Two developments demonstrated the significance of such a partnership in the Sino-Saudi 
economic and trade links. The first was the global financial crisis. During the crisis 
period, the heads of states urged an increase of cooperation, the boosting of trade and 
investments, and the cooperative prevention of financial risk. This issue was discussed 
during President Hu Jintao’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2009. King Abdullah stressed the 
Kingdom’s willingness to further cooperation in trade, economic and other areas, and to 
exchange opinions related to global issues. Both leaders agreed to have close discussions 
on global financial reforms (Xinhua General News Service 10.02.09).  
 
307 
 
Second, was the unprecedented achievement of Chinese-Saudi commercial ties from 
2008 to 2010. The two countries proposed a new target for bilateral trade volume after 
the previous target had been well met: the bilateral trade target of USD 40 billion in 2010 
had been already achieved in 2008 (Xinhua General News Service 10.01.10). Therefore, 
at the Fourth Meeting of the Joint Committee on Economy and Trade held in Riyadh in 
January 2010, the China’s Minister of Commerce, Chen Deming, and Saudi Minister of 
Finance, Ibrahim bin Abdel Aziz al-Assaf, agreed on a new target for the Sino-Saudi 
bilateral commercial link. The new target was an increasing of the trade volume between 
both countries by 50 percent over the next five years (2015). Minister Chen Deming 
announced, ‘We want to increase the trade volume to $60 billion by 2015 after the target 
for 2010 of $40 billion was surpassed early in 2008,’ (Qatar News Agency 11.01.10). In 
this meeting, China also announced that Saudi Arabia had become its largest trade partner 
in West Asia.  
 
Table 5.10 and Graph 5.10 provide statistical data of Beijing-Riyadh exports and imports 
between 2006 and 2009. The total volume of Sino-Saudi trade reflects an upward trend in 
the years from 2006 to 2008. The highest total volume of trade was in 2008, with a value 
of USD 41.8 billion. This volume (USD 41.8 billion) was almost three times that of the 
highest total volume recorded in the years between 2001 and 2005 (the highest total 
volume was in 2005, with a value of USD 16.1 billion). A dramatic increase in China’s 
exports to and imports from the Kingdom also occurred in 2008 in which exports and 
imports rose by 38 percent and 77 percent respectively. In 2009, the exports and imports 
showed significant decline, falling by 22.6 percent and 19 percent respectively. The 
concept of ‘friendly and cooperative strategic partnership’ which had been introduced in 
2008 seemed to carry no positive effect on the volume of these exports and imports.  
 
From 2006 to 2009, China ran a huge trade deficit with Saudi Arabia, totalling at USD 55 
billion, as compared to USD 19.3 billion in the period of 2001 to 2005. The annual 
average of this USD 55 billion trade deficit was USD 14 billion. This trade deficit varied: 
it declined by 3 percent in 2007, raised to 107.8 percent in 2008, and dropped by 27.5 
308 
 
percent in 2009. The largest trade deficit was in 2008, climbing to USD 20.1 billion. One 
factor that shaped this trend was a sharp increase in global oil prices (Table 5.10 and 
Graph 5.10). 
 
Table 5.10: China’s Exports to and Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2006-2009 (US 
Dollars)  
 Exports Imports Balance of Trade Total Volume of 
Trade 
2006 5,055,833,989 15,084,532,094 -10,028,691,000 20,140,366,083 
2007 7,839,958,562 17,560,475,696 -9,720,517,128 25,400,434,258 
2008 10,823,467,968 31,022,697,923 -20,199,229,960 41,846,165,891 
2009 8,977,851,553 23,620,243,562 -14,642,392,010 32,598,095,115 
Source: United Nations Statistic Division 
 
Graph 5.10: China’s Exports to and Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2006-2009 (USD) 
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From 2006 to May 2008, ‘Textiles and Their Raw Materials’ (the raw materials included 
wool, cotton, silk and synthetic fibres) retained its dominance in China’s total exports to 
the Kingdom by 26 per cent. The second and third of the major exports were ‘Machinery, 
Equipment, Audio and Video Products and Parts’, and ‘Cheap Metals and Products’ 
accordingly. In the same period, the second major export constituted 23 per cent and the 
third major export made up 16 per cent of these exports (Table 5.11 and Chart 5.11).  
 
The same trend had already appeared from 2001 to 2005 in which the ‘Textile and Their 
Raw Materials’ led China’s total exports to Saudi Arabia by 34 percent. ‘Machinery, 
Equipment, Audio and Video Products and Parts’ and ‘Cheap Metals and Products’ 
served China’s  second and third major exports to Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 5.11: China’s Major Exports to Saudi Arabia, 2006- May 2008 (1,000 USD) 
 Total 
Exports 
Textiles and 
Their Raw 
Materials 
Machinery, 
Equipment, 
Audio and 
Video Products 
and Parts 
Cheap 
Metals 
and 
Products 
Miscellaneous 
Goods 
Plastic, 
Rubber 
and Their 
Products 
2006 5,055,729 1,271,795 1,168,104 822,347 383,229 224,471 
2007 7,806,963 2,058,281 1,778,707 1,534,483 484,413 322,796 
January – 
May 2008 
3,123,947 608,261 892,322 562,319 215,193 136,906 
Source: Xinhua Economic News Service 
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Graph 5.11: China’s Major Exports to Saudi Arabia, 2006 to May 2008 (1,000 USD) 
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Chart 5.11: China’s Major Exports to Saudi Arabia Relative to Total Exports, 2006 
to May 2008   
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Table 5.12, Graph 5.12 and Chart 5.12 illustrate China’s major imports from Saudi 
Arabia between 2006 and May 2008. Minerals, mainly dominated by crude oil, were a 
leading category in these imports, and surged strongly throughout this period.  In these 29 
months, this category constituted at 81.8 per cent (more than three quarters) of China’s 
total import from the Kingdom. The ‘Chemicals and Related Products’ category was the 
second major import of China from the Kingdom, accounting for 13 percent of the total 
imports. The third major import was ‘Plastic, Rubber and their Products’, which made up 
5.5 percent of China’s total imports from the Kingdom. Overall, the trend of this period 
repeated the development that had occurred from 2001 to 2005, demonstrating the 
dominance of the ‘mineral’ sector over the two other major imports.  
 
Table 5.12: China’s Major Imports from  Saudi Arabia, 2006  to May 2008 (USD 
1,000) 
 Total Imports Minerals Chemicals and 
Related Products 
Plastics, Rubber 
and Their 
Products 
2006 15,084,388 11,995,590 2,017,738 1,044,122 
2007 17,560,201 13,859,885 2,635,613 1,007,933 
January- May 
2008 
11,570,080 10,039,799 1,111,054 392,663 
Source: Xinhua Economic News Service 
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Graph 5.12: China’s Major Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2006 to May 2008 (1,000 
USD) 
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Chart 5.12: China’s Major Imports from Saudi Arabia, 2006 to May 2008 (USD 
1,000) 
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Oil Trade 
The exchange visits of the heads of states in January and April 2006 strengthened the 
energy cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia from 2006 to 2010. These visits led 
to initiatives of the national oil companies to ensure that Saudi oil exports could meet the 
oil demand of the Chinese market. Despite economic turmoil in the late 2000s, these 
companies continued to increase the total volume of oil trade. The figures for Sino-Saudi 
oil trade suggest that soaring Saudi oil exports to China led to the development of oil 
dependency.  The trend of the Sino-Saudi oil trade dealings was not much different from 
the previous five years. The growth of oil trade volume between 2001 and 2005 increased 
significantly, from 8.7 million tons in 2001, to 22.1 million tons in 2005. The government 
officials and the state-owned oil companies remained the major actors of oil trading 
between the two states. 
 
The opening of 2006 witnessed aggressive policies from China and Saudi Arabia 
regarding oil cooperation. As oil demand from China had been increasing, the leaders 
decided to tighten energy cooperation between the countries. When King Abdullah and 
President Hu Jintao met in Beijing on January 23, 2006, the two governments concluded 
an energy protocol. This protocol aimed to extend cooperation in oil, natural gas and 
minerals and served as an important landmark of state-to-state oil cooperation. As a 
Research Director of the Shenzhen-based Guohai Securities Zhu Baohe pointed out, ‘this 
is the first agreement between the two governments on overall cooperation in energy 
sector’ (China Energy Weekly 27.01.06). 
 
There were two factors surrounding the formation of this energy pact. The first was the 
need to assist Chinese oil companies. Sinopec, for example, had witnessed a gradual 
decline of its oil stockpile, which required replenishment. The Middle East was a prime 
location since the majority of Sinopec’s crude oil originated from this region. With the 
signing of this protocol, Sinopec could secure more oil from Saudi Arabia (Xinhua 
Economic News Service 25.01.06). Secondly, the government sought an energy policy 
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that would diversify crude oil suppliers and upgrade refining capacity. For this reason, 
China intensified its effort to secure oil from Saudi Arabia as well as from Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Venezuela. Tapping oil from the countries that had new emerging resources 
was also part of this effort (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 28.08.06).  
 
President Hu Jintao continued to play an active and significant role in pursuing China’s 
energy policy. His three-day state visit to Saudi Arabia in 2006 was not simply about the 
actual pace of China’s energy policy, but also concerned China’s strong interest in 
acquiring more oil from foreign producers. Securing this hydrocarbon resource was vital 
for the country’s oil stockpile. In this visit, the leaders reached an agreement on Chinese 
strategic oil reserve, which meant China could add 2,000 tons of oil per year to its oil 
stockpile (Xinhua Economic News Service 26.04.06).  
 
Following the initiative of President Hu Jintao to secure oil from Saudi Arabia, the oil 
companies of the two countries made efforts to guarantee sufficient and uninterrupted oil 
supply for China. One example of this was the opening of Saudi ARAMCO’s branch in 
Shanghai in 2006. The office that had also aimed to expand Saudi ARAMCO’s operation 
in China would concentrate on ‘product purchasing, manufacturing and contracting’ 
(Middle East and North Africa Financial Network 15.11.06). The efforts of China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation and China National Petroleum Corporation served as 
another example. This company had acquired advanced equipment that could improve its 
refining capacity for processing oil from the Middle East (Sinocast China Business Daily 
News 11.10.07). 
 
The solid cooperation between the two governments and their national oil companies 
proved to be worthwhile in that it produced two positive results: the escalation of Saudi 
crude oil exports to China and the assurance of China’s energy security. At the end of 
2008, China stored 7.3 million barrels of crude oil in its oil stockpiles, located in 
Huangdao Island and Qingdao City. It was claimed that 50 percent of this stock consisted 
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of crude oil from Saudi Arabia (SinoCast  11.12.08). Between 2003 and 2008, China had 
four oil stockpiles, which were located in Zhenhai, Zhoushan, Huangdao and Dalian.  
 
The reinforcement of Sino-Saudi oil trade continued even during the economic crisis. The 
Saudi national oil company planned to boost the volume of oil transactions with China, 
preparing itself for a forthcoming commercial operation of a joint venture project in 
Fujian. In November 2008, the President of Saudi ARAMCO, Abdallah S. Jum’ah, 
announced his company’s plan to increase the volume of oil exports to China. An 
increase from 750,000 bpd to 1 million bpd was to take place in the first quarter of 2009. 
This plan took into consideration the Fujian integrated refining and petrochemical project 
that was scheduled to start its operations at the beginning of 2009 (Sinocast China 
Business Daily News 11.10.07). The economic crisis seemed to have no implication on 
crude oil trade between the two nations, though Abdallah S.Jum’ah stated that the 
Kingdom had already anticipated a decrease in global oil demand due to the prevailing 
economic downturn.   
 
To meet the demand from the Fujian Refinery Plant, Chinese and Saudi oil 
conglomerates maximized the benefits of the existing energy cooperation. Chinese oil 
companies continued increasing the volume of imported oil from Saudi Arabia. This 
trend was significant because it reflected the rising dependency of China on Saudi oil. At 
the end of 2009, Sinopec Corp and PetroChina agreed to increase the purchasing of crude 
oil from Saudi ARAMCO by 12 percent in 2010. This meant that these two China state 
oil companies would import 1.04 million bpd of crude oil from the latter. The Fujian 
refinery plant would consume 200,000 bpd out of this 1.04 million bpd crude oil imports 
(Middle East and North Africa Financial Network 21.11.09). 
 
The president of Saudi ARAMCO said, he was content with the oil trade dealings that the 
Saudi and Chinese oil companies had accomplished.  His statement, to some extent, 
convinced the Chinese oil companies that they were good partners in oil trade 
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cooperation. Therefore, there was a prediction that oil cooperation between these 
companies would be extended. The President stated, ‘we’re very happy with the 
cooperation, and we’re very happy with all the deals that we have done with our friends 
in China. The deals are beneficial for both parties.’ Saudi ARAMCO, having begun its oil 
exports to China in 1990, now constitutes China’s biggest oil supplier. Furthermore, 
Saudi Arabia envisaged that the MoU signed between Sinopec and Saudi ARAMCO in 
2006 would resume even after the contract termination date of 2010.  
 
China became a dependent client of oil from Saudi Arabia. A swelling volume of 
imported oil from the Kingdom reflected the extent to which China had been locking up 
oil from the world’s biggest oil producing country. As Table 5.13 shows, the period of 
2006 to 2009 witnessed an increase of China’s petroleum and crude oil imports from the 
Kingdom. This trade rose by 75 percent, expanding from 23.8 million tons in 2006 to 
41.8 million tons in 2009. The recorded annual average was 19 percent. In this four-year 
period, almost one fifth of China’s oil imports from the world depended on oil imports 
from Saudi Arabia (Chart 5.13). 
 
China’s oil demand from Saudi Arabia from 2006 to 2009 expanded faster than it had 
from 2001 to 2005. Between 2006 and 2009, the purchasing of Saudi oil exceeded the 
amount between 2001 and 2005 by 71.4 percent (53.3 million tons). This record-high 
increase demonstrated the tight energy cooperation between the two countries, Saudi 
Arabia’s heightened role in fulfilling China’s oil thirst, and the indirect contribution of 
the Kingdom in stimulating the growth of China’s economy. 
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Table 5.13: China’s Imports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals, and 
Crude Oil from the World and Saudi Arabia, 2006-2009 (Tonnes) 
 China’s Imports of 
Petroleum Oil, 
Oils from 
Bituminous 
Minerals, Crude 
from the World 
 
China’s Imports of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals, Crude from 
Saudi Arabia 
 
% 
Change 
Percentage of 
China’s Imports 
of Petroleum Oil, 
Oils from 
Bituminous 
Minerals and 
Crude Coming 
from Saudi Arabia 
2006 145,174,839.0 23,871,514.6 8% 16.4% 
2007 163,161,815.0 26,333,689.8 11% 16.1% 
2008 178,885,216.4 36,368,396.2 38% 20.3% 
2009 203,786,208.4 41,857,126.4 15% 20.5% 
Total 691,008,078.8 128,430,727.0 - 18.6% 
Source: United Nations Statistic Division 
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Chart 5.13: China’s Imports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals, 
Crude from the World and Saudi Arabia, 2006-2009  
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China was more reliant on Saudi crude oil than on the rest of its major crude oil sources. 
From 2006 to 2009, Saudi Arabia ranked as the largest provider of oil to China and 
accounted for approximately 34 percent of China’s total oil imports from these major 
sources: Angola (29.2 percent), Iran (21.6 percent) and Russia (15.1 percent) (Table 5.14 
and Chart 5.14). Moreover, China’s dependency on Saudi oil during this period was at 
the same level as it had been from 2001 to 2005. In the latter period, Chinese dependency 
on Saudi oil averaged 34 percent.  
 
Table 5.14: China’s Oil Imports from Major Suppliers, 2006-2009    
(Million Tonnes) 
Source: United Nations Statistic Division 
  
 Saudi 
Arabia 
% 
Change 
Iran % 
Change 
Angola % 
Change 
Russia % 
Change 
2006 23.8 7.6 16.7 17.6 23.4 34.4 15.9 25.1 
2007 26.3 10.5 20.5 22.7 24.9 6.4 14.5 - 8.8 
2008 36.3 38.0 21.3 3.9 29.8 19.6 11.6 - 20.0 
2009 41.8 15.1 23.1 8.4 32.1 7.7 15.3 31.8 
Total 128.0 - 81.6 - 110.2 - 57.3 - 
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Chart 5.14: China’s Oil Imports from Major Suppliers, 2006-2009    
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Furthermore, China’s General Administration of Customs released a statement indicating 
the three biggest oil suppliers of China for the year 2009. Saudi Arabia, Angola and Iran 
sold 41.86 million tonnes, 32.17 million tonnes and 23.15 million tonnes respectively to 
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China. As the largest oil provider to China in 2009, Saudi Arabia contributed 20.5 
percent of China’s total oil imports from the world (Xinhua General News Service 
10.02.10).  
 
Table 5.15 shows a significance of Chinese oil imports relative to its oil production and 
consumption. In 2006 to 2009, Chinese oil production supplied 48 percent to 53 percent 
of the domestic market demand, with the remaining percentage supplied through oil 
imports (Table 5.15). China’s oil imports were stronger during this period than in the 
previous five years (2001-2005). If from 2001 to 2005 this import ranged between 1.4 
million bpd  and 2.7 million bpd, in 2006-2009, this import grew from 3.3 million bpd to 
4.2 million bpd. The pattern of this import, however, was a not drastic, but rather a steady 
and gradual increase. Oil imports continued to meet China’s domestic oil consumption 
from 30.6 percent in 2001 to 51.2 percent in 2009.  
 
Table 5.15: China's Total Oil Production, Total Oil Consumption, and Oil Imports, 
2001-2009  
Barrels Per Day (bpd) 
 Total Oil Production Total Oil 
Consumption 
Total Oil Import 
2001 3,434,535 4,917,882 1,483,347 
2002 3,529,762 5,160,714 1,630,953 
2003 3,559,006 5,578,111 2,019,105 
2004 3,657,452 6,437,484 2,780,031 
2005 3,791,566 6,695,444 2,903,878 
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration Independent Statistic & Analysis 
 
Table 5.16 shows Saudi’s exports of petroleum oil, oils from bituminous minerals and 
crude to the world and China.  In 2006, China accounted for 6.78 percent of the total 
Saudi oil exports to the world.  For this sector, Saudi Arabia only provided the statistics 
for the year 2006 and 2007 in the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. 
 
Table 5.16: Saudi Export of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals, Crude 
to the World and China, 2006-2009 (Tonnes) 
 Saudi Export of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils from 
Bituminous Minerals, 
Crude to the World 
 
Saudi Export of Petroleum 
Oil, Oils from Bituminous 
Minerals, Crude to China 
 (Comtrade) 
Percentage of Saudi 
Export of Petroleum Oil, 
Oils from Bituminous 
Minerals, Crude to China 
Relative to the World 
2006 351,064,865.2 23,822,590.5 6.78 
2007 345,598.6 N/A N/A 
2008 365,059,863.0 N/A N/A 
2009 307,807,661.0 N/A N/A 
Source: United Nations Statistic Division 
2006 3,865,271 7,263,328 3,398,058 
2007 3,921,356 7,582,000 3,660,644 
2008 3,982,718 7,831,000 3,848,282 
2009 3,991,404 8,200,000 4,208,596 
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Table 5.17 presents the data of Saudi exports of petroleum oil, oils from bituminous 
minerals and crude to the United States, Japan and China for a period of four years. As of 
2006, twenty percent of Saudi oil went to the US, 17 percent to Japan, and 56 percent to 
the rest of the world.  As Saudi Arabia exported only seven percent of its oil to China 
(Chart 5.17), compared to the US and Japan, China received less oil.  The same 
development took place in the previous period (2001-2005). Saudi Arabia sold more oil 
to the US and Japan than China. In 2005, for example, American, Japanese and Chinese 
markets bought 72.3 million tons, 62.7 million tons and 22.5 million tons of Saudi oil 
respectively. This analysis, however, is also constrained by the limited availability of data 
in the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistic Database. 
 
Table 5.17: Saudi Exports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals, Crude 
to the United States, Japan and China, 2006-2009 (Tonnes) 
 Saudi Export of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals, Crude to 
the World 
 
Saudi Export of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals, Crude to 
the United States  
 
Saudi Export of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals, Crude to 
the Japan 
 
Saudi Export of 
Petroleum Oil, Oils 
from Bituminous 
Minerals, Crude to 
China 
  
2006 351,064,865.2 70,408,170.9 60,064,174.1 23,822,590.5 
2007 345,598.6 75,874.7 109,699.4 N/A 
2008 365,059,863.0 N/A N/A N/A 
2009 307,807,661.0 N/A N/A N/A 
Source: United Nations Statistic Division 
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Chart 5.17: Saudi Exports of Petroleum Oil, Oils from Bituminous Minerals, Crude 
to the United States, Japan and China, 2006  
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From 2006 to 2008, Saudi oil exports to North America and Asia increased by 10.48 
percent and 8.3 percent respectively. This percentage indicates the importance of both 
markets to the Kingdom (Table 5.18 and Graph 5.18). Saudi oil exports to Western 
Europe, however, declined by 17.1 percent. 
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Table 5.18: Saudi Exports of Crude Oil to North America, Western Europe and 
Asia, 2006-2008  
(Million Barrels) 
 Saudi Exports of 
Crude Oil to North 
America 
Saudi Exports of 
Crude Oil to Western 
Europe 
Saudi Exports of 
Crude Oil to Asia 
2006 534.50 374.80 1440.63 
2007 571.78 306.04 1453.23 
2008 590.66 310.97 1560.86 
Source: SAMA Annual Report 46th  
 
Graph 5.18: Saudi Exports of Crude Oil to North America, Western Europe and 
Asia, 2006-2008 
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In 2009, China reportedly outstripped the US in the importation of oil from Saudi Arabia. 
For the first time in 20 years, Saudi crude oil exported to the US dropped below one 
million bpd, whereas the same commodity to China exceeded one million bpd. For the 
year 2009 alone, China imported 41.86 million tonnes of crude oil from Saudi Arabia 
(SinoCast 23.02.10). 
 
Non-oil Trade 
This section provides an assessment of non-oil trade and consists of two parts: the 
petrochemical and non-petrochemical sectors. For the petrochemical sector, the 
assessment begins with a Chinese anti-dumping issue that raised tension among Saudi 
petrochemical producers and business people. The two governments attempted to solve 
this issue, yet yielded no result. In the non-petrochemical sector, a new variation of 
made-in-China products was offered to the Saudi market. Most of these products had the 
added benefit of recent technology. 
 
Petrochemical Sector 
A serious challenge emerged in the Sino-Saudi petrochemical business when the Chinese 
government planned to implement unfavourable protectionist policy against some of the 
world producers and exporters of petrochemicals. For this purpose, China launched a 
number of investigations on petrochemical products, which ended up lasting more than a 
year. On June 25, 2009, China’s Ministry of Commerce began its anti-dumping 
investigation of methanol from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and New Zealand. The 
investigation aimed to assess whether these petrochemical products had been dumped at a 
price that was lower than the production cost. According to a circular released by the 
Ministry, the probe would complete before June 24, 2010. However, there was a 
possibility that this investigation could extend to December 24 of the same year 
(SinoCast 25.06.09).  
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The investigation created overwhelming concern, dissatisfaction and even criticism from 
Saudi business groups, who deemed it as unfair, and felt it would spoil the petrochemical 
trade between the two countries. The Chairman of the Executive Council of Saudi Export 
Development Center (SEDC), Abdul Rahman al-Zamil, was outraged with the 
investigation on methanol and butanediol (BDO), which began in June 2009.  Al-Zamil 
rejected this investigation on at least three accounts. In the first place, China had no 
reason to probe these petrochemical imports because, as he said, ‘We do not subsidize 
our exporters’. He further claimed that for China to impose protection policy against the 
petrochemical imports was unacceptable since both countries had mostly practised ‘duty-
free bilateral trade’. He also considered China’s action ‘a direct threat’ to Saudi economy 
since Methanol and BDO comprised 10 and 15 percent of Saudi petrochemical exports to 
China (the total value of these exports was USD 2 billion). Moreover, he commented, 
‘the damage will be done while they study it for one, two or even 100 years’ (Arab News 
05.07.09).  
 
This called for immediate response by the Saudi authority to urgently cope with this 
petrochemical issue. The authority was also pressed to retaliate against China’s products 
in the Saudi market. Al Zamil urged the Saudi government to have a clear position in 
regards to this problem. Moreover, Saudi petrochemical exporters enjoined their 
government to apply tariffs on industrial goods from China. Al-Zamil stated, ‘The 
Chinese are dumping on our market...We want our government...to apply the same 
principles, the same customs duties’ (Arab News 05.07.09). In the Kingdom, the custom 
tariff on imported medicine and foodstuff went down to zero and was slashed to five 
percent on other products. The reduction of tariff was taking place while the Kingdom 
was preparing to join the WTO (Arab News 05.07.09). 
 
A few days later, the Saudi authority responded to this demand, reflecting an awareness 
of the interests of Saudi businesses. The authority also promised to tackle the issue. In 
light of a strong bilateral relation with China, SABIC announced that it would find a 
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solution for this anti-dumping problem. Saudi delegations reportedly went to China that 
month to discuss the issue (Chinese Business News 07.07.09).  
 
On December 24, 2009, the Chinese government imposed an anti-dumping duty on Saudi 
1.4-butanediol (BDO), an important element in producing plastic-like elastic fibre. The 
duty was between  4.5 and 13.6 percent (Oil Daily 12.01.10). The reason for this 
imposition was that Chinese industry had been affected by the low-cost Saudi 
petrochemicals made from ethane. 
 
As of January 2010, no solution for the petrochemical issue had emerged despite the fact 
that government-to-government relations ran deep. The officials of the two countries 
preferred a negotiation approach to a legal one, which would involve bringing the case to 
the court. China’s Minister of Commerce, Chen Deming, and Saudi Minister of Finance, 
Ibrahim al-Assaf, had a discussion, but were not able to reach a settlement concerning the 
anti-dumping dispute. Al-Assaf commented that a discussion of this matter would 
continue (Qatar News Agency 11.01.10). Al-Assaf further stressed, ‘We want to solve all 
conflicts amicably without going to court’ (ArabianBusiness.com 10.01.10).  
 
The assessment will now focus on the trading of petrochemical products between the two 
countries.  As seen in the previous period (2001-2005), China imported more polymers of 
ethylene than it did  polymers of propylene from Saudi Arabia. The same trend also 
continued from 2006 to 2009 in which the import volume of the polymers of ethylene 
exceeded the import volume of the polymers of propylene by 201 percent (1.9 million 
ton). Saudi polymers of ethylene accounted for a significant share of the total imports 
figure of ethylene – 12.2 percent (Table 5.19, Graph 5.19 (b)). In contrast, Saudi 
polymers of propylene merely contributed 6.1 percent to the total import figure of 
propylene (Table 5.19, Graph 5.19 (a)). This development suggests that Saudi Arabia 
retained its efforts to become one of the major exporters of polymers of ethylene to the 
Chinese market. 
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Table 5.19: China’s Petrochemicals Import from the World and Saudi Arabia, 
2006-2009 (tonnes) 
 Polymers of 
Propylene and 
other Olefins in 
Primary Forms 
from the World 
Polymers of 
Propylene and 
other Olefins in 
Primary Forms 
from Saudi 
Arabia 
Polymers of 
Ethylene in 
Primary Forms 
from the World 
Polymers of Ethylene 
in Primary Forms 
from Saudi Arabia  
2006 3,401,704 157,261 5,323,753 790,056 
2007 3,618,038 134,628 5,060,689 667,591 
2008 3,246,427 208,472 4,959,266 554,989 
2009 5,182,417 445,854 8,080,264 835,071 
Total 15,448,586 946,215 23,423,972 2,847,707 
Source: United Nations Statistic Division 
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Graph 5.19 (a): China’s Import of Polymers of Propylene from the World, and 
Saudi Arabia, 2006-2009 (Millions Tonnes) 
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Graph 5.19(b): China’s Import of Polymers of Ethylene from the World, and Saudi 
Arabia, 2006-2009 (Millions Tonnes) 
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Non-Petrochemical Sector 
There was a significant improvement in the range of non-petrochemical goods in Sino-
Saudi trade, from basic goods to more sophisticated and highly technological products. 
This development was important because it showed a strengthened presence of other 
categories of Chinese exports in the Saudi market. It also the acceptance of Chinese 
exports by the Saudi population. In 2007, for example, Yuchai Group, a Chinese 
company, received an order to export 1,000 diesel engines (YC6A260-20) to Saudi 
Arabia for use in Jianghuai passenger vehicles (Xinhua Economic News Service 
04.07.07). In the same year, five models of Chery Automobile were launched in Riyadh: 
Chery A5, Chery Easter, Chery V% and the SUV Chery Tiggo. Chery Automobile was 
one of the biggest passenger carmakers of China and its distributor in Saudi Arabia was 
First Motors Company. 
 
Chinese bus companies continued to secure their market in the Saudi transportation 
sector. In May 2006, the Kingdom bought two buses (each costing CNY 1 million) from 
Youngman Automotive Group Co., Ltd, China’s biggest exporter of luxury buses 
(SinoCast China Business Daily News 21.11.07).  On April 13, 2008, Zhongtong Bus 
Holding Co., Ltd. and a Saudi company signed a contract to purchase buses totalling 
USD 64 million. In the following month, this Saudi company paid 10 percent of 
contract’s value, which included an export of 1600 city buses, to the Kingdom. The 
remaining transports included in this contract were ‘school buses and pilgrimage 
vehicles’. Both companies, however, had been involved in such deals since 2005 
(SinoCast 21.05.08).  
 
Similar to the businesses in the transportation market, several Chinese companies also 
met the demand for computer equipment as well as the technology market of Saudi 
Arabia.  In August 2009, Saudi Telecom ordered Primeton EOS from Primeton 
Technologies, a company based in Shanghai. The Primeton EOS was described as ‘a 
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family product that forms a middleware platform for building, testing, running as well as 
monitoring web-based enterprise application software’ (SinoCast 10.08.09). In December 
of the same year, Saudi Arabia received a high performance server from Inspur Group, a 
Shandong based company. This was apparently the first export of such a product to a 
foreign market (Chinese Business News 07.12.09).  
 
5.4.2.3 Mutual Investments in the Hydrocarbon Sector: Extraction, Refining, 
Marketing and Downstream Processes 
The Sino-Saudi mutual investments in the hydrocarbon sector are identified in the 
Quanzhou refining and petrochemical project and the natural gas exploration in Rub’ Al-
Khali, Saudi Arabia. There is also a potential joint venture in the Qingdao refining 
project. Quanzhou refining and petrochemical plant began its operation in 2009; gas 
exploration in Rub’ Al-Khali pursued another three years of drilling since its first 
operation began in 2005; and a joint venture in the Qingdao refining project was still 
caught up in the negotiation process.   
 
SABIC has been tightening its leverage in the Chinese petrochemical sector. This is 
evidenced by its successful performance in the Tianjin joint venture petrochemical 
project and its minor yet crucial role with the Quanzhou refinery and petrochemical plant. 
The potential cooperation of Saudi and Chinese petrochemical firms in the Dalian 
project, however, was affected by the economic policy of the government. 
Retrospectively, SABIC has been expanding its business in China since the 1980s. It 
supplied China’s customers with ‘fertilizers, synthetic fibers, iron, steel and plastic 
products’. Now, SABIC aims to improve its presence and even broaden its expansion in 
China’s market (Middle East Company News Wire 23.04.06).  
 
An analysis of the Sino-Saudi hydrocarbon projects from the years 2006 to 2010 will 
substantially concentrate on the progress that had been made by Saudi ARAMCO, 
SABIC, Sinopec and Dalian Shide. 
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Quanzhou Refining and Petrochemical Project (Fujian Province) 
Table 5.20: Quanzhou Refining and Petrochemical Project (Fujian Province) 
Year Activities /Achievements 
February 
and 
March 
2007  
 
• Sinopec, Saudi ARAMCO and ExxonMobil concluded a final 
contract with an investment of USD 4.5 billion.  
• The Chinese government officially approved this project and two 
business licenses were granted. 
July   
2008 
• ‘A mutual cooperation agreement’ was signed between Sino Saudi 
Aramco Company Ltd (a subsidiary of Saudi ARAMCO) and SABIC 
Shenzhen Trading Company Ltd (a subsidiary of SABIC in the 
PRC).  
November 
2009 
• The commercial and full operation of the Quanzhou refining and 
petrochemical project began. 
The above table outlines the progress of the joint venture project in Quanzhou in the 
period between 2006 and 2009. The progress was smooth and substantial. In 2007, the 
parties of the joint venture agreed on an increase of the share by USD 1 billion. They 
received two licences from the Chinese government; one for production and another one 
for marketing activities. At the end of 2009, the project came online and created great 
opportunities for the partners of the joint venture. In reassessing the achievements of the 
project in the period from 2001 to 2005, these partners engaged in a joint feasibility study 
and newly proposed plans. Of all these efforts, the most crucial development was the 
commencement of the construction of the plant.  
 
The FPCL (owned by Sinopec and Fujian government), Saudi ARAMCO and 
ExxonMobil successfully established two joint venture companies for the Quanzhou 
project. With the formation of these two companies, they were going to expand their 
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function from production activities to marketing operations. Moreover, the shares not 
only had a positive impact on their partnership but also offered Sinopec a more dominant 
position in the project. 
 
The first joint venture company was the Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd. The 
FPCL acquired 50 percent of the stake and ExxonMobil and Saudi ARAMCO equally 
shared another 50 percent of the stake. In February 2007, the FPCL, Saudi ARAMCO 
and ExxonMobil reached an agreement on the term of the final contract for this project. A 
significant change was identified in relation to an increase in volume of investment 
needed for the project. There were two factors that drove this increase of the volume of 
investment, from USD 3.5 billion (this amount was agreed upon in the previous 
preliminary agreement of August 2004) to USD 4.5 billion (China Knowledge Newswire 
27.02.07). These were the rising cost of labour and raw materials and the proposed 
development of a 700,000 tonne per year paraxylene facility (South China Morning Post 
27.02.07).  
 
The second joint venture company was Sinopec SenMei (Fujian) Petroleum Co. Ltd. in 
which Sinopec had 55 percent of the stake, while ExxonMobil and Saudi ARAMCO 
shared the remaining 45 percent (Xinhua Economic News Service 30.05.09). Sinopec 
SenMei (Fujian) Petroleum Co. Ltd. would undertake a marketing project that was worth 
USD 600 million. As part of the project, hundreds of petrol stations in Fujian province 
would be rebranded.  
 
In 2007, an official approval from the Chinese government was granted and two business 
licenses were given to above-mentioned joint venture companies: Fujian Refining and 
Petrochemical Co. Ltd. and Sinopec SenMei (Fujian) Petroleum Co. Ltd. (Middle East 
Company News Wire 31.03.07).  
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The USD 4.5 billion investment (a sum that represented the value of investment for the 
refining and petrochemical complex and excluded the petrol stations’ project) reflected 
the mega-construction of world-class refining and petrochemical facilities. It expanded 
the existing refinery from 80,000 bpd to 240,000 bpd. The project also consisted of the 
following units: ‘an 800,000 tonnes-per-year ethylene steam cracker, an 800,000 tonnes-
per-year polyethylene unit, a 400,000 tonnes-per-year polypropylene unit and an 
aromatics complex to produce 700,000 tons-per-year of paraxylene.’ Other facilities like 
‘a 300,000-tonne crude berth and power co-generation’ were also constructed (China 
Energy Weekly 28.02.07). These highly advanced technological facilities would enable 
the joint venture company to increase production capacity and target a huge market for 
both refinery and petrochemical products.  
 
The Quanzhou refining and petrochemical plant that was built at Quangang (in Quanzhou 
city) with an expected annual sales revenue of more than CYN 60 billion (Sinocast 
31.08.09) was very progressive. Its trial production, including the testing of the extruders 
and reactors in June 2009, had been completed a few months before the commercial 
production started. Five months later, on November 11, 2009, the commercial and full 
operation of this plant began. For the petrochemical plant, the production rates would be 
adjusted based on the market conditions. Not only did the production from this plant 
serve as an incentive to China's petrochemical industry, but it also managed to meet the 
escalating demand of chemical products in the region. 
 
Among the positive implications of the Quanzhou integrated project was the 
establishment of a cooperative effort between the subsidiaries of two Saudi giant 
companies: Sino Saudi ARAMCO Company Ltd (a subsidiary of Saudi ARAMCO) and 
SABIC Shenzhen Trading Company Ltd. (a subsidiary of SABIC in China). This was the 
only project in China, so far, that the two companies had built in cooperation. The 
agreement that these two companies had created marked the integration between two 
businesses of different backgrounds and from different industries, namely the 
petrochemical industry and the oil industry. It also showed that Saudi Arabia wanted to 
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build a strong presence in China’s petrochemical industry. On July 12, 2008, these 
companies reached ‘a mutual cooperation agreement’ in the Saudi ARAMCO office in 
Dhahran. The SABIC subsidiary agreed to market the Polyolefin products of Saudi 
ARAMCO. These products would be produced when the Quanzhou project completed. 
With a 25 percent share in Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Co. Ltd., Saudi 
ARAMCO’s products were estimated at 320,000 metric tonnes annually (MENA Reports 
13.07.08). Saudi ARAMCO was the principal supplier of crude oil for the project. The 
representatives for the signing of this agreement were Khalid G. Buainain, Saudi 
ARAMCO’s Sr. Vice President of Refining, Marketing and International Operations and 
Eng. Mutlaq Al-Morished, SABIC’s Vice President, Corporate Finance. 
 
In view of the above initiative, Saudi ARAMCO not only distributed the benefits of this 
project to another Saudi company, but also provided room for the latter to enhance its 
expertise and experience in the Chinese petrochemical market. The cooperation of the 
two subsidiaries would, moreover, enhance the merit of Saudi Arabian investment at the 
local and international levels. It also laid the basis for more cooperation in the future. 
Mohamed al-Mady considered this move to be ‘an extra relative advantage for SABIC’. 
More than just marketing polyolefins, SABIC would also support and promote Saudi 
investment in foreign countries. Al-Mady also commented, ‘We believe this cooperation 
between Saudi ARAMCO and SABIC will, in the future, add value to the Kingdom’s 
internal and external investments (MENA Reports 13.07.08). He also hoped that this 
agreement would encourage further collaboration between the two companies, stating, ‘I 
look forward to this agreement to serve as a launching pad for more extensive strategic 
cooperation between the two companies’ (MENA Reports 13.07.08). 
 
The Quanzhou refining and petrochemical project created a synergy for the joint venture 
companies, as well as elevated the cost and the risk of their businesses. The parties in this 
venture were well matched because each had its own distinctive capabilities and 
expertise. These advantages would serve as a huge benefit to the Chinese petrochemical 
sector. The Chairman of ExxonMobil (China) Investment Co., Ltd., P.C. Tan, stated, ‘the 
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Fujian Government brings local knowledge and support; Sinopec an intimate 
understanding of the Chinese market; Saudi ARAMCO the reliability of crude supply; 
and ExxonMobil operations expertise, management systems, financial discipline and 
technological know-how’ (China Energy Weekly 20.10.06). Regarding the reliability of 
Saudi ARAMCO as the principal supplier of crude oil for Quanzhou project, the first 
cargo that shipped 900,000 barrels of Arab Extra Light arrived in China on February 16, 
2009. The Director of Asia Joint Venture Development of Saudi ARAMCO Ibrahim al-
Buainain commented on this progress, ‘The arrival of the Arabian crude oil...signifies 
Saudi ARAMCO’s supply commitment as a shareholder’ (Reuters 25.02.09) 
 
The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Exxon Mobil Corporation, Rex W. 
Tillerson, stressed the reasons that this integrated refining and chemical project was 
economically strategic and cost effective. First, there was ‘the synergy of feedstocks: 
refining streams are used as feedstock in the production of petrochemicals while by-
products from the chemicals’ facilities are sent back to the refinery for conversion to 
high-value products, like motor fuels.’ Second was the maximization of ‘operating 
flexibility’ and the securing of ‘associated cost savings’ (Business Wire 11.11.09). 
 
The Quanzhou project was a landmark for future collaboration and a long-term 
relationship. A few months after this project came into operation, the Chinese company 
tabled a new proposal. There was the likelihood that the same companies of the existing 
joint venture would extend their cooperation for the proposed project. At the beginning of 
2010, Sinopec planned for the expansion of the existing integrated oil refinery and 
petrochemical complex in Quanzhou. There was a possibility that this project would 
involve ExxonMobil and Saudi ARAMCO. A feasibility study of this project had been 
conducted (Business Daily Update 09.03.10). 
338 
 
 
Table 5.21: Qingdao Refining Project (Shandong Province) 
Year Activities / Achievements 
May  
2005 
• The construction of Qingdao Refinery Project began with a sum of 
USD 1.21 billion. Saudi ARAMCO had not yet engaged in this 
project. 
April 
2006 
• President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Saudi Arabia accelerated the 
negotiation process between Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec. 
2007 - 2010 • The negotiation process continued. 
 
The above table indicates the progress that Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec have made 
towards Qingdao refinery project. The period from 2006 to 2010 witnessed a 
continuation of a series of negotiations between the two companies. In 2006, when 
President Hu Jintao made a state visit to Saudi Arabia, these companies seemed to 
revitalize the negotiation process. One of the factors that explained why Saudi ARAMCO 
delayed the formation of joint venture was China’s policy in regards to the price of oil 
products. In 2009, China’s authority modified this policy, yet the talks were still 
occurring between these companies. This progress, therefore, was not much different 
from the development in the period between 2001 and 2005, when the companies were 
continually engaging in the negotiation process. 
 
The construction of the Qingdao Refinery Project began in May 2005 with a total 
investment of USD 1.21 billion. At this stage, only three local companies had invested in 
this project: Sinopec Corp., the Shandong International Trust Investment Company and 
the Qingdao International Trust Company. Sinopec Corp. acquired 85 percent of the stake 
(China Energy Weekly 28.04.06).  
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Although the construction began without the involvement of Saudi ARAMCO, further 
negotiation on the project was stressed during a state visit from China’s president. The 
Saudi and Chinese national oil companies seemed to be more serious in the joint venture 
effort since this visit had concluded an agreement on strategic oil reserves. Saudi 
ARAMCO, however, did not rush into the decision of participating in this project. During 
a visit from President Hu Jintao to Riyadh in April 2006, Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec 
agreed to have a deep discussion on the involvement of Saudi ARAMCO in the Qingdao 
Refinery Project. Saudi ARAMCO was expected to buy 25 percent of the stake of 
Sinopec Qingdao Refining & Chemical Co., Ltd. However, Saudi ARAMCO was still 
negotiating with Sinopec though the construction of this project was completed in 
January 2008, and its operation came on stream in the middle of the same year. The 
ongoing negotiation was due to the concern of Saudi ARAMCO on the impact of China’s 
oil price system on its business. Sinopec Planning Director, Lei Dianwu, stated, ‘Saudi 
Arabia is willing to supply us with crude. They may participate in investing in the 
refinery when domestic Chinese refined oil prices are at appropriate levels’ (International 
Oil Daily 28.05.08). This issue, apparently, held up the negotiation for several months. 
 
Not until November 2009 did the discussion between Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec 
resume. This move was a response to a new policy on the price of oil products introduced 
by China’s government in January of the same year (Xinhua Economic News Service 
12.11.09). The change of policy, however, did not immediately result in Saudi ARAMCO 
purchasing stake in the project. In 2010, Saudi ARAMCO was still considering the 
purchasing of stake in the Qingdao project, and an ongoing negotiation of joint venture 
between Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec ensued (Platts Oilgram News 13.05.10). At this 
stage, the reason for the negotiation was not known.  
 
Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec could benefit from a number of mutual gains were this 
partnership to be established. Among these gains are an assurance of uninterrupted crude 
oil supply and the availability of facilities that could smoothly transport and process 
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Saudi oil.   Firstly, an oil supply to Qingdao refinery could be sustained. The Chairman of 
Sinopec, Su Shulin, contended that a steady flow of crude oil supply to Qingdao refinery 
could be guaranteed once a partnership with Saudi ARAMCO is formed (Platts Oilgram 
News 30.03.10). Secondly, an opportunity for Saudi ARAMCO to be part of the refining 
activities and business in China would be expanded. Qingdao refinery will become the 
second investment of Saudi ARAMCO in China’s refinery sector. This refinery plant is 
designed with the aim of refining Saudi light crude. It is expected to refine ‘10 million 
tonnes of import crude oil’ and to produce ‘7.6 million tonnes of finished oil and one 
million tonnes of chemical light oil’ (SinoCast 09.03.07). Finally, there is the strategic 
location of the Qingdao refinery, which is linked to Huangdao Port and the country’s oil 
reserve depot. These facilities, therefore, will provide this refinery easy access to oil from 
overseas producers (SinoCast 27.11.06). 
 
Gas Exploration in Rub’ Al-Khali 
Saudi Arabia is ranked as having the fourth largest gas reserve in the world. Driven by 
domestic demand, especially from the petrochemical sector, Saudi Arabia opened its 
upstream activities of non-associated gas to foreign companies in 2001. In the period 
from 2001 to 2005, a joint venture company between Sinopec Group and Saudi 
ARAMCO was set up and known as Sino-Saudi Gas. In this consortium, Sinopec Group 
and Saudi ARAMCO hold 80 percent and 20 percent of shares respectively (Middle East 
Energy, Oil and Gas News Wire 18.06.09). Between 2006 and 2010, more development 
could be seen in the joint venture project. The drilling of gas wells began and was 
resumed even after the consortium had identified that the product found had no 
commercial value. 
 
In November 2005, Sino Saudi Gas began its drilling in the Sheeh-2 well. It was ‘the first 
of seven wildcat wells’ that had been agreed upon and authorized for the company 
(International Oil Daily 02.10.06). In June 2009 (almost four years later), the Sino Saudi 
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Gas was exploring the seventh and final well of natural gas. It was estimated that the 
drilling would end by October 2009.  
 
The gas exploration was a high risk project for Sino Saudi Gas. When the result of this 
exploration was known to be discouraging, the two joint venture companies had to bear 
the high cost of the project. Six wells had been explored, and yet they were not profitable 
due to economic factors. As mentioned in the Middle East Energy, Oil and Gas News 
Wire, these wells produced ‘no flows of commercial value, partly due to low gas price’. 
This could be further explained by the discovery of a small amount of gas with no 
commercial value. The gas price in the Kingdom was cheap and fixed to 75 cent per 
million Btu (Oil Daily 26.10.10).The exploration cost was another factor in that it went 
beyond an early target of USD 300 million (Middle East Energy, Oil and Gas News Wire 
18.07.09). 
 
The two companies, despite the disappointing result of the first period of gas exploration, 
pressed the project ahead. After five years of gas exploration in Rub’ al-Khali, and with a 
non-commercial value for the last or the seventh drilled well, Sino-Saudi Gas continued 
their commitment to a second period of gas exploration in the same place. This means 
that this company will drill new wells for a period of another three years (Middle East 
Energy, Oil and Gas News Wire 26.10.10). This decision, which was disclosed in 
October 2010, was associated with several causes. Sinopec saw this move as an effort to 
increase its expertise in gas exploration (BMI Middle East and Africa Oil and Gas 
Insights 01.10.10). Some observers, however, argue that Sino-Saudi relations were the 
core reason that Sinopec retained its involvement in this gas project (Middle East Energy, 
Oil and Gas News Wire 26.10.10). 
 
Tianjin Refining and Petrochemical Project 
SABIC and Sinopec initiated their cooperation in the Tianjin petrochemical and refinery 
project in the mid-2000s.  An examination of this topic will begin with the process of 
342 
 
developing this cooperation and the efforts made before the project was run. The merits 
of this project will also be analysed. 
 
When China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) tabled a proposal for the 
Tianjin petrochemical and refinery project, SABIC was not a nominated partner. Almost 
ten years later, SABIC, however, began getting involved in this project. This involvement 
was further driven by several developments concerning the initiatives of the two 
governments for this project, a consequence of Dalian petrochemical project and the 
distinctiveness of the Tianjin project. The Tianjin project was put forward in 1995 with a 
proposed joint venture partner, Dow Chemical. In 2002, however, Dow Chemical 
withdrew from taking part in the negotiation process. Since 2004, SABIC has channelled 
its attention on this project and begun to conduct a series of discussions concerning its 
participation in this joint venture. SABIC has continued to step up its efforts in this 
project for a number of reasons. The first was due to the approval of this project by 
China’s authorities in December 2005. Since then, SABIC has increased its discussions 
with Sinopec. The second was the 2006 visit of King Abdullah and SABIC 
representatives to China, which later led to the resumption of this negotiation (ICIS 
Chemical Business 30.10.06). 
  
The third was the strategic location of Tianjin. Up to the year 2006, no other foreign 
investments had emerged for any such projects in North-Eastern China. SABIC was the 
first foreign company to make an  investment in this petrochemical sector.  Other foreign 
companies, like BP, Royal Dutch Shell and Exxon Mobil, also invested in China’s 
petrochemical projects, but only in the eastern and southern parts of the country. 
 
Fourth was the implication of a postponement of Dalian’s project. After the approval of a 
joint venture with Dalian Shide was delayed in 2007, SABIC developed more interest in 
negotiating a Tianjin joint venture with Sinopec. Its Chief Executive, Mohamed al-Mady, 
stated, ‘We are advancing with Sinopec and working and hopefully we might have 
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investment…it will take time – we have not finalized any agreements but we are still 
working together’ (Chemical News & Intelligence 05.11.07).  
 
After a four-year negotiation process, a non-legal binding agreement was reached 
between the two companies. This agreement implied that SABIC would very soon 
become Sinopec’s partner. Since the joint venture company would be based on an equal 
share, SABIC was prepared to expand its role and offer a new petrochemical product for 
this project. SABIC was also willing to share its technology with Sinopec. In an effort to 
set up a ‘joint venture company’, both parties concluded HOA on January 31, 2008, 
which led to the establishment of a joint venture company. The company was named 
SINOPEC SABIC Tianjin Petrochemical Co., Ltd., and had a ‘50:50 equal share’. Five 
months later, a strategic cooperation agreement was concluded between SABIC and 
Sinopec in Jeddah. This agreement emphasized the scope of partnership in the 
construction of Tianjin industrial complex, extending it to an earlier scope, which 
appeared in the Heads of Agreement (HOA) signing on January 31, 2008. With this new 
scope, SABIC was expected to introduce polycarbonates (a new product that would use 
SABIC Innovative Plastic Technology and utilize raw material that was produced at 
Tianjin complex) (AME Info – ME Company Newswire 22.06.08). The signatories of this 
agreement were the Chairman of the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, the 
SABIC Board Chairman, Prince Saud bin Abdullah bin Thenayan al-Saud, and Sinopec 
Board Chairman Su Shulin. 
 
It took five years for China’s economic planner to assess and agree to the establishment 
of the SABIC-Sinopec partnership. In 2009, the Chinese National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) approved the participation of SABIC in the Tianjin 
petrochemical complex that was being constructed (Saudi Economic Survey 19.07.09).  
 
Sinopec and SABIC invested billions of dollars because they wanted to produce a wide 
range of petrochemical products. The overall cost of the Tianjin petrochemical project 
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was USD 2.7 billion. Its petrochemical complex was expected to produce 3.2 million 
tonnes per year of chemical products: polyethylene, ethylene glycol, polypropylene, 
butadiene, phenol, and butane-1, and one million tonnes of ethylene. It was said that 
ethylene cracker, eight downstream units and other facilities were tested and ready for 
operation (Saudi Economic Survey 16.11.09). It is worth mentioning here that the Tianjin 
project also included the expansion of an oil refinery complex. Only two companies 
joined this refinery project: Sinopec Group, and Rosneft (a Russian oil and gas 
company). 
 
After waiting seven months to get an approval from China’s authority, the two companies 
agreed to inject billions of Yuan into this plant. The strengthening of financial capability 
resulted in the smooth running of the project, which eventually came on stream in 2010. 
In a press conference in January 2010 in Riyadh, Mohamed al-Mady revealed a financing 
contract that had been inked between SABIC and Sinopec. Both parties had agreed on a 
‘long-term loan of CNY 12.26 billion in total and short-term working capital of CNY 9 
billion’ which was directed to this petrochemical complex (SinoCast 21.01.10). On May 
11, 2010, this petrochemical complex began running its commercial production, and full 
operation began in August 2010. 
 
Before a full operation of the plant could begin, the producers and buyers of Tianjin 
petrochemical products were bound by an agreement: Sinopec and SABIC targeted the 
local firms as their customers. The two companies efficiently managed their marketing 
strategy, presumably to reduce market competition. In July 2010, SABIC signed a MoU 
with eight companies from China. With this RMB 6 billion MoU, SABIC agreed to sell 
the chemical products from the Tianjin petrochemical plant to these companies (China 
Knowledge Newswires 20.07.10). SABIC’s Vice President of Polymers, Khaled al-Mana, 
stressed that a majority of petrochemical products from the Tianjin plant would be sold in 
China. 
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SABIC’s involvement in China’s petrochemical industry was growing significantly. Its 
Chairman voiced his confidence and praised the positive implications of this venture. The 
Tianjin project, to some extent, helped SABIC to reach its production target. It was also 
seen as a starting point for subsequent collaboration between the two national 
petrochemical companies and a means of enabling these companies to produce better 
products. As the first joint venture project of SABIC in China, Mohamed al-Mady saw 
the Tianjin project as a sign of SABIC’s business expansion in this country. SABIC 
needed more petrochemical plants in order to achieve its target of producing 130 million 
tonnes of petrochemical products by 2020. Al-Mady expected that more joints ventures 
could be reached in the future; thus, a strong relationship could be established between 
SABIC and Sinopec. One example of potential future collaboration was a plan to develop 
a polycarbonate (PC) manufacturing unit in the Tianjin plant.  This unit could produce 
230,000 m.t./year of PC, and would use the technology of SABIC Innovative Plastic 
subsidiary. The operation of this unit was expected to begin in 2014.  
 
The Tianjin petrochemical plant not only promised a tremendous outcome to SABIC and 
Sinopec, but also offered additional benefits to the local industry and province. When 
there was an enormous contribution to the economic development of the surrounding 
areas, the results of this project were seen to benefit the home country. The Sinopec-
SABIC joint venture in Tianjin would improve the chlorine-alkaline industry in Tianjin, 
and spur the economic growth of Tianjin municipality and New Binhai. An early 
estimation showed that this project would increase Tianjin’s annual GDP by more than 
four percent and create a RMB 100 billion (USD 14.8 billion) investment in downstream 
and related industries (Oil & Gas News 06.12.09). 
 
Dalian Petrochemical Project (Liaoning Province) 
The Dalian project was an integrated oil refining and petrochemical plant. SABIC was 
expected to install ethylene equipment, while the Dalian Shide group would be 
responsible for the installation of the oil refining facility. This joint venture would require 
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an investment of USD 5.2 billion (SinoCast China Financial Watch 17.05.06). From 
2001 to 2005, negotiations on this project were held between the two companies, and 
from 2006 to 2010 there was a delay on the approval of this project. SABIC began to 
seek other petrochemical projects with Sinopec. 
 
In 2006, the joint venture of Dalian petrochemical project was being considered at the 
governmental level. All parties involved in the negotiation process of this project were 
looking forward to the decision of the home government. SABIC and the Dalian Shide 
Group Co. were still waiting on an approval from China’s central government for the 
joint venture of the petrochemical project in Dalian, located in the north eastern Liaoning 
province. Mohamed al-Mady stated, ‘We have finalized the last prerequisites for 
investment with Shide and are waiting for government approval’. Al-Mady also 
mentioned the possibility of SABIC acquiring 50 percent of the stake (Chemical Week 
24.05.06). For the time being, no agreement related to the equity distribution had been 
reached. 
 
Apparently, there was an obstacle to the approval of this joint venture. This obstacle was 
associated with a Chinese government policy regarding the country’s economic 
development. The policy was based on the 11th Five-Year plan (2006-2010) wherein 
only one large-scale ethylene project was allowed per region. At that time, the Chinese 
government had already approved an 800,000 tonne ethylene project in the city of 
Fushun, (Liaoning province), which was managed by PetroChina Fushun Petrochemical 
Corp. (China Energy Weekly 19.05.06).  
 
In 2007, no progress had been made on the Dalian project due to a deceleration of the 
approval process by the Chinese government. At this stage, SABIC had been waiting 18 
months for this result. This was a pressing challenge, yet SABIC did not give up. As a 
dynamic and ambitious company, SABIC had an alternative option for the time-
consuming Dalian project. It continued acquiring other joint venture petrochemical 
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projects with Sinopec. SABIC Chairman Prince Saud bin Abdullah bin Thunayan al-Saud 
said that in the event that approval was being delayed, SABIC might search for another 
location for its petrochemical project. SABIC was also seen to shift its attention to a 
possible joint venture in the Tianjin project led by Sinopec. Al-Mady said, ‘We are 
advancing with Sinopec and working together and hopefully we might have investment,’ 
(Chemical News & Intelligence 23.10.07). SABIC’s relentless efforts were eventually 
rewarded when it signed a Heads of Agreement (HOA) with Sinopec for the Tianjin 
petrochemical project in 2008. 
 
In discussing SABIC-Dalian Shide project, several reports in 2009 and 2010 repeatedly 
emphasized that SABIC had not yet attained the Chinese government’s approval. 
However, no reasons were given for this situation. Yet, as earlier mentioned the obstacle 
was the Chinese economic development policy that allowed only one ethylene project in 
a region. 
 
5.4.2.4 Mutual Investment in the Non-Hydrocarbon Sector: Manufacturing and 
Service 
The state-owned and private companies of China have grown and even broadened their 
investment activities in Saudi Arabia. This achievement, to some extent, is a result of a 
high level of commitment and active promotion led by a particular Saudi governmental 
agency. Having a bigger role in promoting Saudi Arabia as a strategic investment hub, 
the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) is responsible for bringing 
foreign investment into the country. In the context of China, SAGIA pledged to 
materialize the vision of King Abdullah in bolstering the bilateral links between the two 
countries. SAGIA made itself available and accessible to Chinese investors by opening 
its Representative Office in Hong Kong in May 2006. Moreover, during the 
BusinessWEEK Tenth Annual CEO Forum, held in November 2006 in Beijing, SAGIA 
used this avenue in promoting Saudi Arabia as an important location for China’s 
investment (Middle East Company News Wire 12.09.06). 
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In this section, the growing investment of China companies in Saudi Arabia is analysed 
through a number of projects. Although the role of SAGIA has not been mentioned in 
these projects, its official function of extending advice to foreign investors should not be 
overlooked. In its website, SAGIA has clearly stated one of its major functions, ‘offering 
everything from advice on organising visas and building regulations, to financing and 
legal support’ (SAGIA 2010). 
 
The investments of Chinese companies in the economic sectors (excluding energy and 
petrochemical sectors) of Saudi Arabia increased from the years 2006 to 2010. Four 
Chinese companies invested billions of dollars in the aluminium and steel projects in 
Jizan Economic City (JEC) of Saudi Arabia. Other Chinese companies also expanded 
their business operations through mutual investments in the logistics and mining 
industries. There were also individual investors from China and Saudi Arabia who jointly 
invested in the construction of China Mart in the Kingdom. The analysis on the 
development of these projects will be presented in the following sub-sections.  
 
China’s Investment in Jizan Economic City (JEC), Saudi Arabia  
Four Chinese companies invested in the development of the industrial sector of Jizan 
Economic City in the southwest area of Saudi Arabia. The first company was Aluminum 
Corporation of China Limited (Chalco), the biggest alumina and primary aluminium 
producer in China. The second and the third companies were China National Machinery 
Industry Corporation (Sinomach) and China Non-ferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign 
Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd. (NFC) respectively. These companies entered into 
investment agreements of aluminium smelters in this economic city. The fourth company 
was Hebei Iron and Steel Group Company Limited (Hebei). It contributed to the 
development of the steel industry in JEC. 
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The construction of two aluminium smelters in JEC was granted to three Chinese 
companies. With an estimation of USD 3.6 billion, the first smelter would be built by 
Sino-Saudi Jizan Aluminium Limited, a consortium that incorporated three companies: 
Chalco, MMC International Holdings Limited and Saudi Binladin Group (SBG). (Middle 
East Magnet September 2009). MMC International Holdings Limited (a Malaysian 
company) and SBG were the main developers of the JEC. Choosing a top Chinese 
aluminium company for the development of aluminium smelter plants would enable the 
sharing of expertise, technology and resources.  
 
A historical development of this cooperation began at the end of 2007. Through a number 
of important steps, the consortium was set up in which the Saudi and Chinese companies 
had an equal share except for the Malaysian company. These companies invited another 
Chinese firm into the project that would be responsible in the construction of a supporting 
infrastructure. The project began with the signing of a preliminary MoU on October 4, 
2007. It was then followed by a framework agreement on November 24 of the same year. 
In this agreement, these companies agreed ‘to develop, own and operate an aluminium 
smelter’ in JEC. The production capacity of this smelter was estimated at one million 
tonnes per year. The agreement also outlined the allocation of shares: Chalco (40 
percent), SBG (40 percent) and MMC (20 percent) (Middle East Magnet. 2009) (note: 
Chalco was the largest stakeholder in this project). In 2008, a feasibility study of this 
smelter was being conducted. Also, in this year, the consortium chose China’s CPI Power 
Engineering as a contractor for the building of a 2,400 MW captive power plant of this 
aluminium smelter (Arab News 29.12.08). In 2010, the call for the design and 
construction of the smelter was made. At this stage, the technical feasibility study 
continued (Project Information. 01.06.10) and the construction of the consortium project 
had not yet commenced. 
 
The second smelter would be built by Sino-Saudis Western Way for Industrial 
Development Company. The partners of this joint venture company were two Chinese 
companies and one local firm: Western Way for Industrial Development Company 
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Limited (WWIDC – a Saudi company), China National Machinery Industry Corporation 
(Sinomach), and China Non-ferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign Engineering & 
Construction Co., Ltd. (NFC). They reached a framework agreement in April 2007. The 
Chinese companies were to share their technical and operational experience and engage 
in technology transfer. They were also expected to have a strong presence in this project. 
 
A huge amount of assets would be allocated for this project because it aimed to build 
facilities that could support a large-scale production. WWIDC, Sinomach and NFC 
would engage in the construction of alumina and electrolytic aluminium smelter with an 
estimated production capacity of 1.6 million tonnes of alumina, and 660,000 - 700,000 
tonnes of aluminium. The construction of docks and power plant were also part of the 
project (Xinhua Financial News 25.05.07). The cost of the project was USD 5 billion, and 
had three phases of construction. The role of Sinomach in this project was to design, 
construct, operate, and transfer the technology to this project (Sinocast China Business 
Daily News 27.04.07). 
 
This project was considered as ‘one of the biggest deals between China and the Middle 
Eastern country (Wall Street Journal 20.04.07). This was assured by the Governor of 
SAGIA, Amr al-Dabbagh, who claimed this project to be the biggest Chinese investment 
in the region (AFX International Focus 20.04.07).  
 
Like the first smelter project, the construction of the second smelter was still at the initial 
stage, and no construction activity was observed. In 2008, WWIDC was in a negotiation 
with the Saudi Ministry of Petroleum on the fuel allocation of ‘the smelter’s captive oil-
fired power station’ (Mining & Metals 2008). In 2009, the project required ‘the design, 
supply, installation and operation of an integrated 1.6 million tonne per year alumina 
refinery and a 1 million tonne per year aluminium smelter’. The project was expected to 
start its operation in February 2013 (Project Information 01.06.09).  
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Unlike the two above-mentioned aluminium projects, the value of mutual investment 
between Hebei and Pan Kingdom Investment Company Limited (a Saudi based 
company) was far lower. With a USD 500 million investment, the two companies would 
develop an integrated steel industry project. As the biggest steelmaker in China, Hebei 
believed that this project would improve its global competiveness and its ability to offer 
good energy prices. As its President stated, ‘This is our maiden project outside China and 
this investment will enable us to leverage on JEC’s attractively-priced energy and 
compete more effectively in the global steel market’ (Jazan Economic City 2008). 
 
 An incentive was offered to investors in JEC that would presumably help reduce the cost 
of their project. The Kingdom planned to subsidize the cost of the fuel that would be used 
in the new plants in JEC. If this plan was implemented, the factories in JEC would enjoy 
a cheap rate of electricity for the duration of 25 years (UPI Energy 13.05.08).   
 
China Mart in Riyadh  
The Saudi and Chinese businessmen undertook an ambitious initiative by setting up a 
joint venture company. They invested in a project that offered an avenue for Chinese 
producers to market their goods and for Saudi customers to access and enjoy a variety of 
made-in-China products. This project was one of the business modes where the demand 
for the Chinese goods in Saudi market could be met. A large number of China’s 
businessmen, moreover, would have the opportunity to deal closely with their Saudi 
customers. Saudi businessman Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Kridis and his Chinese counterpart 
Wei Shiming formed a joint venture company, Chinese Competitive Spirit, in November 
2008. Al-Kridis was the Chairman, while Shiming was the CEO of the company. In the 
same year, the company intended to build ‘China Mart’ in Saudi Arabia at a cost of USD 
80 million. China Mart was a market that offered a wide range of products from China. A 
total of 250 China’s companies from 12 different sectors would open their shops in this 
market. At one point, the company was negotiating with several other companies, looking 
for a site that covered more than 100,000 square meters. The opening of this market was 
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expected to be in the third quarter of 2009, and would attract wholesalers and retailers in 
the Kingdom (MENA English 20.11.08). The market, however, was opened in Riyadh in 
November 2010. This was the first project  successfully developed by Chinese 
Competitive Spirit (Middle East Retails News Wire 02.11.10).  
 
Logistics Industry of Saudi Arabia 
A Chinese and a Saudi firm formed a joint venture company whose main focus was the 
logistics industry of the Kingdom. The two companies seemed to have a good 
background of doing business in the engineering services of this industry. They also had 
experience of jointly engaging in this type of business before the year that the joint 
venture was set up. China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corporation (Sinotrans) 
and Al-Majdouie formed a joint venture company in Saudi Arabia. The agreement was 
signed on June 24, 2008. Both parties had equal share in this joint venture. Sinotrans was 
a company that offered logistics services in China. This agreement was Sinotrans’ first 
joint venture in the Saudi market, while Al-Majdouie was the biggest company in the 
Kingdom that provided ‘inland transport services’. Some cooperation between the two 
companies could be traced in 2005. Examples were a completion of customs clearance 
and the transport of equipment for the Kingdom’s cement production line (Xinhua 
Economic News Service 02.07.08). 
 
Cooper-Zinc-Gold-Silver Mining Sector of Saudi Arabia  
In the period from 2006 to 2010, a Saudi company (Al-Masaneal Al-Kobra Mining 
Company) and two Chinese companies, China National Geological Mining Corporation 
(CNGM) and China Energy and Environmental Protection Group (CECEPG), concluded 
an agreement in the mining sector of the Kingdom. The participation of the Chinese 
companies in the two mining projects was broad. 
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In December 2007, CNGM and Al-Masaneal Al-Kobra Mining Company concluded a 
commercial contract for an exploration of copper, zinc, gold and silver proven reserve in 
Al-Masane. Although the Chinese company concentrated on the exploration activity, the 
area of cooperation with the Saudi company was comprehensive and extensive. The 
scope of this cooperation included ‘investment, management, risk undertaking and 
interest sharing’ (Xinhua Economic News Service 07.12.07). The Saudi company would 
deal with the investment of the project, which was worth approximately at USD 95 
million.  This mine is located in south western Saudi Arabia with a proven reserve of 7.2 
million tonnes (Xinhua Financial News 26.11.07).  
 
The same Saudi firm also collaborated with CECEPG (China’s state-owned company). 
The area of cooperation was inclusive, ranging from construction to production, and 
would be completed within six years. The value of the project was larger than the Al 
Masane mining project. In 2010, CECEPG and Al-Masaneal Al-Kobra Mining Co. 
concluded an agreement, signifying their cooperation in copper and zinc mining in 
Jeddah. In this agreement, the preparation and construction work of the project was 15 
months, and the production would then begin and continue for the following 45 months. 
The cost of the project was USD 125 million (China Business Newswire 06.07.10).  
 
5.4.2.5 China’s Active Involvement in the Construction Activities of Saudi Arabia 
Between 2006 and 2010, Chinese companies were actively and extensively involved in 
the construction sector of Saudi Arabia. This dynamic could be justified by the contracts 
that they had secured in the Kingdom. To support their participation, the Saudi authority 
amended the policy concerning the bidding process for the construction contracts in the 
country. In the period of 2001 to 2005, the number of construction contracts was 
increasing, mostly concentrated in the cement industry sector of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Chinese companies increased and strengthened their participation in the construction 
sector of Saudi Arabia. The volume of contracts offered to these companies was rising 
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and conducive to the increasing number of Chinese companies entering the industry, and 
involved billions of US dollars. These contracts, however, also included the contracts 
offered for production activities. According to China’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia H.E. 
Mr. Wu Chunhua,  fifty-five Saudi contracts worth USD 3.4 billion were granted to 
Chinese companies, and this was between January 2005 to March 2006 (note: for an 
average calculation, three Chinese companies obtained one contract each month). These 
contracts involved the following fields: ‘oil-related products, cement production, 
telecommunications, and infrastructure construction’ (Xinhua General News Service 
21.04.06). In mid-2006, contracts worth USD 400 million were signed between China 
and Saudi enterprises during a Chinese Guangdong-Saudi Arabia Fair Trade and 
Economic Cooperation. These contracts included the production of ‘liquefied petroleum 
gas, steel tubing, clothing, light industry products, household utensils, furniture, building 
materials, and home appliances’ (Xinhua General News Service 07.06.06).   
 
The Saudi authority encouraged more participation of China’s companies by speeding up 
their involvement in the bidding process of the construction contracts. A provision that 
could be seen as a way of minimising  bureaucratic procedures allowed Chinese 
companies to have direct contact with the Saudi ministry. This also implied that the Saudi 
authority had given priority to and strongly welcomed the Chinese peoples’ skills into the 
construction sector of the country. In 2007, a direct tendering of the project in Saudi 
Arabia was opened to the construction companies from China. This opportunity appeared 
in the MoU on Engineering Project Cooperation that was signed between Saudi Vice 
Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs Mansour bin Motaab and China’s Assistant 
Minister of Commerce Chen Jian. China’s construction companies were given the right 
of direct bidding on projects offered by the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, such 
as the construction of roads, bridges and buildings. The years before this MoU was 
concluded, the Chinese companies were the subcontractors within Saudi business 
activities (Xinhua General News Service 24.06.07). 
 
355 
 
The following assessment highlights the engagement of China’s firms in the major 
construction activities of Saudi Arabia. Those activities were diverse in form and come 
under the management of different consortiums. Railway construction, the cement 
industry, phosphate projects, telecommunication and internet service, and ports were the 
main construction projects that lured the business expansion of Chinese companies. 
 
Railway Construction in Saudi Arabia  
Saudi Arabia is currently improving its transportation system into a world class facility 
and service. Two railway expansion projects are being developed in the country: Saudi 
Landbridge Project and Haramain High Speed Rail Project (Saudi Railways Organization 
2010).  
 
The Saudi Landbridge Project seems to be heavily influenced by economic 
considerations. Upon completion, this project is expected to boost the economic 
development, increase the efficiency of product distribution between the east and west of 
the country, and ease the transportation links among major cities. Saudi Landbridge 
Project aims to improve the railway link between the Red Sea and the Persian Arabian 
Gulf. In this project, three port cities, Jeddah, Dammam and Jubail, will be linked. New 
lines that cover 950 km between Riyadh and Jeddah, and 115 km between Dammam and 
Jubail will be also built. The aims of this project are to transport a huge amount of cargo 
and to provide a convenient service to passengers. Cargos will be transported between the 
ports of Jeddah and Dammam and  will then be shipped to the other Gulf States. 
Furthermore, the Dammam-Jubail railway will ease the transportation of cargos from the 
Industrial City of Jubail to other parts of the country, including Riyadh and Jeddah (Saudi 
Railway Organization 2010). 
 
The second railway project seems to concentrate on providing good facilities to the 
Muslim visitors who come to Saudi Arabia to fulfil religious duties. The project, which 
involves two phases of construction, aims to facilitate the movement of a huge number of 
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passengers within specific areas. As a public-funded project, the Haramain High Speed 
Project has the objective of providing fast and convenient transport to passengers, 
especially for the millions of Muslims who perform Hajj in the two Holy Places in the 
Kingdom. With a 450 kilometre high-speed railway, the project will link Makkah and 
Madinah via Jeddah and King Abdullah Economic City. The railway is designed to serve 
20,000 passengers with trains operating at 360 km per hour (SinoCast 12.02.09). This 
project involves two phases. The first phase has two packages: the first package includes 
the design and building of the route and the second package includes the construction of 
the stations; the second phase covers those not included in the first phase, such as ‘track, 
signaling, telecommunication, power…’ (Saudi Railway Organization 2010). The 
Haramain High Speed Rail Project is due to be completed by the end of 2012. 
 
The Saudi authority and company, and the Chinese firm will be sharing and utilizing their 
resources and expertise in this project. The Chinese firm that is known for its expertise in 
building the Shanghai Maglev Rail lines has been extensively engaged in this project. Its 
engagement has started with the design and extends to the management of this high-speed 
railway. On February 11, 2009, Al Rajhi consortium, which was led by China Railway 
Construction Corporation (CRCC) and the Saudi authority, reached an agreement on the 
first phase of construction for the Haramain High Speed Project. The value of the deal 
was USD 1.77 billion. The construction is to be completed by the end of 2012. The 
CRCC will be responsible for the ‘design, procurement, construction and operation 
management’ of the project (SinoCast 12.02.09).  
 
A month later, this project began to offer incentives to other Chinese companies, or what 
might be called a ‘spill-over’ effect. These companies supplied, for example, the 
transport that would be used in the project. The roles of the companies in accelerating the 
progress of the project, to some extent, reflected the importance of Chinese companies in 
the development of the Saudi infrastructure. In March 2009, China Railway Construction 
& Rolling Stock Industry (Group) Corporation reached an agreement with Changchun 
Railway Vehicles Co., Ltd. (CRC) to supply Saudi Arabia with ‘204 A-type high-end 
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subway vehicles’. The latter was a ‘leading locomotive and railway vehicle maker’ in 
China. This supply indicated the first export of metro vehicles by a Chinese producer to 
the Kingdom. These vehicles would be used in the ‘metro line’ that covered the 18.08 
kilometres of railway project in the Kingdom (SinoCast 16.04.09).  
 
In November 2009, the Saudi Railway Organisation (SRO) delegation visited CSR 
Changjiang Auto (a subsidiary of China South Locomotive & Rolling (CSR)) in Wuhan, 
finalizing an order of USD 100 million railway boxcar that would be utilized for the 
Haramain High-Speed Rail project (Chinese Business News 23.11.09). 
 
To facilitate the development of the project, the Saudi government extended its full-
fledged support to this project by offering a financial loan. This initiative would 
financially assist the Saudi-Chinese consortium. In February 2010 during a Cabinet 
meeting chaired by King Abdullah, the Saudi Council of Ministers directed the Public 
Investment Fund to provide an ‘interest free loan’ to the Haramain Railway project.    
 
The Haramain High Speed Rail project moved into the next stage, which was the search 
for a consortium to carry out the second phase of the project. The value of the second 
phase project was estimated at USD 12.5 billion, which was seven times higher than the 
deal offered in the first phase (TendersInfo 06.07.10). Regarding the contract of this 
second phase, three consortiums (including a China consortium led by China South 
Locomotive Rolling Stock), however, did not participate in the bidding process.  
 
The second phase of the project entails a substantially wider scope of work than the first 
phase. It concentrates on ‘the establishment of the 450 km electric railroad, construction 
of signal and communication systems, supply of adequate number of speed trains, as well 
as operation and maintenance of the railway’(Gulf News (United Arab Emirates) 
10.02.10). The SRO also offered a contract for the development of railway stations in 
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four locations: Makkah, Madinah, King Abdullah Economic City of Rabigh and Jeddah 
airport. 
 
For China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), its initial success with this project 
was seen during the Hajj season of 2010. The Makkah Metro, which offered an efficient 
service between Mina, Arafat and Muzdalifa, came into operation during this period.  
With a distance of 18 kilometres, the Makkah Metro had elevated the congestion during 
the Hajj period that annually receives 2.5 millions pilgrims around the world (The 
Associated Press 14.11.10). Only Saudi and Gulf state pilgrims utilized this facility 
during 2010 Hajj, and a full operation would be carried out in the coming year. This 
achievement did not simply provide a world-class facility to Saudi Arabia; it also 
deepened the confidence of Saudi authority toward the expertise and engagement of the 
Chinese companies in the construction activity. 
 
Construction of Processing Facilities in Saudi Arabian Cement Industry  
In the 2000s, the cement industry of the Middle East was rapidly expanding due to the 
increasing market demand, mainly from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Experiencing a 
massive development of new infrastructure, Saudi Arabia was called upon to improve 
and expand the capacity of the cement production plants in the country.  
 
With a huge demand in the local market, Saudi cement producers had to build more 
production plants in the country. This development evidently demanded the heavy 
involvement of Chinese companies in the construction of cement production lines. In the 
period between 2001 and 2005, Chinese companies secured four construction contracts in 
the cement industry. Since some of these construction projects were completed in 2007 
and 2008, Chinese companies continued to receive new contracts. These contracts were 
granted to Sinoma International Engineering Co., Ltd, and Chengdu Building Materials 
Industry Design & Research Institute (CDI) in 2009 and 2010.   
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In two consecutive years, Chinese companies completed the construction of two cement 
production lines in Saudi Arabia. The total production capacity of these lines was 
estimated at 11,000 tonnes per day. When these plants came into operation, an increased 
supply of cement would be able to alleviate the high demand of the local market. On 
November 13, 2007, with a contract for USD 170 million, Sinoma International 
Engineering Co., Ltd completed the construction of a cement production line in Riyadh. 
The contract was concluded in the last two years. This production line was owned by 
Riyadh Cement Company and had the capacity to produce 5,000 tonnes per day 
(SinoCast China Business Daily News 14.11.07). China National Building Materials & 
Equipment Import & Export Corporation (CNBM International) successfully completed a 
construction of cement production line in Saudi Arabia, which had begun in April 2006. 
The first operation started in February 2008. This production line was capable of 
producing 6,000 tonnes of cement clinkers per day (SinoCast 03.03.08).   
 
In 2009 and 2010, more contracts for the construction of cement production facilities 
were made between Saudi and Chinese companies. Sinoma International Engineering Co. 
signed two contracts in 2009 and 2010, and Chengdu Building Materials Industry Design 
& Research Institute (CDI) obtained one contract in 2009. The constructions would be 
taking place in three different locations: Riyadh, Tihama and Hail. The Chinese 
companies would help boost the production capacity of these lines, which ranged from 
5,000 tonnes to 12,000 tonnes per day. Against this backdrop, one could argue that 
Chinese companies had a good reputation in the construction activities of Saudi cement 
sector. In February 2009, Riyadh Cement Company and Sinoma International 
Engineering Co. (a China-based company) signed a contract for the construction of a new 
production line with a capacity to produce 12,000 tonnes per day (Middle East Business 
Digest 13.02.09). The two companies signed the agreement during a state visit of 
President Hu Jintao to Saudi Arabia. This development indicated an expansion of 
cooperation between the Chinese and Saudi companies from the previous project in 2007. 
In May of the same year, another Chinese company, Chengdu Building Materials 
Industry Design & Research Institute (CDI), signed an EPC contract with Saudi local 
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firm, Hail Cement Company. In this contract, CDI would build a clinker production line 
with a capacity of 5000 tonnes of cement daily (News Bites Asian Market 29.10.10). 
 
In January 2010, a contract was signed between China’s Sinoma International 
Engineering Company and the Southern Province Cement Company (SPCC) (Saudi 
company) in the construction of a second production line at the Tihama Cement plant. 
This contract was worth USD 147 million (Saudi Economic Survey 27.01.10) with an 
estimated production of 5,000 tonnes per day (Middle East Business Digest 06.11.09).   
 
Construction of Processing Facilities in Saudi Arabian Phosphate Project 
Ma’aden Phosphate Company (MPC), a Saudi consortium, and a Chinese firm, Guizho 
Hongfu Industry and Commerce Co., Ltd. (Hongfu), signed a contract for the building of 
a processing facility for a phosphate deposit in Al Jalamid. The project was then 
completed within the duration that had been agreed upon in the contract. China’s state-
owned company, Hongfu, won the contract for the construction of beneficiation plant at 
Al Jalamid in the northern part of Saudi Arabia. The 28-month contract was worth USD 
350 million. The Chinese company would build a phosphorus concentrator with a 
production capacity of 12.5 million tonnes of ore (Xinhua General News Service 
30.11.07). This construction was part of MPC’s project (MPC was a joint venture 
company between two state-owned companies: Ma’aden Phosphate Company and 
SABIC).  
 
In 2010, by carrying out some final jobs, the construction of this plant met its schedule. 
The President of MPC, Abdul Aziz al-Harbi, announced that the plant was ‘well-
positioned’ to supply phosphate concentrate (the raw material) to Ras Az Zawr for a 
processing in a fertilizer production facility. The other work that had been completed 
earlier was described as ‘the launching work and inspection of machinery and equipment 
at the beneficiation plant’ (Arab News 08.07.10). 
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Construction of Port Facilities in Jeddah and Ras Az Zawr 
Another area where the expertise and technology of the Chinese companies were 
rewarded in Saudi Arabia was in the construction of port facilities. Chinese companies 
secured contracts for this type of construction in Ras Az Zawr and Jeddah Islamic Port. 
 
A Chinese state-owned company, China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), 
expanded its business operation in the construction project of the oldest and the largest 
port of Saudi Arabia. The project, which took less than two years, would build a new 
facility which would later increase the efficiency of the port’s operation. Moreover, the 
new facility would spur the trading activities of the country. CHEC and Saudi Trade and 
Export Development Company (Tusdeer) signed a USD 510 million contract on the 
construction of ‘Red Sea Gate’ terminal in Jeddah Islamic Port in November 2007 (ITP 
Business Publishing Ltd. 2011). The length of the contract was 22 months and went into 
effect in January 2008. In December 2009, the first phase of project was conducted. It 
was expected that the capacity of the port could be enhanced by 45 percent after the 
completion of the construction (Middle East Real Estate and Construction News Wire 
29.11.07). It also had the potential to boost export and import activities in the country, 
and improve Saudi economic competitiveness in the region (SinoCast 14.01.08). A 
Chinese equipment supplier, Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery Company, was also 
granted an equipment supplying contract in the expansion project of this port. 
 
CHEC also engaged in the construction of facilities at Ras Az Zawr port. Under a joint 
venture company between China Harbour Engineering Arabia Company, CHEC and 
Rafid Group (Saudi company) secured a contract and would build port facilities at a cost 
of USD 586.84 million (Saudi Economic Survey 03.02.10). One of these facilities was the 
construction of a liquid wharf in the no. 3 berth port. The construction began in February 
2008 and lasted for three years (China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd. 2009). 
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Construction of Facilities for Telecommunication and Internet Services in Saudi 
Arabia  
Chinese companies sought business experience in Saudi Arabia through commercial 
contracts in telecommunication and wireless networking. They cooperated with the local 
companies in developing and improving high-tech service in the Kingdom. However, 
there was an event in which the Chinese telecommunication company ended up retreating 
from the bidding process. 
 
China Telecommunications Corporations (China Telecom Group) did not participate in 
the whole bidding process for the license of telecom service in Saudi Arabia. The process 
was very competitive and challenged the financial aspect of the company. China Telecom 
Group initially participated in a bid for ‘fixed telecom service licenses’ in the Kingdom. 
Nine other bidders also participated in the bid. However, in April 2007, China Telecom 
withdrew from the next round of bidding since the tender price for the fixed-line license 
in the Kingdom was high. This company was the biggest provider of fixed-lines in China. 
 
However, there was no an obstacle for other Chinese firms who wanted to expand their 
business operations and make a profit in the high-technology business of Saudi Arabia.  
ZTE Corporation (a Shenzhen-based company) cooperated with a local firm, Etihad 
Atheeb Telecom (Atheeb), in developing a WiMAX base station and networking. In 
addition to the two companies sharing technology and expertise, the Chinese firm would 
provide the Saudi company with high-tech equipment. In June 2009, ZTE Corporation 
and Atheeb signed an agreement for the development of a High-speed WiMAX network 
in Saudi Arabia that covered five major cities. ZTE Corporation was a company that 
offered telecommunications equipment and network solutions, while Atheeb was the 
largest operator of WiMAX in the Kingdom. Both companies would also engage in the 
development of 300 WiMAX base stations. ZTE would supply this Saudi company with 
IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystems) and MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching) (Chinese 
Business News 22.06.09). 
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Like ZTE Corporation, a Chinese firm, Huawei, signed a MoU for a business engagement 
in the wireless networking service in Saudi Arabia. It also agreed to share its technology 
and supply high-tech equipment to one of Saudi’s wireless research centres. In October 
2009, a MoU was reached among Etihad Etisalat (Mobily), Huawei, and Industrial & 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBvaC). The signatories were Chairman of Mobily, 
Abdulaziz al-Saghyir, the Vice President of Huawei, Ding Shaohua, and the Vice 
President of Dubai branch of ICBC, Ma Xiangjin. Mobily was a mobile service provider 
and Huawei was a telecom solution provider. The MoU aimed at arranging a financing 
option for the project that was granted to Huawei. The most important aspect of the MoU 
was the initiative of Mobily to offer Huawei a contract ‘to run operational services for its 
2G and 3G networks, network expansion, and various broadband and enhancement 
projects’ (MENA English 07.10.09). In October 2010, Huawei agreed to support and 
provide a Centre of Excellence for Wireless Applications (CEWA) in Saudi Arabia with 
its Long Term Evolution (LTE) and WiMAX equipment. CEWA conducts research and 
development, and offers expertise and consultation in conducting wireless applications to 
various customers, such as telecommunication operators and governments (MENA 
English 27.10.10). 
 
Conclusion 
From 2001 to 2005, the economic cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia was 
further enhanced, particularly in the oil trade and in investment and construction 
activities. In trade relations, the volume of Chinese imports of Saudi oil in the years 
between 2001 and 2005 was seven times larger than the period from 1992 to 2000. Since 
Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia was low, the Saudi and Chinese governments 
intensified their efforts to improve this investment climate. Regarding the construction 
sector, in 2004 and 2005, Chinese companies won four contracts to construct cement 
production facilities in Saudi Arabia in the cities of Al-Moujarada, Muzamiyah, Marat 
and Hufuf. 
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Between 2006 and 2010, the bilateral economic links were immensely strong and highly 
successful. The exchange visits of the leaders – King Abdullah and President Hu Jintao – 
in January and April 2006 solidified oil cooperation. During the King’s visit to China, 
five agreements were reached between the countries. In the context of cooperation in the 
hydrocarbon sector, the visit brought the signing of the energy protocol, which intended 
to widen cooperation in oil, natural gas and minerals. Similarly, the return visit of 
President Hu Jintao in the same year witnessed the signing of an agreement regarding 
strategic oil reserves. Chinese imports of Saudi oil expanded drastically in the period 
from 2006 to 2009. In comparison with the period from 2001 to 2005, an increase of 71.4 
percent (53.5 million tonnes) was recorded in the years between 2006 and 2009. 
Although the Chinese oil market was increasingly dominated by Saudi oil, it received less 
Saudi oil than American and Japanese oil markets did. In other words, American and 
Japanese markets remained the major foreign markets of oil from Saudi Arabia. 
 
In the mutual investment of the hydrocarbon sector, the Quanzhou refining and 
petrochemical project began its commercial and full operation on November 11, 2009. 
There is a possibility that Sinopec will cooperate with Saudi ARAMCO and ExxonMobil 
in an expansion of the project. In 2010, Sinopec and Saudi ARAMCO continued the 
second phase of gas exploration in Rub’ Al-Khali, though the exploration of the previous 
seven wells produced no commercial value. In October 2010, the commercial and full 
operation of Tianjin petrochemical project began. Sinopec and SABIC will further their 
collaboration in the development of a polycarbonate (PC) manufacturing unit through this 
project. 
 
The theoretical conception of complex interdependence accurately describes the recent 
state of Sino-Saudi relations. Actors involved in the bilateral relations were varied, and 
the channels used in the Sino-Saudi links were multiple. Furthermore, the nature of the 
bilateral relations reflected both interstate and transnational contacts. Beijing-Riyadh 
relations significantly revealed two other characteristics of complex interdependence: the 
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minimal role of military force and the absence of hierarchy among issues. The role of 
force in the Sino-Saudi relations was highly insignificant: the two countries did not form 
any military alliances, and Saudi Arabia did not rely on China for its military equipment 
and training. The absence of hierarchy among issues, which suggested that military 
security did not dominate the agenda of a state-to-state relationship, was exhibited in the 
Sino-Saudi relations. The interstate agenda between China and Saudi Arabia was entirely 
dominated by economic interests. 
 
The theory of constructivism clearly helps to illuminate the development of Sino-Saudi 
relations during the period between 2000 and 2010. One of constructivism’s themes—the 
norms following from social structure—can be seen to have  shaped the Chinese and 
Saudi policy behaviour in response to the major events in the region. Institutional 
structures and the norms associated with legitimacy also influenced policy behaviour. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion, and Relevance for US Relations with Saudi Arabia 
 
Introduction 
This chapter gives the conclusion of the thesis and contains an analysis of the relevance 
of Sino-Saudi links to US-Saudi relations. In the conclusion, some key developments in 
Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations are stressed. In examining these developments, the 
political and economic dimensions are given particular emphasis. The conclusion will 
underline the application of the complex interdependence and constructivism to the 
Beijing-Riyadh relationship over the last two decades.  
 
6.1 What the thesis has shown? 
The characteristics of complex interdependence did not exist in the context of Sino-Saudi 
relations before 1978. However, from 1979 to 1989, some of the necessary elements of 
complex interdependence began to exhibit. In 1990, the characteristic of complex 
interdependence were developing in the official relations between the two countries. In 
the 2000s, especially after the 2006 exchange visits of the top leaders, the relationship 
between China and Saudi Arabia appeared to be one of complex interdependence. 
 
China and Saudi Arabia established diplomatic relations on July 21, 1990. The Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, and the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal 
were the leading figures who made possible this historic event. The two ministers agreed 
on the foundation principles (namely peaceful coexistence, non-interference, mutual 
benefit and equity) which would govern the newly established diplomatic relations. 
 
State-to-state relations between China and Saudi Arabia signified an absence of a 
hierarchy of issues which stressed that military security did not dominate the inter-state 
agenda. Economic interests topped the agenda of the leaders and officials who 
coordinated the Sino-Saudi bilateral relations. The visit of Premier Li Peng to Saudi 
Arabia in 1991 (a year after the diplomatic relations were established) was ‘a new starting 
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point’ for the advancement of bilateral relations (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
12.07.91). The leader deemed it was essential to fortify the diplomatic link so as to forge 
the economic ties. 
 
In pursuing economic interests, the concerted efforts for bolstering the economic links 
between the two countries were invested. In 1992, agreements concerning the 
development of economic cooperation were signed. In 1993, a Chinese Consulate 
General’s Office was opened in Jeddah and dealt with exports and imports between 
China and Saudi Arabia. In 1996, the Sino-Saudi Arabian Mixed-Trade and Economic 
Committee was formed and in the following year the Saudi Arabia-China Friendship and 
China-Saudi Arabia Friendship Associations were established. Exchange visits by trade 
delegations between the two countries increased in the early years of these diplomatic 
relations. 
 
Multiple channels of contact, which constitutes one of the characteristics of complex 
interdependence, successfully preserved and fostered the economic links between the two 
countries. Chinese and Saudi high-level officials consistently encouraged the 
involvement of the private sector in the bilateral economic relationship. Officials clearly 
outlined several approaches in which bilateral economic links could be cemented. To 
help the business circles of the two countries to develop and strengthening their 
commercial ties, a non-governmental joint commercial committee was formed in 2003. 
An office of the Saudi Consulate-General was opened in Hong Kong in that year. 
 
A number of Chinese top leaders called on the promotion of strategic cooperation in the 
Beijing-Riyadh bilateral relations. The leaders deemed not to give emphasis to security 
concern in the interstate agenda (note: neglecting security concern in the agenda 
described one of the conditions of complex interdependence). In a visit to Saudi Arabia in 
April 2006, President Hu Jintao accentuated China’s readiness to forge such cooperation 
with the Kingdom. The agreements that were concluded during the visit heavily stressed 
the political and economic relations between the two countries, but did not embrace or 
even promoted a security relationship between Riyadh and Beijing. Strategic cooperation 
which would serve the Sino-Saudi economic interests was briefly mentioned in a joint 
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communiqué during a visit of President Jiang Zemin to Saudi Arabia in November 1999. 
In the communiqué, the strengthening of the Sino-Saudi political and economic 
relationship was strongly emphasized. 
 
China’s Vice President, Xi Jinping, in 2008 introduced another interpretation of 
‘strategic’ with regard to the Sino-Saudi bilateral relations. Underlining the significance 
of bilateral economic and trade ties, the new version of the concept was known as ‘a 
friendly and cooperative strategic partnership’.  
 
In a state visit to Saudi Arabia in 2009, President Hu Jintao called upon the two countries 
to build ‘strategic friendly relations’. The President more precisely defined strategic 
cooperation in order to prevent a misunderstanding with the United States on the issue. 
 
Complex interdependence matched with the development of the Sino-Saudi links. The 
Sino-Saudi trade performance was strong and solid. The total trade value between the two 
countries dramatically increased in the eighteen years following the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. In the first decade following the agreement, the total value of Sino-
Saudi trade grew from USD 417 million (1990) to USD 3.1 billion (2000), an increase of 
643.4 percent. From 2001 to 2005, trade between China and Saudi Arabia rose by 295.6 
percent, increasing from USD 4.07 billion to USD 16.1 billion. Between 2006 and 2008, 
trade between the two countries increased by an additional 108 percent. However, due to 
the global economic crisis, Chinese and Saudi total trade in 2009 fell by 22 percent, from 
USD 41.8 billion in 2008 to USD 32.6 billion.  
 
The imports of oil from Saudi Arabia which created an element of dependence clearly 
affected the Sino-Saudi trade balance. China ran a trade surplus with Saudi Arabia from 
1991 to 1995. In the following five years, however, China experienced a trade deficit 
with the Kingdom and continued to face an unfavourable trade balance in the following 
years. Between 2001 and 2005, the negative trade balance rose by 519 percent, with a 
total of USD 19.38 billion. From 2006 to 2009, the Chinese trade deficit continued to 
climb to a total of USD 55 billion. The soaring global price of oil and the growing 
Chinese oil needs were among the factors contributing to the widened deficit. 
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China’s dependency on Saudi Arabian oil developed gradually from 1991 to 2009. The 
volume of China’s oil imports from Saudi Arabia, the percentage of Saudi Arabian share 
of Chinese total oil imports and the overall ranking of China’s major oil suppliers 
strongly suggest that Chinese oil dependency on the Kingdom is deep. Between 1991 and 
1998, the volume of Chinese oil imports from Saudi Arabia was less than 1 million 
tonnes in each year. In the following three years, however, the volume grew from 1.8 
million tonnes in 1998, to 2.5 million tonnes in 1999 and 5.7 million tonnes in 2000. 
Over the ten years from 1991 to 2000, the volume of oil imports rose by 6721 percent, 
from 84 thousand tonnes to 5.7 million tonnes. From 2001 to 2005, purchases of Saudi oil 
rose by 154 percent, reflecting China’s oil dependency on Saudi Arabia. Chinese imports 
of Saudi oil continued to rise from 2006 to 2009, from 23.8 million tonnes in 2006 to 
41.8 million tonnes in 2009, a 75 percent increase. 
 
The Saudi Arabian share of China’s total oil imports grew significantly, from 1.41 
percent in 1990 to 8.16 percent in 2000. From 2001 to 2005, Saudi oil made up 74.6 
million tonnes (15.7 percent) of total Chinese oil imports. This total rose to almost 20 
percent in the next three years. 
 
The position of Saudi Arabia in relation to China’s other oil sources—Iran, Angola and 
Russia—has increased significantly. Between 1992 and 2000, Saudi oil exports to China 
ranked third after Angola and Iran. The Kingdom moved to second place in 2001 and first 
in 2002. It has remained in first place ever since. 
 
Much effort was expended in facilitating and enhancing energy cooperation between the 
two countries. Since 1997, oil companies in each of the two countries have concluded 
several cooperation agreements. The visit of Crown Prince Abdullah in 1998 led to the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding which concentrated on trade, investment, 
mining and oil. In 1999, President Jiang Zemin made a state visit to Saudi Arabia and 
concluded five agreements. One of the most important of these was the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Oil Cooperation. The state visits of the two country’s leaders in 2006 
established aggressive oil policies between the two countries. The visit of King Abdullah 
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to Beijing in January 2006 culminated in the signing of an energy protocol between the 
two countries, whereas the visit of President Hu Jintao a few months later concluded an 
agreement on Chinese strategic oil reserves. 
 
China’s dependency on Saudi oil exemplifies the link between power and 
interdependence. The nature of the dependency fits with the term of ‘vulnerability of 
interdependence’ that Keohane and Nye have stressed in their discussion on the role of 
power in interdependence. One may assess the vulnerability when the degree of efficacy 
of Chinese altered and new policies is known (note: China has been pursuing alternative 
policies, attempting to reduce its oil dependency on the Middle Eastern oil producing 
countries). 
 
The thesis also examines the application of constructivism in Sino-Saudi relations from 
1949 to 2010. It argues that China and Saudi Arabia had a shared understanding that 
ideology was preventing the formation of official links between them during the period 
between 1949 and 1977. Over the course of the following twelve years, this 
understanding gradually changed. The change led to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations in 1990. In the years between 1990 and 2010, the policy responses of China and 
Saudi Arabia to major regional events exhibited the continued relevance of the themes 
introduced by the constructivists, such as the social structure, to the study of Sino-Saudi 
relations. This relevance was further reinforced by the process the two countries followed 
in enriching their shared understanding. 
 
371 
 
6.2 Relevance for US Relations with Saudi Arabia  
Introduction 
Some analysts have critically argued that the close relationship between China and Saudi 
Arabia in this decade has seriously challenged the economic and security interests of the 
US, a long-standing partner of the Kingdom. The growing concern regarding this 
perceived threat will be the main focus of this sub-section. Key factors in the Sino-Saudi 
relationship which have been identified are the energy strategy of China, the oil policy of 
Saudi Arabia and China’s position as a new close friend of the Kingdom. Do these factors 
present a great challenge to American-Riyadh relations?  
 
Chinese Energy Strategy 
Two objectives guide Chinese energy strategy towards the Middle Eastern oil exporting 
countries: to ensure China’s long-term economic growth and to reduce China’s 
vulnerability concerning energy (Fan and Donghai 2006 p. 99). In attaining these 
objectives, China incorporates the element of soft power in its energy strategy; it adopts a 
diplomatic approach in its oil trade dealings with the producing countries. China 
frequently calls for a better relationship with these countries and greater political stability 
in the region. 
 
Chinese energy policy could have some significant implications to the world oil market 
and pose potential threats to other consuming countries. First, China’s pressing need for 
oil markedly increases the percentage of global oil demand, and therefore has the 
potential to destabilize the world oil market (Wu and Liu 2007 p. 217). Second, Chinese 
energy policy (export strategy) encourages Chinese National Oil Companies (CNOCs) to 
acquire and build up their equity stakes in the operation of oil producing countries. This 
development led former President Bush to voice Washington's concern in his 2006 
National Security Strategy. He criticized China’s policy behaviour, stating ‘as if they can 
somehow “lock up” energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather 
than opening them up’ (Sanger 2006). 
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China’s strategy and its growing need for oil should not be seen as an energy threat to the 
US. The notion of China as posing the threat is a misleading and overstated, in the view 
of Wu and Liu,  China does not pose a threat since the influence of the US in the energy 
market remains strong and profound. The US is known for its considerable influence in 
the energy market and among oil producing nations of the Middle East, the Gulf and 
Latin America. Wu and Liu (2007) further argue against a false perception that assesses 
China as a country that causes instability in the energy market. The contributing factor of 
the instability (the rising global oil demand and price) is the US oil demand. By referring 
to the British Petroleum Statistical Review, they go on to argue that between 1995 and 
2005, the US oil import grew by 4.42 million bpd, a figure that was considerably larger 
than China’s oil demand, which accounted for 1.5 million bpd.  
 
The Significance of Saudi Oil Policy 
Saudi Arabia is ‘the focal point for the global oil market’ due to its ‘oil reserve, oil 
exports [and] spare oil production capacity’ (Blanchard 2011 p. 6). The Kingdom is 
committed to ensuring the stability of the oil supply and oil price: it offsets oil supply 
losses and prevents the shock of a sharp oil price increases.  In an article published in 
2009, Prince Turki al-Faisal states that Saudi Arabia has invested USD 100 billion in 
producing 12.5 million bpd of oil. The Prince stresses his country’s capacity to ease 
critical shortages of global oil supply, saying, ‘today we hold about 4.5 million barrels 
per day of spare capacity (or more than 90 percent of the global total), enough to replace 
the second and third-largest OPEC producers overnight if the world needed more oil’ 
(2009, p. 103). 
 
Saudi oil policy has gained a significant degree of influence over the international oil 
market. Saudi Arabia has ‘spare production capacity’, which causes Telhami and Hill to 
describe the Kingdom as holding a ‘trump card’ (2002). They stress that Saudi Arabia is 
the only oil producing country that has the ability to affect a short-term increase of global 
oil prices: the Kingdom may boost or maintain the volume of oil supply (Telhami and 
Hill 2002). Saudi Arabia has the ability to ‘replace single-handedly, within months, the 
total loss of exports of any other oil producer on the globe’. The world economy would 
suffer were there to be a ‘sudden loss of the Saudi oil network’ (Jaffe 2003 p. 2). 
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A political science scholar at the University of Vermont, Gregory Gause, argues that the 
production capacity of Saudi Arabia is more crucial than ‘the details of Saudi oil sales’. 
The Kingdom frequently uses its production capacity to ‘smooth jolts to world oil prices’, 
including those occasioned by the strikes in Venezuela in 2002 and the events of 
September 11, 2001. Gause sees the role of Saudi Arabia in such situations as ‘the central 
bank’. The Saudis, moreover, ‘[are] at a point where there’s precious little surplus 
capacity’ globally (Energy Bulletin 15.09.04). 
 
Saudi Arabia diversifies its customers and attempts to maintain its foothold in Asian 
market. When Asian demand for oil increases, the Saudi crude oil price is also boosted. 
The Kingdom, therefore, has recently minimized the contract prices to Asian customers 
because it has to ensure that the price of its oil is competitive. Previously, the price for 
crude oil supply to Asia was higher than the prices for supplies going to Europe and the 
US. The higher price was due to the transportation cost. 
 
Saudi Arabia is significantly extending its influence as the world’s biggest oil producer 
and supplier. Saudi ARAMCO has been building refinery facilities in Asia and will 
encourage Asian countries to import heavy crude grades from the Kingdom. Joint venture 
refineries in China have also helped strengthen Saudi ARAMCO’s supply chain in Asia. 
An example is the Saudi ARAMCO, Sinopec and ExxonMobil joint venture in the Fujian 
refinery project. Saudi refineries in Jubail and Yanbu, which will begin their operations 
in 2013 and 2014, aim to meet the demands of refined products in the Asian and Middle 
Eastern markets (Gavin 2010). 
 
Saudi Arabia Finds a New Best Friend 
China’s policy behaviour and position at the international level have facilitated the 
development of Sino-Saudi relations.  Prince Turki al-Faisal comments on Saudi relations 
with China: ‘with China, there is less baggage, there are easier routes to mutual benefits’ 
(Hurriyet Daily News 21.04.10). Lippman assumes that ‘building consumption’ might be 
one of the factors that has influenced the shift of Saudi attention towards China. Lippman 
argues that the Saudis ‘...need a good relationship with a country that is a permanent 
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member of the (U.N.) Security Council, is a strong a growing market for our oil, is a 
nuclear power and...is untainted by having invaded any Arab countries’ (Energy Bulletin 
15.09.04). 
 
China’s economic achievement has received considerable attention from Saudi Arabia. 
Director of Market and Country Strategies at US Consultant PFC Energy, David Kirsch, 
holds the view that Saudi Arabia has focused its oil trade on China because the Chinese 
market is experiencing strong development as compared to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD) countries, which are facing a declining 
demand (Gavin 2010). Mohammad al-Mady also claims that ‘China is a country that has 
the greatest market for our products, so there is no politics behind this, it is only straight 
business’ (Hurriyet Daily News 21.04.10). 
 
Have Sino-Saudi Economic Relations Affected US-Saudi Economic Ties? 
This sub-section attempts to argue that Sino-Saudi relations currently do not have 
profound implications for US-Saudi relations, nor do they signify a total shift of Saudi 
relations from the West to Asia. On the other hand, Beijing-Riyadh relations imply a 
diversifying of Saudi relations with foreign countries and customers, and a significant 
expansion of Saudi influence as the key economic player in the international oil market. 
 
US-Saudi relations remain strong though there is a close economic link between Saudi 
Arabia and China. This fact is proved by statistical data on trade between the US and 
Saudi Arabia and the competitiveness of American firms relative to other foreign 
companies. The US Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, Francisco J. 
Sanchez, stresses the trade improvement between his country and Saudi Arabia, saying, ‘I 
am happy to report that our trade for 2010 with Saudi Arabia is up eight percent in the 
first six months over the same period last year (Arab News 11.12.10). Commenting on the 
competition from India, China and Turkey, Sanchez believes that American firms ‘still 
[have] the edge’. He admits the advantages that the US firms have had concerning 
technological and innovation aspects, and stresses, ‘I know that American companies are 
among the most innovative in the world, and so they can bring innovation, the latest 
technology, in a number of fields’ (Arab News 11.12.10). He cites an example of 
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Maaden’s decision to choose Alcoa for the development of an aluminium smelting 
project in Ras Azwar: ‘Saudi Arabia considered companies from different parts of the 
world for this project, and it ultimately chose Alcoa, a US company, because of the 
innovation and because of the state-of-the-art technology that it brought’ (Arab News 
11.12.10). In addition, the Head of Commercial Affairs at the US embassy in Riyadh, 
Amer Kayani, stresses the enormous contribution of American businesses to Saudi 
economic development, stating: 
 
The United States has engaged in trade with Saudi Arabia since 1945. The two 
countries have a very, very close relationship. Today, there are tens of thousands 
of Americans who are living in Saudi Arabia with their families doing business. 
They represent U.S. companies, work for Saudi companies, or work for 
multinationals. There are more U.S.-educated PhDs employed by the Saudi 
government than by our own government (Department of Commerce United 
States of America 2011). 
 
The US energy strategy with Middle Eastern oil producing nations has built a direct and 
close linkage between  economic and security interests. The economic interest is to retain 
a reasonable global oil price by ensuring a constant flow of oil supply to the international 
market. The security interest, as viewed by the US, requires the existence of a stable 
political order in the Middle East, thereby allowing the US to access the oil, markets and 
communication of the region. This would also protect US investment and assets in the 
area. The Gulf War in 1990-91 indicated an inextricable and obvious link between energy 
and security interests. In this war, the US needed to protect the Saudi oil reserve since the 
illegal occupation of Iraqi military troops in Kuwait entailed a high risk to the oil rich 
eastern province of Saudi Arabia. 
 
The US dependency on Saudi oil cooperation in ensuring a reliable oil supply and a 
stable and smooth international oil market is high. Arguing that there is no technology at 
the moment that could help the US replace the oil consumption that supports its ‘massive 
manufacturing, transportation, and military needs’, Prince Turki al-Faisal believes that 
the US has to acknowledge the fact of energy interdependence (2009, p.102). The 
concept of ‘energy independence’, as he further claims, is ‘unrealistic, misguided, and 
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ultimately harmful to energy-producing and -consuming countries alike’ (Al-Faisal 2009 
p.102). 
 
Telhami and Hill (2000) claim that the US would face ‘additional complications’ when 
there emerges a new country in the Middle East that needs to protect its energy interest in 
the region. Some Chinese economists  predict that by 2030 and 2040, China’s economy 
will become equal to that of the US. At this time, an increasing Chinese oil dependency 
on the Persian Gulf states will be competing with the US interest in the region (Aarts 
2006 p. 419). 
 
The US imports more Saudi oil than China, yet China’s strategy to actively increase its 
oil imports from the Kingdom might seem to challenge America’s position as one of the 
biggest buyers of Saudi oil. Between 1992 and 2009, the US purchased a higher volume 
of petroleum and crude oil from Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis China: the US and China’s annual 
average imports of this commodity accounted for 926.5 million tonnes and 187.3 million 
tonnes respectively (Table 6.1 and Graph 6.1). On the other hand, the trend of Chinese 
petroleum and crude oil imports from Saudi Arabia rose dramatically compared to that of 
the US. Between 1992 and 2009, imports grew from 187 thousand tonnes to 41.8 million 
tonnes; an increase of 2493 percent. By contrast, the trend of imports to the US was 
declining.  Imports dramatically lowered by 36.6 percent, from 80.4 million tonnes in 
1992 to 51 million tonnes in 2009. The declining US imports of this commodity in 2009 
were in tune with the economic contractions that the oil consuming countries had been 
experiencing (Table 6.1 and Graph 6.1). Despite this change, the Sino-Saudi oil trade still 
has no threat to the US oil imports from the Kingdom. 
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Table 6.1: Chinese and the US Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1992-2009 (Tonnes) 
 China  The US 
1992 187,323 80,430,791 
1994 146,449 67,525,153 
1996 230,635 55,614,612 
1998 1,807,618 69,391,459 
2000 5,730,211 69,281,982 
2002 11,390,760 74,371,236 
2004 17,243,549 75,481,215 
2005 22,178,924 121,646,854 
2006 23,871,514 116,422,460 
2007 26,333,689 70,609,089 
2008 36,368,396 74,761,322 
2009 41,857,126 50,975,477 
Source: United Nations Commodity Division  
 
Graph 6.1: Chinese and US Oil Imports from Saudi Arabia, 1992-2009 (Tonnes) 
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Will China Challenge US Military Strategic Cooperation with Saudi Arabia? 
Military cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia is rather weak due to a lack of 
arms deals between them and the lack of Chinese military interest in the Gulf. Saudi 
Arabia purchased 36 CSS-2 missiles from China in the late 1980s. In the following 
decades, the purchasing of military weapons from China, however, declined. Although 
there was rumoured to be some nuclear cooperation between the two countries, the 
evidence of such is lacking (Nonneman 2006 p. 344). China has limited military interest 
in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia, in particular, for at least two reasons. First, China has 
announced that the principal purpose of its military power is for national security. 
Chinese leaders assert that this military power will retain the dominance of the 
Communist Party in the country, and secure the national border and provide a safe 
environment for the economic growth. Second, the deliberate intention behind Chinese 
military modernization is to prevent any attacks from its neighbours and regional rivals, 
notably India, Japan and Russia. Its military modernization no doubt can be seen as a 
challenge to the US military power. In China’s view, however, its military capability is 
not strong enough to reach this objective. 
 
China recognizes the limitation of its military capability. Most indices of national power 
show that China ‘...continues to lag far behind the United States’ (Glaser 2010).  In 
protecting and promoting its interest in the Persian Gulf, China deploys ‘the tools of 
statecraft’ since its military capability in the area is limited. Some examples of the tools 
are ‘diplomatic contacts, trade and foreign investment, arms sales and its influence in the 
United Nations and in terms of its relations with France and Russia’ (Yetiv and Chunlong 
2007 p. 201). China, moreover, is not interested in becoming heavily involved in the 
Middle East’s critical issues and realizes that cooperation rather than competition with 
the US is vital to protecting its energy interest (Pant 2008). 
 
Saudi Arabia retains its close link with its biggest supplier of arms (the US) and ‘...China 
has done nothing to…divert Saudi Arabia from this course’ (Pant 2008 p. 5). The 
Kingdom largely depends on military equipment from foreign countries, and the US 
remains one of its major arms suppliers. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme 
has been established, and this allows the Kingdom to buy military hardware from the US 
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without bureaucratic delays. As a traditional ally of the US, the Kingdom has been a 
location for US military troops since 1979. Their numbers were increasing due to a series 
of wars in the Gulf. In September 2003, however, almost all of these troops redeployed in 
Al Udeid Air Base in Doha, Qatar. Only a few hundred US training personnel still remain 
in the Kingdom (Business Monitor International Ltd. 2008). The arms relationship, 
nonetheless, has become stronger. 
 
In brief, the strong relations between China and Saudi Arabia pose no threat to US-Saudi 
relations. 
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